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- From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
- Subject: Re: Searle on animal consciousness
- Message-ID: <1993Jan27.022533.18935@psych.toronto.edu>
- Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
- References: <1993Jan26.033139.17612@psych.toronto.edu> <1993Jan26.154911.1421@unocal.com> <26JAN199314064356@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu>
- Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 02:25:33 GMT
- Lines: 20
-
- In article <26JAN199314064356@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu> mcgeege@ctrvx1.vanderbilt.edu (MCGEEGE) writes:
- > You won't
- >read anything about the really interesting arguments about consciousness and
- >mind, like those by Levinas, Derrida, James, Zaner, Rollo May, etc., here,
- >because there is no interest in the FELT problem of mind/body/consciousness.
-
- You're wrong. Read Searle. He's not a phenomenologist, but he is specifically
- interested in the essential *subjectivity* of consciousness.
-
- >Here, in American Philosophy of the 21st C, it is a big professional crossword
- >puzzle for your amusement. End of diatribe.
- >
- Read first. Diatribe after.
-
-
- --
- Christopher D. Green christo@psych.toronto.edu
- Psychology Department cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
- University of Toronto
- Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
-