NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/comp/ai/philosop/7380

Internet Message Format | 1993-01-24 | 3.6 KB

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From: [e-mail] (Damien P. Neil)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Searle on animal consciousness
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 1993 03:34:32 GMT
Organization: Case Western Reserve University
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In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Christopher Green) writes:
>>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
>>>Searle says that "it seems to me a well-attested empirical fact
>>>that dogs are conscious."  [The Rediscovery of the Mind, p.74.]
>>>I haven't read much about animal consciousness, and I would
>>>be interested to hear the opinions of various philosophers on
>>>the topic.  Is it as uncontroversial as Searle implies?
>>
>>I very much doubt it. My freshman philosophy teacher maintained that humans
>>are the only self-aware creatures on the planet, and that we perceive
>>conciousness in animals because we tend to judge all things by ourselves.
>>
>You've made a standard confusion. Let's not get the whole discussion
>confused about it. Consciousness is not the same a self-consciousess
>(or "reflective consciousness"). Mammals are seemingly quite aware
>of their environments (see the "pain" posting of another poster).
>This makes them consciousness. Whether they are aware of themselves
>(as conscious agents, not just as other objects in the world) is
>a whole other question. The opinion of your "freshman philosophy teacher"
>does not count as an argument in any case. You also used the terms
>"perceive" and "judge" in vary imprecise ways.

I was not arguing that animals are not concious. I was saying that I do not
think of this as an uncontroversial subject. I disagree with my professor's
opinion -- as I went on to say in my original post, I feel that the evidence
that my cat is concious is as convincing as the evidence that any human you
care to point to is concious.

I am also aware that I was imprecise in stating that particular argument
against the conciousness of animals. I do not find the argument interesting
or compelling, and so I did not feel like spending the time on phrasing it
in a clear and precise fashion.

My personal opinion is that there is no current way to _prove_ that any
particular organism is concious or unconcious. Therefore, the best policy is
to assume that anything that _acts_ concious (i.e. conforms to our views of
our own conciousness), _is_ concious. I have seen my cat appear to express
happiness, desire, fear, and other emotions. Therefore, while it is possible
that my cat is no more concious that my computer, I assume that it is in
fact concious.

I find it more interesting to think about creatures like ants, or oysters.
At what point does conciousness creap in? Douglas Hofstadter, in his book
_Godel, Escher, Bach_, comes up with the interesting thought that an anthill
might (theoretically) be concious, while the ants are not -- the individual
ants would act as an analogue for neurons in the brain.

This post ended up a bit longer than I intended. Oh well... I like
discussions like this.
-----
Damien Neil   [e-mail]    "Until somebody debugs reality, the best
Case Western Reserve University    I can do is a quick patch here and there."
CMPS/EEAP double majoring masochist               - Erik Green