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- From: sulkom@ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu (Mark Sulkowski)
- Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism
- Subject: Re: Evidence for the market
- Message-ID: <C1HuL7.2uD@acsu.buffalo.edu>
- Date: 27 Jan 93 03:50:00 GMT
- References: <C1AMsv.G6K@undergrad.math.waterloo.edu> <1993Jan23.210811.1399@netcom.com> <C1Ft7t.Gn6@acsu.buffalo.edu> <1993Jan26.185439.5786@netcom.com>
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- In article <1993Jan26.185439.5786@netcom.com>, abell@netcom.com (Steven T. Abell) writes...
- >Well, it's kind of subtle, and you have to read *all* of what I said.
- >
- >If you'll reread my posting, you'll see I said "service to individuals",
- >that is, service to those who benefit directly from what they are paying for.
- >Medical care is a good example. The benefits of national defense are diffuse
- >and hard to measure in terms of individuals, even when those benefits are
- >large.
-
- That's true. The benefits of defense are hard to measure.
-
-
- >Defense of a country against an external enemy is not something that can
- >be carried out by individuals until the enemy has successfully invaded.
-
- Hmmm. Consider a defense employee looking at satellite photos
- for signs of potential enemy troop movements. Isn't that defense as
- much as firing missles? But I suppose you mean that we cannot evaluate
- how well the job is being done until an actual invasion attempt.
-
-
- >External defense doesn't provide anything that enhances life under what we
- >like to think of as normal circumstances (fails constructiveness test).
-
- Are you saying that if defense does not enhance our lives, it
- is impossible to measure its value? Can't we just compare the value
- of what we have to the value of the worst case scenario based on a
- rational evaluation of the danger of foreign countries? (i.e. if the
- country next door becomes aggressive and dangerous, give more money
- to defense.)
-
-
- >And while defense can help maintain quality of life, there's no feedback
- >channel to maintain quality of service during peacetime because the system
- >isn't being tested in a way that individuals can immediately perceive (fails
- >service-to-individuals test). Because of these two non-features, rational
- >people don't build private markets in external defense.
-
- Hmmm. I suppose all of your argumentation shows that rational
- individuals do not build competitive markets in defense in the same
- sense that they build markets in butter. It would be difficult to
- choose between defense company A and defense company B because there
- would be little opportunity to find out which was the more effective
- company in practice. However, it would be easy to choose between two
- different brands of butter because they could be sampled immediately
- after sale and the customer would buy her favorite brand from then on.
-
- However, let me propose the following.
-
- 1) Rational individuals realize the need for defense.
-
- 2) In the absense of government defense, which may be rejected
- out of a distrust for it, rational individuals will choose
- instead to create private alternatives which are funded in
- a purely voluntary fashion.
-
- 3) Rational individuals will accept your point that the
- efficacy of such institutions will be very difficult to
- measure, and so the market may not work as well as markets
- for other goods.
-
- 4) However, these rational individuals are determined to
- make this system work as well as it can.
-
- 5) Since defense is a public good and its benefits cannot
- be withheld from non-customers, this makes it impossible
- for it to be fee-funded, it would have to be donation-funded.
-
- 6) These rational individuals are presented with two
- problems.
-
- a) Deciding which defense company(ies) to support.
-
- b) Deciding how much money to give.
-
- 7) These are no small problems. The question becomes: is
- there any information rational individuals can gather in
- order to make such decisions?
-
- While it may be impossible to have a completely accurate
- impression of the true defensive value of certain companies, perhaps
- it IS possible to make a good GUESS.
-
- Perhaps you know someone who works at one of the companies.
- You could ask that person questions about the goings-on there.
- Are the people trustworthy? Are they dependable? In your estimation,
- what is the effectiveness of your company? What sorts of military
- action are you prepared for? What defense tactics do you have planned?
- Do your troops practice regularly? Are your instructors good?
-
- Companies could be evaluated by "Consumer Reports" type
- watchdog companies, which might ask similar questions. They won't
- have perfect information regarding defense effectiveness, but they
- could try to estimate it as well as they can.
-
- You could give donations to those companies that, in your
- estimation, made the best efforts to prepare for invasion in a
- cost effective manner. These donations would be a 'reward' for
- a job well done, and an incentive for further good work.
-
- The size of your donations may be in proportion to your
- confidence in the companies, and also in proportion to your
- estimation of the danger of other militaries. If the country
- next door became aggressive, you might be very willing to give
- a big donation right away. You would also watch to see that
- your donation was actually going to good use.
-
- In conclusion, my point is that perhaps there really IS
- enough information to make sound guesses about defense company
- effectiveness. These guesses are not likely to be as accurate
- as markets for goods where effectiveness is easily determined.
- However imperfect the market for defense may be, it may still
- be implemented and be supported by rational individuals doing
- the best they can in a world of limited information.
-
- BTW, I make these kinds of decisions quite frequently
- in giving donations to libertarian public policy institutes.
- It is often quite difficult to determine how effective they
- really are. Do I give my next donation to CATO or the Reason
- Foundation? How much? I still make these decisions and these
- institutes clearly exist from such funds.
-
- Mark Sulkowski
-