NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #1/NN_1993_1.iso/spool/sci/philosop/tech/4762

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From: [e-mail] (Gary Merrill)
Subject: Re: Which theory before observation ?
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Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1993 20:22:32 GMT
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In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Russell Turpin) writes:

Some (mostly minor) rhetorical points:

|> This objection does not damage the terminology-as-shorthand
|> thesis.  Suppose that "mass" initially means any or all of these

It wasn't intended for this purpose, but merely to illustrate (once
again) the very "shoot from the hip" approach that Schiller has
taken.

|> It is undoubtedly the case that words that refer to observations
|> are potentially ambiguous, even such simple terms as "cat" or
|> "rug." (Thank you, Wittgenstein.)  It strikes me as quite a leap
|> from there to the notion that such terms are theory laden in any
|> significant sense.  When ambiguities arise, they are easily
|> resolved by introducing new terms that express finer
|> distinctions.

Quite a leap indeed.  I am more than a little bit uncomfortable in
appearing to defend the "theory-ladeness of perception" type of thesis
advanced by Campbell, Feyerabend, et al.  I don't buy it, of course.
And one needn't (as you realize) defend this extreme view in pointing
out the inadequacies of Schiller's position.

|> > ...  I wonder this:  Are you in fact familiar with the vast
|> > literature in this area while you choose to reject the well
|> > known criticisms and counterexamples to your views for some
|> > rational reason?  Or are you ignorant of this literature and
|> > simply clinging to your own view based on your "intuition" of
|> > how things are?
|>
|> Perhaps Schiller is waiting for someone who is "familiar with the
|> vast literature" to give a good and interesting criticism before
|> he delves into it.  After all, a "vast literature" has little to
|> recommend it if those who read it, study it, and recommend it are
|> not made the wiser thereby.  (Consider: are you led to reading
|> Rand's essays from the babblings of Objectivists?)

No, but having been a professional philosopher I *did* read Rand's
essays (carefully, I might add).  Since Schiller claimed to be a
"scientist", it seems to me likewise that he *ought* to be familiar
with at least *some* of this (it is hardly the property of philosophers,
and I believe that anyone educated as a genuine scientist must of
necessity have encountered *some* of the issues and arguments).
Quite honestly, at this point it appears to me that Schiller's view
of theories and their role in science (as well as his knowledge
of the history of science) is so naive that I suspect the claim to
being a scientist.  Suppose in response to the naive operationalist
view of Schiller (I won't even call it 'instrumentalist' any more),
I were to raise to *you* the simple question, "If such statements
as we have been considering are *only* shorthand descriptions of
our past experiences, what about the status of nomological
generalizations?"  I believe *you* would know what I meant and
could at least state the problems.

--
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / [phone]
[e-mail] ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm