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- Path: sparky!uunet!usc!cs.utexas.edu!news
- From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
- Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
- Subject: Re: Colours - which theory before observation ?
- Date: 12 Jan 1993 13:20:37 -0600
- Organization: CS Dept, University of Texas at Austin
- Lines: 28
- Message-ID: <ll66g5INNq03@tokio.cs.utexas.edu>
- References: <1993Jan11.210040.497@samba.oit.unc.edu>
- NNTP-Posting-Host: tokio.cs.utexas.edu
-
- -*----
- In article <1993Jan12.152736.16617@samba.oit.unc.edu> Charlie.Creegan@launchpad.unc.edu (Charlie Creegan) writes:
- > CF Wittgenstein on the difficulties inherent in ostensive
- > definition; you have to know what kind of thing is being
- > pointed at before you can know what is being pointed at.
- > Thus a conceptual scheme logically precedes a particular
- > usage. ...
-
- Logically, yes, but not always temporally. When the islander
- points and says "floop," he could be giving the word for
- "finger," or "points," or that to which he points, or several
- other things. So the stranded sailor makes a guess at a
- conceptual scheme. If the guess is right, further dependent
- communication becomes possible; if it is wrong, the two remain
- confused by later interactions and try yet again. Undoubtedly,
- the ability to guess at and try conceptual schemas is part of
- what we are able to do and part of what is required to learn
- language. It may even be that there is some innate preference to
- some conceptual schemas over others. But sometimes the knowledge
- that we have guessed the right one comes after its use.
-
- > ... Wittgenstein probably rolls in his grave at having this
- > called or assimilated to "theory" ...
-
- I'm still choking on that one.
-
- Russell
-
-