home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- From: Owen.Lewis@purplet.demon.co.uk (Owen Lewis)
- Path: sparky!uunet!pipex!demon!purplet!Owen.Lewis
- Subject: Re: DES (Was: Re: 800MHz
- Organization: FidoNet node 2:252/305 - The Purple Tentacle, Reading
- Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 01:33:00 +0000
- Message-ID: <31.2B4F51F3@purplet.demon.co.uk>
- Sender: usenet@demon.co.uk
- Lines: 33
-
- -=> Quoting Steven Bellovin to All <=-
-
- Govt use of DES
-
- SB> Definitely not in the U.S.
-
- > ..... claim that the cost to the US taxpayer for breaking each DES
- > ciphertext is $56. ...
-
- SB> These appear to be Diffie and Hellman's numbers. .......each solution
- SB> would cost $50.
-
- SB> I don't think that that projection has held up.....
-
- SB> ..... conclusion -- and I agree with it -- is that straight DES is
- SB> probably still useful for protecting individual sessions, but is not
- SB> suitable for encrypting keys. ...... suggest using triple encryption for
- SB> key distribution.
-
- My thanks to Steve for the informative post. I admit to being interested
- in the arguement posted in this news group, more than once, that multiple
- encryption with DES - or keylengths more that 56 bits - do not actually
- improve resistance to cryptanalysis. I don't have the ability to prove
- this mathemetically one way or the other but I wonder if searching
- the ciphertexts for identifiable patterns, where the encryption is of short, selected
- and repetitive plaintexts and using various multiples of encryption rounds,
- might be an interesting exercise. If only there was time follow up all one
- found interesting.
-
-
-
- ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.11
-
-