NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/philosop/misc/2572

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From: [e-mail] (Randall Holmes)
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
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Date: Mon, 23 Nov 1992 16:57:35 GMT
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In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (David Spurrett) writes:
>In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>In article <[e-mail]>
>>[e-mail] (David Spurrett) writes:
>
>(1)
>>>(1) In article <[e-mail]>,
>>>[e-mail] (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>>>
>>>> I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
>>>> chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
>>>> incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
>>>> correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
>>>> that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
>>>> sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
>>>> [.....]
>>>
>>>I disagree fundamentally. Certainly there are many senses of possibility, but
>>>the sense relevant to `free will' is not what is sometimes called `epistemic'
>>>possibility, as suggested by Holmes.
>>
>>But surely Randall's "free will" is all that you can ask for.  After
>>all you cannot know that which you cannot know.  There is no way of
>>determining if there is any other type of free will.
>
>--------------->
>Surely?  WHY?  I see no point in responding to dollops of positivist
>cant which are not dignified with even token arguments.  I am attempt-
>ing to initiate a conceptual investigation into the tenability of a
>non-deterministic account of causation.  This follows from an analysis
>of the doctrine of `free will' and determinism, and takes place in the
>light of an explicitly realist position which says, in essence, that I
>think the question about `free will' to be as much scientific as
>philosophical.  Crystal-hugging attempts to `plug' free will into
>violations of the laws of physics, or inept interpretations of QM are
>all rejected at the outset.  All of this is conducted through
_arguments_.

>
>Which is the bit which bothers you?  And `surely' in a philosophy
>group it would be good form to say _why_?
>
>                              ---oOo---
>(2)
>>>This is, perhaps, well illustrated by
>>>looking at the way we deal with attributions of responsibility.  If I believe
>>>of a person who stole my watch that that person _thought_ s/he could have
>>>chosen not to take the watch, but was in fact mistaken then I cannot con-
>>>sistently hold him/her responsible.
>>
>>This argument is surely irrelevant.  Randall was not talking about belief
>>but about knowledge.  In other words, the situation is that as far as
>>the thief knew, he had the free will not to steal your watch, and as
>>far as you know he had that same free will.
>
>--------------->
>(i)
>How can the thief have free will `as far as I know' when part of my
>`knowledge' is determinism?

That you know that events are determined has nothing to do with
whether you know what the events will be.  Determinism says that _if_
you know the initial conditions and the laws, you will be able to
predict what will happen.  But your knowledge of either is incomplete.
Moreover, eve a perfect knowledge of the laws and the conditions is
not quite all that is needed; there is the question of computing
resources.  The thief has free will, because he decided to do what he
did; he was not coerced.


  When two items in our knowledge have dif-
>ferent implications about the `same' thing, then we cannot cheerfully
>continue to believe both _if_ we are concerned with truth.

Explain how my belief that the weather tomorrow is determined by
physical law and my accurate belief that I do not know what the
weather will be tomorrow are incompatible.

  I remember
>you claiming (in your posting <[e-mail]> in
>the `FREE WILL 1' thread) that the only reason for holding to a prin-
>ciple of non-contradiction was `religous belief.'  I followed up in
>detail, and asked a number of questions on this point none of which
>you seem to have replied to.
>
>(ii)
>If I have a car, but do not understand the engine, then (even though I
>believe in determinism) in terms of the view you defend above, I would
>have to regard my car as _free_ to breakdown, and would be justified
>in holding it responsible for my getting to a meeting late.  Ho Hum.

This is rather disingenuous.  The behaviour of the car will not be
affected by your holding it responsible; the behaviour of an
intelligent being can be so affected.

>
>                              ---oOo---
>(3)
>>Thus, based on everything
>>you know, you should hold him responsible.  But if in some interpretation
>>of how the universe works it happens that the thief was not free, then
>>in that same interpretation you yourself are not free to decide not to
>>hold him responsible either.  To put it in other terms, your ability to
>>choose whether to hold him responsible is itself the evidence you need
>>to conclude that he was responsible.
>
>--------------->
>(i) The point about `everything you know' made above applies here.
>
>(ii) Your last sentence surely involves conflict with the rest of your
>posting.  You talk about what my `ability to choose' proves, which makes
>sense to me as a statement on its own, but when looked at in the light of
>the rest of your posting seems to contradict your claim that we cannot in
>fact choose, but that incomplete knowledge lets us think we can.

I won't take responsibility for the intervening poster, but I will say
for myself that we _do_ choose; but our actions of choice are caused,
to the same degree as everything else.  What makes them choices is not
that they are uncaused; it is that their proximate cause is our own
thoughts and desires.


>
>                              ---oOo---
>
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
>| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
>| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
>| email: [e-mail]      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
>o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o


--
The opinions expressed        |     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"    |     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person        |     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.            |     [e-mail]