NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/philosop/misc/2554

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From: [e-mail] (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: FREE WILL 2: Neither a Determinist nor an Indeterminist be.
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 21 Nov 92 16:22:49 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.54.722362969
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In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <[e-mail]>
>[e-mail] (David Spurrett) writes:

(1)
>>(1) In article <[e-mail]>,
>>[e-mail] (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>>
>>> I agree with Spurrett that "free will" involves the notion that one
>>> chooses an action and could have chosen otherwise.  But this is not
>>> incompatible with determinism if one chooses the sense of possibility
>>> correctly.  The sense in which the agent could have acted otherwise is
>>> that _so far as he knows_ he could have acted otherwise.  This makes
>>> sense in a deterministic universe because of incomplete information.
>>> [.....]
>>
>>I disagree fundamentally. Certainly there are many senses of possibility, but
>>the sense relevant to `free will' is not what is sometimes called `epistemic'
>>possibility, as suggested by Holmes.
>
>But surely Randall's "free will" is all that you can ask for.  After
>all you cannot know that which you cannot know.  There is no way of
>determining if there is any other type of free will.

--------------->
Surely?  WHY?  I see no point in responding to dollops of positivist
cant which are not dignified with even token arguments.  I am attempt-
ing to initiate a conceptual investigation into the tenability of a
non-deterministic account of causation.  This follows from an analysis
of the doctrine of `free will' and determinism, and takes place in the
light of an explicitly realist position which says, in essence, that I
think the question about `free will' to be as much scientific as
philosophical.  Crystal-hugging attempts to `plug' free will into
violations of the laws of physics, or inept interpretations of QM are
all rejected at the outset.  All of this is conducted through _arguments_.

Which is the bit which bothers you?  And `surely' in a philosophy
group it would be good form to say _why_?

                              ---oOo---
(2)
>>This is, perhaps, well illustrated by
>>looking at the way we deal with attributions of responsibility.  If I believe
>>of a person who stole my watch that that person _thought_ s/he could have
>>chosen not to take the watch, but was in fact mistaken then I cannot con-
>>sistently hold him/her responsible.
>
>This argument is surely irrelevant.  Randall was not talking about belief
>but about knowledge.  In other words, the situation is that as far as
>the thief knew, he had the free will not to steal your watch, and as
>far as you know he had that same free will.

--------------->
(i)
How can the thief have free will `as far as I know' when part of my
`knowledge' is determinism?  When two items in our knowledge have dif-
ferent implications about the `same' thing, then we cannot cheerfully
continue to believe both _if_ we are concerned with truth.  I remember
you claiming (in your posting <[e-mail]> in
the `FREE WILL 1' thread) that the only reason for holding to a prin-
ciple of non-contradiction was `religous belief.'  I followed up in
detail, and asked a number of questions on this point none of which
you seem to have replied to.

(ii)
If I have a car, but do not understand the engine, then (even though I
believe in determinism) in terms of the view you defend above, I would
have to regard my car as _free_ to breakdown, and would be justified
in holding it responsible for my getting to a meeting late.  Ho Hum.

                              ---oOo---
(3)
>Thus, based on everything
>you know, you should hold him responsible.  But if in some interpretation
>of how the universe works it happens that the thief was not free, then
>in that same interpretation you yourself are not free to decide not to
>hold him responsible either.  To put it in other terms, your ability to
>choose whether to hold him responsible is itself the evidence you need
>to conclude that he was responsible.

--------------->
(i) The point about `everything you know' made above applies here.

(ii) Your last sentence surely involves conflict with the rest of your
posting.  You talk about what my `ability to choose' proves, which makes
sense to me as a statement on its own, but when looked at in the light of
the rest of your posting seems to contradict your claim that we cannot in
fact choose, but that incomplete knowledge lets us think we can.

                              ---oOo---

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: [e-mail]      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
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