NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/talk/philosop/misc/2516

Internet Message Format | 1992-11-17 | 8.5 KB

Xref: sparky talk.philosophy.misc:2516 sci.philosophy.tech:4156
Path: sparky!uunet!ogicse!psgrain!ee.und.ac.za!shrike.und.ac.za!pc18.superbowl.und.ac.za!spurrett
From: [e-mail] (David Spurrett)
Newsgroups: talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: FREE WILL 3: Observability (was Re: FREE WILL 2)
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 18 Nov 92 07:59:18 GMT
Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.49.722073557
References: <[e-mail]>
Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
Lines: 152
NNTP-Posting-Host: pc18.superbowl.und.ac.za


SUMMARY:  A question which has arisen in this, and related threads, as
well as in email exchanges on the side, is that of the observability
status of `free will.'  I argue that there is a real, differenct be-
tween a series of events involving `free will' and one which is either
determined or random, and that the difference has empirical con-
sequences.

                              ---oOo---

Highlights from the `empiricst' line:

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail]
(Randall Holmes) writes:
> I am
> arguing that the actual physical facts of indeterminism/determinism
> are _irrelevant_ to our free will.  Our free will and responsibility
> is relative to our state of knowledge; pure determinism would indicate
> that we were not responsible for our actions relative to God (say) but
> it would not change our position relative to each other.

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Neil
Rickert) writes:
> The point here is that there may be no distinction between "our free
> will" and "our impression of free will".  That is to say, if you wish
> to make the distinction, you must posit a view from outside our universe
> which can see the "true situation".  But if there is such an externally
> viewable truth we shall never see it.  That is, there is no experiment
> you can perform within our universe which will distinguish between an
> apparent free will and an actually externally visible free will.  If
> the knowledge of such a view of externally visible free will is forever
> denied to us, then in what sense is it reasonable to pretend that such
> a view even makes legitimate sense?

Laurence Edwards:  (These extracts are from different postings)

>Seems like a contradiction in terms to me ... either you can precisely predict
>the future or you can't. If you can, then as far as you are concerned
>the universe is deterministic, if you can't then it is non-deterministic.

>Here I meant on close examination of the intuitive notion of free will
>not on close examination of human being ... e.g. how do you experimentally
>distinguish between some entity that makes decisions on the basis of
>"free will" and one that makes decisions based on random events?

>A deterministic system is predictable ... if a system is not predictable to
>an observer then from the observers point of view it is non-deterministic.

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Neil
Rickert) writes:

>You are confusing determinism with predictability.  In order for something
>such as the weather to be predictable, you need (a) an adequate degree
>of determinism, and (b) sufficient data about the initial conditions
>which determine the resulting effects.  With phenomena such as weather
>it is surely (b) which fails, so it does not provide any good evidence
>for or against determinism.

                              ---oOo---

[In  what  follows  here  I  am  heavily  indebted to Roy Bhaskar's "A
Realist Theory of Science."   Bhaskar does not directly discuss  `free
will' in  this work,  but his  arguments about  science, evidence  and
reality are deeply relevant.]

(1) DETERMINISM & PREDICTABILITY:

  In order  to get anywhere on  this we need to  look at what sort  of
reasons we would want before saying of a system (or model) that it was
either predictable or deterministic.

  In the case of  predictability we would probably be willing  to call
something `predictable' if our theory was robustly successful, and had
been reasonably  well tested.   Insofar  as the  mechanics goes we can
probably all agree  that the path  of a body  of known mass  thrown in
specified circumstances is predictable.

  With determinism  there are _two_ possible  (good) reasons.  (i)  is
predictability.   _Whatever_ I  think about  QM, I  would probably say
that as quantified  and described in  a good mechanical  theory, there
are situations in which macroscopic objects behave  deterministically.
I would  do this  on the  basis of  the existence  of good  predictive
models.  There is  another reason.  (ii)  is `understanding'.  When  a
system is made up of a number  of parts each of which in certain  cir-
cumstances I can get to behave predictably/deterministically, it seems
sane enough to  suppose that the  same relationsips are  at work, even
where the interaction does not result in any visible predictability or
even  regularity.    An  example  would  be the driven double pendulum
studied by chaologists.  Here even where our scientific work tells  us
that there is not even predictability _in_principle_ we still (I think
correctly) believe that there is determinism.

  If I may digress briefly (ii) above is the essential practice of ex-
perimental science:  To constrain  the world in order to  create regu-
larities which enable  us to identify  connections which we  regard as
applying even where  _no_ regularities are  observable.  To  deny this
would be  equivalent to holding  that the laws of nature do  not apply
outside the lab, which is as pathetic as some alleged psychics' claims
that _their_ effects mysteriously don't work _inside_.

  This means that simple non-predictability is not an adequate  reason
to  abandon  determinism.    [QM  raises  the  possibility of true in-
determinism as a result of considerations arising from its interpreta-
tion, which is potentially an adequate reason.]

(2) THE REAL THINGS

  Having made that point, it follows that the object of science is not
primarily the various sequences of events which are represented in our
experiences.  The object of  science is the `causal mechanisms'  which
give rise  to the  events, but  which (otherwise  experiments would be
pointless) are not `in phase' with  them.  In this case science  is at
least in part  concerned with the  _sources_ of the  causes, which are
the things of which the world is  made.  It is the causal activity  of
the things which gives rise to the events which we can experience.

(3) `FREE WILL'

  Having said all that, what about free will?  Firstly I would want to
say that an agent is a `thing' in the sense mentioned above.  Further:
that an agent is a thing with causal powers.  This agent or `self'  is
what I was proposing as the immanent causer in my initial posting.  It
is a defining feature of an agent that s/he is self-conscious.

  Looking directly at the issue of `what difference' it would make for
an act to be  caused by an agent,  and to be random,  the most obvious
point is that the  two would not be  the same in the  consciousness of
the agent.  (Just  as  deliberately kicking  my dog is different  from
kicking it when  somebody taps my  knee with a  little rubber hammer.)
If I _am_ the  cause then I would  probably know it.   Unconscious mo-
tives may be  identified in psychotherapy  sometimes, and if  we get a
few good cases it is (as with the experimental case) enough to justify
belief that _some_ of  the time acts which  we do not bother  to study
are caused by the  agents.  (I don't  want to get into  responsibility
here, it will obscure the issue.)

  Also an  act (as opposed to  a random event) will  have a meaningful
relationship with its  environment in space  and time.   Any theory of
`free will' which has the  conseqence that human lives will  no longer
be narratively comprehensible can be  thrown out on that basis  alone.
In other words agents with `free will' make _sense_ enough of the time
for randomness to be evidently _not_ the explanation for the series of
events arising from their acts.

  I  don't want to  labour the point  needlessly here, so  will say no
more until the cries of `Huh?' `Balderdash!' and `Lies!' come in.

o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
| David Spurrett, Department of Philosophy |  `I have seen the truth, and |
| University of Natal, Durban              |   it makes no sense.'        |
| email: [e-mail]      |              - OFFICIAL!     |
o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o