NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/sci/space/shuttle/2773

Internet Message Format | 1992-11-18 | 7.2 KB

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Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle,sci.space
Path: sparky!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!caen!umeecs!umn.edu!csus.edu!netcom.com!hage
From: [e-mail] (Carl Hage)
Subject: Re: Shuttle replacement
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Organization: Various Places
References: <[e-mail]>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 1992 07:33:40 GMT
Lines: 135

[e-mail] (Dr. Norman J. LaFave) writes:
: By the way, I am in the process of trying to convince Gore to back the
: SSTO
: and NASP programs as well as the SEI program. Any ideas you could provide
: would be appreciated.

From a prior post:

                    STATEMENT BY SENATOR AL GORE
                     Goddard Space Flight Center
                       Monday, October 19, 1992
...
      Probably one of the most critical issues facing the space
 program today is the need to reduce the cost of launching payloads,
 whether they be military, scientific, or commercial satellites.  Our
 only existing choices are the Space Shuttle, which currently costs
 more than $4 billion a year to operate, and decades-old technology in
 our fleet of expendable launch vehicles.  The urgency of this problem
 is readily apparent to everyone associated with the U.S. space
 program.
...
      In their own right, each of these systems may have some merit,
 even given the fact that the Space Plane and the Single Stage
 Technology program may provide significant benefits only in the
 long-term future.  But, trying to fund all three in the current
 budget environment is ridiculous.
...
 However, Quayle's National Space
 Council let politics determine how the NLS program would be
 structured.  Rather than tailoring the program to suit realistic
 launch needs of either NASA, the military, or the commercial launch
 industry, the Council made a politically expedient decision.
...
    However, any decision to develop the next generation
 of launch vehicles must be based on cost-effective criteria with a
 clear concept of mission requirements in mind.
...

Although Gore was flamed here for this speech, it would seem to me that he
could be a very strong supporter of SSTO. To convince him and the others
in Washington to support SSTO, they need to believe:
    1. DC-X/Y/1 will provide dramatically lower launch costs.
    2. There is a clear concept of mission requirements in mind.
    3. Benifits will not be "in the long-term future".
    4. The SSTO program is well managed.
    5. SSTO development costs will not be extraordinarily high.
    6. SSTO deserves a higher priority than the alternatives.

As to point 1, there has been significant discussion on the net as to the
potential of lower costs. Since probably everyone would agree that
reducing launch costs is the most critical issue facing the space program,
what will be needed will be making a credible argument. Since SSTO has been
part of SDI, there is probably a built-in bias against credibility.
Development of DC-X has been relatively low cost, but can you convince
everyone that DC-1 will be cheap? Are the cost predictions realistic?
(BTW: I wasn't sure about the engines for DC-1. In scaling up, are
more engines added or larger engines added? If larger, does that mean
using SSME type engines or a whole new design?)

[e-mail] (Allen W. Sherzer) writes:
: At $1 to $10 million per flight it will be a lot cheaper. Just the
: expendable for a HL20 will be over ten times this amount.
:
: This BTW is a source of trouble for SSTO.

A source of trouble? HL20 won't win any arguments claiming to be better
because it's more expensive. They might win if SSTO is making exagerated
claims though. Of course, as Gore said, "trying to fund all [alternatives]
in the current budget environment is ridiculous", so every project is
going to have to compete for it's existence.

Claims of $1M or even $10M launch costs seem too low to be believable.
Since the claims for the Space Shuttle, nuclear power (too cheap to meter),
etc. were very wrong in the past figures like this are taken with a
great deal of skepticism. Does your info kit offer clear and complete
information that will convince a skeptic?

For point 2, lower cost and somewhat lighter payloads meets the bulk
of launch requirements.

For point 3, there seems to be a particular timetable in mind for
producing DC-X/Y/1. How does that timetable compare with the alternatives?
It seems to me that the idea of building a cheap scale prototype (DC-X)
and developing the technology on that is a good idea for a number of
reasons. I would think the total project cost would be lower and the
time to get the final working system would even be lower. Also this
would provide a better opportunity to manage the program with more short
term goals/milestones. I would guess that DC-X will uncover problems that
will delay DC-Y/1, but the delays and extra cost will be less than the
delays and cost overruns from building DC-1 directly.

The unknowns in the timetable probably relate to developing new technologies
to address problems which have not yet been solved. What are the major
new technologies which need to be developed by DC-X and DC-Y?

On point 4, we haven't had an opportunity on the net to find out how well the
project is managed. Conceputally, as stated above, the idea of scaling up
seems like a plus and allows funding to be contingent on success. However,
I don't understand the GAO (?) report which was critical of the project.
How about summarizing the objections given in the report with a response.
Technically, it seems that DC-X makes a lot of sense. If the project is
mismanaged, then maybe some changes need to be made. Could we have some
discussion on this here?

On point 5, the development costs should be less than the alternatives
proposed, at least from what I get from the discussions here. We don't
know the costs on DC-Y/1, but fixing the problems on DC-X will be a lot
cheaper than it would be if we built DC-1 first. Are there some ballpark
estimates for total costs to develop DC-1?

If points 1-5 are true, then point 6 is obvious. One could say that
none of 1-5 are true for the alternatives. I fail to understand why
NASA, etc. isn't enthusiastic about SSTO. I won't buy that the reason
is bureaucracy, or it is an "outside" project. It must be that are not
convinced of points 1-5.

Oh, I forgot one other point.
    7. The chance of success is high

It seems like it is a matter of a few simple calculations to show that
it is theoretically possible/impossible given some basic assumptions
about current rocket technology like, weight, engine efficiency, fuel
weight, etc. Presumably you have shown that it is possible.

What are the areas in which others might conclude that there is an
unsolved problem which presents a significant risk to the success of the
project? The NASP needs to have an engine developed, and this is not a
simple matter of engineering a design. Are there similar sorts of problems
with DC-Y? It seems like from the discussions, that DC-X didn't require
basic research projects, and is mainly a matter of engineering to put
together existing technology to build a prototype.

If there are arguments against SSTO because of risk associated with an
unsolved problem, then perhaps discussing these arguments and possible
solutions will reduce peoples perceptions of risk.