NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/sci/military/11092

Text File | 1992-11-15 | 7.4 KB | 138 lines

Newsgroups: sci.military
Path: sparky!uunet!psinntp!ncrlnk!ciss!law7!military
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: Joint Commands vs General Staffs
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Sender: [e-mail] (Sci.Military Login)
Organization: University of Alaska Fairbanks
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1992 17:39:40 GMT
Approved: [e-mail]
Lines: 125


From [e-mail]

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Lawrence Crowl) writes:
> In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] writes:
>>[In the Grenada invasion] I fully believe that those two Marine companies
>>could have secured the entire island on their own, without airborne/ranger
>>battalions(!) dropping from the sky.
>
> Yes, but in how long?  Landing at the beach and driving to the center
> will be slower than dropping in on the center.  By its very nature, the
> deliberate unstoppable amphibious assault was not what the situation
> called for.

The Marines advanced much faster than the airborne did.  Grenada is a small
island, and would have been secured in a few days, about as long as it took
with the joint attack.  Remember that the airborne assault was held up at
Salinas by the APCs- preventing the air assault landings of the Ranger BNs.  So
during the time that the airfield wasn't secure, there was no effective
advance by the airborne operations.  Assuming that there was no landing on the
southern end of the island, Grenadan/Cuban forces concentrated on the airfield
would have forced another paradrop to relieve the first attack - a case
of lightly armed paratroopers coming to the rescue of lightly armed
paratroopers, which might have worked, or might not have.  In any case, it
would have delayed securing the island.

The amphibious assault had integral airsupport and anti-armor capability that
would have been present whether or not the airborne were there, and with the
AAVs they were mechanized to boot.  None of the Grenadan/Cuban forces on the
island were capable of standing up to a MEU (or MAU at the time) that still
maintained a third of it's forces in reserve (that could easily have landed in
a flanking position if necessary).

>
>>By definition, island campaigns are Navy/Marine `turf' and it was the
>>Army who really didn't belong there.
>
> If you say amphibious assaults are Navy/Marine `turf', I'll agree.
> However, a parachute drop by the army may be appropriate even when the
> landing zone is on an island.  (This does not excuse the fact that
> neither air drop had the equipment to take out an APC.)  This "island
> implies marines" thinking is a product of not having officers whose
> job is to evaluate the need for different services on a case-by-case
> basis.
>
No, the island is Marine turf idea springs from the fact that a MEU carries
with it a landing force that contains infantry, some armor (especially now that
LAVs are being emphasised by HQMC), attack and transport helicopters, with the
Cobra-W being replaced by Harriers in some cases, some motor transport, and an
integrated command structure.  In addition, NGF (naval gunfire) is available
for accurate pre-landing shore bombardment, and available *on demand* until the
operation has progressed several miles inland.  Usually a MEU will also carry
with it some artillery of it's own that will be in action as soon as the
beach head is secure.  Also, combat supplies for 30 days of operations are
readily available.

Compare this with an airborne assault.  Infantry landed by parachute have no
armor to speak of (sheridans being few and far between, and don't work well in
operations anyway), no motor transport, and air support based wherever their
transport aircraft came from.  This implies that CAS will be on a time delay or
pre-arranged basis for the most part.  With tankers, and attack aircraft
refueling on station, this situation could be remedied somewhat, but pilot
fatigue would then be an issue.  Also, until the Army aquires CAS aircraft and
tankers of it's own, there would be a joint command mucking things up.  The
supply situation would require resupply after 3 to 7 days of operations.

Unless the island being considered is close to a major US base or territory
(like Haiti, Cuba, etc.) then the tactical inflexibility of the paratroopers
far outweighs their strategic flexibility.  An MEU might take longer to get
there, but if you look at operational capabilities on the ground you'll find
that an MEU has greatly expanded capabilities over a like sized or larger
paratrooper force.

Paratroopers are best used to sieze and hold key objectives until a larger
(ground based) force can reach them.  Using them to take and hold an island is
inappropriate in 90% of the cases.  If you look at historical examples, the
German assault on Crete was a skin of the teeth victory, and the only example i
know of for an island being taken mainly by airborne forces.  Most airborne
assaults simply consist of taking a key area, and holding it until the ground
forces relieve the airborne (including Normandy).  Operations such as Crete
(and Dien Bien Phu, Arnhem, IMHO) show that unsupported airborne troops
are generally vulnerable if not relieved promptly, even with air support,
available in all three examples.

This argument relies purely on military considerations, and is not based on a
doctrinal approach that states that the USMC must be the major force involved
in island campaigns.  Rather, since the USMC is organized, equipped, trained
and often pre-positioned aboard ship near a trouble spot, and paratroopers are
not, it's a common sense call.  Use the tool for the job, don't try to make the
airborne into something they're not.  I certainly wouldn't use the Marine Corps
for airborne jobs like taking and holding ground to flank an enemy, unless it
suited to do so, as in Inchon (a rare opportunity).

>>  Luttwak's arguement to the contrary, I have seen various joint exercises in
>>action, and generally, the services cooperate when they have to.  In Saudi
>>Arabia, ...
>
> The problem is not the cooperation when the bullets start flying, but
> cooperation before the action, when this year's budget has more reality
> than next year's possible contingency.
>
Yet in the Grenada example, you are proposing that the forces used should have
been the forces least suited for taking an island.  Military considerations
would have pointed at the MAU in the area to take the operation.  That leaves
political considerations for making the airborne/air assault operations.
Since i've been away for more than a week, and haven't been able to follow
this, i am going to remove myself from the general staff argument.  None of
the arguments presented have changed my opinion, and i don't think they will as
i slowly sift through a week's worth of sci. mil.  However, misuse of military
assets is something i will debate- my own specialty is misused quite a bit by
people who don't look at capabilities closely.  Being both a Marine and a
paratrooper, this example is of particular interest to me.

I have noticed that both the Army's _Military Review_ and the Navy's _Naval
War College Review_ have articles about joint command and joint operations in
their later issues (winter 1992 for NWCR, sometime this summer for MR).



> --
>   Lawrence Crowl        503-737-2554    Computer Science Department

James Zuelow
[e-mail]