NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #27/NN_1992_27.iso/spool/can/politics/9722

Internet Message Format | 1992-11-16 | 6.2 KB

Path: sparky!uunet!utcsri!torn!news.ccs.queensu.ca!qucdn!spraggej
Organization: Queen's University at Kingston
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 1992 09:46:52 EST
From: John G. Spragge <[e-mail]>
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Newsgroups: can.politics
Subject: Re: Senate Interrogation
Distribution: can
References: <[e-mail]> <[e-mail]>
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Lines: 108

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] (Bruce Jonathan
Schuck) says:

>History? You claim production went up *because* of allied bombing of
>Germany. What does that have to do with history?

Ok, first, you are twisting my words. I did not claim production
went up because of the Allied bombing. I accept that the "precision
bombing of bottleneck industrial targets" (the USAAF attempt to
wipe out German ball bearing production) DID come close to success,
and DID hinder German industry. This discussion deals not with air
assault in general, nor with precision strategic bombing, but with
one specific tactic of Bomber command, namely mass bombing of large
cities. And yes, even that tactic did reduce "production"; it did
kill workers and destroy factories. But according to many historians,
but destroying civilian production, it merely made it easier for the
German government to redirect resources into armaments.

Secondly, in a literal answer to your question: it has everything to
do with history. You can not call an idea unhistorical because you do
not find it obvious or ideologically congenial. You expect us to
believe the RAF could knock out factories by dropping bombs within
a few miles of them (I made a mistake about the bombing error Harris
assumed; he expected an error of five miles).

>And so on. The miltary production lost would have gone into offensive
>weapons. And the military production diverted to defensive weaponrey
>would have gone into offensive weapons.

First off: we know that military production continued to rise until
mid 1944, at which time the massive losses on the Eastern front gave
way to a demographic crisis (Hitler started calling up everyone over
fourteen and under fifty). So no drop in production took place that
we can directly attribute to bombing. So when you talk glibly
about the "military production lost", your assertion lacks any
compelling evidence. Secondly, Bomber Command also consumed resources.
We can only speculate on what the British could have accomplished
with those resources, but we must set the cost to Britain (which we
know) against the cost to Germany (which we can only guess at).

>Fine. Learning from history is excellent. Portraying someone as evil,
>such as Harris, because he didn't have those historical lessons is
>grossly unfair.

Unfortunately, the nastiest things I have heard about Harris and his
policies come from the men who flew for him. I have already quoted
from a person I know who flew in the Dresden raid, and I suggest you
look up "Terror in the Starboard Seat".

>My information is that they certainly had the know how, but they
>didn't commit the resources. The Manhattan Project was incredibly
>expensive and required a massive commitment of money and people.

Ok, where does your information come from? I have meticulously
quoted my sources all the way through this thread. Where did
the information that they "certainly had the know how" come from?
My sources tell me they did not have the information necessary.

We do know that when Germany did put resources into advanced technology
such as rockets, jet fighters, and tanks, they succeeded in producing
them.

>Thats not always true. Britain had limited options to do damage to
>Germany. Attacking them by air was one of them. They could have put
>men and resources into the army, bout it wasn't going to be able to
>attack Europe for years. They were capable of air attacks immediately.

Britain landed an expeditionary force in mainland Europe in 1941. The
Germans defeated it handily, because the British did not commit
adequate resources. They might have committed more if they had not
been using the industrial production and soldiers for bomber command.
I don't mention that fact to second-guess the decision; only to make
the point that the British did make it. You have said several times
that the British could only fight the Germans by bombing their cities.
Even if we pretend that North Africa never existed, the British
could and did engage the Germans elsewhere in Europe.

>And, fighting back does wonders for civlian morale. What would British
>military production been if the workers were being bombed by the
>Luftwaffe, and they knew their counterparts in Germany didn't have to
>worry about air attacks.

I think you get more of a morale boost from fighting back successfully.
Besides, the British people had to bear the casualties in bomber
command; their sons died (and got taken prisoner) at a very high
rate. I doubt that did "wonders for morale".

>And you have a bigger problem. You have a nice unsubstantiated theory
>that bombing helped *increase* German military production with no
>evidence offered. Yet, military production increased in countries that
>weren't bombed.

No evidence? I have given my reasoning. I have offered a long list
of sources for my various assertions. You have yet to provide a
single reference.

>But you offer no alternatives except for Britain to have just sat
>there and accepted the pounding. Thats not an alternative.

Not true (again).

As I have said, the British forces did engage the Germans on land
almost continuously between Dunkirk and D-day. Even if you leave
out North Africa (the Eighth army veterans would love to know
their sacrifice counts for nothing with you) the British did
engage the Germans with at least  one expeditionary force in
Europe. The British did have alternatives to inaction that did
not involve bombing German cities.