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- Newsgroups: sci.math
- Path: sparky!uunet!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!galois!zermelo!jbaez
- From: jbaez@zermelo.mit.edu (John C. Baez)
- Subject: Re: You know, the integers (was: Re: Stupid question about FLT)
- Message-ID: <1992Jul21.163533.15492@galois.mit.edu>
- Sender: news@galois.mit.edu
- Nntp-Posting-Host: zermelo
- Organization: MIT Department of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA
- References: <1992Jul21.132554.152734@ns1.cc.lehigh.edu>
- Date: Tue, 21 Jul 92 16:35:33 GMT
- Lines: 53
-
- In article <1992Jul21.132554.152734@ns1.cc.lehigh.edu> fc03@ns1.cc.lehigh.edu (Frederick W. Chapman) writes:
-
- >I can't speak for anyone else, but I find the notion that the
- >consistency of ZFC has not yet been established to be the most
- >singularly disturbing mathematical news to ever reach my ears, given
- >that ZFC is intended to serve as a foundation for the rest of
- >mathematics.
-
- The carefully guarded secret about these "consistency proofs" is that
- for you to believe them you must have faith in the consistency of the
- system in which you are doing the proof. Suppose you could prove
- Con(ZF) in ZF. Well, if you are smart and know Goedel's theorem you
- know you're in deep trouble at this point since ZF must be inconsistent.
- But even if you weren't so smart you could realize that it's still quite
- possible for ZF to be inconsistent, in which case one could prove
- EVERYTHING in ZF, e.g., Con(ZF).
-
- Now consider the propositional calculus. There's a consistency proof
- for it. However, I claim that this proof isn't worth much if what you
- are seeking is reassurance that your ideas on logic aren't screwed up.
- For the reasoning used in the proof of consistency of the propositional
- calculus, while usually left informal, is no more "self-evidently
- consistent" than the propositional calculus itself. It's possible that
- our ideas on logic are somehow very deeply confused and that one day
- someone will come up with a proof of P & not(P) in the propositional
- calculus. Of course, in this case our ideas on logic would be revealed
- to be a bunch of baloney - including our proof of the consistency of the
- propositional calculus.
-
- For a while I was planning on writing a short story entitled "The
- inconsistency of the propositional calculus", that would imagine this
- happening.
-
- I used to crave certainty and this sort of thing bugged me. Now I'm
- fairly used to it -- as well as the fact (which once seemed disturbing)
- that no r.e. set of axioms about the integers will have a unique model
- up to elementary equivalence, and NO set of axioms about the integers
- will have a unique model up to isomorphism. It irritates Torkel when I
- say that this means we're not quite sure what the "real" integers ARE.
- I think the sense in which I mean this was most clearly indicated by my
- game show in which one tried to figure out which mathematician was using
- the real integers and which two were fakes. (What's the name of that
- show, anyway? Truth or Consequences?)
-
- Please don't think I'm losing any sleep over this. I like to think of
- it this way. I have a notion - "the integers" - and I try to capture
- this notion in some axioms and prove some things using the axioms. All
- I get is what I pay for, I should not expect the axioms to answer all possible
- questions, I should not expect the axioms to be categorical, and I
- should not expect to get some sort of guarantee that the axioms are
- consistent, other than the empirical fact that nobody has found an
- inconsistency yet. This may seem tough but it's certainly no worse than
- the rest of life.
-