NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #16/NN_1992_16.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/5249

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From: [e-mail] (dave "who can do? ratmandu!" ratcliffe)
Subject: "Presumed Guilty, How & Why the W.C. Framed Lee Harvey Oswald" [8/11]
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Summary: A factual account based on the Commission's public & private documents
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Keywords: continued endemic denial of our true history consigns us to oblivion
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Organization: Silicon Graphics, Inc.
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1992 16:50:18 GMT
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      7


      Oswald at Window?




      Hard as the Commission tried to make tenable that Oswald carried
      his rifle to work on November 22, it tried even harder to place him
      at the southeast corner window of the Depository's sixth floor, the
      putative source of the shots.  This was the location at which a man
      with a gun had been seen, and to which Oswald had unlimited access.
      In accordance with the official story, Oswald's guilt hinges on
      this one point, he had to have been at the window to have fired
      some or all of the shots.
         The first evidence discussed in this section of the Report
      concerns the fingerprints left by Oswald on two cartons located
      next to the "assassin's" window.  As was noted in chapter 2, the
      Commission used this evidence to place Oswald at the window at some
      time.  In doing this, it read an unfair and improper meaning into
      limited data.  The presence of Oswald's prints on these objects
      indicates {only} that he handled them and does not disclose exactly
      when or {where} he did so.  I noted that Oswald could have touched
      the cartons {prior} to the time they were moved to the southeast
      corner window.  The fingerprints were the only "physical evidence"
      the Commission could offer to relate Oswald to that specific window
      (R140-41).  Since the fingerprint evidence in fact does {not}
      relate Oswald to the window, it is important to note that {no}
      physical evidence placed Oswald at the window at any time.


      {Oswald's Actions Prior to the Shooting}

         On the morning of the assassination, a number of Depository
      employees had been putting down flooring on the sixth floor.  About
      15 minutes before noon, these employees decided to break for lunch.
      Going to the northeast corner of the building, they began to "race"
      the elevators down to the first floor.  On their way down, they
      noticed Oswald standing at the elevator gate on the fifth floor
      (6H349), where he was shouting for an elevator to descend (3H168;
      6H337).
         One of the floor-laying crew, Charles Givens, told the
      Commission that upon returning to the sixth floor at 11:55, to get
      his cigarettes, he saw Oswald on that floor (6H349).  The Report
      attaches great significance to Givens's story by calling it
      "additional testimony linking Oswald with the point from which the
      shots were fired" (R143).  No testimony was needed to link Oswald
      with the sixth floor;  he worked there.  However, the Report adds
      that Givens "was the last known employee to see Oswald inside the
      building prior to the assassination," unfairly precipitating a bias
      against Oswald by implying that he remained where Givens saw him
      for the 35 minutes until the assassination.
         It is necessary to note, although admittedly it is not central
      to Oswald's possible involvement in the shooting, that there are
      many aspects of Givens's story that cast an unfavorable light on
      its veracity.[1]  It seems illogical that Oswald would have gone
      {up} to the sixth floor after yelling for an elevator {down} from
      the fifth;  even at that, such "jumping" between floors is
      consistent with the type of work Oswald did:  order filling.  In
      addition, police Lieutenant Jack Revill and Inspector Herbert
      Sawyer both testified that Givens was taken to city hall on the
      afternoon of the shooting to make a statement about seeing Oswald
      on the sixth floor (5H35-36;  6H321-22).  However, the police radio
      log indicates that Givens was picked up because he had a police
      record (narcotics charges) and was missing from the Depository
      (23H873).  Givens himself told the Commission he was picked up and
      asked to make a statement, but not in reference to having seen
      Oswald (6H355).  Indeed, the affidavit he filed on November 22,
      1963, makes no mention of either his return to the sixth floor or
      his having seen Oswald there (24H210).
         The previous information forms a basis for doubting Givens's
      story.  There is one other consideration that strongly suggests
      this entire episode to be a fabrication:  it was physically
      impossible for Givens to have seen Oswald as he swore he had done.
      From Givens's testimony, it is clear that his position on the sixth
      floor when he claimed to have seen Oswald was somewhere between the
      elevators at the northwest corner of the building to about midway
      between the north and south walls.  Either way, he would have been
      along the far west side of the sixth floor (6H349-50).  However,
      Givens said he observed Oswald walking along the {east} wall of the
      building, walking {away} from the southeast corner in the direction
      of the elevators (6H349-50).  Dallas Police photographs of the
      sixth floor (CEs 725, 726, 727, 728) show that such a view would
      have been obscured by columns and stacks of cartons as high as a
      man.  If Givens saw Oswald, then there {must} be a major flaw in
      his description of the event.  As the record stands, Givens {could
      not} have seen Oswald on the sixth floor at 11:55.
         We should recall that when Oswald was seen on the fifth floor at
      about 11:45, he was shouting for an elevator to take him {down}.
      Apparently this is exactly the course Oswald pursued, if not by
      elevator, then by the stairs.  Bill Shelley was part of the floor-
      laying crew that left the sixth floor around 11:45.  He testified
      unambiguously that after coming down for lunch he saw Oswald on the
      first floor near the telephones (7H390).  Mention of this fact is
      entirely absent from the Report.
         The Commission seized upon Givens's story because, according to
      the Report, he was the last person known to have seen Oswald prior
      to the shots.  The Report strongly implies that Oswald must have
      remained on the sixth floor, since no one subsequently saw him
      elsewhere.  But Oswald was both inconspicuous and generally unknown
      at the Depository;  he always kept to himself.  Likewise, most of
      the other employees had left the building during this time.  It
      would have been unremarkable if no one noticed his presence,
      especially then.  However, if someone {had} noticed Oswald in a
      location other than the sixth floor after 11:55, his story would
      have been all the more important by virtue of Oswald's
      inconspicuousness.
         The Report makes two separate assurances that no one saw Oswald
      after 11:55 and before the shots, first stating "None of the
      Depository employees is known to have seen Oswald again until after
      the shooting" (R143), and later concluding, "Oswald was seen in the
      vicinity of the southeast corner of the sixth floor approximately
      35 minutes before the assassination and no one could be found who
      saw Oswald anywhere else in the building until after the shooting"
      (R156).  A footnote to the first statement lists "CE 1381" as the
      source of information that no employee saw Oswald between 11:55 and
      12:30 that day.
         CE 1381 consists of 73 statements obtained by the FBI from all
      employees present at the Depository on November 22, 1963.  In
      almost every instance, the particular employee is quoted as saying
      he did not see Oswald at the time of the shots.  A few people
      stated they either had never seen Oswald at all or had not seen him
      that day (see 22H632-86).  This collection of statements does not
      support the Report's assertion that no employee saw Oswald between
      11:55 and 12:30, for it almost never addresses that time period,
      usually referring only to 12:30, the time of the shots.
         I have learned that General Counsel Rankin, in requesting these
      statements from the FBI, deliberately sought information relating
      to Oswald's whereabouts at 12:30 {only}, never considering the
      11:55 to 12:30 period.  The Report then falsely and wrongly applied
      this information to the question of Oswald's whereabouts between
      11:55 and 12:30.
         I obtained from the National Archives a letter from J. Lee
      Rankin to Hoover dated March 16, 1964, in which Rankin requested
      that the FBI "obtain a signed statement from each person known to
      have been in the Texas School Book Depository Building on the
      assassination date reflecting the following information:"  Rankin
      then listed six items to be included in each statement:  "1. His
      name . . . [etc.], 2. Where he was at the time the President was
      shot, 3. Was he alone or with someone else. . . ?, 4. If he saw Lee
      Harvey Oswald {at that time?,"}  plus two other pieces of
      information.[2]  Clearly, Rankin desired to know whether any
      employee had seen Oswald {at the time of the shots}.  There is no
      reason to expect that the agents who obtained the statements would
      have sought any further detail, and the final reports reveal that
      indeed none was sought.  Even Hoover, in the letter by which he
      transmitted CE 1381 to the Commission, reported, "Every effort was
      made to comply with your request that six {specific} items be
      incorporated in each statement" (22H632).
         Why did Rankin, when he had the FBI go to such extensive efforts
      in contacting all 73 employees present that day, fail to request
      the added information about the time between 11:55 and 12:30, the
      period that could hold the key to Oswald's innocence had he been
      observed then in a location other than the sixth floor?
         The Commission knew of at least two employees who {had} seen
      Oswald on the first floor between 12:00 and 12:30.  It suppressed
      this information from the Report, lied in saying that no one had
      seen Oswald during this time, and cited an incomplete and
      irrelevant inquiry in support of this drastic misstatement.
         Depository employee Eddie Piper was questioned twice by
      Assistant Counsel Joseph Ball.  During one of his appearances,
      Piper echoed the information he had recorded in an affidavit for
      the Dallas Police on November 23, 1963, namely, that he saw and
      spoke with Oswald on the first floor at 12:00 noon (6H383;
      l9H499).  Piper seemed certain of this, and he was consistent in
      reporting the circumstances around his brief encounter with Oswald.
      Clearly, this is a direct contradiction of the Report's statement
      that no one saw Oswald between 11:55 and 12:30.  The Report, never
      mentioning this vital piece of testimony, calls Piper a "confused
      witness" (R153).  This too was the opposite of the truth.  Piper
      was able to describe events after the shooting in a way that
      closely paralleled the known sequence of events (6H385).  There
      was, in fact, no aspect of Piper's testimony that indicated he was
      less than a credible witness.
         While Piper's having seen Oswald on the first floor at 12:00
      does not preclude Oswald's having been at the window at 12:30, it
      is significant that this information was suppressed from the
      Report, which makes an assertion contrary to the evidence.  One
      aspect of Piper's story could have weighed heavily in Oswald's
      defense.  In his November 23 affidavit, Piper recalled Oswald as
      having said "I'm going up to eat" during the short time the two men
      met (19H499).  In his testimony, Piper modified this quotation,
      expressing his uncertainty whether Oswald had said "up" or "out" to
      eat (6H386).  Despite the confusion over the exact adverb Oswald
      used, the significant observation is that he apparently intended to
      eat at 12:00.  He would most likely have done this on the first
      floor in the "domino" room or in the second-floor lunchroom.
      {Oswald consistently told the police that he had been eating his
      lunch at the time the President was shot} (R600, 613).  The
      suppression of Piper's story was, in effect, the suppression of an
      aspect of Oswald's defense.
         The Commission had other corroborative evidence of a probative
      nature.  Oswald's account of his whereabouts and actions at and
      around the time of the shooting cannot be fully known, for no
      transcripts of his police interrogations were kept--a significant
      departure from the most basic criminal proceedings (see 4H232;
      R200).  Our only information concerning Oswald's interrogation
      sessions during the weekend of the assassination is found in
      contradictory and ambiguous reports written by the various
      participants in the interrogations--police, FBI, and Secret Service
      (R598-636).
         The interrogation reports are generally consistent in relating
      that Oswald said that he had been eating his lunch at the time of
      the shots.  In three of these reports a significant detail is
      added, in three partially contradictory versions.  Captain Fritz
      thought Oswald "said he ate lunch with some of the colored boys who
      worked with him.  One of them was called `Junior' and the other was
      a little short man whose name he didn't know" (R605).  FBI Agent
      James Bookhout wrote that "Oswald had eaten lunch in the lunchroom
      . . . alone, but recalled possibly two Negro employees walking
      through the room during this period.  He stated possibly one of
      these employees was called `Junior' and the other was a short
      individual whose name he could not recall but whom he would be able
      to recognize" (R622).  Secret Service Inspector Thomas Kelley
      recalled that Oswald "Said he ate lunch with the colored boys who
      worked with him.  He described one of them as `Junior,' a colored
      boy, and the other was a little short negro [{sic}] boy" (R626).
         These versions are consistent in reporting that Oswald had been
      eating lunch (probably on the first floor) when he saw or was with
      two Negro employees, one called "Junior," the other a short man.
      It is possible that Oswald was in a lunchroom (the domino room)
      during this time, although we cannot be certain that Oswald
      directly stated so to the police.  Likewise, it is possible that
      Agent Bookhout correctly reported that Oswald ate alone and merely
      observed the two Negro employees, while Fritz and Kelley
      misconstrued Oswald's remarks as indicating that he ate his lunch
      {with} these two men.
         James Jarman was a Negro employed at the Depository;  his
      nickname was "Junior" (3H189;  6H365).  On November 22, Jarman quit
      for lunch at about 11:55, washed up, picked up his sandwich, bought
      a coke, and went to the first floor to eat.  He ate some of his
      lunch along the front windows on the first floor, near two rows of
      bins;  walking alone across the floor toward the domino room, he
      finished his sandwich.  After depositing his refuse, Jarman left
      the building with employees Harold Norman and Danny Arce through
      the main entrance (3H201-2).
         Harold Norman, another Negro employee, was of rather modest
      height, fitting the description of the man Oswald thought had been
      with Jarman on the first floor (see CE 491).  On November 22,
      Norman ate his lunch in the domino room and "got with James Jarman,
      he and I got together on the first floor."  According to Norman,
      Jarman was "somewhere in the vicinity of the telephone" near the
      bins when the two men "got together."  This would define a location
      toward the front of the building.  Norman confirmed Jarman's
      testimony that the two subsequently left the building through the
      main entrance (3H189).
         There is no firm evidence pinpointing the exact time Jarman and
      Norman left the Depository.  Their estimates, as well as those of
      the people who left at the same time or who were already standing
      outside, are not at all precise, apparently because few workers had
      been paying much attention to the time.  The estimates varied from
      12:00 as the earliest time to 12:15 as the latest (see 3H189, 219;
      6H365;  22H638, 662;  24H199, 213, 227).  Twelve o'clock seems a
      bit early for Jarman and Norman to have finished eating and to be
      out on the street;  the time was probably closer to 12:15.  It was
      most likely within five minutes prior to 12:15 that Jarman and
      Norman "got together" near the front or south side of the first
      floor and walked out the main entrance together.
         Jarman and Norman appeared together on the first floor again,
      about ten minutes after stepping outside.  Because the crowds in
      front of the Depository were so large, the two men went up to the
      fifth floor at 12:20 or 12:25.  To do this, they walked around to
      the back of the building, entering on the first floor through the
      rear door and taking the elevator up five stories (3H202).
         Obviously, Oswald could not have told the police that "Junior"
      and a short Negro employee were together on the first floor unless
      he had seen this himself.[3]  For Oswald to have witnessed Jarman
      and Norman in this manner, he had to have been on the first floor
      between either 12:10 and 12:15 or 12:20 and 12:25.  The fact that
      Oswald was able to relate this incident is cogent evidence that he
      was in fact on the first floor at one or both of these times.  If
      he was on the {sixth} floor, as the Commission believes, then it
      was indeed a remarkable coincidence that out of all the employees,
      Oswald picked the two who were on the first floor at the time he
      said, and together as he described.  Since this is a remote
      possibility that warrants little serious consideration, I am
      persuaded to conclude that Oswald was on the first floor at some
      time between 12:10 and 12:25, which is consistent with the
      previously cited testimony of Eddie Piper.[4]
         Buttressing the above-discussed evidence is the story of another
      employee, who claimed to have seen Oswald on the first floor around
      12:15.  Mrs. Carolyn Arnold, a secretary at the Depository, was the
      crucial witness.  Her story was omitted not only from the Report
      but also from the Commission's printed evidence.  It was only
      through the diligent searching of Harold Weisberg that an FBI
      report of an early interview with her came to light.[5]  She spoke
      with FBI agents on November 26, 1963, only three days after the
      assassination.  The brief report of the interview states that

         she was in her office on the second floor of the building on
         November 22, 1963, and left that office between 12:00 and
         12:15 PM, to go downstairs and stand in front of the
         building to view the Presidential Motorcade.  As she was
         standing in front of the building, she stated that she
         thought she caught a fleeting glimpse of LEE HARVEY OSWALD
         standing in the hallway between the front door and the
         double doors leading into the warehouse, located on the
         first floor.  She could not be sure this was OSWALD, but
         said she felt it was and believed the time to be a few
         minutes before 12:15 PM. (CD5:41)

      As Weisberg cautioned in his book "Photographic Whitewash," where
      he presents this FBI report, "This is the FBI retailing [sic] of
      what Mrs. Arnold said, not her actual words."[6]
         Mrs. Arnold was never called as a witness before the Commission;
      absolutely no effort was made to check her accuracy or obtain
      further details of her story.  If what she related was true, she
      provided the proof that Oswald could not have shot at the
      President.  The Commission's failure to pursue her vital story was
      a failure to follow up evidence of Oswald's innocence.
         Mrs. Arnold was reinterviewed by the FBI on March 18, 1964, in
      compliance with Rankin's request to Hoover for statements from all
      Depository employees present at work November 22 (22H634).  In
      accordance with the deliberate wording of Rankin's items to be
      included in the statements as discussed earlier, Mrs. Arnold was
      not asked about seeing Oswald {before} the shooting, as she earlier
      said she did.  Instead, she provided the specific information
      requested in item (4) of Rankin's letter:  "I did not see Lee
      Harvey Oswald at the time President Kennedy was shot."  "At the
      time" of the assassination obviously is not the same as "before"
      the assassination.  If Rankin for some specific reason avoided
      asking about any employee who had seen Oswald right before the
      shots, he could have had no better witness in mind than Mrs.
      Arnold.
         In her March 18 statement, Mrs. Arnold wrote:  "I left the Texas
      School Book Depository at about 12:25 PM."  The report of her first
      interview states that she left her office on the second floor
      between 12:00 and 12:15 and saw Oswald from outside the building at
      "a few minutes before 12:15."  The important distinction between
      these two estimates is that one is in Mrs. Arnold's words, the
      other but a paraphrase.  Of the people who left the Depository with
      Mrs. Arnold, Mrs. Donald Baker recalled having left at about 12:15
      (22H635), Miss Judy Johnson at about 12:15 (22H656), Bonnie Rachey
      also at 12:15 (22H671), and Mrs. Betty Dragoo at 12:20 (22H645).
         It is perfectly reasonable to assert that Mrs. Arnold saw a man
      whom "she felt" was Oswald on the first floor anywhere between a
      few minutes before 12:15 and, at the latest, 12:25.  The actual
      time probably tended toward the 12:15 to 12:20 period.  The
      significance of this one piece of information is startling;  the
      "gunman" on the sixth floor was there from 12:15 on.  If Mrs.
      Arnold really did see Oswald on the first floor at this time, he
      could not have been a sixth-floor assassin.
         Arnold Rowland is the first person known to have spotted a man
      with a rifle on the sixth floor of the Depository.  The time of
      this observation was, according to Rowland, who had noted the large
      "Hertz" clock atop the Depository, 12:15 (2H169-72).  Rowland
      provided an even more accurate means for checking his time
      estimate:

         there was a motorcycle parked just on the street, not in
         front of us, just a little past us, and the radio was on it
         giving details of the motorcade, where it was positioned,
         and right {after} the time I noticed him (the man on the
         sixth floor) and when my wife was pointing this other thing
         to me . . . the dispatcher came on and gave the position of
         the motorcade as being on Cedar Springs.  This would be in
         the area of Turtle Creek, down in that area. . . .  And this
         was the position of the motorcade and it was about 15 or 16
         after 12. (2H172-73;  emphasis added)

      Rowland could not have had access to the police radio logs.
      However, every version of these logs in the Commission's evidence
      shows that the location of the motorcade described by Rowland was
      in fact broadcast between 12:15 and 12:16 PM (17H460;  21H390;
      23H911).  We must note also that while Rowland first noticed this
      man {before} hearing the broadcast at 12:15, it is possible that he
      had been there for some period of time prior to that.
         The difference between Mrs. Arnold's earliest estimate of the
      time she possibly saw Oswald on the first floor and the time
      Rowland saw the sixth-floor gunman is but a few minutes, hardly
      enough time for Oswald to have picked up his rifle, made his way to
      the sixth floor, assembled the rifle, and appeared at the
      appropriate window.  If Mrs. Arnold's later estimates are accurate,
      then Oswald was, in fact, on the first floor while the "assassin"
      was on the sixth.
         Without elaboration from Mrs. Arnold, we can draw no conclusions
      based on the brief FBI report of her first interview.  At this late
      date, I feel that Mrs. Arnold can not honestly clarify the
      information reported by the FBI, either through fear of challenging
      the official story or through knowledge of the implication of what
      she knows.  It was the duty of the Warren Commission to seek out
      Mrs. Arnold to obtain her full story and test her accuracy, if not
      in the interest of truth, certainly so as not posthumously to deny
      Oswald the possible proof of his innocence.
         The Commission failed in its obligation to the truth for the
      simple reason that it (meaning its staff and General Counsel) never
      sought the truth.  The truth, according to {all} the relevant
      evidence in the Commission's files, is that Oswald was on the first
      floor at a time that eliminates the possibility of his having been
      the sixth-floor gunman, just as he told the police during his
      interrogations.


      {Identity of the Gunman}

         The Commission relied solely on the testimony of eyewitnesses to
      identify the source of the shots as a specific Depository window.
      The presence of three cartridge cases by this window seemed to
      buttress the witnesses' testimony.  The medical findings, although
      not worth credence, indicated that some shots were fired from above
      and behind;  still, that evidence, even if correct, cannot pinpoint
      the {precise} source "above and behind" from which certain shots
      originated.  It was the people who said they saw a man with a gun
      in this window who provided the evidence most welcome to the
      Commission.
         The Commission's crew of witnesses consisted of Howard Brennan
      and Amos Euins, both of whom said they saw the man fire a rifle;
      Robert Jackson and Malcolm Couch, two photographers riding in the
      motorcade, who saw the barrel of a rifle being drawn slowly back
      into the window after the shots (although neither saw a man in the
      window);  Mrs. Earle Cabell, wife of the city's mayor, who, also
      riding in the procession, saw "a projection" from a Depository
      window (although she could not tell if this was a mechanical object
      or someone's arm);  and James Crawford, who saw a "movement" in the
      window after the shots but could not say for sure whether it was a
      person whom he had seen (R63-68).  Two additional witnesses are
      added in the Report's chapter "The Assassin."  They are Ronald
      Fischer and Robert Edwards, both of whom saw a man without a rifle
      in the window shortly before the motorcade arrived.
         Two other "sixth-floor gunman" witnesses didn't quite make it
      into the relevant sections of the Report--one, in fact, never made
      the Report at all.  Arnold Rowland saw the gunman 15 minutes before
      the motorcade arrived at the plaza.  However, at this time, the man
      was in the far south{west} (left) window.  Rowland told the
      Commission that another man then occupied the southeast corner
      (right) window.  The Commission, whose legal eminences knew that
      another man on the sixth floor at this time satisfied the legal
      definition of conspiracy, sought only to discredit Rowland,
      rejecting his story under a section entitled "Accomplices at the
      Scene of the Assassination" (R250-52).  Mrs. Carolyn Walther saw
      the gunman in the right window, shortly before the procession
      arrived.  However, she too saw a second man on the sixth floor,
      although the "accomplice" she described was obviously different
      from Rowland's (24H522).  Rowland sprang his information on the
      Commission by surprise, none of the various reports on him having
      ever mentioned the second man.  Mrs. Walther told of a second man
      from the beginning and was totally ignored by the Commission.
         While the testimony indicates the presence of a man {holding} a
      rifle in the southeast-corner sixth-floor window, there is {no}
      evidence that this rifle was {fired} during the assassination.
      Under questioning by Arlen Specter, Amos Euins, a 16-year-old whose
      inarticulateness inhibited the effectiveness with which he conveyed
      his observations, said he saw the Depository gunman fire the second
      shot (2H209).  However, Specter never asked Euins what caused him
      to conclude that the gun he saw had actually discharged, that is,
      that the gunman was not merely performing the {motions} of firing
      that gave the impression of actual discharge when combined with the
      noises of other shots, but was fully pulling the trigger and
      shooting bullets.
         The Report cites the testimony of three employees who were
      positioned on the fifth floor directly below the "assassin's"
      window, one of whom claimed to have heard empty cartridge cases
      hitting the floor above him, with the accompanying noises of a
      rifle bolt (R70).  However, there is nothing about the testimony of
      any of these men to indicate that the {shots} came from {directly}
      above them on the sixth floor.  As Mark Lane points out in "Rush to
      Judgement," the actions of these men subsequent to the shooting
      were not consistent with their believing that any shots came from
      the sixth floor;  one of the men even denied making such a
      statement to the Secret Service[7] (3H194).  The stories of the
      fifth-floor witnesses, if valid, indicate no more than the presence
      of someone on the sixth floor operating the bolt of a rifle and
      ejecting spent shells.
         Howard Brennan was the Commission's star witness among those
      present in the plaza during the assassination.  His testimony is
      cited in many instances, including passages to establish the source
      of the shots and the identity of the "assassin."  Brennan was the
      only person other than Euins who claimed to have seen a gun fired
      from the Depository window (R63).  Yet, in spite of Brennan's
      testimony that he saw the sixth-floor gunman take aim and {fire} a
      last shot, there is reason to believe that the man Brennan saw
      never discharged a firearm.  Brennan was asked the vital questions
      that Euins was spared.

            Mr. McCloy:  Did you see the rifle explode?  Did you see
         the flash of what was either the second or the third shot?
            Mr. Brennan:  No.
            Mr. McCloy:  Could you see that he had discharged the
         rifle?
            Mr. Brennan:  No . . .
            Mr. McCloy:  Yes.  But you saw him aim?
            Mr. Brennan:  Yes.
            Mr. McCloy:  Did you see the rifle discharge, did you see
         the recoil or the flash?
            Mr. Brennan:  No.
            Mr. McCloy:  But you heard the last shot?
            Mr. Brennan:  The report;  yes, sir. (3H154)

      If Brennan looked up at the window as he said, his testimony would
      strongly indicate that he saw a man aim a gun {without firing it}.
      When the Carcano is fired, it emits a small amount of smoke
      (26H811) and manifests a recoil (3H451), as do most rifles.  That
      Brennan failed to see such things upon observing the rifle and
      hearing a shot is cogent evidence that the rifle Brennan saw did
      not fire the shot.
         Thus, the Commission's evidence--taken at face value--indicates
      only that a {gunman} was present at the sixth-floor window, not an
      {assassin}.  This distinction is an important one.  A mere gunman
      (one armed with a gun) cannot be accused of murder;  an assassin is
      one who has committed murder.  A gunman present at the sixth-floor
      window could have served as a decoy to divert attention from real
      shooters at other vantage points.[8]  While we cannot know surely
      just what the man in the sixth-floor window was doing, it is vital
      to note that evidence is entirely lacking that this gunman was, in
      fact, an assassin.
         To the Commission, the gunman was {the} assassin, no questions
      asked. The limitations of the evidence could not be respected when
      the conclusions were prefabricated.   By arbitrarily calling a
      gunman the "assassin," the Commission, in effect, made the charge
      of murder through circumstances, without substantiation.
         As was discussed in chapter 1, the Commission had {no} witness
      identification of the "assassin" worthy of credence.  Of the few
      who observed the gunman, only Brennan made any sort of
      identification, saying both that Lee Harvey Oswald {was} the gunman
      and that he merely {resembled} the gunman.  The Commission rejected
      Brennan's "positive identification" of Oswald, expressed its
      confidence that the man Brennan saw at least looked like Oswald,
      and evaluated Brennan as an "accurate observer" (R145).
         Many critics have challenged the Report's evaluation of Brennan
      as "accurate."[9]  Evidence that I have recently discovered
      indicates that Brennan was not even an "observer," let alone an
      accurate one.
         One of the main indications of Brennan's inaccuracy is his
      description of the gunman's position.  Brennan contended that in
      the six-to-eight-minute-period prior to the motorcade's arrival, he
      saw a man "leave and return to the window `a couple of times.'"
      After hearing the first shot, he glanced up at this Depository
      window and saw this man taking deliberate aim with a rifle (R144).
      The Report immediately begins apologizing for Brennan:

            Although Brennan testified that the man in the window was
         standing when he fired the shots, most probably he was
         either sitting or kneeling. . . .  It is understandable,
         however, for Brennan to have believed that the man with the
         rifle was standing. . . .  Since the window ledges in the
         Depository building are lower than in most buildings [one
         foot high], a person squatting or kneeling exposes more of
         his body than would normally be the case.  From the street,
         this creates the impression that the person is standing.
         (R144-45)

      The Report's explanation is vitiated by the fact that Brennan
      claimed to have seen the gunman standing {and sitting}.  "At one
      time he came to the window and he sat sideways on the window sill,"
      swore Brennan.  "That was previous to President Kennedy getting
      there.  And I could see practically his whole body, from his hips
      up" (3H144).  Thus, Brennan should have known the difference
      between a man standing and sitting at the window, despite the low
      window sill.  Had the gunman been standing, he would have been
      aiming his rifle through a double thickness of glass, only his legs
      visible to witness Brennan.  Had he assumed a sitting position--on
      the sill or on nearby boxes--he would have had to bend his head
      down {below} his knees to fire the rifle out the window (see
      photographs taken from inside the window, at 22H484-85).
         From November 22 until the time of his Commission testimony,
      Brennan said he was looking at the sixth floor at the time of the
      last shot.  His November 22 affidavit states this explicitly
      (24H203) and it can be inferred from his later interviews.  In
      observing the Depository, Brennan contended that he stopped looking
      at the President's car immediately after the first shot (3H143-44).
      Obviously, then, he could not have seen the impact of the fatal
      bullet on the President's head, which came late, probably last, in
      the sequence of shots.  However, Brennan's observations were
      suddenly augmented when he was interviewed by CBS News in August
      1964 for a coast-to-coast broadcast.  As was aired on September 27,
      1964, Brennan told CBS "The President's head just exploded."[10]
      Unless Brennan lied to either CBS or the federal and local
      authorities, it must now be believed that he saw the sixth-floor
      gunman fire the last shot, then turned his head faster than the
      speeding bullet to have seen the impact of that bullet on the
      President's head, then turned back toward the window with equal
      alacrity so as to have seen the gunman slowly withdraw his weapon
      and marvel at his apparent success.  Unless, of course, Brennan had
      eyes in the back of his head--which is far more credible than any
      aspect of his "witness account."
         Brennan's identification of Oswald as the man he saw (or said he
      saw?) in the sixth-floor window weighed heavily in the Commission's
      "evaluation" of the "evidence."  As was discussed in chapter 1, the
      Commission first rejected Brennan's positive identification in
      discussing the evidence, and subsequently accepted it in drawing
      the conclusion that Oswald was at the window.  Without Brennan,
      there would have been not even the slightest suggestion in any of
      the evidence that Oswald was at the window during the shots.  No
      one else even made a pretense of being able to identify the sixth-
      floor gunman.
         On November 22, 1963, Brennan was unable to identify Oswald as
      the man he saw in the window, but picked Oswald as the person in a
      police line-up who bore the closest resemblance to the gunman.
      Months later, when he appeared before the Commission, Brennan said
      he could have made a positive identification at the November 22
      lineup,

         but did not do so because he felt that the assassination was
         "a Communist activity, and I felt like there hadn't been
         more than one eyewitness, and if it got to be a known fact
         that I was an eyewitness, my family or I, either one, might
         not be safe." (R145)

      The Report continued that, because Brennan had originally failed to
      make a positive identification, the Commission did "not base its
      conclusion concerning the identity of the assassin on Brennan's
      subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the man
      he saw fire the rifle."  Through the Report, the Commission
      expressed its confidence that "Brennan saw a man in the window who
      closely resembled Lee Harvey Oswald, and that Brennan believes the
      man he saw was in fact . . . Oswald" (R146).
         The Commission accepted Brennan's observations and assurances
      without question.  However, the excuse Brennan offered for not
      originally making a positive identification was falsely and
      deliberately contrived, as the evidence reveals.  As Brennan is
      quoted, he felt that he had been the only eyewitness and feared for
      his family's security should his identity become known.  Contrary
      to this sworn statement, Brennan immediately knew of at least one
      other witness who had seen the sixth-floor gunman.  Secret Service
      Agent Forrest Sorrels spoke with Brennan in Dealey Plaza within
      twenty minutes after the shooting, at which time he asked Brennan
      "if he had seen anyone else, and he pointed to a young colored boy
      there, by the name of Euins" (7H349).  Sorrels testified that
      Brennan also expressed his willingness to identify the gunman.  On
      the afternoon of the assassination, {before} he attended the line-
      up, Brennan filed an affidavit with the police (3H145;  7H349) in
      which he again made it known that he could identify the man if he
      were to see him once more (24H203).  This contradicts Brennan's
      testimony that he could have identified Oswald on November 22 but
      declined to do so for fear of its becoming known.
         Thus, Brennan originally indicated a willingness to identify the
      gunman, saw Oswald in a line-up and declined to make a positive
      identification, and subsequently admitted lying to the police by
      saying that he {could} have made the identification but was afraid
      to.
         However, even Brennan's identification of Oswald as the man who
      most closely resembled the gunman is invalid, since prior to the
      line-up, Brennan twice viewed Oswald's picture on television
      (3H148).  Brennan again contradicted himself in speaking of the
      effect that seeing Oswald's picture had on his later identification
      of Oswald.
         On December 17, 1963, Brennan spoke with an FBI Agent to whom he
      confided "that he can now say that he is sure that LEE HARVEY
      OSWALD was the person he saw in the window."  At this time, Brennan
      began offering his many excuses for not having originally made a
      positive identification.  One of these

         was that prior to appearing at the police line-up on
         November 22, 1963, he had observed a picture of OSWALD on
         his television set at home when his daughter asked him to
         watch it.  He said he felt that since he had seen OSWALD on
         television before picking OSWALD out of the line-up at the
         police station that it tended to "cloud" any identification
         of OSWALD at that time. (CD5:15)

      On January 7, 1964, Brennan's "clouded identification" was further
      lessened, for he told another FBI Agent that seeing Oswald's
      picture on television "of course, did not help him retain the
      original impression of the man in the window with the rifle"
      (24H406).  Finally, on March 24, Brennan could no longer tell just
      what seeing Oswald prior to the line-up had done.  On this date,
      Brennan testified before the Commission:

            Mr. Belin:  What is the fact as to whether or not your
         having seen Oswald on television would have affected your
         identification of him one way or the other?
            Mr. Brennan:  That is something I do not know. (3H148)

         As his earlier interviews demonstrate, Brennan "knew" but was
      not saying.  It seems obvious that seeing Oswald's picture on
      television prior to the line-up not only would have "clouded" and
      "not helped" the identification, but would also have prejudiced it.
         The best that can be said of Howard Brennan is that he provided
      a dishonest account that warrants not the slightest credence.  He
      contradicted himself on many crucial points to such a degree that
      it is hard to believe that his untruths were unintentional.  He was
      warmly welcomed by the unquestioning Commission as he constantly
      changed his story in support of the theory that Oswald was guilty.
      This man, so fearful of exposure as to "lie" to the police and
      possibly hinder justice, consented to talk with CBS News for a
      coast-to-coast broadcast {before} the Warren Report was
      released,[11] and allowed himself to be photographed for the
      October 2, 1964, issue of "Life" magazine, where he was called by
      Commissioner Ford "the most important witness to appear before the
      Warren Commission."[12]  His identification of Oswald, incredible
      as it was through each of his different versions of it, was
      worthless, if for no other reason than that he saw Oswald on
      television prior to the police line-up.
         Through twenty pages of repetitious testimony, Howard Brennan
      rambled on about the man he saw and who he looked like,
      interjecting apologies, and inaccurately marking various pictures.
      The Commission could not get enough of Brennan's words, for he
      spoke the official language:  "Oswald did it."  Yet, when Brennan
      offered one meaningful and determinative fact, he was suddenly
      shown the door.  Commission Counsel David Belin had been showing
      Brennan some of Oswald's clothing when Brennan interjected:

            Mr. Brennan:  And that was another thing that I called
         their [the police's] attention to at the lineup.
            Mr. Belin:  What do you mean by that?
            Mr. Brennan:  That he [Oswald] was not dressed in the
         same clothes that I saw the man in the window.
            Mr. Belin:  You mean with reference to the trousers or
         the shirt?
            Mr. Brennan:  Well, not particularly either. In other
         words, he just didn't have the same clothes on.
            Mr. Belin:  All right.
            Mr. Brennan:  I don't know whether you have that in the
         record or not.  I am sure you do.
            Mr. Dulles:  Any further questions?  I guess there are no
         more questions, Mr. Belin.
            Mr. Belin:  Well, sir, we want to thank you for your
         cooperation with the Commission.
            Mr. Dulles:  Thank you very much for coming here.
         (3H161)

         The Commission had no witness-identification-by-appearance that
      placed Oswald in the window at the time of the shots.  No one,
      including Brennan, could identify the sixth-floor gunman.  However,
      Brennan's statement that the gunman wore clothes different from
      those that Oswald wore on that day might indicate the presence of
      someone other than Oswald in the window.
         If there is anything consistent in the testimonies of those who
      observed a man on the sixth floor, it is the clothing descriptions.
      Rowland recalled that the man wore "a very light-colored shirt,
      white or a light blue . . . open at the collar . . . unbuttoned
      about halfway" with a "regular T-shirt, a polo shirt" underneath
      (2H171).  Brennan described light-colored, possibly khaki clothes
      (3H145).  Ronald Fisher and Bob Edwards described "an open-neck . .
      . sport shirt or a T-shirt . . . light in color;  probably white"
      (6H194), and a "light colored shirt, short sleeve and open neck"
      (6H203), respectively.  Mrs. Carolyn Walther saw a gunman "wearing
      a white shirt" (24H522).
         In each case, these witnesses have described a shirt completely
      different from that worn by Oswald on November 22.  That day Oswald
      wore a long-sleeved rust-brown shirt open at the neck with a polo
      shirt underneath.  At least two witnesses described such attire on
      Oswald {before} he went to his rooming house within a half hour
      after the shots (see 2H250;  3H257), and a third provided a similar
      but less-complete description (R159).  From the time of his arrest
      until sometime after midnight that Friday, Oswald was still wearing
      this shirt, as is shown in many widely printed photographs.[13]
      Although it seems likely that he wore the same shirt all day long,
      Oswald told police he changed his shirt during a stop at his
      rooming house at 1:00 P.M. that afternoon, having originally been
      wearing a red long-sleeved buttondown (see R605, 613, 622, 626).
      However, Oswald did not possess a shirt of this description (see
      CEs 150-64).
         The Commission never sought to determine if Oswald had worn the
      same shirt continually that day or if he had changed prior to his
      arrest.  Apparently it was not going to risk the implications of
      Brennan's testimony that the clothing worn by Oswald in the line-up
      (Oswald wore the rust-brown shirt during the line-ups on November
      22 [7H127-29, 169-70]) differed from that of the sixth-floor
      gunman.  Indeed, when shown the shirt in question, CE 150, Brennan
      said the gunman's shirt was lighter (3H161).
         The testimony of Marrion Baker, a police officer who encountered
      Oswald right after the shots, is somewhat illuminating on this
      point.  When Baker later saw Oswald in the homicide office at
      police headquarters, "he looked like he did not have the same
      [clothes] on" (3H263). However, the reason for Baker's confusion
      (and Baker was not nearly so positive about the disparity as was
      Brennan) was that the shirt Oswald wore when seen in the Depository
      was "a little bit {darker}" than the one he had on at the police
      station (3H257;  emphasis added).
         The crux of the matter is whether Oswald was wearing his rust-
      brown shirt all day November 22, or if he changed into it
      subsequent to the assassination.  While there is testimony
      indicating that he wore the same shirt all along, the nature of the
      existing evidence does not permit a positive determination.  Had
      Oswald been wearing CE 150 at the time of the shots, it would seem
      that he was not the sixth-floor gunman, who wore a white or very
      light shirt, probably short sleeved.  While it can be argued that
      Oswald may have appeared at the window in only his white polo
      shirt, he was seen within 90 seconds after the shots wearing the
      brown shirt.[14]  As will be discussed in the next chapter, there
      was not enough time, had Oswald been at the window, for him to have
      put on his shirt within the 90-second limit.
         The Commission had no evidence in any form that Oswald was at
      the sixth-floor window during the shots;  its only reliable
      evidence placed Oswald on the first floor shortly before this time.
      The Commission concluded that Oswald was at this window because it
      wanted, indeed needed, to have him there.  To do this, it put false
      meaning into the meaningless--the fingerprint evidence and Givens's
      story--and believed the incredible--Brennan's testimony.  Through
      its General Counsel, it suppressed the exculpatory evidence, and
      claimed to know of no evidence placing Oswald in a location other
      than the sixth floor when its {only} evidence did exactly that.
      The conclusion that Oswald was at the window is simply without
      foundation.  It demands only the presumption of Oswald's guilt for
      acceptance.  It cannot stand under the weight of the evidence.



__________

 [1] It was Sylvia Meagher who brought the shortcomings of Givens's
     story to light in her book, pp. 64-69.
       Since her initial disclosure in 1967, Mrs. Meagher has discovered
     several unpublished documents in the National Archives that leave
     little doubt that Givens's story of seeing Oswald on the sixth
     floor {was} fabricated and that staff lawyer David Belin knew this
     when he took Givens's testimony.  The documents tell a shocking
     story, which Mrs. Meagher incorporated in an impressive article
     published in the "Texas Observer," August 13, 1971.
       When Givens was interviewed by the FBI on the day of the
     assassination, he not only failed to mention having seen Oswald on
     the sixth floor, but he actually said he saw Oswald on the {first}
     floor at 11:50, reading a newspaper in the domino room (CD 5,
     p. 329).  On February 13, 1964, Police Lt. Jack Revill told the FBI
     "he believes that Givens would change his story for money" (CD 735,
     p. 296).  A lengthy memorandum by Joseph Ball and David Belin dated
     February 25, 1964, acknowledges that Givens originally reported
     seeing Oswald on the first floor reading a paper at 11:50 on the
     morning of November 22 (p. 105).  On April 8, 1964, Givens
     testified for Belin in Dallas and said for the first time that he
     saw Oswald on the sixth floor at 11:55 when he returned for his
     cigarettes (Givens had never before said that he returned to the
     sixth floor) (See 6H346-56).  Belin twice asked Givens if he ever
     told anyone that he "saw Lee Oswald reading a newspaper in the
     domino room around 11:50 . . . that morning?"  On both occasions,
     Givens denied ever making such a statement (6H352, 354).  Finally,
     on June 3, 1964, when the FBI reinterviewed him, Givens "said he
     {now} recalls he returned to the sixth floor at about 11:45 A.M. to
     get his cigarettes . . . [and] it was at this time he saw Lee
     Harvey Oswald" (CD 1245, p. 182;  emphasis added).
       Belin apparently found nothing unusual in Givens's failure to
     mention the sixth-floor encounter until he testified in April 1964,
     contradicting a previous statement that he denied making.  Givens's
     denial does not prove he actually never made his early statement,
     although for Belin the pro forma denial was sufficient, despite the
     caution of Lt. Revill that Givens would change his story for money.
     The Report (R143) mentions only the later Givens story and says
     nothing of the original version.  This is consistent with the
     constant suppression of evidence exculpatory of Oswald.

 [2] Letter from J. Lee Rankin to J. Edgar Hoover, dated March 16, 1964,
     in the "Reading File of Outgoing Letters and Internal Memoranda."
       This letter was based on a request for additional investigation
     by staff lawyers Ball and Belin.  In their lengthy "Report #1,"
     dated February 25, 1964, they suggested that "everyone who had a
     reason to be in" the Depository on November 22, 1963, be
     interviewed.  "Each of these persons should be asked:  1) to account
     for his whereabouts at the time the President was shot. . . .  3) if
     he saw Lee Oswald at that time" (p. 125).

 [3] The episode with Jarman and Norman was first brought to light by
     Harold Weisberg in "Whitewash," p. 73.  Sylvia Meagher later
     discussed the issue in more detail in her book, p. 225.

 [4] The Report mentions this incident in a context other than one of
     Oswald's defense.  It assures that Jarman neither saw nor ate with
     Oswald at the times involved (R182).  This in no way disproves the
     validity of Oswald's claim that he saw Jarman, for it would not
     have been unusual for Jarman or any other employee not to have
     noticed Oswald.

 [5] Harold Wesiberg, "Photographic Whitewash," pp. 74-75, 210-11.

 [6] Ibid., p. 74.

 [7] Mark Lane, chap. 6.

 [8] The possibility that the sixth-floor gunman was a decoy was first
     suggested by Sylvia Meagher in her book, p. 9.

 [9] E.G., see Weisberg, "Whitewash," pp. 39-42, and Lane, chap. 5.

[10] "CBS News Extra:  `November 22 and the Warren Report,'" broadcast
     over the CBS Television Network, September 27, 1964, p. 20 of the
     transcript prepared by CBS News.

[11] Ibid.  At page two of the transcript, Walter Cronkite specifies
     that CBS interviewed various witnesses a month before the release of
     the Report.

[12] "Life," October 2, 1964, pp. 42, 47.

[13] E.G., see CEs 1769, 1797, 2964, 2965;  CD 1405 (reproduced in
     "Photographic Whitewash," p. 209);  Curry, pp. 72, 73, 77;  "Life,"
     October 2, 1964, p. 48.

[14] Baker testified to this at 3H257.  In December 1963, Truly, who also
     saw Oswald within 90 seconds after the shots, said that Oswald had
     been wearing "light" clothing {and} a T-shirt (CD 87, Secret Service
     Control No. 491)







--
                                              daveus rattus

                                    yer friendly neighborhood ratman

                                KOYAANISQATSI

    ko.yaa.nis.qatsi (from the Hopi Language)  n.  1. crazy life.  2. life
        in turmoil.  3. life out of balance.  4. life disintegrating.
          5. a state of life that calls for another way of living.