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$Unique_ID{bob01194} $Pretitle{} $Title{Nixon Tapes, The April 14, 1973. (2:24pm - 3:55pm)} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{nixon pres ehrlichman haldeman hr unintelligible that's get say right} $Date{1974} $Log{} Title: Nixon Tapes, The Author: Various Date: 1974 April 14, 1973. (2:24pm - 3:55pm) Meeting: President Nixon, HR Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Oval Office Pres. Nixon: All finished? J. Ehrlichman: Yes sir. He an innocent man in his heart and in his mind and he does not intend to move off that position. He appreciated the message of the good feeling between you and him. Pres. Nixon: He got that, huh? J. Ehrlichman: He appreciated my - Pres. Nixon: How did you get him here? Give us a little chapter and verse. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I started out by saying that the subject was so difficult for you to talk to him personally about that you had asked me to do this. Pres. Nixon: What did you next say? J. Ehrlichman: That you had had me doing this. That I had presented you with a set of conclusions that were admittedly hearsay, but that pointed in the direction of his ex-soldier and Jeb's and other people and that you were having me systematically talk to these people because in the course of this investigation we had discovered a frame of mind on the part of some people that they should stand mute in order to help the President, and that your sense was that the Presidency was not helped by that, and that it was not my purpose to tell anybody what he should do, but only to tell him that as far as your view of the interest of the Presidency were concerned, that they were not served by a person standing mute for that reason alone. Now, there might be plenty of reasons why a person might want to stand mute to put the government out to prove it. And that wasn't the question. Then he said, Well, what you say to me is that the President is reserving to me all my options," and I said, "Of course he is, John. The only thing that he doesn't want you to feel is that you don't have the option of going in and copping, if you want to do so. You have completely every option to go in or not to go in." And he said, well he appreciated that but he had not been taking the position he had for the reason that he thought he was necessarily helping or hurting the Presidency, but he said, "You know, these characters pulled this thing off without my knowledge." He said, "I never saw Liddy for months at a time." And he said, "I didn't know what they were up to and nobody was more surprised than I was. We had this meeting," and be lobbed mud balls at the White House at every opportunity - it was very interesting how he dragged it in. One after the other. But first he said, "There were these meetings. These characters came over to my office and Liddy put on this million dollar presentation which was perfectly ridiculous. The origin of that, of course, was in the White House where Bob Haldeman and I talked about something called the Operation Sandwedge that was really the grandfather of this whole thing." He said, "Of course, that was never put together because we couldn't get the right people to do it." They were talking about Joe Woods and people of that kind and so he said, "It never happened." Pres. Nixon: What is Operation Sandwedge? HR Haldeman: He is right. Jack Caulfield came up with that back in 1971, said we need some fellows to set up our own detail. J. Ehrlichman: So then he went on to say that there were only those meetings - he is still hung up on there were only three meetings thing. He made it very clear to me that he did never believe there was a fourth meeting. He said that, of course - HR Haldeman: He wasn't in the fourth meeting, John. There was no fourth meeting as far as he was concerned. J. Ehrlichman: No, no, but he didn't refer to three or four, he referred to the meetings themselves. He argues that there was no meeting after the million dollar meeting. HR Haldeman: Well, it wasn't that way. J. Ehrlichman: Right. That is the sense of what he was saying. I didn't press him on it and I tried to play him with kid gloves. I never asked him to tell me anything. He just told me all this stuff. He says that actually Magruder is going to have a problem with all of this because Dean talked Magruder into saying the wrong things to the Grand Jury, and so Magruder's got a problem. Pres. Nixon: My God, Mitchell was there? J. Ehrlichman: Yep. Pres. Nixon: Is that Dean they are referring to? J. Ehrlichman: Sure HR Haldeman: Sure Pres. Nixon: Mitchell was there when Dean talked him into saying the wrong things? J. Ehrlichman or HR Haldeman: That's what he says. That is what Mitchell says. Pres. Nixon: What does Dean say about it? J. Ehrlichman: Dean says it was Mitchell and Magruder. It must have been the quietest meeting in history everybody's version is that the other two guys talked - Pres. Nixon: Go ahead. J. Ehrlichman: Well it goes on like that. His characterization of all this is that he was a very busy man, that he wasn't keeping track of what was going on at the Committee - that this was engendered as a result of Hunt and Liddy coming to Colson's office and getting Colson to make a phone call to Magruder and that he, Mitchell, was just not aware that all that happened until Van Shumway brought Liddy into Mitchell's office sometime in June and that's the first he had knowledge of it. It was much later in the conversation before - HR Haldeman: Before the discovery? J. Ehrlichman: I don't know. I don't know. You can listen to it. I've got it taped. Forgive me. But in any event, much later I said that the Grand Jury, or the U.S. Attorney, felt that they had John wired. And he said, "Well, what possible evidence could they have to feel that way?" Pres. Nixon: John Dean or John Mitchell? J. Ehrlichman: John Mitchell, Well I said I understand that one version of the fact is that Magruder brought you a memo with a number of targets on it, and that you checked off the targets that you wanted. And he said, "Why nothing could be further from the truth than that." Pres. Nixon: That was John Dean's version. HR Haldeman: That's right. Pres. Nixon: That's what he said to Mitchell. HR Haldeman: Right. Then what Mitchell said to me was that he did not - he said I checked - I signed off on it. Pres. Nixon: Go ahead. HR Haldeman: I said you mean you initialed it and he said no. J. Ehrlichman: Then I said they had testimony saying Hunt and Liddy, having a conversation, and Liddy saying to Hunt, "Yes, I know how you don't like this stuff, but we have to do it because Mr. Mitchell insists on it." He said, "I never saw Liddy for five months. From February to June, I never laid eyes on him." He said, "I think Liddy is the source of a lot of my problems here, using my name, etc. So it is very much of (unintelligible) thing. He said, "If I am indicted, it is going to be very hard but," he said, "I have to think of my reputation. I can't let people get away with this kind of thing," and he said, "I am just going to have to defend myself every way I can." He said, "Obviously I can't get a fair trial in the city of Washington by any stretch of the imagination. We'll just have to see how that all comes out." He said, "I am sorry to hear that so much of this is going to come to the White House because it certainly is not in the President's interest to have all this kind of thing come out." He made a great point of the $350,000. He says that his recollection - and he said, "You want to check this because," he said, "I am very vague on the facts of this." I told him about Strachan, because Strachan used to work for him. And I told him that Strachan had been, and has to go back and correct the $350,000 to $328,000. He said, "I wasn't the only (unintelligible) for that money." And I said, "Oh?" And he said, "No, you would have to check with John Dean on this but," he said, "it is my recollection that Dean had Strachan draw other money out of that fund for payments to these defendants." I said, "Well, that is the first I have heard of that. I understood that Strachan had gone to Bob and said this fund and Bob had said send it back to the Committee and that Strachan had taken it to LaRue as a representative of the Committee." He said, "Yes, I think that's the way it all went, but not until some of it had been tapped by the defendants." And I said, "It was not known to anyone over here who was going to receive it." I said, "Was that before the money got to LaRue?" And he said, "Yes, I am sure it was." I said, "Well, who would know about that because I have never heard that before?" He said, "Well, Dean." So - Pres. Nixon: The $328,000 is wrong, too, then? J. Ehrlichman: Well if Mitchell is to be believed, that's right that is the inference. But you don't know of any other withdrawal do you, Bob? HR Haldeman: Well, I told you the $328,000 was not returned in one trip, but it all went to LaRue. Pres. Nixon: (unintelligible) HR Haldeman: Here is the sequence on that. We wanted to get the money back to the Committee. The Committee wouldn't take it. Mitchell wouldn't let LaRue take it. I said give it art back. Mitchell said no. Then they got desperate for money, and being desperate for money took back - I think it was $40,000. That is all they would take. I still said, "Take it all back, not just a segment of it, and made the point that I didn't see what the problem was. If they needed money and we wanted to get rid of money, it seemed to me it was of mutual interest in working it out. And that, then, was what happened. The balance Pres. Nixon: Tell Strachan on Monday that he better be clear that he didn't give HR Haldeman: Right. Pres. Nixon: Strachan has testified apparently that he gave the whole bundle at once. HR Haldeman: No, he wasn't asked that. Pres. Nixon: He wasn't asked? HR Haldeman: His testimony in that area is not wrong. Pres. Nixon: Good. J. Ehrlichman: Now, John kept referring to, using the phrase, protecting the rights of people. One of the ways that he used that phrase was in response to my question about what he thought I ought to do with the information that I had collected in the last several weeks. And he said, "Well, you have to first of all consider the rights of individuals." I said, "Yes. At the same time here is the Presidency hindered now with a body of hearsay and not absolute knowledge. Ah, my inclination is to give it to Kleindienst." And he thought about that awhile and he said, "Yes, I guess that is the best thing you could do." I said, "Now you should know that Kleindienst has said that if you in any way get cracked in this case that he is going to step aside, regardless of the case. I understand Henry Petersen also will." And I said, "That the thing Kleindienst is pushing for is a special prosecutor." John said, "That would be a grave mistake because it would be subversive to the orderly process of justice if everytime you had an important ease you strive to put the matter in an ad hoc process." Pres. Nixon: Well, I particularly - the present prosecutor (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: So I said, "At least, he thought he should step aside." He got a very wide smile on his face, and he said, "Well, its great to have friends isn't it?" He says, "Especially the way we stuck by them" - meaning the ITT business, I assume, because of Kleindienst. So that was an interesting little aside. He said, "I would be very grateful if you would all kind of keep me posted," and I said, "Fine." He knew that we were talking to Chappie Rose. I told him no decision had been made about a Special Counsel, but we were inclined not to appoint a Special Prosecutor; that you were - Pres. Nixon: He doesn't mind a Special Counsel? J. Ehrlichman: He thinks it is a good idea to have a Special Counsel. He suggested that maybe the Special Counsel should be the one to go talk to Kleindienst, rather than somebody from the White House staff. Pres. Nixon: I'll be darned. J. Ehrlichman: And so that was his only reaction to that. I told him again that I thought he ought to be represented, and that Paul O'Brien was now a target of this Grand Jury and that I thought he really had to think about getting representation. He said he had given it a lot of thought, but that he didn't think that he would want to make a change yet. He thought he would wait and see how O'Brien got along. HR Haldeman: Which confirms he considers O'Brien to be his attorney. J. Ehrlichman: Right. HR Haldeman: That's interesting. J. Ehrlichman: He asked me how he was involved; what I heard about the prosecutor's view of Mitchell's involvement in the obstruction of justice suit. I said that I really had not been able to find anybody who was in a fishing net, who really went to a defendant and said, "Don't talk" or so and so. And he said, "Well I really wonder if you ever will, other than their lawyers." He said, "My impression of this is that they are the ones who are worried about their fees and who will really be coming to us rather than for any of us going to them to bring about a change in testimony. As a matter of fact," be said, "the same that - HR Haldeman: Dean has been saying that all along. He said, "The thing - that we were talking to Dean about," he says, "I wasn't really worried about what they testified to. I was worried about what they would say to the press." HR Haldeman: Exactly what Hunt made the challenge. J. Ehrlichman: Yep. HR Haldeman: But somehow Dean doesn't see that that way. He said, "Yes, I am sure it was." I said, "Well, before?" J. Ehrlichman: Well, we've got to talk to him some more. He, Mitchell, did not mention Martha at all and I didn't raise it. That was just not even in the conversation. I told him that the only way that I knew that he was mentioned, in so far as the aftermath was concerned, was that from time to time he would send Dean over saying, "Hey, we need money for this," and he said, "Who told you that?" And I said, "Well, John, that is common knowledge, and Dean will know that you told him that." I said, "Dean has not been subpoenaed. He has not testified and, as a matter of fact, the way they are proceeding down there, it looks like they are losing interest in him." I said this to John because I wanted him to be impressed with the fact that we were not jobbing him. Pres. Nixon: Oh. I get the point. Now does he know that Magruder is going to confess. J. Ehrlichman: I said that in the course of calling to invite people to come talk with me today, and I indicated that there were more than two, that the persons who called was told that Dean intended - pardon - that Magruder intended to make a clean breast of it and that was first party information and very reliable, and that that would tend to begin to unravel the saint from the sinner in both directions. And he agreed with that. Now he said, "Which version is it that Magruder is going to testify to? Is it the one that he gave Bob and me in Bob's office, or is it some other version?" HR Haldeman: That's not true. J. Ehrlichman: I said - Pres. Nixon: What was the version he gave Bob? Was it another version? J. Ehrlichman: Well, let me tell you what Mitchell said. It was another gigging of the White House. He said, "You know in Bob's office, Magruder said that Haldeman had cooked this whole thing up over here at the White House and -" Pres. Nixon: Had he said that? J. Ehrlichman: Well that is what he said, and that he had been sort of - Pres. Nixon: Now wait a minute. Your conversation with Mitchell is the one where - HR Haldeman: I've got my notes on it. Pres. Nixon: where Mitchell (unintelligible) is one where Mitchell does - it's good you have the notes, too, but - J. Ehrlichman: Mitchell's theory - Pres. Nixon: Whatever his theory is, let me say, one footnote - is that throwing off on the White House won't help him one damn bit. J. Ehrlichman: Unless he can peddle the theory that Colson and others were effectively running the Committee through Magruder and freezing him out of the operation which is kind of the story line he was giving me. HR Haldeman: Did he include me in the others? J. Ehrlichman: Yep. HR Haldeman: That I was freezing him out of the operation? J. Ehrlichman: That you, in other words, he didn't say this baldly or flatly, but he accumulated a whole bunch of things: it's Colson, Dean and Bob working with Magruder, and that was sort of the way the line went. Pres. Nixon: No. The White House wasn't running the campaign committee. HR Haldeman: He's got an impossible problem with that. The poor guy is pretty sad if he gets up there and says that. It is a problem for us, there is no question about it, but there is Do way he can prove it. J. Ehrlichman: He had a very, very bad tremor - Pres. Nixon: He has always had it. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I have never noticed it as bad as this. Pres. Nixon: So, you've done your (unintelligible) HR Haldeman: The next question is whether you see Magruder or not and you are now set to see him at 4 o'clock, and if you are going to cancel him, why don't you do it right now. J. Ehrlichman: I see no purpose in seeing him. Pres. Nixon: Why because Magruder is aware of the fact that - HR Haldeman: Magruder is already going to do what John is going to tell him to do, so we now know - Pres. Nixon: Our purpose, as I understood it - what I mean Bob, was for making a record. J. Ehrlichman: Alright. For that purpose maybe I should. Maybe what I should do HR Haldeman: Ask him to tell you what he told me, and then you say, "Good." Pres. Nixon: We would like to get the hell what he is going to say. J. Ehrlichman: Alright, alright. Pres. Nixon: I would particularly like to get what the hell he is going to say about Strachan. J. Ehrlichman: Alright. Pres. Nixon: You could say, "Look, Jeb, I have to conduct this investigation on the White House. "Tell me what you are going to say," If he says Strachan knows, ask him how he knows he knows. J. Ehrlichman: Alright. Pres. Nixon: Do you think we should ask him that or do you not want to dig him on that? HR Haldeman: That's O.K. J. Ehrlichman: Once he tells me he intends to go forward to tell the truth, he has nothing to lose in talking to me. Pres. Nixon: Without guiding or leading him, you can at least maybe get that out tonight. HR Haldeman: Well, his lawyer will be there. J. Ehrlichman: Right. Pres. Nixon: The other thing is what about - of course, you realize that if he says something about Strachan then of course that puts an obligation on us to do something about Strachan doesn't it? J. Ehrlichman: Well at least to corroborate it or investigate it or go forward on it. HR Haldeman: Question, John, - J. Ehrlichman: Well, if it ends up that way, why then you have a sort of a dog fight. HR Haldeman: Let me say this. I don't think Jeb wants to hang Strachan. I think Jeb is worried about the fact that in going through this, he is going to reveal things that will implicate Strachan. That is the same kind of thinking as Strachan and Chapin, who were both very concerned about getting me into the Segretti thing. In other words, they see any involvement, any mentioning of the name as being a problem. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: I don't think Jeb sees it or understands the question of whether he really got Strachan in or not, and I am not sure how far he intends to go with Strachan. J. Ehrlichman: He didn't say, didn't really make it clear? HR Haldeman: No. He just said unfortunately this whole thing is going to come up and if it comes up, Bob, - I said, "What is the problem with Gordon?" And he said, "Well, I don't know. That depends on what other people say." Pres. Nixon: Other people, you mean like a secretary, you mean, or someone like that? HR Haldeman: Could be. Pres. Nixon: Typing a memorandum. To a degree I think one of the nice things in Strachan's case is the - the other possibility, of course, would be - maybe they are very likely, they might do this Bob, that they are going to ask the question, "Who told you to do this Jeb, or Mr. Magruder?" HR Haldeman: He stoutly denied that Strachan told him to do it. Larry brought back the exact story that he insists - Pres. Nixon: What about the Colson (unintelligible.) J. Ehrlichman: He says that he is going to have to hurt Mitchell. HR Haldeman: He says, "The ones I am going to hurt is Mitchell, and to some degree, John Dean and maybe Gordon. Pres. Nixon: He's obviously thought this through. Isn't it worthwhile to find our - I think we owe it to ourselves to find out about John Dean, for example, what he - now understand that he thinks (unintelligible) this is true from (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: Alright. J. Ehrlichman: I think that's right. This is probably a golden opportunity in a way. Pres. Nixon: Right, to find out - let me put it this way. You've got to find out what the hell he is going to say. (unintelligible) which is frightening to me, (unintelligible) rather than (unintelligible) HR Haldeman: Right. Pres. Nixon: The interesting thing is - did Bob tell you - are you prepared to say that he says that he, Magruder, says they will indict him and not Mitchell. That's a hard damn thing. Isn't that what you told me, Bob? Bob, didn't you tell me that? HR Haldeman: No. He said everybody is going to fall on this. He wasn't meaning indictments. He was meaning going to talk. Pres. Nixon: Oh. HR Haldeman: Himself, LaRue, everybody is going to drop but John. He didn't mean that Mitchell was going to be indicted. J. Ehrlichman: That's correct. HR Haldeman: He meant that Mitchell was the only one to who was going to continue to hardline, because everybody else had given up. And that is why he has given up. His point is that his keeping quiet now or lying now serves no purpose because all it is going to do is get him on a perjury counts as well as everything else. If he can clean up anything he can live with himself better. He faced the fact that he has had it. Pres. Nixon: Uh, uh. So that means LaRue, O'Brien. Is that right? HR Haldeman: Depends on how far they go. J. Ehrlichman: That's right. HR Haldeman: Jeb doesn't know - I don't think - much about that. Pres. Nixon: It's under cover. They'll push him. I think he can put up a pretty good fight on the thing don't you? HR Haldeman: I would think so. Pres. Nixon: If they indict him, it is going to be a damn hard case to prove. You've got to prove motive there, don't you, John? J. Ehrlichman: Yes. Dean argues that in a conspiracy such as they are trying to build they may not have to prove the same kind of (unintelligible) of some of the participants but only that they were in it. I would have to read the cases. I just don't know what the law is. Pres. Nixon: Of course, you've got there the defendants. They're the same way, too. HR Haldeman: That's right. Pres. Nixon: In fact, the key witness there is Hunt. J. Ehrlichman: Well there are the defendants and the defendants' lawyer, Bittman. Pres. Nixon: Hunt and Bittman. Hunt is to testify tomorrow. J. Ehrlichman: My guess is that a fellow like Bittman has probably negotiated immunity for himself, and has HR Haldeman: Dean strongly feels they wouldn't give it to him. Pres. Nixon: They would. HR Haldeman: Will not J. Ehrlichman: He is going to tell them about a lot of conversations he had with a lot of people. Pres. Nixon: Bittman is? J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. Pres. Nixon: Do we know that? J. Ehrlichman: I don't know that but I know, for instance, that Bittman had a conversation with Colson that was a Watergate conversation. And I know what Colson says about it - that he was brilliant and adroit, avoided any - HR Haldeman: And be says Bittman's recollection of it would be exactly the same as Colson's - his recollection of the specific conversation - but he says Birtman may draw conclusions from it. Pres. Nixon: This is the clemency conversation? And his conclusion would be that he felt the President had offered clemency? HR Haldeman: No. His conclusion he, Colson, will have Hunt out by Christmas. He says you know what kind of pull I have at the White House. I will be able to work that. That's what he would have thought. That by saying - Pres. Nixon: How does Colson handle that? J. Ehrlichman: He says he has a paper or a memo or something that says exactly what he said. Pres. Nixon: Just a minute. HR Haldeman: He wrote a memorandum of the conversation immediately after the conversation. That's all it is - his side of the story. Pres. Nixon: You don't think this would lead to an indictment of Colson do you? J. Ehrlichman: I don't know. Dean thinks everybody in the place is going to get indicted. HR Haldeman: They're all doing the same thing. Look, Dean said just looking at the worst possible side of the coin that you could make a list of everybody who in some way is technically indictable in the cover-up operation. And that list includes, in addition to Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Dean, - Pres. Nixon: Because they all discussed it? HR Haldeman: Strachan, Kalmbach, Kalmbach's go-between, Kalmbach's source, LaRue, Mardian, O'Brien, Parkinson, Rittman, Hunt and you know just to keep wandering through the impossibles, maybe for everybody on that list to take a guilty plea and get immediate - what do you call it - J. Ehrlichman: Clemency HR Haldeman: Clemency. That shows you the somewhat incredible way of some of John Dean's analytical thinking. J. Ehrlichman: No way. Pres. Nixon: It's a shame. There could be clemency in this case and at the proper time having in mind the extraordinary sentences of Magruder, etc. etc., but you know damn well it is ridiculous to talk about clemency. They all knew that. Colson knew that. I mean when you talked to Colson and he talked to me. J. Ehrlichman: The Magruder thing is 4 o'clock and it is still on. HR Haldeman: I think I have to go confirm it. J. Ehrlichman: Alright. Now the question is whether I ought to get hold of Kleindienst for, say 5 o'clock, and get this thing all wrapped up. Pres. Nixon: Have you determined it should be Kleindienst rather than Silbert? J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. Dean's right about that I am sure. Pres. Nixon: How do you know? J. Ehrlichman: I asked him for his advice on this. He said Silbert would ask you to wait a minute and he would stop out of the room and he would come back to get you and walk you right into the Grand Jury. Pres. Nixon: Oh. J. Ehrlichman: And you see, he doesn't dare handle a communication like that personally from the standpoint of the later criticism. He says the better out would be to go to Kleindienst who will probably step aside and refer you to Dean. Dean would in turn say to Henry Petersen they have done this little investigation over at the White House. They have collected a bunch of hearsay. There doesn't seem to be much new but they've got it there if anybody wants it. Petersen would in turn inform Silbert who would say, "I've got more than I can handle here now. We'll wait and interview that guy later." Pres. Nixon: The purpose in doing this is what? J. Ehrlichman: The purpose of doing it is - Pres. Nixon: The White House has conducted an investigation and has turned it over to the Grand Jury. J. Ehrlichman: Turned it over to the Justice Department. Pres. Nixon: Before the indictments. J. Ehrlichman: Right. Pres. Nixon: How much are you going to put out? J. Ehrlichman: I think I would let them drag it out of me in a way. I don't know I just really haven't thought that part through. Pres. Nixon: Because if they say why did the White House wait for Justice Department to do all this - J. Ehrlichman: Did the White House know is probably the way this would in turn come. Pres. Nixon: Yes, as a matter of fact. J. Ehrlichman: We had been at work on this for some time. President first ordered it. Pres. Nixon: Independent investigation. J. Ehrlichman: Needed it known. Pres. Nixon: I had ordered an independent investigation at the time McCord had something to say. Right. J. Ehrlichman: Alright. Pres. Nixon: At that time you conducted an investigation. J. Ehrlichman: And that a - at the time I was ready to report to you my tentative conclusions, and they were no more than that, you felt that they were sufficiently serious - Well, you felt that one overriding aspect of the report was that some people evidently were hanging back feeling that they were somehow doing the President a favor. That the President had me personally transmit to them his views that this ought to be a complete open thing; that may or may not have played some part in - Pres. Nixon: Jeb Magruder's subsequent disclosures to the Grand Jury? J. Ehrlichman: In any event, rather than for us simply to hold the information in the White House, we turned it over to the Justice Department for whatever disposition they wanted to make of it. Pres. Nixon: If Mitchell is indicted here, you think he is going to be convicted? J. Ehrlichman: Yeah, I think so. I can't guarantee it, but I would be amazed once Magruder goes in there. Pres. Nixon: Well, that's only one man. J. Ehrlichman: Well, that is plenty. Pres. Nixon: Is it? J. Ehrlichman: Oh, yes, sir. Pres. Nixon: What about the law? J. Ehrlichman: Well, with all the other stuff they've got, they - Pres. Nixon: All the other stuff they've got? J. Ehrlichman: They have a way of corroborating - Pres. Nixon: Alright. So let's go down the road. If Mitchell is indicted, when do you think this is going to happen? With Magruder going in today, it could come sooner. J. Ehrlichman: Could be. Could be, although Dean feels it will not be before May 15th at the earliest and now with the glut of people coming in, it may be even later than that. Pres. Nixon: Because they want to make a show. J. Ehrlichman: They will want to do it all at once. Steward Yes, Sir? Pres. Nixon: I will have some consomme. J. Ehrlichman: I might have Dick and Jeb come over at 5 o'clock. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. J. Ehrlichman: And tell them what we have done, tell them that I will reduce the report to typewriting, which it is not now. HR Haldeman: He could probably be over sooner if you wanted him. He is at his lawyer's office. J. Ehrlichman: Why don't we do it as soon as we can? HR Haldeman: 3:30? J. Ehrlichman: No sense of sitting around here. Make it 3:30. It looks like we always have a drum on the lawn when these things are going on. We had a band out there when Hickel came in. HR Haldeman: Oh, really? Would you check Jeb and see if they - why not have it held here? J. Ehrlichman: Yes, sir. Pres. Nixon: What is the situation then with Mitchell? Undoubtedly, he will have a change of venue? HR Haldeman: If he could come at 3:30 it might be even better. Here. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I think he would have maybe a better chance of getting a judge in a different venue - concerning the witnesses - than he would certainly here in Washington who would feel the political heat of letting the Senate go on. I don't know how to calculate that. That's - It's a good question. I mean, you would have to have it in a place like Missoula, Montana. Pres. Nixon: It is a national story. HR Haldeman: Place like Pascagoula Mississippi might even be better. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah, that would be better. Miami would a pleasant place for it. Pres. Nixon: With you here, you men and Dean, without building stars - well, we have a pretty big bag. HR Haldeman: Right. (unintelligible) his opinion is that they will not reach him. He does not think he is a target and he doesn't think he will be. He thinks he might be but he doesn't think he will and if he's not, that means they are just going to be targeting on the White House. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I am not so sure of that. HR Haldeman: That's right. He said they may be after bigger targets. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. The same names are kind of pealing off, like yours truly. HR Haldeman: Yep. I think he is trying to get attention with that John. J. Ehrlichman: He does believe me. Pres. Nixon: I don't think though - as a matter of fact I can't see that. John Dean has said that we all have to keep our thinking in perspective, - but the potential relationship Magruder had with John is nothing compared to Dean's. He sat in on the damn meetings. HR Haldeman: That's right. As however even at a somewhat higher level - if he can establish himself in a similar role as that of Gordon Strachan - and say that he was merely a messenger, a conduit, an agent. J. Ehrlichman: Boy, Mitchell sure doesn't agree with that. I assume Mitchell will never testify. That would by my assumption. HR Haldeman: Well one thing that you know we haven't talked about, but I am sure you have thought through and I have talked to him and told him I was reporting to the President is that the outcome of the Magruder thing is that there will never be any published Magruder testimony. J. Ehrlichman: That's right. HR Haldeman: So the question of what Magruder's testimony amounts to is only - J. Ehrlichman: That's not right, Bob. He will be indicted and he will plead guilty and be sentenced. HR Haldeman: That's right. J. Ehrlichman: Then he is available so the Committee or to the Court as a witness in somebody else's case. Pres. Nixon: Oh, he is? J. Ehrlichman: He will be brought in his prison denims, change into a business suit and be put on the stand. Pres. Nixon: Oh. HR Haldeman: Really? J. Ehrlichman: Sure. HR Haldeman: Why doesn't he take the Fifth on additional possible self- incrimination? J. Ehrlichman: He's already been doing it. HR Haldeman: (unintelligible) must - go on anyway. This stuff wasn't hanging on any of those things anyway and we just have to face that fact that whatever the story is it is going to be out anyway. J. Ehrlichman: They will have the entire story out, plus probably two other stories that two other guys make up. HR Haldeman: That's right. J. Ehrlichman: And that anything and everything that is said will be believed. HR Haldeman: And at least some of which will be enormously damaging to us. J. Ehrlichman: There would no way - HR Haldeman: Not provable, but damaging - J. Ehrlichman: No way to deny it. Pres. Nixon: It is terrible when they get such a big bag. HR Haldeman: Yep. Pres. Nixon: What does all this mean with regard to the - our posture here. Would you say let's take the gaff? HR Haldeman: No, or do you deny it? Pres. Nixon: And cooperating with the committee and so forth. You are now looking at another month of it. HR Haldeman: I don't think we should take that chance. See if we can - a month or more. Pres. Nixon: I don't want to. I don't want to. Bob, you see the point. I don't want to cooperate with the committee unless I could get a resolution of the entire Republican Caucus in the Senate. We can't do that. (Unintelligible) based on the (unintelligible) situation. Do you not agree? HR Haldeman: Well, I don't know, but I think what happened there J. Ehrlichman: Look, what should I say to Ervin and Baker on Monday? Pres. Nixon: That's exactly why I am raising this point. J. Ehrlichman: One thing, it's a live actors show. I think Magruder and Mitchell and others - HR Haldeman: If they show up at the Senate J. Ehrlichman: Will not be witnesses at the Ervin hearings. Pres. Nixon: They will not? You just told me a moment ago that they could be witnesses at the trial. J. Ehrlichman: Well, they can but the point is that - after the trial and their sentencing. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. Of Mitchell. J. Ehrlichman: They could be subpoenaed. Pres. Nixon: Yeah J. Ehrlichman: And they would be delivered up to the committee. Pres. Nixon: But by that you mean until Mitchell is tried they can't be. J. Ehrlichman: That's right. Until they stand trial, well, it would prejudice their rights. Pres. Nixon: Not only they - but he's already given - pled guilty. J. Ehrlichman: Ah. Well then Magruder could be a witness after he's been sentenced. If he wanted to be and - Pres. Nixon: Wanted to be? J. Ehrlichman: Here's the tricky point. Whether or not Ervin can grant immunity to someone who has been sentenced and is serving a sentence is something that I don't know, whether that would make any difference or not. I have no doubt that a judge can, but I don't know whether the Senate can. I think Ervin's best bet is to suspend as soon as these indictments are announced. If he were smart that's what he'd do, and then just let this thing (unintelligible) and then come around afterwards and punch up places that they missed. Just go around the battlefield and get the croix de guerre. Pres. Nixon: Well after they get through, this - this kind of indictment - there isn't going to be that much gas in the Ervin Committee. I mean, they'll go ahead, but I mean they'll say well, now, what the hell. Still Segretti - too small. (Unintelligible.) J. Ehrlichman: Just take the leavings. Pres. Nixon: What? J. Ehrlichman: He gets the leavings. That's all. HR Haldeman: They'll delve into it because their whole pitch is that this isn't the Watergate. It's the use, the misuse, of money and all that sort of stuff. They're going to run that money (unintelligible) down. Where did it come from. HR Haldeman: Where did it go? J. Ehrlichman: Mitchell said, incidentally - Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) million dollars? HR Haldeman: Well, yeah. J. Ehrlichman: Mitchell said that we should take great care to establish that three fifty came from the pre-'72 campaign money. HR Haldeman: Right. J. Ehrlichman: I asked. "Any questions in your mind about that?" And he said, "No. My impression is that that is where it came from," but he said, "Maury Stans and Herb Kalmbach spent a week together trying to tie all these various funds down as the source and that's a big loose end." Pres. Nixon: Well you better - let's get that one. Well, there's no question about that was there Bob? HR Haldeman: Not in my mind. J. Ehrlichman: Well, but you see Maury and Herb HR Haldeman: Was that, there was - well, (unintelligible) the question was how much of it would we set aside. (Unintelligible) to three fifty. J. Ehrlichman: Maury - Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) over here? Maury? HR Haldeman: No. Gordon Strachan went over there and got it. Well, either Sloan brought it ver here or Strachan went over there. I'm not sure which. Strachan took delivery from Sloan. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) this was before the campaign started, in other words? HR Haldeman: April sixth. Pres. Nixon: April sixth? J. Ehrlichman: That may make a problem. Pres. Nixon: After the date of - HR Haldeman: The day before the seventh. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) it was April seventh. But it was (unintelligible) before. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah it was cash that had been - John (unintelligible) but John implied that they had bigger problems and that they had to use this money to make up shortages some place else or something. I don't know. He didn't get into all this, but he said - HR Haldeman: They never told me that. J. Ehrlichman: They had problems with making their accountings all come out even Kalmbach and Stans. HR Haldeman: Kalmbach assured me all the time that the cash from seventy was intact, except for some that we knew had been used. But what was intact was - there was supposedly about two million. What was intact was about a million six and the question - there was way more than three fifty in other words. Many times that. And the question was how much of that million, six - and they convinced me that you don't want a million six - or it could have been restored to two million (unintelligible) but you don't want that because under the new laws and everything there is no way that you could find to spend it. There isn't that much stuff you can spend on that wouldn't be traceable. And so somehow a figure of three fifty was negotiated as being a reasonable figure that might be, you know, would cover what might come up that wouldn't be impossible and wouldn't put exactly a hole in the campaign. So it was (unintelligible). That was money that was not really - Pres. Nixon: Didn't belong to the Committee? HR Haldeman: Belonged to the Committee. What happened really is that it did. We made a contribution to the Committee. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. That's what it was. HR Haldeman: The friends of Nixon in seventy. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: Made a million three contribution to the Committee and kept three fifty of what it had of its carry over funds. J. Ehrlichman: That's the way to argue that. HR Haldeman: That's the way it was. Pres. Nixon: I wonder if you'll (unintelligible) then - (unintelligible) I think, Bob. HR Haldeman: I can't reach Magruder. There's no answer (unintelligible) over something. If he arrives here they'll let us know. Pres. Nixon: We better get the other things out of the way. I think we're going to be - I don't want to be hammered - (unintelligible) I don't want to - I don't (unintelligible) they'll hammer the hell out of us anyway, but I don't (unintelligible) that's a - that's just a (unintelligible) all here. We'll take - we'll take a hell of a beating (unintelligible) in the next thirty days, a lot of heat, we'll take with regard to why we aren't appearing, why we aren't going to appear before the Committee. Now, how do we answer that? Do we answer that by saying the Committee won't agree to our - to the proper ground rules? Is that correct? J. Ehrlichman: We say we don't want to turn it into a circus. We want our testimony received in a judicious and probative way. We are willing to have our people go, but only under the right circumstances. Pres. Nixon: Well. HR Haldeman: You get it by the Kissinger thing we are releasing the record of your negotiations down channel. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: Simply say that this is what we offer. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: We stand ready to meet this offer whenever the enemy is willing to talk. J. Ehrlichman: Seriously. Pres. Nixon: The question would then arise. HR Haldeman: Tell 'em we'll resume the bombing. J. Ehrlichman: I think it will probably not in the light of the heat from the Grand Jury and so on. HR Haldeman: I still think you can. Maybe it can't be done, but there ought to be a way to turn the Grand Jury thing strongly our way, which is that this proves the rightness of the President's approach of full cooperation with the proper process of justice which is bringing people, even at the very highest level, to account. Pres. Nixon: You (unintelligible) cooperation. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. I think we should do that. HR Haldeman: And cooperating on the (unintelligible). And the value of that. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) first man out on it should not be favored. You understand the importance of that and so forth and so on. Then I've got to (unintelligible) and get (unintelligible). Trying to think of how to use you effectively in this too, John, is a - J. Ehrlichman: I have to - I have to be unwilling to tell the press what I discovered because of the rights of individuals. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. J. Ehrlichman: Unless we want to get Mitchell and Magruder off. I could sure as hell give them an iron clad defense. Pres. Nixon: Oh. Oh, I meant (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: Just don't defend 'em huh? Pres. Nixon: The time the Grand Jury has indicted. J. Ehrlichman: I could prejudice their rights in such a way that they could - will never get a fair trial. Pres. Nixon: I guess you're right. You can't do it. See, Bob, very little you can do (unintelligible) Grand Jury. J. Ehrlichman: Well, how about a HR Haldeman: What's wrong with prejudicing their rights? J. Ehrlichman: Well, I don't know. How about if I were to do this. HR Haldeman: Get your indictment, but you don't get anybody in jail. J. Ehrlichman: I could say that I made a report. I could say that I made a deal. I could say that you instructed me to do certain things. One of the things you instructed me to do was talk to Magruder. Another thing you instructed me to do was to talk to the Attorney General. And I did all those things. Pres. Nixon: And you did, but not Mitchell. J. Ehrlichman: And then I wouldn't mention who else. I could say I talked to other people. Pres. Nixon: "Did you talk to Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Ehrlichman?" J. Ehrlichman: I am not going to get into any other names of any people. HR Haldeman: Then why get into Magruder? Pres. Nixon: Cause he's testifying. That's the only difference. I don't know. You always come up with what not to do to those people. J. Ehrlichman: (Unintelligible) right. Pres. Nixon: Does (unintelligible) know Bob. Aren't we really sort of in a position where it would be better to know whose (unintelligible) in that damn Grand Jury. At least, pull the (unintelligible) on something there. I really think you do. And, they're (unintelligible) happy. It seems to me that a hell of a lot of the issue about do something involves our inability to (unintelligible) back that we're willing to cooperate. That we're willing to waive executive privilege and keeping our people silent. Now that's what I'm really trying to (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: We will get - HR Haldeman: I've always heard that that's the right - that's the point - that kind of argument. Pres. Nixon: Is that (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: (Unintelligible) one day plus story. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: The price for which is weeks of - Pres. Nixon: Disaster. HR Haldeman: Disaster. J. Ehrlichman: But the thing that's wrong with that is that while it's a one day plus story, it's also the illumination of ninety days of negative stories. Pres. Nixon: Before you ever get there. That's the point. HR Haldeman: And it's setting up ninety days of other negative, more negative stories. J. Ehrlichman: Well, maybe. Maybe. That's a very good question. Pres. Nixon: The question is how much more negative is there. J. Ehrlichman: You could have Pres. Nixon: Then have the Senators go out and characterize it and all that. J. Ehrlichman: You could have peace with honor if we could get them to agree, as I believe they will, that executive privilege is reserved at the time of questioning. HR Haldeman: They've pretty much stipulated that, haven't they? J. Ehrlichman: That's right. Pres. Nixon: What do you mean reserved? J. Ehrlichman: I mean Pres. Nixon: Negotiated? J. Ehrlichman: No. HR Haldeman: You (unintelligible) regarding the individual question J. Ehrlichman: Right. HR Haldeman: Evaluate privilege as to appearance. J. Ehrlichman: Right HR Haldeman: But you also (unintelligible) the merits of each individual question as to whether it relates to privilege or not and ask you question by question. It will be by your representative (unintelligible). And Connally's happy dream that I go up there charging away at the Senate doesn't work. Pres. Nixon: I think Henry has a good point here too and the thought about it is, he doesn't want to go out and be the first witness and if there is an overrule (unintelligible). I think makes sense. Although, let me say I do think that we still ought to consider - are we still considering the possibility of getting out the Segretti story? J. Ehrlichman: Yes. Pres. Nixon: No way we could do it? J. Ehrlichman: I think getting out the Haldeman story would be more useful in the light of Magruder and others going down to testify. Pres. Nixon: In other words you'd get that out before they testify? J. Ehrlichman: If possible. J. Ehrlichman: Well, (unintelligible) yeah. HR Haldeman: The best (unintelligible) story you'd get out would be a White House story. Pres. Nixon: That's right. J. Ehrlichman: About how we've been working at - HR Haldeman: Which meets Henry's objections. Well, it's the Haldeman story, but you add to it - the whole thing. It's the J. Ehrlichman: You say (unintelligible) I have investigated. (Unintelligible) up the whole. Pres. Nixon: What - what I, basically, is having an Ehrlichman report. We've got some of the Dean report. That would be simply we have an Ehrlichman report that he makes and here is the situation with regard to the White House involvement. I haven't gone into the Committee thing. J. Ehrlichman: Now the current (unintelligible) the current (unintelligible) on White House involvement primarily are Haldeman's (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: That's right. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I didn't go into White House involvement. I assumed that - Pres. Nixon: No. I (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: That what you needed to know from me, and this would be what I would say, what the President needed to know was the truth or falsity of charges that were leaking out with regard to committee for the Reelection personnel and any connections to the White House that might exist. That was the area of inquiry rather than whether anybody in the White House was involved." Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) trying to get you out there in a way that you didn't have to go into all that stuff, you see. J. Ehrlichman: I know. I understand. I understand. Pres. Nixon: The fact that you are going to go before the indictments. J. Ehrlichman: Well, I'd do it before the indictments and say, look, we have great confidence in the Grand Jury process. Pres. Nixon: That's right. J. Ehrlichman: And I don't want to do anything that is going to in any way impair that process. Pres. Nixon: That's right. A number of people have been called before that Grand Jury, and I'm not going to J. Ehrlichman: The - HR Haldeman: Say everything I have found has been turned over to the Justice Department. J. Ehrlichman: Check. HR Haldeman: Relating to that. Pres. Nixon: Everything that the Grand Jury is considering. J. Ehrlichman: And I doubt seriously that I discovered anything new. What I probably did was simply bring into the White House for the first time a body of information that otherwise was available. Other investigators undoubtedly could do the same thing that I did and maybe a lot better. But we had had no occasion, previously, to bring all that information before us. I talked to Kleindienst, so I got what the Justice Department had. I got stuff from all over and we brought it in and we tried to assemble it in a way that it was meaningful for the President and - HR Haldeman: Did you review the FBI files? J. Ehrlichman: No. HR Haldeman: Why not? That's the original source you said was the most extensive investigation in history. Why the hell didn't you look at it? J. Ehrlichman: I didn't look at it because I didn't need to look at it. I got a summary. Pres. Nixon: Dean (unintelligible) the summary. J. Ehrlichman: No, and the Justice Department - Pres. Nixon: Yeah, go ahead. J. Ehrlichman: And - Pres. Nixon: I think that's easy enough (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: I do too. J. Ehrlichman: I didn't, I didn't try and duplicate the work of the U.S. Attorney. What I tried to do was simply determine for the President's us - and for the President's use only whether or not there was substance to charges that we were hearing, and whether or not there was White House involvement with relation to those charges. And to determine whether or not the White House ought to be doing anything about its own personnel or about others that it was not doing. We were not trying to determine what the U.S. Attorney should do or the Grand Jury should do or the Justice Department should do. At the same time it would be (unintelligible) for us to withhold anything from the Justice Department in the thought that some of this information might not have been previously available to them. So I am not going to go into it. I am not going to tell you what I found. Pres. Nixon: Well, but here's the Haldeman story (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: But - no. I'm not going to tell you specifically what I found because obviously the purpose of my work was simply for the President to form judgments - as the basis for the President to form judgments - with regard to White House personnel and other government personnel. And to determine whether or not the White House was actually in any way impeding the progress of the prosecutorial effort by anything that we were inadvertently doing. And, so that - that's not very fancy and I'd want to think that through. Pres. Nixon: So (unintelligible) what I'm trying to get is how you get his story out. That's what I'm (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: Oh. I see. I think you just put that out - just Bat put that out. And do it - hang it on the peg of the Ervin Committee setting a date for their first day of hearings. Pres. Nixon: You mean you'd ask for an early date? J. Ehrlichman: No. They will, they will Wednesday, they will Wednesday. Pres. Nixon: Right. J. Ehrlichman: Their hearing schedule. Pres. Nixon: And then Haldeman will make his statement - J. Ehrlichman: Haldeman makes his statement and says, well I have been sitting here waiting for a chance to be heard. It's obvious now that it's going to be umpty-ump days before Pres. Nixon: We think the dates (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: Well, first of May is the earliest. HR Haldeman: When they start. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. HR Haldeman: And they - then when they hear McCord and (unintelligible) witnesses before that J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. HR Haldeman: Before us. J. Ehrlichman: So he could say it now looks like it will he several months before I would get a chance to be heard before the Ervin Committee at best, so I would like to make a statement at this time going into a number of charges that have been Pres. Nixon: That have been bandied about J. Ehrlichman: Right. Pres. Nixon: Then you - the way I would handle that, I would say, "Now let's take the Segretti matter" - no - "First, let's take Watergate." You say, "I had no knowledge -" (unintelligible). "Let's take the Segretti thing. Now, here are the facts." - Then I would point out - (unintelligible) point out (unintelligible) incrimination? HR Haldeman: No. J. Ehrlichman: Well, we don't know that HR Haldeman: Huh? Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) OK, John. (Unintelligible) with Segretti? HR Haldeman: Well, he was clearly (unintelligible) which is to - tally (unintelligible) that Segretti - Segretti's instructions were that he was to do nothing illegal. And, well then answer the question how could you launch a guy out - Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: And (unintelligible) Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: (Unintelligible) that's one of the reasons that they - Pres. Nixon: Now, well, yeah. HR Haldeman: (Unintelligible) Pres. Nixon: Now - here's my (unintelligible) then, and there are charges of money - cash. HR Haldeman: I have a whole list of the general charges. Pres. Nixon: Well, the point is on the money, now I'd (unintelligible). I would say, "(Unintelligible) money - yes, there was three hundred and fifty thousand dollars left over from the campaign in 1970. It was delivered to the White House. HR Haldeman: You see that ties to the same fund that Kalmbach - see you get a question, how could I authorize the expenditure of money to Segretti? Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: Well, I've already established the Segretti thing that Kalmbach bad these funds left over for the campaign and that's what I would assume he would use. Pres. Nixon: Right. Right. HR Haldeman: He was to cut - Pres. Nixon: He decided that these funds were made available for private polling and so forth and so on. "They were used only for - twenty eight thousand dollars was used for - twenty-two thousand dollars for advertising and the balance of three hundred and twenty eight was returned. HR Haldeman: They are going to get very excited about that advertising when, as soon as they find that out, they are going to track that down. And that, we have (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: Vietnam? HR Haldeman: It was "Tell it to Hanoi." Pres. Nixon: Hmph. HR Haldeman: It was a "Tell it to Hanoi" ad countering Vietnam anti-Vietnam veterans. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible). HR Haldeman: Wasn't (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: That's good. HR Haldeman: It went to Baroody which was the J. Ehrlichman: Bill or another Baroody? HR Haldeman: No, Sam or Charlie. J. Ehrlichman: Sam. HR Haldeman: Or Edgar or somebody. One of the others. Pres. Nixon: "Tell it to Hanoi" ads (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: Whatever it was, it wasn't - I was scared to death it might be something. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: A Colson ad but it wasn't. At least that's according to (unintelligible) J. Ehrlichman: Mitchell kept lobbing out little tidbits about Colson's operation. Pres. Nixon: Hmmm. J. Ehrlichman: About sending rioters up to the Capitol steps and other things that he knew about. Pres. Nixon: Well, that was separate from all of Mitchell's stuff, though, wasn't it? What Colson did? J. Ehrlichman: Well, he was saying it's really too bad that all this is coming out because there's so much sordid stuff that will be (unintelligible) to the White House. Pres. Nixon: But sending rioters to the Capitol steps. What do you mean? HR Haldeman: They weren't rioters for heavens sake. Pres. Nixon: Well, they named demonstrators. Why do you tell me? J. Ehrlichman: No, tell it to John Mitchell. HR Haldeman: I don't think anybody (unintelligible) Colson can (unintelligible) rioters. Pres. Nixon: The point is - that is the (unintelligible) my thought with Bob, though, is not to make the counter-charge in his - in this (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: That's right. Pres. Nixon: I think he should save that for the Committee. Now do you agree with that, Bob? HR Haldeman: I don't know. HR Haldeman: It's weak. It's weak if I don't. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. You've got to say - HR Haldeman: I think I've got to make it in - I don't mean make it - Pres. Nixon: Put it in general terms, but hold the white paper. HR Haldeman: I say - site some examples - and say, "All these were done by the others," but I hold off on the thing that I have requested the Committee to look into, and when I'm up there I can say it's a matter of fact, you know, (unintelligible) Pres. Nixon: I do feel that we should get this ready and really bounce it and I think that's the day to do it and I'd say (unintelligible) and I'd say - HR Haldeman: It's ready. Oh, no, it isn't ready but it's close. But it's awful long. Pres. Nixon: Will it be alright? HR Haldeman: I'm not so sure that (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: Perfectly alright. Grand Jury. (Unintelligible) the damn (unintelligible) down to it. And if it says if the Committee doesn't, I cannot allow - I cannot allow - the (unintelligible). I mean the - "my effectiveness as an Assistant to the President will be seriously damaged." "Eroded by false charges and so forth and consequently I am making this statement now. I will make this statement under oath. (Unintelligible) I will make this statement under oath and answer questions under oath when the Ervin Committee finally gets around to hearing me." How's that sound to you, John? J. Ehrlichman: Sounds pretty good. Pres. Nixon: All right. Now I think - I will say - point out - (unintelligible) it is (unintelligible) - "I do not suggest that - "I have only tried to cover in this statement questions of charges to date. That's what I have said and it has not been - and I am sure that others will be made." And (unintelligible) HR Haldeman: But I can't possibly anticipate what they - Pres. Nixon: "I cannot anticipate them. I do not - I cannot anticipate them, but I'd be prepared to answer them." He won't thereby have answered through me questions why (unintelligible). Now the only question that you have left is, I suppose, sort of the peripheral (unintelligible) Dean tumbling around here and asking you and Haldeman how about getting us some money for Watergate defendants. Damn. I can't believe it. I can't believe they'd (unintelligible) you for conspiracy if you were asked for that. Maybe they could. HR Haldeman: I - technically, I'm sure they could. Practically, it just seems awfully remote, but maybe that's wishful thinking. Pres. Nixon: Incidentally, could Strachan - I think - be very helpful for him to say what that twenty-two thousand dollars was for before the Grand Jury. Why not? J. Ehrlichman: He will have to. I can't imagine that they would - Pres. Nixon: Well, they haven't asked him yet. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah, but they will. Because Pres. Nixon: Twenty-two thousand dollars in (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: That makes sense. Pres. Nixon: To be sure, you just tell what happened, you mean? Huh? HR Haldeman: Yeah. Pres. Nixon: Yeah, let's be sure. Well, you could say (unintelligible), it was my (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: I probably better get up and get set up for (unintelligible). HR Haldeman: Let me ask you if this - has that been - there was something else on Gordon. Pres. Nixon: Gordon (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: I m supposed to ask Gordon whether it was delivered in pieces? HR Haldeman: Oh, yeah. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible) forty thousand dollars to (unintelligible) why did he deliver it (unintelligible) actually it was - it was a large - that's a large amount of money. J. Ehrlichman: No, they've already got him on that. Pres. Nixon: Oh, that (unintelligible). J. Ehrlichman: It all fit in a suitcase or something and (unintelligible) of support. HR Haldeman: The reason they were in pieces because there was difficult for them obviously that (unintelligible) to receive back all this cash. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. HR Haldeman: And they requested that it not be. Pres. Nixon: Requested it in two installments? HR Haldeman: (Unintelligible) part of it at the time (unintelligible) balance. My interest was delivering all of it as quickly as possible. I don't know what their (unintelligible) was. Pres. Nixon: At the suggestion of (unintelligible) Magruder (unintelligible) everything you can. HR Haldeman: He's bringing two lawyers. Pres. Nixon: (Unintelligible). HR Haldeman: What we'll do - the point here - if you want Jeb (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: Well, as you know (unintelligible) they want Strachan and they want Dean. Right? HR Haldeman: (Unintelligible) Pres. Nixon: Just trying to get the facts and that's all there is to it. J. Ehrlichman: I'll get back to you when - Pres. Nixon: Be sure you convey my warm sentiments. J. Ehrlichman: Right. HR Haldeman: I think I ought to get Strachan squared away. Pres. Nixon: Sure. HR Haldeman: And if he (unintelligible). Pres. Nixon: Well, we'll see what this finally come down to here (unintelligible). I firmly think - frankly I should say I don't know, but based on what Ehrlichman tells me about (unintelligible) and that removes him from some other things he said. That's what makes (unintelligible) here. (Unintelligible) is the important thing. HR Haldeman: Well (unintelligible) Dean. I can't understand because it's in his interest, as well as everyone else's, to see the motive grow with loyalty. Pres. Nixon: I less we're not surprised at Mitchell, are we? HR Haldeman: No. It's partly true. Pres. Nixon: Hmh. HR Haldeman: What he's saying is partly true. I don't think he did put it together. Pres. Nixon: He shouldn't - he shouldn't throw the burden over here, Bob, on you. Now, frankly, Colson I understand, Colson certainly put the heat on over there. I don't think John seriously (unintelligible) unless you put them up to this thing. HR Haldeman: (unintelligible) I didn't. He knows I didn't. No question of that. Pres. Nixon: I should think be knows it. (Unintelligible) himself. So his (unintelligible), huh? HR Haldeman: That's what he says. Pres. Nixon: You know he'll never - he'll never (unintelligible). What do you think about that as a possible thing goes a trial of the former Attorney General of the United States bud him? This damn case! HR Haldeman: I don't know whether he (unintelligible) or not. Pres. Nixon: He'll have to take the stand at some points. (Unintelligible) all this has happened now. HR Haldeman: That's exactly the point. He's got no defense witness that can deny It. Pres. Nixon: You know in one sense, Bob, it's better to (unintelligible) a couple of these small things but it's much better to hand it to the Grand Jury. McCord may move on the theory that Mitchell will be sorry and the others too (unintelligible) the damn thing - and the Ervin Committee get credit in the Watergate thing? HR Haldeman: Yeah. Pres. Nixon: I don't know. Am I seeing something (unintelligible) that really isn't (unintelligible) or am I? HR Haldeman: No, no. That was the thing I was trying to get at this morning. That what that proves is the President's, in my view, the President's course was right. The President wasn't covering up. The President was cooperating with the proper place and the proper place has come to the proper result, which is to find out in an orderly manner without tarring innocent people, to find out what's going on.