Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0118/01183.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01183}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Nixon Tapes, The
March 21, 1973. (5:20pm - 6:01pm)}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{nixon
pres
john
dean
haldeman
hr
ehrlichman
say
now
problem}
$Date{1974}
$Log{}
Title:       Nixon Tapes, The
Author:      Various
Date:        1974

March 21, 1973. (5:20pm - 6:01pm)

Meeting:  President Nixon, John Dean, HR Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman,
     EOB Office

Pres. Nixon:  Well, what conclusions have you reached up to the moment?

HR Haldeman:  Well, you go round and round and come up with all questions and
               no answers.  Right back where you were at when you started.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, do you have any additional thoughts?

J. Ehrlichman:  Well, I just don't think that the immunity thing will wash

Pres. Nixon:  In a Grand Jury?

J. Ehrlichman:  It may but (inaudible) John's Grand Jury package was

Pres. Nixon:  To get immunity for some -

J. Ehrlichman:  For various witnesses.

Pres. Nixon:  Who had to go before the Grand Jury.

J. Ehrlichman:  I think you have to figure that that is out of the picture.  I
               just don't believe we can do that.  It can't be carried off.

HR Haldeman:  Either the Grand Jury (inaudible) special, or a special panel,

John Dean:  A panel could investigate and report back on the whole thing.
               Immunized witnesses can be obtained,

Pres. Nixon:  Will it an indictment of people in the Presidential family?

John Dean:  We have pending work on legislation to get immunity powers at the
               Department of Justice right now, asking them to assess tins.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, let's take the Grand Jury now, without immunity, and what
               are your ideas about getting out of it?

John Dean:  Well, yes I think that is still a possibility, at least for some
               very drastic results (inaudible) statutes later on some
               (inaudible)

J. Ehrlichman:  Well, there could be people in and out of the White House
               indicated for various offenses.

Pres. Nixon:  The other item I mentioned, I wouldn't spend too much time with
               that.

J. Ehrlichman:  The other item would be to pick out two papers and possibly
               three and say "(expletive omitted), you asked me about this.
               Here is my review of the facts."  I think we disagree as to
               whether or not that is a viable.  I think you could get out a
               fairly credible document that would stand up, and that would
               have the effect of turning the scope, and would have the effect
               of maybe becoming the battle ground on a reduced scope, which I
               think is important.  The big danger is the Ervin Hearings, as I
               see it, is the Committee will run out leads into areas that it
               would be better not to have them get into.  And then Baker
               could come in this direction.  And then you could put out a
               basic document that would come on in a limited subject that
               would rather consciously hit the target.

Pres. Nixon:  The imposing problem is this, Does anybody really think we can
               do nothing?  That's the option, period.  If he fights it out on
               this ground, it takes all summer.

HR Haldeman:  Which it will.

Pres. Nixon:  That's it, whether or not today at the danger point.

HR Haldeman:  Well, we have talked about that.  We have talked about possible
               opportunities in the Senate.  Things may turn up that we don't
               foresee now.  Some people may be sort of playing the odds.

J. Ehrlichman:  The problem of the Hunt thing or some of these other people,
               there is just no sign off on them.  That problem goes on and
               on.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, that's right.  If that's the case then, what is your view
               as to what we should do now about Hunt, et cetera?

J. Ehrlichman:  Well, my view is that Hunt's interests lie in getting a pardon
               if he can.  That ought to be somehow or another one of the
               options that he is most particularly concerned about.  Now, his
               indirect contacts with John don't contemplate that at all -
               (inaudible)

Pres. Nixon:  He assumes that's already understood.

John Dean:  He's got to get that by Christmas, I understand.

J. Ehrlichman:  That's right.  And if he does, obviously he has a bigger
               defense crosswise.

HR Haldeman:  If that blows -

J. Ehrlichman:  If that blows and that seems to me, although I doubt if he is
               understood, he has really turned over backwards since he has
               been in there.  However, can he, by talking, get a pardon?
               Clemency from the Court?  Obviously he has thought of this.  If
               he goes in there and tells this Judge before sentencing, if he
               says, "Your honor I am willing to tell all.  I don't want to go
               to jail.  I plead guilty to an offense.  If I don't have to go
               to jail, I will cooperate with you and the government.  I will
               tell you everything I know."  I think that probably he would
               receive very favorable consideration.

Pres. Nixon:  Yeah.  And then so the point we have to, the bridge we have to
               cross there, that you have to cross I understand quite soon, is
               what you do about Hunt and his present finance?  What do we do
               about that?

John Dean:  Well apparently Mitchell and LaRue are now aware of it so they
               know how is is feeling.

Pres. Nixon:  True.  Are they going to do something?

John Dean:  Well, I have not talked with either of them.  Their positions are
               sympathetic.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, it is a long road isn't it?  When you look back on it, as
               John has pointed out here, it really has been a long road for
               all of you, of us.

HR Haldeman:  It sure is.

Pres. Nixon:  For all of us, for all of us.  That's why you are wrestling with
               the idea of moving in another direction.

John Dean:  That's right.  It is not only that group, but within this circle
               of people, that have tidbits of knowledge, there are a lot of
               weak individuals and it could be one of those who crosses up:
               the secretary to Liddy, the secretary to Jeb Magruder.  Chuck
               Colson's secretary, among others, will be called before the
               Senate Committee.  This is not solved by one forum.  A civil
               suit filed by O'Brien which for some reason we can't get
               settled.  They are holding on to it.  They will have intense
               civil discovery.  They may well work hand and glove with that
               Senate Committee.  They will go out and take depositions and
               start checking for the inconsistencies, see what is in the
               transcript of one and see what people say in the other
               (inaudible)

Pres. Nixon:  Well, I am not going to worry about that.

John Dean:  Well, they, the people are starting to protect their own behind:
               Dwight, for example, hired himself a lawyer; Colson has
               retained a lawyer; and now that we are all starting the
               self-protection certainly.

Pres. Nixon:  Maybe we face the situation.  We can't do a damn about the
               participants.  If it is going to be that way eventually, why
               not now?  That is what you are sort of resigned to, isn't it?

John Dean:  Well, I thought (inaudible) by keeping on top of it it would not
               harm you.  Maybe the individuals would get harmed.

Pres. Nixon:  We don't want to harm the people either.  That is true.  They
               were doing things for the best interests of their my concern.
               We can't harm these young people (inaudible) country - at is
               all.

HR Haldeman:  Well, we don't have any question here of some guy stashing money
               in his pocket.

Pres. Nixon:  It isn't something like this, for example, (expletive omitted)
               treason.

HR Haldeman:  Well, like Sherman Adams, doing it for their own ambition or
               comfort.

Pres. Nixon:  Well, that is why I say on this one that we have to realize that
               the system is going to run and that is your problem.

HR Haldeman:  The only problem (inaudible)

John Dean:  It is structured.  That your concern about, "There is something
               lurking here."  Now is the time to get the facts before Richard
               Nixon himself.  Dean couldn't get all the information.  People
               wouldn't give it to him.  There are things, there are a lot of
               things.  And if you would like to get all of this information
               and you lay it before the public, but it is not going to come
               because some people go to a Grand Jury and tell the truth.

HR Haldeman:  Lie?

Pres. Nixon:  And it isn't going to come out of the Committee.

J. Haldeman:  For those reasons,

John Dean:  It would not be fair.  Go ahead, that's the point, or it may never
               come out.  But now is the time to throw it all out.

HR Haldeman:  They are not going to have the key witnesses.

John Dean:  So therefore you select a panel of the Attorney General, the head
               of the Criminal Division, head of the Civil Division -
               something like that.  Call on everybody in the White House, and
               tell them we want them, we have been instructed by the
               President to tell him exactly what happened.  And you won't be
               prosecuted for it because that is not the point now.  The point
               is to get out this information.  And then you will make a
               decision, based on what you learn, whether people can remain in
               the government or not.  And if it is bad they will be removed
               or forced to resign.  If it was something that is palatable,
               they'll go on with their job.

HR Haldeman:  The hue and cry is that this is a super-Presidential Board.  And
               now they realize that they have got guilty people, and they
               immunize them so that they cannot be prosecuted.

John Dean:  I am not so sure how many people would come out guilty.

HR Haldeman:  The perception, as you put it.

Pres. Nixon:  The point is, we were talking -

John Dean:  Alright, is that better?  Or is it better to have (inaudible) and
               things blow up and all of a sudden collapse?  Think about it.

HR Haldeman:  After a little time, the President is accused of covering up
               that way.

Pres. Nixon:  That isn't the point.

J. Ehrlichman:  Or is there another way?

Pres. Nixon:  Yeah, like -

J. Ehrlichman:  The Dean statements, where the President then makes a bold
               disclosure of everything which he then has.  And is in a
               position if it does collapse at a later time to say, "I had the
               FBI and the Grand Jury, and I had my own Counsel.  I turned
               over every document I could find.  I placed in my confidence
               young people and as is obvious now (inaudible)

Pres. Nixon:  (inaudible) It doesn't concern me.  I mean as far as the policy
               is concerned.  You as White House Counsel, John.  I asked for a
               written report, which I do not have, which is very general
               understand.  I am thinking now in far more general terms,
               having in mind the facts, that where specifics are concerned,
               make it very general, your investigation of the case.  Not that
               "this man is guilty, this man is not guilty," but "this man did
               do that."  You are going to have to say that, John.  Segretti
               (inaudible) That has to be said.  And so under the
               circumstances,

J. Ehrlichman:  Could he do this?  To give some belief to this, that he could
               attach an appendix, listing the FBI reports that you had access
               to:  interview with Kalmbach, interview with Segretti,
               interview with Chapin, Magruder, and whoever and me.  So that
               the President at some later time is in a position to say, "I
               relied."

John Dean:  And Dean cooperated on these things.

J. Ehrlichman:  That's right.

Pres. Nixon:  It also helps with the Gray situation because it shows Dean's
               name on the FBI reports as reporting to the President.  He can
               say in there, "I have not disclosed the contents of these to
               anybody else.  Yes, I had access to the reports for the purpose
               of carrying out your instructions."  And I know that that is
               true because you are the one I asked with regard to my report.

J. Ehrlichman:  I think the President is in a stronger position later.  The
               President is in a stronger position later, if he can be shown
               to have justifiably relied on you at this point in time.

John Dean:  Well, there is the argument now that Dean's credibility is in
               question.  Maybe I shouldn't do it.  Maybe someone else

HR Haldeman:  This will rehabilitate you though.  Your credibility -

Pres. Nixon:  As a matter of fact, John, I don't think your credibility has
               been much injured.  Sure you are under a test that they want.
               You are up there to testify.  I don't think it is the
               credibility.  They want you to testify.  I would not be too
               sensitive about that.  You are going to make a hell of a good
               impression.

J. Ehrlichman:  Beyond that, you can help your participation in the interviews
               by saying that, in addition to having seen the FBI synopses,
               you were present at the time of the interviews.

Pres. Nixon:  No.  Not seeing.  You were present at the time of the interviews
               and that you, yourself, conducted interviews of the following
               people.  I am just trying to think of people, et cetera, that
               you can list.

John Dean:  It will turn it all into a puzzle.

J. Haldeman:  Absolutely, yeah.

J. Ehrlichman:  I am doing this in furtherance of my role.

Pres. Nixon:  Also, that there has been such a lot of - put out about what you
               have done without referring to the fact, without being
               defensive about it, you intended to - This should not be a
               letter to Eastland.  I think this should be a letter to me.
               You could say that, "Now, now that hearings are going on, I can
               now give a report that we can put out."

HR Haldeman:  That is what you can say.  In other words, he gives you a report
               because you asked him for it, regardless of the timeliness.

John Dean:  I am not thinking of that.  Don't worry about that.  I have no
               problem with the timing.  It is just that Liddy and McCord are
               still out on appeal.  That is why I haven't tried to do this
               before.

HR Haldeman:  We are going to have a big period of that.  I think you could
               say -

J. Ehrlichman:  You could say, "I have a report.  I don't want to show it.  I
               would not want it published because some fellows' trial of the
               case is still on."

Pres. Nixon:  Let me say this.  The problem with, is:  I don't believe that
               helps on our cause.  The fact that cover up - I am not sure.
               Maybe I am wrong.  The fact that the President says, "I have
               shown Ervin."  Remember we had nobody there.  I think that
               something has to go first.  We need to put out something.

HR Haldeman:  If we worry about the timeliness, and try to hang it on a sense
               thing, then we have to ignore the trial, and say Dean has given
               you a report.  We basically said it was an oral report.  The
               thing is that Dean has kept you posted from time to time with
               periodic oral reports as this thing, as it becomes convenient.
               You have asked him now to summarize those into an overall
               summary.

Pres. Nixon:  Overall summary.  And I will make the report available to the
               Ervin Committee.  And then I offer the Ervin Committee report
               this way, I say, "Dear Senator Ervin.  Here is the report
               before your hearings.  You have this report, and as I have said
               previously, any questions that are not answered here, you can
               call the White House staff member, and they will be directed to
               answer any questions on an informal basis." (inaudible)

HR Haldeman:  Yeah.

J. Ehrlichman:  Let's suppose you did do that.  You did as to the burglary,
               you did it as to Segretti and you made some passing comments to
               money, right?  You send her up there.  Let's suppose I am
               called at some time.  Our position on that is that I wasn't a
               prosecutor, that he was sent out to do an investigation on
               Ellsberg.  And when we discovered what he was up to, we stopped
               him.  Now, I suppose that lets Ellsberg out, because there are
               search and seizure things here that may be sufficient at least
               for a mistrial, if not for -

Pres. Nixon:  Isn't that case about finished yet?

J. Ehrlichman:  Oh, it will go a little while yet.  Let's suppose that
               occurred.  That it was a national security situation.  The man
               exercised bad judgment, and I think it is inarguable that he
               should never have been permitted to go to the Committee after
               that episode, having reflected on his Judgment that way.  But
               beyond that, the question is did he completely authorize
               (inaudible)

Pres. Nixon:  Yeah.  Getting back to this, John.  You still tilt to the panel
               idea yourself?

John Dean:  Well, I see in this conversation what I have talked about before.
               They do not ultimately solve what I see as a grave problem of a
               cancer growing around the Presidency.  This creates another
               problem.  It does not clean the problem out.

Pres. Nixon:  Well,

J. Ehrlichman:  But doesn't it permit the President to clean it out at such
               time as it does comes up?  By saying, "Indeed, I relied on it.
               And now this later thing turns up, and I don't condone that.
               And if I had known that before, obviously I would have run it
               down."

Pres. Nixon:  Here's what John is to.  You really think you've got to clean
               the cancer out now, right?

John Dean:  Yes sir.

Pres. Nixon:  How would you do that?  Do you see another way?  Without
               breaking down our executive privilege.

John Dean:  I see a couple of ways to do it.

Pres. Nixon:  You certainly don't want to do it at the Senate, do you?

John Dean:  No sir, I think that would be an added trap.

Pres. Nixon:  That's the worst thing.  Right.  We've got to do it.  We aren't
               asked to do it.

John Dean:  You've got to do it, to get the credit for it.  That gets you
               above it.  As I see it, naturally you'll get hurt and I hope we
               can find the answer to that problem.

J. Ehrlichman:  Alright, suppose we did this?  Supposing you write a report to
               the President on everything you know about this.  And the
               President then, prior to seeing it, says "Did you send the
               report over to the Justice Department?"  When it goes he says,
               (unintelligible) has been at work on this.  My, Counsel has
               been at work on this.  Here are his findings.

Pres. Nixon:  Where would you start?  I don't know where it stops.  Ziegler?
               The Vice President?

HR Haldeman:  Well, re Magruder over at Commerce.  Obviously you would send a
               report over that said Magruder did this and that.  Well, that
               is what he is talking about apparently.

Pres. Nixon:  And then Magruder.  The fellow is a free agent.

J. Haldeman:  The free agent.

Pres. Nixon:  Who according to the Hunt theory, could pull others down with
               him.

HR Haldeman:  Sure.  What would happen?  Sure as hell we have to assume Dwight
               would be drawn in.

John Dean:  Draw numbers with names out of a hat to see who gets hurt and who
               doesn't.  That sounds about as fair as you can be, because
               anyone can get hurt.

Pres. Nixon:  Strachan.  This wouldn't do anything to him would it?

John Dean:  Strachan?  I would say yes.  About the same as Jeb.

J. Haldeman:  Do you think so?

John Dean:  Yes, I think he has a problem.

Pres. Nixon:  What is the problem about?

J. Haldeman:  He has a problem of knowledge.

John Dean:  Magruder has a problem of action, action and perjury.

HR Haldeman:  Well, Strachan handled the money.  That is the problem.

John Dean:  The thing that I would like to happen, if it is possible to do it,
               is - Hunt has now sent a blackmail request directly to the
               White House.

Pres. Nixon:  Who did he send it to?  You?

John Dean:  Yes.

Pres. Nixon:  Or to me?

John Dean:  Your Counsel.

HR Haldeman:  That is the interesting kind of thing, there is something there
               that may blow it all up that way and everything starts going in
               a whole new direction.

J. Ehrlichman:  That he would hurt the Eastern Asian Defense.  Right there.
               That is blackmail.

HR Haldeman:  For example, where does that take you?  That takes you to your
               support, the other people who are not fully aware of the DC end
               of it.  But then we didn't know about it either.

John Dean:  That's right.  Well, then you have to get the proper people to say
               -

HR Haldeman:  Well, see if we go your route, you can't draw the line someplace
               and say,

John Dean:  No, no you can t.

Pres. Nixon:  You see, if we go your route of cutting the cancer out.  If we
               cut it out now.  Take a Hunt.  Well, wouldn't that knock the
               hell out from under him?

John Dean:  That's right.

HR Haldeman:  If you take your move and it goes slightly awry, you have a
               certainty, almost, of Magruder going to jail, Chapin going to
               jail, and you going to jail, and probably me going to jail.

Pres. Nixon:  No, I question the last two.

HR Haldeman:  Certainly Chapin.  Certainly Strachan.  No, not really.  Chapin
               and Strachan are clean.

J. Ehrlichman:  I think Strachan is hooked on this money.

Pres. Nixon:  What money was that?

J. Ehrlichman:  He is an accessory on undeclared campaign funds.

HR Haldeman:  That's not his problem.  The only man responsible for that is
               the Treasurer.  I am sure.

John Dean:  I don't know under the law.

Pres. Nixon:  That undeclared was money from before 1970, that was 1968.

J. Ehrlichman:  Yeah.  But then it got back into the coffers and was used in
               this campaign.

John Dean:  Let's say the President sent me to the Grand Jury to make a
               report.  Who could I actually do anything for?  As a practical
               matter, firsthand knowledge, almost no one.  All I could do
               would be to give them focus point leads.

Pres. Nixon:  Right.

J. Haldeman:  Then they would start calling the leads.

John Dean:  That's right and whether all of them would come down or be served.
               There again, we don't have anybody who could talk to somebody
               who has learned how to pro cess that sort of thing on the
               outside.  I was talking outside with Bob about Henry Peterson.
               We need to have someone talk to Henry Peterson, who can say to
               Henry, "What does this mean in criminal justice?  What kind of
               a case could be made on this?  What kind of sentences would
               evolve out of that?"  He would have a pretty good idea of most
               of the statutes that are involved.  There is so much behind the
               statutes.

Pres. Nixon:  Do you want to recommend that?  That you talk to him?

John Dean:  Well, you are putting in his knowledge.

Pres. Nixon:  I see.

John Dean:  There're a couple of points -

HR Haldeman:  It would be even much better.  Yes.  I have this brother-in-law
               in school. -

John Dean:  He wants a wild scenario.

HR Haldeman:  My friend is writing a play, and he wants to see how -

John Dean:  It bothers me to do anything further now, sir, when Hunt is our
               real unknown.

Pres. Nixon:  Do you think it is a mistake - to talk to him?

John Dean:  Yes, I do.

Pres. Nixon:  It doesn't solve anything - it's just one more step.

J. Haldeman:  The payment to Hunt does too.

John Dean:  The payment to Hunt does.  That is why I say if somebody would
               assess the criminal liability.

HR Haldeman:  Maybe we are misassessing it?

John Dean:  Well, maybe.  We don't know.

Pres. Nixon:  Would you reply to him?

J. Haldeman:  I think I would.

J. Ehrlichman:  How else would you do it?  You could start down that road.
               Say, "I want to talk with you about some questions that arise
               in the course of my own investigation, but I would have to
               swear you to secrecy."

HR Haldeman:  If he will take it on that basis.

John Dean:  The answer is, of course, in the course of this investigation I
               don't know whether he would talk to me off-the-record.

HR Haldeman:  What are your options?

J. Ehrlichman:  Boy, if you could eliminate the option by taking a legal
               position.  You knew nothing about it.

Pres. Nixon:  So you don't see the statement thing helping insofar as in any
               way sparking the start?  You think that over some more.

John Dean:  Yes sir.  You see it is a temporary cancer.

Pres. Nixon:  I agree with that.  And the point is, - but you see, here is the
               way I would see the statement that we would put out:
               Everything we would intend to say in a general statement that I
               have already indicated with regard to the facts as we send them
               in, we say people are to cooperate, without executive
               privilege, et cetera.  Statement, it is true, is temporary.
               But it will indicate that the President has looked into the
               matter, has had his Counsel report to him and this is the
               result of the matter.  We tell the Committee "we will
               cooperate."  The Committee will say no.  And so we just stand
               right there.

John Dean:  Well, really I think what will complicate the problem will be
               Sirica giving a speech from the Bench on Friday when he
               sentences.  Where he will charge that he doesn't believe that
               the trial conducted by the lawyers for the government presented
               a legitimate case and that he is not convinced that the case
               represents the full situation.

HR Haldeman:  In other words -

John Dean:  It will have a dramatic impact coming from the Bench.

Pres. Nixon:  That's right.

John Dean:  I may say in Sirica's defense, it has been charged that there are
               higher-ups involved in this.  He may take some dramatic action
               like, he might appoint a special prosecutor.  Who knows?

Pres. Nixon:  Can he do that?

John Dean:  Sure.

Pres. Nixon:  He would appoint a special prosecutor, for what?

John Dean:  For work in the field of investigating.  He is the Presiding
Judge.

HR Haldeman:  You know he can pick the Grand Jury.  Or he said he could.

Pres. Nixon:  The government is going to do that for a while.

John Dean:  A week after sentencing they are going to take all of the people
               who have been sentenced before a Grand Jury -

Pres. Nixon:  These same ones?

John Dean:  These same ones.  And see if they will now want to talk.  When it
               comes to Sirica and sentencing, he may be giving the ones who
               talk a lesser sentence.  If they don't talk, he will probably
               leave these long sentences stand.

Pres. Nixon:  Suppose he does that.  Where does that leave us, John?

J. Ehrlichman:  I don't think that is a surprise to the defendants.  I think
               their counsel has advised them of that.

Pres. Nixon:  Right, right.  However in terms of this, what about a solution?
               We are damned by the courts before Ervin even gets started.

J. Ehrlichman:  The only thing we can say is that we have investigated it
               backwards and forwards in the White House, and have been
               satisfied on the basis of the report we had that nobody in the
               White House has been involved in a burglary, nobody had notice
               of it, knowledge of it, participated in the planning, or aided
               or abetted it in any way.  And it happens to be true as for
               that transaction.

Pres. Nixon:  John, you don't think that is enough?

John Dean:  No, Mr. President.

J. Ehrlichman:  Let's try another concomitant to that.  Supposing Mitchell
               were to step out on that same day to say, "I have been doing
               some investigation at 1701 and I find - so and so and so and
               so."

Pres. Nixon:  Such as what?

J. Ehrlichman:  I don't know what he would say, but that he wanted to be some
               kind of a spokesman for 1701.

Pres. Nixon:  What the hell does one disclose that isn't doing to blow
               something?  I don't have any time.  I am sorry.  I have to
               leave.  Well, good-bye.  You meet what time tomorrow?

HR Haldeman:  I am not sure.  In the morning probably.