$Unique_ID{bob01183} $Pretitle{} $Title{Nixon Tapes, The March 21, 1973. (5:20pm - 6:01pm)} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{nixon pres john dean haldeman hr ehrlichman say now problem} $Date{1974} $Log{} Title: Nixon Tapes, The Author: Various Date: 1974 March 21, 1973. (5:20pm - 6:01pm) Meeting: President Nixon, John Dean, HR Haldeman, and John Ehrlichman, EOB Office Pres. Nixon: Well, what conclusions have you reached up to the moment? HR Haldeman: Well, you go round and round and come up with all questions and no answers. Right back where you were at when you started. Pres. Nixon: Well, do you have any additional thoughts? J. Ehrlichman: Well, I just don't think that the immunity thing will wash Pres. Nixon: In a Grand Jury? J. Ehrlichman: It may but (inaudible) John's Grand Jury package was Pres. Nixon: To get immunity for some - J. Ehrlichman: For various witnesses. Pres. Nixon: Who had to go before the Grand Jury. J. Ehrlichman: I think you have to figure that that is out of the picture. I just don't believe we can do that. It can't be carried off. HR Haldeman: Either the Grand Jury (inaudible) special, or a special panel, John Dean: A panel could investigate and report back on the whole thing. Immunized witnesses can be obtained, Pres. Nixon: Will it an indictment of people in the Presidential family? John Dean: We have pending work on legislation to get immunity powers at the Department of Justice right now, asking them to assess tins. Pres. Nixon: Well, let's take the Grand Jury now, without immunity, and what are your ideas about getting out of it? John Dean: Well, yes I think that is still a possibility, at least for some very drastic results (inaudible) statutes later on some (inaudible) J. Ehrlichman: Well, there could be people in and out of the White House indicated for various offenses. Pres. Nixon: The other item I mentioned, I wouldn't spend too much time with that. J. Ehrlichman: The other item would be to pick out two papers and possibly three and say "(expletive omitted), you asked me about this. Here is my review of the facts." I think we disagree as to whether or not that is a viable. I think you could get out a fairly credible document that would stand up, and that would have the effect of turning the scope, and would have the effect of maybe becoming the battle ground on a reduced scope, which I think is important. The big danger is the Ervin Hearings, as I see it, is the Committee will run out leads into areas that it would be better not to have them get into. And then Baker could come in this direction. And then you could put out a basic document that would come on in a limited subject that would rather consciously hit the target. Pres. Nixon: The imposing problem is this, Does anybody really think we can do nothing? That's the option, period. If he fights it out on this ground, it takes all summer. HR Haldeman: Which it will. Pres. Nixon: That's it, whether or not today at the danger point. HR Haldeman: Well, we have talked about that. We have talked about possible opportunities in the Senate. Things may turn up that we don't foresee now. Some people may be sort of playing the odds. J. Ehrlichman: The problem of the Hunt thing or some of these other people, there is just no sign off on them. That problem goes on and on. Pres. Nixon: Well, that's right. If that's the case then, what is your view as to what we should do now about Hunt, et cetera? J. Ehrlichman: Well, my view is that Hunt's interests lie in getting a pardon if he can. That ought to be somehow or another one of the options that he is most particularly concerned about. Now, his indirect contacts with John don't contemplate that at all - (inaudible) Pres. Nixon: He assumes that's already understood. John Dean: He's got to get that by Christmas, I understand. J. Ehrlichman: That's right. And if he does, obviously he has a bigger defense crosswise. HR Haldeman: If that blows - J. Ehrlichman: If that blows and that seems to me, although I doubt if he is understood, he has really turned over backwards since he has been in there. However, can he, by talking, get a pardon? Clemency from the Court? Obviously he has thought of this. If he goes in there and tells this Judge before sentencing, if he says, "Your honor I am willing to tell all. I don't want to go to jail. I plead guilty to an offense. If I don't have to go to jail, I will cooperate with you and the government. I will tell you everything I know." I think that probably he would receive very favorable consideration. Pres. Nixon: Yeah. And then so the point we have to, the bridge we have to cross there, that you have to cross I understand quite soon, is what you do about Hunt and his present finance? What do we do about that? John Dean: Well apparently Mitchell and LaRue are now aware of it so they know how is is feeling. Pres. Nixon: True. Are they going to do something? John Dean: Well, I have not talked with either of them. Their positions are sympathetic. Pres. Nixon: Well, it is a long road isn't it? When you look back on it, as John has pointed out here, it really has been a long road for all of you, of us. HR Haldeman: It sure is. Pres. Nixon: For all of us, for all of us. That's why you are wrestling with the idea of moving in another direction. John Dean: That's right. It is not only that group, but within this circle of people, that have tidbits of knowledge, there are a lot of weak individuals and it could be one of those who crosses up: the secretary to Liddy, the secretary to Jeb Magruder. Chuck Colson's secretary, among others, will be called before the Senate Committee. This is not solved by one forum. A civil suit filed by O'Brien which for some reason we can't get settled. They are holding on to it. They will have intense civil discovery. They may well work hand and glove with that Senate Committee. They will go out and take depositions and start checking for the inconsistencies, see what is in the transcript of one and see what people say in the other (inaudible) Pres. Nixon: Well, I am not going to worry about that. John Dean: Well, they, the people are starting to protect their own behind: Dwight, for example, hired himself a lawyer; Colson has retained a lawyer; and now that we are all starting the self-protection certainly. Pres. Nixon: Maybe we face the situation. We can't do a damn about the participants. If it is going to be that way eventually, why not now? That is what you are sort of resigned to, isn't it? John Dean: Well, I thought (inaudible) by keeping on top of it it would not harm you. Maybe the individuals would get harmed. Pres. Nixon: We don't want to harm the people either. That is true. They were doing things for the best interests of their my concern. We can't harm these young people (inaudible) country - at is all. HR Haldeman: Well, we don't have any question here of some guy stashing money in his pocket. Pres. Nixon: It isn't something like this, for example, (expletive omitted) treason. HR Haldeman: Well, like Sherman Adams, doing it for their own ambition or comfort. Pres. Nixon: Well, that is why I say on this one that we have to realize that the system is going to run and that is your problem. HR Haldeman: The only problem (inaudible) John Dean: It is structured. That your concern about, "There is something lurking here." Now is the time to get the facts before Richard Nixon himself. Dean couldn't get all the information. People wouldn't give it to him. There are things, there are a lot of things. And if you would like to get all of this information and you lay it before the public, but it is not going to come because some people go to a Grand Jury and tell the truth. HR Haldeman: Lie? Pres. Nixon: And it isn't going to come out of the Committee. J. Haldeman: For those reasons, John Dean: It would not be fair. Go ahead, that's the point, or it may never come out. But now is the time to throw it all out. HR Haldeman: They are not going to have the key witnesses. John Dean: So therefore you select a panel of the Attorney General, the head of the Criminal Division, head of the Civil Division - something like that. Call on everybody in the White House, and tell them we want them, we have been instructed by the President to tell him exactly what happened. And you won't be prosecuted for it because that is not the point now. The point is to get out this information. And then you will make a decision, based on what you learn, whether people can remain in the government or not. And if it is bad they will be removed or forced to resign. If it was something that is palatable, they'll go on with their job. HR Haldeman: The hue and cry is that this is a super-Presidential Board. And now they realize that they have got guilty people, and they immunize them so that they cannot be prosecuted. John Dean: I am not so sure how many people would come out guilty. HR Haldeman: The perception, as you put it. Pres. Nixon: The point is, we were talking - John Dean: Alright, is that better? Or is it better to have (inaudible) and things blow up and all of a sudden collapse? Think about it. HR Haldeman: After a little time, the President is accused of covering up that way. Pres. Nixon: That isn't the point. J. Ehrlichman: Or is there another way? Pres. Nixon: Yeah, like - J. Ehrlichman: The Dean statements, where the President then makes a bold disclosure of everything which he then has. And is in a position if it does collapse at a later time to say, "I had the FBI and the Grand Jury, and I had my own Counsel. I turned over every document I could find. I placed in my confidence young people and as is obvious now (inaudible) Pres. Nixon: (inaudible) It doesn't concern me. I mean as far as the policy is concerned. You as White House Counsel, John. I asked for a written report, which I do not have, which is very general understand. I am thinking now in far more general terms, having in mind the facts, that where specifics are concerned, make it very general, your investigation of the case. Not that "this man is guilty, this man is not guilty," but "this man did do that." You are going to have to say that, John. Segretti (inaudible) That has to be said. And so under the circumstances, J. Ehrlichman: Could he do this? To give some belief to this, that he could attach an appendix, listing the FBI reports that you had access to: interview with Kalmbach, interview with Segretti, interview with Chapin, Magruder, and whoever and me. So that the President at some later time is in a position to say, "I relied." John Dean: And Dean cooperated on these things. J. Ehrlichman: That's right. Pres. Nixon: It also helps with the Gray situation because it shows Dean's name on the FBI reports as reporting to the President. He can say in there, "I have not disclosed the contents of these to anybody else. Yes, I had access to the reports for the purpose of carrying out your instructions." And I know that that is true because you are the one I asked with regard to my report. J. Ehrlichman: I think the President is in a stronger position later. The President is in a stronger position later, if he can be shown to have justifiably relied on you at this point in time. John Dean: Well, there is the argument now that Dean's credibility is in question. Maybe I shouldn't do it. Maybe someone else HR Haldeman: This will rehabilitate you though. Your credibility - Pres. Nixon: As a matter of fact, John, I don't think your credibility has been much injured. Sure you are under a test that they want. You are up there to testify. I don't think it is the credibility. They want you to testify. I would not be too sensitive about that. You are going to make a hell of a good impression. J. Ehrlichman: Beyond that, you can help your participation in the interviews by saying that, in addition to having seen the FBI synopses, you were present at the time of the interviews. Pres. Nixon: No. Not seeing. You were present at the time of the interviews and that you, yourself, conducted interviews of the following people. I am just trying to think of people, et cetera, that you can list. John Dean: It will turn it all into a puzzle. J. Haldeman: Absolutely, yeah. J. Ehrlichman: I am doing this in furtherance of my role. Pres. Nixon: Also, that there has been such a lot of - put out about what you have done without referring to the fact, without being defensive about it, you intended to - This should not be a letter to Eastland. I think this should be a letter to me. You could say that, "Now, now that hearings are going on, I can now give a report that we can put out." HR Haldeman: That is what you can say. In other words, he gives you a report because you asked him for it, regardless of the timeliness. John Dean: I am not thinking of that. Don't worry about that. I have no problem with the timing. It is just that Liddy and McCord are still out on appeal. That is why I haven't tried to do this before. HR Haldeman: We are going to have a big period of that. I think you could say - J. Ehrlichman: You could say, "I have a report. I don't want to show it. I would not want it published because some fellows' trial of the case is still on." Pres. Nixon: Let me say this. The problem with, is: I don't believe that helps on our cause. The fact that cover up - I am not sure. Maybe I am wrong. The fact that the President says, "I have shown Ervin." Remember we had nobody there. I think that something has to go first. We need to put out something. HR Haldeman: If we worry about the timeliness, and try to hang it on a sense thing, then we have to ignore the trial, and say Dean has given you a report. We basically said it was an oral report. The thing is that Dean has kept you posted from time to time with periodic oral reports as this thing, as it becomes convenient. You have asked him now to summarize those into an overall summary. Pres. Nixon: Overall summary. And I will make the report available to the Ervin Committee. And then I offer the Ervin Committee report this way, I say, "Dear Senator Ervin. Here is the report before your hearings. You have this report, and as I have said previously, any questions that are not answered here, you can call the White House staff member, and they will be directed to answer any questions on an informal basis." (inaudible) HR Haldeman: Yeah. J. Ehrlichman: Let's suppose you did do that. You did as to the burglary, you did it as to Segretti and you made some passing comments to money, right? You send her up there. Let's suppose I am called at some time. Our position on that is that I wasn't a prosecutor, that he was sent out to do an investigation on Ellsberg. And when we discovered what he was up to, we stopped him. Now, I suppose that lets Ellsberg out, because there are search and seizure things here that may be sufficient at least for a mistrial, if not for - Pres. Nixon: Isn't that case about finished yet? J. Ehrlichman: Oh, it will go a little while yet. Let's suppose that occurred. That it was a national security situation. The man exercised bad judgment, and I think it is inarguable that he should never have been permitted to go to the Committee after that episode, having reflected on his Judgment that way. But beyond that, the question is did he completely authorize (inaudible) Pres. Nixon: Yeah. Getting back to this, John. You still tilt to the panel idea yourself? John Dean: Well, I see in this conversation what I have talked about before. They do not ultimately solve what I see as a grave problem of a cancer growing around the Presidency. This creates another problem. It does not clean the problem out. Pres. Nixon: Well, J. Ehrlichman: But doesn't it permit the President to clean it out at such time as it does comes up? By saying, "Indeed, I relied on it. And now this later thing turns up, and I don't condone that. And if I had known that before, obviously I would have run it down." Pres. Nixon: Here's what John is to. You really think you've got to clean the cancer out now, right? John Dean: Yes sir. Pres. Nixon: How would you do that? Do you see another way? Without breaking down our executive privilege. John Dean: I see a couple of ways to do it. Pres. Nixon: You certainly don't want to do it at the Senate, do you? John Dean: No sir, I think that would be an added trap. Pres. Nixon: That's the worst thing. Right. We've got to do it. We aren't asked to do it. John Dean: You've got to do it, to get the credit for it. That gets you above it. As I see it, naturally you'll get hurt and I hope we can find the answer to that problem. J. Ehrlichman: Alright, suppose we did this? Supposing you write a report to the President on everything you know about this. And the President then, prior to seeing it, says "Did you send the report over to the Justice Department?" When it goes he says, (unintelligible) has been at work on this. My, Counsel has been at work on this. Here are his findings. Pres. Nixon: Where would you start? I don't know where it stops. Ziegler? The Vice President? HR Haldeman: Well, re Magruder over at Commerce. Obviously you would send a report over that said Magruder did this and that. Well, that is what he is talking about apparently. Pres. Nixon: And then Magruder. The fellow is a free agent. J. Haldeman: The free agent. Pres. Nixon: Who according to the Hunt theory, could pull others down with him. HR Haldeman: Sure. What would happen? Sure as hell we have to assume Dwight would be drawn in. John Dean: Draw numbers with names out of a hat to see who gets hurt and who doesn't. That sounds about as fair as you can be, because anyone can get hurt. Pres. Nixon: Strachan. This wouldn't do anything to him would it? John Dean: Strachan? I would say yes. About the same as Jeb. J. Haldeman: Do you think so? John Dean: Yes, I think he has a problem. Pres. Nixon: What is the problem about? J. Haldeman: He has a problem of knowledge. John Dean: Magruder has a problem of action, action and perjury. HR Haldeman: Well, Strachan handled the money. That is the problem. John Dean: The thing that I would like to happen, if it is possible to do it, is - Hunt has now sent a blackmail request directly to the White House. Pres. Nixon: Who did he send it to? You? John Dean: Yes. Pres. Nixon: Or to me? John Dean: Your Counsel. HR Haldeman: That is the interesting kind of thing, there is something there that may blow it all up that way and everything starts going in a whole new direction. J. Ehrlichman: That he would hurt the Eastern Asian Defense. Right there. That is blackmail. HR Haldeman: For example, where does that take you? That takes you to your support, the other people who are not fully aware of the DC end of it. But then we didn't know about it either. John Dean: That's right. Well, then you have to get the proper people to say - HR Haldeman: Well, see if we go your route, you can't draw the line someplace and say, John Dean: No, no you can t. Pres. Nixon: You see, if we go your route of cutting the cancer out. If we cut it out now. Take a Hunt. Well, wouldn't that knock the hell out from under him? John Dean: That's right. HR Haldeman: If you take your move and it goes slightly awry, you have a certainty, almost, of Magruder going to jail, Chapin going to jail, and you going to jail, and probably me going to jail. Pres. Nixon: No, I question the last two. HR Haldeman: Certainly Chapin. Certainly Strachan. No, not really. Chapin and Strachan are clean. J. Ehrlichman: I think Strachan is hooked on this money. Pres. Nixon: What money was that? J. Ehrlichman: He is an accessory on undeclared campaign funds. HR Haldeman: That's not his problem. The only man responsible for that is the Treasurer. I am sure. John Dean: I don't know under the law. Pres. Nixon: That undeclared was money from before 1970, that was 1968. J. Ehrlichman: Yeah. But then it got back into the coffers and was used in this campaign. John Dean: Let's say the President sent me to the Grand Jury to make a report. Who could I actually do anything for? As a practical matter, firsthand knowledge, almost no one. All I could do would be to give them focus point leads. Pres. Nixon: Right. J. Haldeman: Then they would start calling the leads. John Dean: That's right and whether all of them would come down or be served. There again, we don't have anybody who could talk to somebody who has learned how to pro cess that sort of thing on the outside. I was talking outside with Bob about Henry Peterson. We need to have someone talk to Henry Peterson, who can say to Henry, "What does this mean in criminal justice? What kind of a case could be made on this? What kind of sentences would evolve out of that?" He would have a pretty good idea of most of the statutes that are involved. There is so much behind the statutes. Pres. Nixon: Do you want to recommend that? That you talk to him? John Dean: Well, you are putting in his knowledge. Pres. Nixon: I see. John Dean: There're a couple of points - HR Haldeman: It would be even much better. Yes. I have this brother-in-law in school. - John Dean: He wants a wild scenario. HR Haldeman: My friend is writing a play, and he wants to see how - John Dean: It bothers me to do anything further now, sir, when Hunt is our real unknown. Pres. Nixon: Do you think it is a mistake - to talk to him? John Dean: Yes, I do. Pres. Nixon: It doesn't solve anything - it's just one more step. J. Haldeman: The payment to Hunt does too. John Dean: The payment to Hunt does. That is why I say if somebody would assess the criminal liability. HR Haldeman: Maybe we are misassessing it? John Dean: Well, maybe. We don't know. Pres. Nixon: Would you reply to him? J. Haldeman: I think I would. J. Ehrlichman: How else would you do it? You could start down that road. Say, "I want to talk with you about some questions that arise in the course of my own investigation, but I would have to swear you to secrecy." HR Haldeman: If he will take it on that basis. John Dean: The answer is, of course, in the course of this investigation I don't know whether he would talk to me off-the-record. HR Haldeman: What are your options? J. Ehrlichman: Boy, if you could eliminate the option by taking a legal position. You knew nothing about it. Pres. Nixon: So you don't see the statement thing helping insofar as in any way sparking the start? You think that over some more. John Dean: Yes sir. You see it is a temporary cancer. Pres. Nixon: I agree with that. And the point is, - but you see, here is the way I would see the statement that we would put out: Everything we would intend to say in a general statement that I have already indicated with regard to the facts as we send them in, we say people are to cooperate, without executive privilege, et cetera. Statement, it is true, is temporary. But it will indicate that the President has looked into the matter, has had his Counsel report to him and this is the result of the matter. We tell the Committee "we will cooperate." The Committee will say no. And so we just stand right there. John Dean: Well, really I think what will complicate the problem will be Sirica giving a speech from the Bench on Friday when he sentences. Where he will charge that he doesn't believe that the trial conducted by the lawyers for the government presented a legitimate case and that he is not convinced that the case represents the full situation. HR Haldeman: In other words - John Dean: It will have a dramatic impact coming from the Bench. Pres. Nixon: That's right. John Dean: I may say in Sirica's defense, it has been charged that there are higher-ups involved in this. He may take some dramatic action like, he might appoint a special prosecutor. Who knows? Pres. Nixon: Can he do that? John Dean: Sure. Pres. Nixon: He would appoint a special prosecutor, for what? John Dean: For work in the field of investigating. He is the Presiding Judge. HR Haldeman: You know he can pick the Grand Jury. Or he said he could. Pres. Nixon: The government is going to do that for a while. John Dean: A week after sentencing they are going to take all of the people who have been sentenced before a Grand Jury - Pres. Nixon: These same ones? John Dean: These same ones. And see if they will now want to talk. When it comes to Sirica and sentencing, he may be giving the ones who talk a lesser sentence. If they don't talk, he will probably leave these long sentences stand. Pres. Nixon: Suppose he does that. Where does that leave us, John? J. Ehrlichman: I don't think that is a surprise to the defendants. I think their counsel has advised them of that. Pres. Nixon: Right, right. However in terms of this, what about a solution? We are damned by the courts before Ervin even gets started. J. Ehrlichman: The only thing we can say is that we have investigated it backwards and forwards in the White House, and have been satisfied on the basis of the report we had that nobody in the White House has been involved in a burglary, nobody had notice of it, knowledge of it, participated in the planning, or aided or abetted it in any way. And it happens to be true as for that transaction. Pres. Nixon: John, you don't think that is enough? John Dean: No, Mr. President. J. Ehrlichman: Let's try another concomitant to that. Supposing Mitchell were to step out on that same day to say, "I have been doing some investigation at 1701 and I find - so and so and so and so." Pres. Nixon: Such as what? J. Ehrlichman: I don't know what he would say, but that he wanted to be some kind of a spokesman for 1701. Pres. Nixon: What the hell does one disclose that isn't doing to blow something? I don't have any time. I am sorry. I have to leave. Well, good-bye. You meet what time tomorrow? HR Haldeman: I am not sure. In the morning probably.