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$Unique_ID{bob01112}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{(A) History Of The Women Marines 1946-1977
Chapter 5: Part 1}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Stremlow, Col. Mary V.}
$Affiliation{U.S. Marine Corps Reserve}
$Subject{women
marine
corps
officers
moss
marines
training
war
assigned
wms}
$Date{1986}
$Log{}
Title:       (A) History Of The Women Marines 1946-1977
Author:      Stremlow, Col. Mary V.
Affiliation: U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
Date:        1986

Chapter 5: Part 1

Utilization and Numbers, 1951-1963

Utilization of Women Marines - Evolution of a Policy

     The war in Korea marked the first of three turning points, each one
opening new career fields to women Marines.  The second turning point was the
Woman Marine Program Study Group (Pepper Board) meeting in 1964.  The third
was the Ad-Hoc Committee on Increased Effectiveness in the Utilization of
Women in the Marine Corps (Snell Committee) of 1973.

     After World War II nearly all women Marines worked in the areas of
administration and supply.  WR veterans who had served in technical fields in
World War II, especially in aviation specialties, were disappointed when they
found themselves reclassified as typists and stenographers upon integration in
1948 and 1949.  It is probable that many skilled WRs, trained during the war,
when faced with the prospect of a change in occupational field, did not apply
for Regular status.

     Pre-Korea recruits, in spite of the detailed classification procedures
followed at Parris Island, were invariably earmarked for administrative work.
Ninety-five percent of them were assigned directly to a job; the remainder,
however, were given formal training at the Personnel Administration School at
Parris Island or the Yeoman Course at San Diego. In the spring of 1950, just
before the war, two recruits, Privates Nancy L. Bennett and Cynthia L. Thies,
slated to be photographers, became the first WMs to complete boot camp and to
be assigned to an occupational field other than administration.  Both Marines
had had experience in photography.

     The shortsightedness of these restrictive measures limiting the
occupational opportunities and training of women to clerical duties was
evident as soon as the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950. Then,
expediency dictated a more diverse classification of women.  Manpower was in
critically short supply.  Each Marine Corps base was polled on the number of
billets that could be filled by women, and on the billeting space available
for distaff Marines.  Unfortunately, the available women Marines had not been
trained to fill many of the needs identified by this survey.

Report of Procedures Analysis Office, 1951

     On 12 December 1950, four months after the mobilization, an internal
memorandum in the Division of Plans and Policies on the subject of
requirements for women Marines revealed that there were 76 military billets at
Headquarters Marine Corps which by their nature could be filled by WMs but to
which women were not assigned.  Lack of training was cited as the cause.
Furthermore, women were assigned to billets in accordance with ability,
regardless of rank deficiency.  At the time of the memorandum, 70 women
privates first class were assigned to billets designated for higher ranks: 27
filling corporals billets; 32 filling sergeants billets; 9 in staff sergeant
billets; 1 in a technical sergeant slot; and 1 in a master sergeant billet.
It was noted, as well, that of a total of 438 military jobs at Headquarters,
230 were coded as requiring male Marines and of these "must be male" billets,
12 were filled by WMs.  The recommendations made in view of the situation was
that the table of organization be reviewed with an eye towards decreasing
requirements for male Marines and that WMs, Regular and Reserve, with adequate
work qualifications and rank be ordered to Headquarters.  A like number of WMs
from Headquarters, the least qualified clerically, would be transferred to
posts and stations.

     Colonel Towle found the memorandum useful in pointing out what she saw
as, "The difficulty of attempting to utilize untrained personnel in skilled
military billets" and "the need of remedial measures."  She reiterated her
position that specialist training beyond recruit indoctrination was essential
to meet the needs of both the Marine Corps and the individual Marine.  Her
conclusion was:

A policy which relies upon an ever-diminishing supply of World War II women
reservists to continue to provide the skills presently needed by the Marine
Corps as well as those which would be required in all-out mobilization, rather
than establish systematic long range training beyond recruit indoctrination
for younger women enlistees of the regular Marine Corps is considered
unrealistic and shortsighted, as well as uneconomical.

     Subsequently, in May 1951, Plans and Policies Division asked that a study
be made to determine the military occupational specialties (MOS) in which
women could be utilized and the proportion of the total number which could be
profitably employed.  The ensuing study conducted by the Procedures Analysis
Office, evaluated MOSs on the basis of utilization of women in the past, legal
restrictions, physical requirements, job environment, availability of training
facilities, and the existence of promotional outlets.  They noted that while
women Marines were assigned MOSs in 25 different occupational fields, actually
about 95 percent of the WMs were concentrated in only six fields.  The lessons
learned in the emergency brought on by the war in Korea were apparent in the
conclusions drawn by the committee that:

     a.  Women can he used in 27 of the 43 occupational fields.

     b.  For maximum effectiveness, women should be employed (as a general
rule) in a limited number of major activities.

     c.  Under the present tables of organization, a maximum of approximately
6,500 women can be employed.

     d.  Full utilization of women Marines requires an evaluation of the
combined influence of all "restricted assignment" groups upon rotation
policies.

     e.  Immediate steps should be taken to utilize women in all appropriate
MOSs so that under full mobilization, expansion can be readily accomplished.

     f.  Service schools must be opened to women to train them for the
appropriate MOS.

     g.  Billets that can be filled by women must be identified on tables of
organization.

     The 27 occupational fields considered appropriate were:

     01 Personnel and Administration
     02 Intelligence
     04 Logistics
     14 Mapping and Surveying
     15 Printing
     22 Fire Control Instrument Repair
     25 Operational Communications
     26 Communication Material
     27 Electronics
     30 Supply
     31 Warehousing, Shipping, and Receiving
     33 Food
     34 Disbursing
     35 Motor Transport
     40 Accounting
     41 Post Exchange
     43 Public Information
     46 Photography
     49 Training and Training Aids
     52 Special Services
     55 Band
     66 Aviation Electronics
     67 Air Control
     68 Aerology
     69 Aviation Synthetic Training Devices
     70 Aviation Operations and Intelligence
     71 Flight Equipment

     Colonel Towle endorsed the study calling it, "thorough, thoughtful, and
essentially a realistic presentation of facts pertinent to the utilization of
women within the Marine Corps."  She did, however, take exception to the
stated position that while women could perform the duties of the 27
recommended occupational fields, they could not be placed in all of the
billets falling under each major heading since the "most effective utilization
occurs when women supervise only women and when situations in which women
supervise men or mixed groups are minimized."  She submitted that:

. . . the most effective utilization of women does not necessarily depend
upon women supervising women, unless credence is also given to the corollary
of this statement that men should supervise only men.  The situation at
Headquarters Marine Corps is an excellent example of the invalidity of this
contention.  During World War II there were many instances at many posts and
stations where women supervised both men and women with notable success.  In
this connection, it should be remembered that women officers' commissions are
identical in wording to those of their male counterparts charging them not
only with the duties and responsibilities of their grade and positions, but
also assuring them of comparable military authority.

     The final report of the Procedures Analysis Office was submitted in
November 1951 and generated a letter the following January to all interested
divisions and sections for comment.  For the most part there was general
agreement with the theory that wider utilization of women Marines would
increase their potential effectiveness upon all-out mobilization.  The
Division of Aviation suggested a greater percentage of WMs could be properly
assigned aviation specialties and recommended the addition of Occupational
Field 64, Aircraft Maintenance and Repair, to the list of appropriate MOSs,
but was overruled.  The agency managing the 35 field, motor transport,
commented that women were qualified to drive the cars, trucks, and jeeps, but
the requirement that the driver load and unload the vehicle restricted their
use.  In the area of communications, it was recommended that a new field,
administrative communications, be created and that women be used as
switchboard operators.  Women as instructors at the Communications-Electronic
School was specifically ruled out due to their lack of combat experience and
because they would have to supervise men.

     All comments and recommendations were incorporated and the list of
appropriate MOSs for enlisted women Marines was promulgated in April 1952,
about a year before the end of the Korean conflict.

     The same memorandum identified the following 16 occupational fields as
unsuitable for women Marines.

     03 Infantry
     07 Antiaircraft Artillery
     08 Field Artillery
     11 Utilities
     13 Construction and Equipment
     18 Tank and Amphibian Tractor
     21 Weapons Repair
     23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
     32 Supply Services
     36 Steward
     56 Guided Missile
     57 Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense
     58 Security and Guard
     64 Aircraft Maintenance and Repair
     65 Aviation Ordnance
     73 Pilot

     In spite of the above exclusions, during the Korean War at least a few
women served in the utilities, weapons repair, supply services, and security
guard field.  It is probable that they were Reservists already knowledgeable
in these occupations.

     At the time of the study, only six WMs were in the motor transport field.
One of these, Sergeant Theresa "Sue" Sousa, mobilized with the Washington,
D.C. Reserve platoon and on duty at Camp Pendleton, became a driver through
determination, persistence, and because she proved she could handle a truck
and jeep.  Then, in the fall of 1952, women were assigned to motor transport
school for the intensive five-week course.  The first WMs to receive such
training since 1945 were Privates First Class Hazel E. Robbins, Christin
Villanueva, Jessie Chance, Elizabeth Drew, and Ann Oberfell.  By 1954, the
number of women in motor transport jumped to 111. Colonel Valeria F. Hilgart,
who was Commanding Officer, Company A, Pearl Harbor that year, remembered that
she had 22 women Marine drivers and a woman Marine dispatcher, Sergeant
Barbara Jean Dulinsky.  This career field has been volatile for WMs as the
number dwindled to seven in 1964 and rose to 186 in 1977.

     Now retired Gunnery Sergeant Helen A. Brusack and one other former WM
worked in radio repairman assignments in 1950 but formal training in this
field was not reopened to women until March 1953 when four WMs (Technical
Sergeants Rosita A. Martinez and Katherine F. Tanalski and Sergeants Norine
Anderson and Mary Williams) received orders to the 16-week course at the
crystal grinding shop at the Baltimore Signal Depot in Fort Holabird,
Baltimore.  The highly technical course covered the manufacture of precisely
cut crystals which controlled the frequency in radios.  Like the motor
transport field, this also proved to be a volatile field as the number of WMs
assigned to it dropped to two in 1961 and then grew to 166 in 1977.

Women Officers MOSs, 1948-1953

     After World War II, all officer MOSs were grouped into categories. For
example, Category I included MOSs suitable for Regular unrestricted officers;
Category II MOSs were suitable for Regular limited duty officers of company
grade; and with the passage of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of
1948, Category V MOSs were deemed suitable for Regular women officers.  Only
the following nine MOSs in four occupational fields, plus the designation for
basic officers (unassigned second lieutenants) and one ground colonel were
considered to be appropriate for women:

     0101 Basic Personnel and Administration Officer
     0105 Administrative Officer
     0110 Personnel Classification and Assignment Officer
     0130 Adjutant
     0190 Personnel Research Officer
     3001 Basic Supply Administrative Officer
     4001 Basic Machine Accounting Officer
     4010 Machine Accounting Officer
     4301 Basic Public Information Officer
     9901 Basic Officer
     9906 Colonel, Ground

     For most of the fields, women officers were limited to the basic position
and therefore not allowed to move up the ladder in that specialty as they were
promoted.  The war in Korea caused some of the restrictions to be lifted in
1950, but women officers continued to serve in a relatively minute number of
fields.

     This untenable situation was noted by the Classifications Section on 1
November 1952 when it was found that the large majority of the older, more
experienced women officers were assigned MOS 0105 (Administrative Officer);
few women held an additional MOS; and no woman at the time had two additional
MOSs.  In all, over 60 percent of all women officers in the Marine Corps were
assigned a basic MOS or MOS 0105.  The discovery led to a study involving a
review of the cases of all women officers on active duty and letters to all
sections interested in MOS assignments.  In view of the antipathy displayed in
1947 and 1948 toward the use of women in the Marine Corps, the comments
emanating from this study were gratifying to the women officers.  The
Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 wrote:

During the congressional discussion prior to the passage of the "Women's Armed
Services Integration Act of 1948" it was emphasized that the primary reason
for establishing women in Regular services was to provide a nucleus of trained
women for rapid expansion in event of an emergency.  If the Marine Corps
assigns women officers only to the MOSs listed there will not be a group of
well trained, experienced women officers who could provide the necessary
leadership in the many fields where large numbers of women will be utilized in
the event of a national emergency.

     From the Classification Branch came the comment, "In fact in the final
analysis it became apparent that a woman officer should be assigned any MOS
for which she had become qualified by actual performance of duty in a
satisfactory manner."  And following the list of recommended MOSs submitted by
the Personnel Control Branch was the statement.  "It is further suggested that
women officers not be precluded from assignment of other MOSs for which an
individual may be qualified."

     In the second phase of the study each woman officer's qualifications were
considered as well as the description of each MOS.  Decisions were based on
legal restrictions, physical restrictions, rotation constraints, technical
schools open to women, billets held by WRs in World War II, and "American
mores."  As a result, the variety of MOSs assigned to women officers increased
somewhat, mainly in the area of additional MOSs, that is, in secondary jobs
for which they were considered qualified.  On 1 March 1953, the allocation of
primary MOSs to women officers was as follows:

     01   Administration                     87
     02   Intelligence                        1
     25   Communications                      7
     30   Supply                             25
     31   Transportation                      1
     34   Disbursing                         10
     41   Post Exchange                       4
     43   Public Information                  7
     49   Training                            2
     52   Special Services                    7
     9906 Ground Colonel                      1

     Women Marine Officers on active duty - 152

     The Division of Aviation had identified the seven fields of aircraft
maintenance, aviation electronics, air control, aerology, aviation synthetic
training devices, aviation operations and intelligence, and flight equipment
as suitable for assignment to women Marine officers, but only three, aerology,
training devices, and flight equipment appeared on the final approved list.
As it turned out, women officers were not assigned to aviation specialties of
any nature until about 1960.

     Subsequent to the study, in March 1953, the Director, Division of
Personnel, Brigadier General Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., recommended that
category restrictions on the assignment of MOSs to women officers be
permanently removed and that a policy be established which would be consistent
with the intent of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948.

1950-1953 Summary

     The Korean War brought permanent changes to the women Marine program, the
most obvious being the return of WMs to major posts and stations.  When the
armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, women were serving at Headquarters
Marine Corps; at the Marine Corps Air Stations at Cherry Point, El Toro, and
Kaneohe; at the Recruit Depots at San Diego and Parris island; at Marine Corps
Bases at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, Quantico, Norfolk, and Pearl Harbor;
at both the Depot of Supplies and the Department of the Pacific in San
Francisco; at the various Reserve districts; and in Stuttgart, Germany.

1954-1964

     As the pressures of war subsided, so did the urgency to revitalize the
women Marine program.  The Personnel Department stated that "The Marine Corps'
long range plan for the utilization of women Marines is to utilize them in
sufficient numbers and appropriate military occupational specialties to
provide a nucleus of trained women for rapid expansion in the event of full
mobilization."  The wording was sufficiently vague to allow commanders to
vacillate, to balk at the idea of women placed in key positions, and to deny
formal schools to WMs.

Numbers

     Numerically, women were limited by law to a ceiling of two percent of the
authorized strength of the Corps, and the women officers were limited to 10
percent of the number of enlisted women.  The Marine Corps set a goal of one
percent rather than the allowable two, but never reached even that figure
during the period 1954-1964.  The one percent was not just an arbitrary,
antiwoman measure but was arrived at in recognition of the Corps' mission and
organization.  Traditionally, the Marine Corps is a compact fighting unit with
much of its logistics and some of its supporting personnel furnished by the
Navy.  Women Marines were prohibited, by law, from ". . . duty in aircraft
while such aircraft are engaged in combat missions and duty on vessels of the
Navy except hospital ships and naval transports."  They were prohibited, by
tradition, from Fleet Marine Force units, security forces at shore activities,
and any unit whose mission it was to develop tactics or combat equipment.

     To accomplish its mission, the Marine Corps is divided generally into 60
percent operating forces and 40 percent supporting units.  Of the latter,
during wartime and based on Korean War figures, eight percent could be
patients, prisoners, and transients, leaving only 32 percent of the billets
available to women.  Even within the supporting establishment, certain factors
restricted the utilization of women: legal prohibitions, Marine Corps rotation
policy, and the necessity for in-service training for men in preparation for
assignment to combat jobs or to the fleet.  To further complicate the matter,
women are only one in a list of restricted assignment groups which include
sole-surviving sons, and twice-wounded Marines.  Added to the above
constraints was the fact that all services planned a cut in women's strength
in 1954.  During the years between Korea and Vietnam the strength of the women
Marines went from a peak of 2,787 in September 1953 to a low of 1,448 on 30
June 1964.