$Unique_ID{bob01112} $Pretitle{} $Title{(A) History Of The Women Marines 1946-1977 Chapter 5: Part 1} $Subtitle{} $Author{Stremlow, Col. Mary V.} $Affiliation{U.S. Marine Corps Reserve} $Subject{women marine corps officers moss marines training war assigned wms} $Date{1986} $Log{} Title: (A) History Of The Women Marines 1946-1977 Author: Stremlow, Col. Mary V. Affiliation: U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Date: 1986 Chapter 5: Part 1 Utilization and Numbers, 1951-1963 Utilization of Women Marines - Evolution of a Policy The war in Korea marked the first of three turning points, each one opening new career fields to women Marines. The second turning point was the Woman Marine Program Study Group (Pepper Board) meeting in 1964. The third was the Ad-Hoc Committee on Increased Effectiveness in the Utilization of Women in the Marine Corps (Snell Committee) of 1973. After World War II nearly all women Marines worked in the areas of administration and supply. WR veterans who had served in technical fields in World War II, especially in aviation specialties, were disappointed when they found themselves reclassified as typists and stenographers upon integration in 1948 and 1949. It is probable that many skilled WRs, trained during the war, when faced with the prospect of a change in occupational field, did not apply for Regular status. Pre-Korea recruits, in spite of the detailed classification procedures followed at Parris Island, were invariably earmarked for administrative work. Ninety-five percent of them were assigned directly to a job; the remainder, however, were given formal training at the Personnel Administration School at Parris Island or the Yeoman Course at San Diego. In the spring of 1950, just before the war, two recruits, Privates Nancy L. Bennett and Cynthia L. Thies, slated to be photographers, became the first WMs to complete boot camp and to be assigned to an occupational field other than administration. Both Marines had had experience in photography. The shortsightedness of these restrictive measures limiting the occupational opportunities and training of women to clerical duties was evident as soon as the North Koreans invaded South Korea in June 1950. Then, expediency dictated a more diverse classification of women. Manpower was in critically short supply. Each Marine Corps base was polled on the number of billets that could be filled by women, and on the billeting space available for distaff Marines. Unfortunately, the available women Marines had not been trained to fill many of the needs identified by this survey. Report of Procedures Analysis Office, 1951 On 12 December 1950, four months after the mobilization, an internal memorandum in the Division of Plans and Policies on the subject of requirements for women Marines revealed that there were 76 military billets at Headquarters Marine Corps which by their nature could be filled by WMs but to which women were not assigned. Lack of training was cited as the cause. Furthermore, women were assigned to billets in accordance with ability, regardless of rank deficiency. At the time of the memorandum, 70 women privates first class were assigned to billets designated for higher ranks: 27 filling corporals billets; 32 filling sergeants billets; 9 in staff sergeant billets; 1 in a technical sergeant slot; and 1 in a master sergeant billet. It was noted, as well, that of a total of 438 military jobs at Headquarters, 230 were coded as requiring male Marines and of these "must be male" billets, 12 were filled by WMs. The recommendations made in view of the situation was that the table of organization be reviewed with an eye towards decreasing requirements for male Marines and that WMs, Regular and Reserve, with adequate work qualifications and rank be ordered to Headquarters. A like number of WMs from Headquarters, the least qualified clerically, would be transferred to posts and stations. Colonel Towle found the memorandum useful in pointing out what she saw as, "The difficulty of attempting to utilize untrained personnel in skilled military billets" and "the need of remedial measures." She reiterated her position that specialist training beyond recruit indoctrination was essential to meet the needs of both the Marine Corps and the individual Marine. Her conclusion was: A policy which relies upon an ever-diminishing supply of World War II women reservists to continue to provide the skills presently needed by the Marine Corps as well as those which would be required in all-out mobilization, rather than establish systematic long range training beyond recruit indoctrination for younger women enlistees of the regular Marine Corps is considered unrealistic and shortsighted, as well as uneconomical. Subsequently, in May 1951, Plans and Policies Division asked that a study be made to determine the military occupational specialties (MOS) in which women could be utilized and the proportion of the total number which could be profitably employed. The ensuing study conducted by the Procedures Analysis Office, evaluated MOSs on the basis of utilization of women in the past, legal restrictions, physical requirements, job environment, availability of training facilities, and the existence of promotional outlets. They noted that while women Marines were assigned MOSs in 25 different occupational fields, actually about 95 percent of the WMs were concentrated in only six fields. The lessons learned in the emergency brought on by the war in Korea were apparent in the conclusions drawn by the committee that: a. Women can he used in 27 of the 43 occupational fields. b. For maximum effectiveness, women should be employed (as a general rule) in a limited number of major activities. c. Under the present tables of organization, a maximum of approximately 6,500 women can be employed. d. Full utilization of women Marines requires an evaluation of the combined influence of all "restricted assignment" groups upon rotation policies. e. Immediate steps should be taken to utilize women in all appropriate MOSs so that under full mobilization, expansion can be readily accomplished. f. Service schools must be opened to women to train them for the appropriate MOS. g. Billets that can be filled by women must be identified on tables of organization. The 27 occupational fields considered appropriate were: 01 Personnel and Administration 02 Intelligence 04 Logistics 14 Mapping and Surveying 15 Printing 22 Fire Control Instrument Repair 25 Operational Communications 26 Communication Material 27 Electronics 30 Supply 31 Warehousing, Shipping, and Receiving 33 Food 34 Disbursing 35 Motor Transport 40 Accounting 41 Post Exchange 43 Public Information 46 Photography 49 Training and Training Aids 52 Special Services 55 Band 66 Aviation Electronics 67 Air Control 68 Aerology 69 Aviation Synthetic Training Devices 70 Aviation Operations and Intelligence 71 Flight Equipment Colonel Towle endorsed the study calling it, "thorough, thoughtful, and essentially a realistic presentation of facts pertinent to the utilization of women within the Marine Corps." She did, however, take exception to the stated position that while women could perform the duties of the 27 recommended occupational fields, they could not be placed in all of the billets falling under each major heading since the "most effective utilization occurs when women supervise only women and when situations in which women supervise men or mixed groups are minimized." She submitted that: . . . the most effective utilization of women does not necessarily depend upon women supervising women, unless credence is also given to the corollary of this statement that men should supervise only men. The situation at Headquarters Marine Corps is an excellent example of the invalidity of this contention. During World War II there were many instances at many posts and stations where women supervised both men and women with notable success. In this connection, it should be remembered that women officers' commissions are identical in wording to those of their male counterparts charging them not only with the duties and responsibilities of their grade and positions, but also assuring them of comparable military authority. The final report of the Procedures Analysis Office was submitted in November 1951 and generated a letter the following January to all interested divisions and sections for comment. For the most part there was general agreement with the theory that wider utilization of women Marines would increase their potential effectiveness upon all-out mobilization. The Division of Aviation suggested a greater percentage of WMs could be properly assigned aviation specialties and recommended the addition of Occupational Field 64, Aircraft Maintenance and Repair, to the list of appropriate MOSs, but was overruled. The agency managing the 35 field, motor transport, commented that women were qualified to drive the cars, trucks, and jeeps, but the requirement that the driver load and unload the vehicle restricted their use. In the area of communications, it was recommended that a new field, administrative communications, be created and that women be used as switchboard operators. Women as instructors at the Communications-Electronic School was specifically ruled out due to their lack of combat experience and because they would have to supervise men. All comments and recommendations were incorporated and the list of appropriate MOSs for enlisted women Marines was promulgated in April 1952, about a year before the end of the Korean conflict. The same memorandum identified the following 16 occupational fields as unsuitable for women Marines. 03 Infantry 07 Antiaircraft Artillery 08 Field Artillery 11 Utilities 13 Construction and Equipment 18 Tank and Amphibian Tractor 21 Weapons Repair 23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal 32 Supply Services 36 Steward 56 Guided Missile 57 Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense 58 Security and Guard 64 Aircraft Maintenance and Repair 65 Aviation Ordnance 73 Pilot In spite of the above exclusions, during the Korean War at least a few women served in the utilities, weapons repair, supply services, and security guard field. It is probable that they were Reservists already knowledgeable in these occupations. At the time of the study, only six WMs were in the motor transport field. One of these, Sergeant Theresa "Sue" Sousa, mobilized with the Washington, D.C. Reserve platoon and on duty at Camp Pendleton, became a driver through determination, persistence, and because she proved she could handle a truck and jeep. Then, in the fall of 1952, women were assigned to motor transport school for the intensive five-week course. The first WMs to receive such training since 1945 were Privates First Class Hazel E. Robbins, Christin Villanueva, Jessie Chance, Elizabeth Drew, and Ann Oberfell. By 1954, the number of women in motor transport jumped to 111. Colonel Valeria F. Hilgart, who was Commanding Officer, Company A, Pearl Harbor that year, remembered that she had 22 women Marine drivers and a woman Marine dispatcher, Sergeant Barbara Jean Dulinsky. This career field has been volatile for WMs as the number dwindled to seven in 1964 and rose to 186 in 1977. Now retired Gunnery Sergeant Helen A. Brusack and one other former WM worked in radio repairman assignments in 1950 but formal training in this field was not reopened to women until March 1953 when four WMs (Technical Sergeants Rosita A. Martinez and Katherine F. Tanalski and Sergeants Norine Anderson and Mary Williams) received orders to the 16-week course at the crystal grinding shop at the Baltimore Signal Depot in Fort Holabird, Baltimore. The highly technical course covered the manufacture of precisely cut crystals which controlled the frequency in radios. Like the motor transport field, this also proved to be a volatile field as the number of WMs assigned to it dropped to two in 1961 and then grew to 166 in 1977. Women Officers MOSs, 1948-1953 After World War II, all officer MOSs were grouped into categories. For example, Category I included MOSs suitable for Regular unrestricted officers; Category II MOSs were suitable for Regular limited duty officers of company grade; and with the passage of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Category V MOSs were deemed suitable for Regular women officers. Only the following nine MOSs in four occupational fields, plus the designation for basic officers (unassigned second lieutenants) and one ground colonel were considered to be appropriate for women: 0101 Basic Personnel and Administration Officer 0105 Administrative Officer 0110 Personnel Classification and Assignment Officer 0130 Adjutant 0190 Personnel Research Officer 3001 Basic Supply Administrative Officer 4001 Basic Machine Accounting Officer 4010 Machine Accounting Officer 4301 Basic Public Information Officer 9901 Basic Officer 9906 Colonel, Ground For most of the fields, women officers were limited to the basic position and therefore not allowed to move up the ladder in that specialty as they were promoted. The war in Korea caused some of the restrictions to be lifted in 1950, but women officers continued to serve in a relatively minute number of fields. This untenable situation was noted by the Classifications Section on 1 November 1952 when it was found that the large majority of the older, more experienced women officers were assigned MOS 0105 (Administrative Officer); few women held an additional MOS; and no woman at the time had two additional MOSs. In all, over 60 percent of all women officers in the Marine Corps were assigned a basic MOS or MOS 0105. The discovery led to a study involving a review of the cases of all women officers on active duty and letters to all sections interested in MOS assignments. In view of the antipathy displayed in 1947 and 1948 toward the use of women in the Marine Corps, the comments emanating from this study were gratifying to the women officers. The Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 wrote: During the congressional discussion prior to the passage of the "Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948" it was emphasized that the primary reason for establishing women in Regular services was to provide a nucleus of trained women for rapid expansion in event of an emergency. If the Marine Corps assigns women officers only to the MOSs listed there will not be a group of well trained, experienced women officers who could provide the necessary leadership in the many fields where large numbers of women will be utilized in the event of a national emergency. From the Classification Branch came the comment, "In fact in the final analysis it became apparent that a woman officer should be assigned any MOS for which she had become qualified by actual performance of duty in a satisfactory manner." And following the list of recommended MOSs submitted by the Personnel Control Branch was the statement. "It is further suggested that women officers not be precluded from assignment of other MOSs for which an individual may be qualified." In the second phase of the study each woman officer's qualifications were considered as well as the description of each MOS. Decisions were based on legal restrictions, physical restrictions, rotation constraints, technical schools open to women, billets held by WRs in World War II, and "American mores." As a result, the variety of MOSs assigned to women officers increased somewhat, mainly in the area of additional MOSs, that is, in secondary jobs for which they were considered qualified. On 1 March 1953, the allocation of primary MOSs to women officers was as follows: 01 Administration 87 02 Intelligence 1 25 Communications 7 30 Supply 25 31 Transportation 1 34 Disbursing 10 41 Post Exchange 4 43 Public Information 7 49 Training 2 52 Special Services 7 9906 Ground Colonel 1 Women Marine Officers on active duty - 152 The Division of Aviation had identified the seven fields of aircraft maintenance, aviation electronics, air control, aerology, aviation synthetic training devices, aviation operations and intelligence, and flight equipment as suitable for assignment to women Marine officers, but only three, aerology, training devices, and flight equipment appeared on the final approved list. As it turned out, women officers were not assigned to aviation specialties of any nature until about 1960. Subsequent to the study, in March 1953, the Director, Division of Personnel, Brigadier General Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., recommended that category restrictions on the assignment of MOSs to women officers be permanently removed and that a policy be established which would be consistent with the intent of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948. 1950-1953 Summary The Korean War brought permanent changes to the women Marine program, the most obvious being the return of WMs to major posts and stations. When the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, women were serving at Headquarters Marine Corps; at the Marine Corps Air Stations at Cherry Point, El Toro, and Kaneohe; at the Recruit Depots at San Diego and Parris island; at Marine Corps Bases at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, Quantico, Norfolk, and Pearl Harbor; at both the Depot of Supplies and the Department of the Pacific in San Francisco; at the various Reserve districts; and in Stuttgart, Germany. 1954-1964 As the pressures of war subsided, so did the urgency to revitalize the women Marine program. The Personnel Department stated that "The Marine Corps' long range plan for the utilization of women Marines is to utilize them in sufficient numbers and appropriate military occupational specialties to provide a nucleus of trained women for rapid expansion in the event of full mobilization." The wording was sufficiently vague to allow commanders to vacillate, to balk at the idea of women placed in key positions, and to deny formal schools to WMs. Numbers Numerically, women were limited by law to a ceiling of two percent of the authorized strength of the Corps, and the women officers were limited to 10 percent of the number of enlisted women. The Marine Corps set a goal of one percent rather than the allowable two, but never reached even that figure during the period 1954-1964. The one percent was not just an arbitrary, antiwoman measure but was arrived at in recognition of the Corps' mission and organization. Traditionally, the Marine Corps is a compact fighting unit with much of its logistics and some of its supporting personnel furnished by the Navy. Women Marines were prohibited, by law, from ". . . duty in aircraft while such aircraft are engaged in combat missions and duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships and naval transports." They were prohibited, by tradition, from Fleet Marine Force units, security forces at shore activities, and any unit whose mission it was to develop tactics or combat equipment. To accomplish its mission, the Marine Corps is divided generally into 60 percent operating forces and 40 percent supporting units. Of the latter, during wartime and based on Korean War figures, eight percent could be patients, prisoners, and transients, leaving only 32 percent of the billets available to women. Even within the supporting establishment, certain factors restricted the utilization of women: legal prohibitions, Marine Corps rotation policy, and the necessity for in-service training for men in preparation for assignment to combat jobs or to the fleet. To further complicate the matter, women are only one in a list of restricted assignment groups which include sole-surviving sons, and twice-wounded Marines. Added to the above constraints was the fact that all services planned a cut in women's strength in 1954. During the years between Korea and Vietnam the strength of the women Marines went from a peak of 2,787 in September 1953 to a low of 1,448 on 30 June 1964.