Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0105/01052.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01052}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 13   Deadlock in Tehran}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{mcfarlane
hostages
iranians
parts
tehran
iranian
release
adviser
hawk
north}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 13   Deadlock in Tehran

     The Presidentially approved McFarlane mission to Tehran in the spring of
1986, was intended to crown a 9-month effort to free the hostages and
establish a dialogue with Iran.  McFarlane likened the mission to Henry
Kissinger's historic secret meeting with Premier Chou En-lai that paved the
way to U.S.-China reconciliation.  Eight years after an Iranian Prime
Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, was dismissed for meeting with President Carter's
National Security Adviser, McFarlane was to meet with Speaker Rafsanjani,
Prime Minister Musavi, and President Khameni, the three most powerful leaders
in Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini.  What is more, McFarlane believed that the
hostages were to be released upon his arrival and that the HAWK parts were not
to be delivered until the hostages were safe.  Hopeful of success, North
arranged logistical support for the return of the hostages and prepared a
press kit for the White House.  North added his own flourish: He ordered a
chocolate cake from an Israeli baker as a gift for the Iranians.

     The Iranians had very different ideas - centering on arms and Da'wa
prisoners.  As a result, the Tehran mission ended in acrimonious confrontation
with the hostages still in captivity.

Preparing for the Mission

     The American delegation consisted of McFarlane, North, former CIA
official George Cave, then-NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Amiram Nir,
adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister on combatting terrorism, and a CIA
communicator who was to remain on the plane and forward messages via secure
means to Poindexter in Washington and Secord in Tel Aviv.  McFarlane included
Nir at the request of the Israelis who viewed this as a joint U.S.-Israeli
operation.  All members of the delegation used aliases and Nir passed himself
off as an American.

     The delegation took one pallet of HAWK parts with them in the aircraft.
The remaining 11 pallets of parts were left in Israel with Secord, who was
poised to deliver them upon the release of the hostages.

     The Tehran trip was both an extraordinarily heroic and a very foolish
mission for McFarlane and his companions.  As the immediate predecessor of the
National Security Adviser, McFarlane knew many of the Nation's most sensitive
secrets.  North was privy to some of them as well, as was Teicher. Yet, the
plan called for them to go to Tehran under false passports and pseudonyms
without even safe conduct documents from the Iranian Government. Ghorbanifar
and the Second Iranian arranged the visit.  Ghorbanifar was a private citizen
and the Second Iranian, was, according to Ghorbanifar, the person responsible
for the kidnapping of CIA agent William Buckley.  The Iranian government had
demonstrated during the U.S. Embassy seizure that it could not prevent the
holding of diplomats as hostages by its Revolutionary Guards.  The State
Department was unaware of the mission because Poindexter had told Shultz back
in March that a proposed high-level meeting between McFarlane and the Iranians
had been cancelled, never informing Shultz that it had been rescheduled.
Further, Poindexter had rejected North's suggestion that Shultz, Poindexter,
and McFarlane meet before the trip. And friendly governments with embassies in
Iran were not alerted.  McFarlane and his party were, in effect, on their own
in Tehran - even subject to legitimate arrest for entering under false
passports and with missile parts.

     Moreover, the plan contemplated that after the hostages were freed,
McFarlane and the delegation would remain in Tehran until the promised HAWK
parts were delivered.  The former National Security Adviser and ranking
members of the NSC staff were, in effect, to substitute themselves for the
hostages.  In fact, the delegation had cause for concern during the
negotiations when the Iranians repeatedly delayed refueling the aircraft. The
original plan for the mission entailed less risk.  It called for the meeting
to be on Kish Island within reach of U.S. naval forces.

     Even some of the proponents of the Iran initiative thought the mission to
Tehran was premature.  Secord testified that there should have been a
preliminary meeting between McFarlane and the Iranians to prepare a realistic
agenda for Tehran; he believed that misunderstandings were creating false
expectations on both sides.  Nir also favored a preliminary meeting.  Cave
believed that he and North should have undertaken a preliminary mission to
Tehran before McFarlane went.  Poindexter testified that he considered a
preliminary mission to be too dangerous and thus ruled it out.

     Even the timing of the trip was wrong.  As North and McFarlane soon
discovered, the trip took place during a holy period in the Islamic calendar,
and Muslim officials were not fully available.  The Iranian officials had to
fast throughout the negotiations.

Arrival in Tehran

     The mission arrived in Tehran on the morning of May 25 and the first
signs of failure were evident almost immediately.  McFarlane expected to be
greeted at the airport by Speaker Rafsanjani or some other high official. The
Americans waited more than an hour, but no one showed up to greet them. Then,
only Ghorbanifar and the Second Iranian arrived.  McFarlane described his
reactions in a cable he sent soon after arrival:

It may be best for us to try to picture what it would be like if after nuclear
attack, a surviving tailor became Vice President; a recent grad student became
Secretary of State; and a bookie became the interlocutor for all discourse
with foreign countries.  While the principals are a cut above this level of
qualification, the incompetence of the Iranian government to do business
requires a rethinking on our part of why there have been so many frustrating
failure[s] to deliver on their part.

     As events proved, however, the Iranians were tough, competent
negotiators.

     Under the pre-Tehran timetable, no HAWK parts - including the pallet on
the plane - were to be delivered until the hostages were freed.  But even
before the American delegation left the airport, the Iranians had removed the
pallet.  The Iranians were nevertheless disappointed, for the Second Iranian
had told his superiors that at least 50 percent - not merely 1 out of 12
pallets - of the parts would be delivered.

The Misunderstanding

     The McFarlane delegation went from the airport to the Independence Hotel
(the Hilton in pre-Revolution days), where the entire top floor was assigned
to them.  In 4 days of talks, virtually the only points on which the Americans
and the Iranians could agree were generalities such as the United States'
acceptance of the Iranian Revolution and Iran's sovereignty, and common fear
of the Soviet Union, including their intervention in Afghanistan.  On concrete
issues such as the hostages and arms sales, the parties were poles apart.

     In accordance with his instructions and the agreement that he believed
had been made with the Iranians in Frankfurt, McFarlane insisted that the
hostages be released before the HAWK parts were delivered.  The Iranians took
the opposite position: The HAWK parts had to be delivered first and then the
release of the hostages would be negotiated.  The Iranians maintained that
they had not agreed in Frankfurt to a release of the hostages upon the arrival
of the McFarlane delegation.  Yet Poindexter had rejected the Iranian position
before the President authorized the mission and had so instructed McFarlane:

[The Iranian official] wants all the HAWK parts delivered before the hostages
are released.  I have told Ollie that we cannot do that.  The sequence has to
be (1) meeting; (2) release of hostages; (3) delivery of HAWK parts.  The
President is getting quite discouraged by this effort.  This will be our last
attempt to make a deal with the Iranians.

     The Americans made contemporaneous notes and reports of the discussions
that provide a full account of what happened at Tehran.  The key points are
summarized here.

Days 1 and 2 - Marking Time

     For the first 2 days, May 25 and 26, no high-level Iranian official
appeared.  The Second Iranian and other "third and fourth level officials" in
the Prime Minister's office represented Iran.  With no Iranian decisionmaker
present, the discussions consisted mainly of exchanges of platitudes, a
"diatribe" by the Iranians against the Americans for not bringing "enough"
HAWK parts, and protests by McFarlane about the Iranians' failure to produce
the hostages.  Ghorbanifar tried to reassure the U.S. delegation that the
hostages would be released, but the Americans had lost confidence in his
promises.  McFarlane's anger flared.  McFarlane regarded the meeting with
low-level Iranians as a waste of time and a degrading breach of protocol.  He
stated that he had come to "meet with Ministers."  The Second Iranian promised
to produce an official at the sub-Minister level but McFarlane was still
dissatisfied, saying:

As I am a Minister, I expect to meet with decision-makers.  Otherwise, you can
work with my staff.

     True to his word, McFarlane withdrew from the discussion and left the
staff to meet with the Iranians, including the Prime Minister's designee, a
member of the Majlis and foreign affairs adviser to Rafsanjani (the "Adviser")
who arrived at 9:30 p.m. on the second day and became the leader of the
Iranian delegation.  Because the Adviser had not attended any prior meetings,
North reiterated the U.S. position:

If your government can cause the release of the Americans held in Beirut 10
hours after they are released, aircraft will arrive with the HAWK missile
parts.  Within 10 days of deposit [of money], two radars will be delivered.
After that delivery, we would like to have our logistics and technical experts
sit down with your experts to make a good determination of what is needed.

     If the initial discussions hinted at the misunderstanding about the terms
of the meeting, the Second Iranian made it unambiguous.  He rebuffed North's
request for a meeting between McFarlane and ministers, saying "We did not
agree to such meetings for McFarlane."  He added that McFarlane would meet
with no higher official than the Adviser; and the Adviser stressed to North
that the immediate delivery of the HAWK parts and other arms was crucial to
the success of the mission:

There is a $2.5 billion deal . . . we want TOWs, especially with technicians.
Easier to operate than MILAN.  We would appreciate your advice on F/14 phoenix
and Harpoon missiles.

 He stated that the:

Imam has said we are ready to establish relations with all the world except
Israel.  But you have to remove the obstacles . . . .  Speed up what has been
agreed . . . .  A few 747's can carry a lot in one day.  We would be very
pleased to discuss our specific needs.

     From the first discussions with the Iranians in December, the Americans
had described the hostages as the "obstacles" to better relations.  Now the
Iranians borrowed the term.  In their view, the failure of the United States
to ship the rest of the HAWK parts and to sell more arms were the obstacles
both to a meaningful dialogue and to the release of the hostages.  The
different meanings that each side gave to the word obstacles symbolized their
different objectives; for the Iranians it meant arms, for the Americans, the
other hostages.  As the discussions with the Adviser and his colleagues ended
on the second day, North said he would urge McFarlane to meet the Adviser the
next day.

     North reported to McFarlane that evening.  In a message sent to
Poindexter that night describing the day's events, McFarlane, relying on
North's assessment, stated that the Adviser was "a considerable cut above the
Bush Leaguers we had been dealing with."  He went on to assure Poindexter
that:

. . . with regard to the hostages, we have and will continue to make clear
that their release is the sine qua non to any further steps between us and if
that has not happened by tomorrow night, they are aware that we will leave and
that the balance of the shipment will not be delivered.

The Final Days - McFarlane Remains Firm

     For the American delegation and the Iranian representatives, May 27 was a
long day.  The discussions, termed "marathon" by Cave, lasted from 10 a.m.
until 12:10 a.m. on May 28.  They began with North, Cave, and Teicher holding
a preliminary meeting with the Adviser and the other Iranians.  The Adviser
delivered bad news about the hostages:

Our messenger in Beirut is in touch with those holding the hostages by special
means.  They made heavy conditions.  They asked for Israel to withdraw
from - the Golan Heights and South Lebanon.  Lahad must return to East Beirut,
the prisoners in Kuwait must be freed, and all the expenses paid for hostage
taking.  They do not want money from the U.S. - Iran must pay this money.

     The Adviser, held out hope, however, particularly if the HAWK parts were
delivered.  He told North that the Iranians were negotiating to scale down the
captors' demands.  However, "only a portion of the 240 spare parts had been
delivered.  The rest should come.  This is an important misunderstanding."

     McFarlane then met with the Adviser, one on one, for 3 hours.  He sent a
message to Poindexter immediately afterward that included the following:

He [the Adviser] reported that Hizballah had made several preconditions to the
release: (1) Israeli withdrawal from the Golan; (2) Israeli withdrawal from
Southern Lebanon; (3) Lahad movement into East Beirut; and (4) someone
(undefined) to pay the bills the hostages have accumulated.  How's that for
Chutzpa . . . .  He hurriedly added [before I unloaded on him] that these
demands are not acceptable and we are negotiating with them and believe that
the only real problem is when you deliver the items [the HAWK parts and the
radar] we have requested.

                  *         *         *         *         *

I then carefully recounted . . . that he [the President] had only reluctantly
agreed to this meeting under a very clear and precise understanding of the
arrangements.  I then went over in detail what those arrangements were:

     1. the U.S. would send a high-level delegation to Tehran.  They would
bring with them a portion of the items they had requested and paid for (which
we had done);

     2. upon our arrival, they had agreed to secure the release of the
hostages promptly, upon release of the hostages to our custody, we would call
forward the balance of items that had been paid for and those that had not
been paid for would be dispatched as soon as payment had been received.

                  *         *         *         *         *

At this point he became somewhat agitated wanting to know just who had agreed
to these terms.  (I fingered Gorba and the Second Iranian).  He stated that
these were not the terms as he understood them.  The basic difference was that
they expected all deliveries to occur before any release took place.

                  *         *         *         *         *

He was obviously concerned over the very real possibility that his people
(Gorba and the Second Iranian) had misled him and asked for a break to confer
with his colleagues.  I agreed noting that I had to leave tonight.  (Actually
I don't have to leave tonight but recognizing that we have been here for three
working days and they have not produced I wanted to try to build a little fire
under them . . . .)

                  *         *         *         *         *

I tend to think we should hold firm on our intention to leave and in fact do
so unless we have word of release in the next six or seven hours.  I can
imagine circumstances in which if they said tonight that they guarantee the
release at a precise hour tomorrow.  We would stand by but not agree to any
change in the terms or call the aircraft forward.

                  *         *         *         *         *

My judgment is that they are in a state of great upset, schizophrenic over
their wish to get more from the deal but sobered to the fact that their
interlocutors may have misled them.  We are staying entirely at arms length
while this plays out.  We should hear something from them before long.

     McFarlane's threat to leave had its intended effect.  Several hours
later, the Adviser reported that the Hizballah had dropped all their demands
except for the release of the Da'wa terrorists held prisoner in Kuwait:

The only remaining problem is Kuwait.  We agreed to try to get a promise from
you that they would be released in the future.

     The request for U.S. intervention with Kuwait flew in the face of U.S.
policy.  The Da'wa had been convicted in Kuwait for a number of terrorist
acts, including the bombing of the U.S. Embassy.  Kuwait had stood up to
threats of reprisal from Da'was for imprisoning the terrorists, and the U.S.
had supported Kuwait.  The United States wanted other countries to follow
Kuwait's example.  American policy was clear: Terrorists should be punished -
not freed, as the Iranians were now asking.

     Accordingly, McFarlane offered no hope of U.S. intervention with Kuwait
on behalf of the convicted Da'wa prisoners, saying that U.S. policy was to
respect the judicial policies of other nations.

     McFarlane adhered to his instructions.  The Adviser then tried to cajole
McFarlane to send the other HAWK parts prior to any hostage release:

Since the plane is loaded why not let it come.  You would leave happy. The
President would be happy.  We have no guilt based on our understanding of the
agreement.  We are surprised now that it has been changed.  Let the agreement
be carried out.  The hostages will be freed very quickly.  Your President's
word will be honored.  If the plane arrives before tomorrow morning, the
hostages will be freed by noon. We do not wish to see our agreement fail at
this final stage.

     McFarlane responded, "We delivered hundreds of weapons.  You can release
the hostages, advise us, and we will deliver the weapons."  Given McFarlane's
firmness, the Adviser suggested another way of breaking the impasse: the U.S.
and Iranian representatives should meet without McFarlane to try to formulate
an agreement on the hostages and HAWK parts, which could be presented to both
sides.  McFarlane consented with the caveat that "staff agreements must be
approved by our leaders."

     The NSC staff and the Iranians met for several hours until near midnight.
The group hammered out a proposal that provided that Secord's aircraft with
the remaining HAWK parts would take off for Tehran but turn around in
midflight if the hostages were not released by morning:

     (1)  The United States Government will cause a 707 aircraft to launch
from a neutral site at 0100 in the morning to arrive in Tehran, Iran at 1000
on the morning of May 28 the seventh day of Khordad.  This aircraft will
contain the remainder of the HAWK missile parts purchased and paid for by the
Government of Iran, a portion of which was delivered on May 24.

     (2)  The Iranian Government, having recognized the plight of the hostages
in the Lebanon, and in the spirit of humanitarian assistance, agrees to cause
the release and safe return of the living American hostages and the return of
the body of the deceased American and that this release will be completed not
later than 0400 Tehran time.

     (3)  It is further agreed by both sides that if by 0400 Tehran time, the
hostages are not safely in the hands of U.S. authorities the aircraft with the
HAWK missile parts will be turned around and will not land in Iran and the
U.S. delegation will depart Tehran immediately.  If, however, the hostages are
released at 0400, as indicated above, the U.S. delegation will remain in
Tehran until 1200 Noon on May 28, 1986.

     (4)  The Government of the United States commits to deliver to Bandar
Abbas, Iran, two phase one IHIPIR radar sets, fully compatible with the HAWK
missile system now in the possession of the Iranian government.  This delivery
to take place after the arrival of the hostages in U.S. custody and within ten
days after the receipt of payment through existing financial channels for
these radar systems. It is further agreed that the government of the United
States will make every effort to locate and identify those items from the
original list of 240 parts which were not immediately available, and to
provide those available as soon as possible after payment is received and the
hostages are in U.S. custody.

     (5)  Both Governments agree to a continuation of a political dialogue to
be conducted in secrecy until such time as both sides agree to make such a
dialogue public.  It is agreed by both sides that this dialogue shall include
discussions on the Soviet threat to Iran, the situation in Afghanistan,
Nicaragua, and other political topics as many be mutually agreed.  Both sides
agree in advance that these discussions will include consideration of further
defense needs of Iran.

     (6)  Both Governments recognize that the lack of a clear channel of
communications has contributed to misunderstanding and confusion in the past
and agree that this problem is best resolved by having the United States
provide a secure channel of communications between our two governments by
placing a secure satellite communications team, and appropriate equipment
secretly in Tehran.  The Government of Iran agrees that the U.S. communicators
will be accorded normal diplomatic privileges and immunity on an informal
basis and without attribution.

     The Adviser pressed North for concessions on the Da'wa.  North, more
flexible than McFarlane, proposed a statement such as:

The U.S. will make every effort through and with international organizations,
private individuals, religious organizations and other third parties in a
humanitarian effort to achieve the release of and just and fair treatment for
Shi'ites held in confinement as soon as possible.

     The Iranians had another problem.  The Adviser said that Iran could not
arrange the release of the hostages by 4 a.m.  He pleaded with McFarlane for
more time.  McFarlane was in no mood to compromise.  However, he gave the
Adviser until 6:30 a.m. to arrange for the release of the hostages.  If the
Iranians did not guarantee their freedom by then, the U.S. delegation would
leave Tehran.

Departure

     Prior to the 6:30 a.m. deadline, the Second Iranian returned to the hotel
with an eleventh-hour compromise.  He offered to release two hostages
immediately and two more after the HAWK parts were delivered.  McFarlane
refused, strictly observing his instructions that all the hostages had to be
released before any parts could be delivered.

     Eager to keep the Iran initiative alive, North recommended that McFarlane
accept the two-hostage compromise.  He testified that McFarlane overruled him,
and that he "saluted smartly and carried it out."  McFarlane testified that
North was so determined to accept a compromise that, while McFarlane was
asleep, North violated McFarlane's orders and directed Secord to send the
plane from Israel with the remaining HAWK parts.  Upon awakening, McFarlane
ordered the plane, midway in its voyage, to return to Israel.  North denied
this allegation, and contended that McFarlane had approved sending the plane
subject to its recall.  Secord testified that it was always part of the plan
to send the plane.  Cave testified that he was unaware that the plane had
taken off.  In any event, the 6:30 a.m. deadline passed without any indication
that any hostages had been released.

     The Iranians made last-minute efforts to sell the compromise and obtain
the HAWK parts.  At 8 a.m., just before the delegation left the hotel, the
Adviser arrived and repeated the two-hostage proposal.  McFarlane rejected it
out of hand:  "You are not keeping the agreement.  We are leaving."

     Even at the Tehran airport, the Second Iranian tried to persuade
McFarlane to change his mind.  But there was no reprieve.  McFarlane had come
to Tehran with instructions and on the understanding that no more HAWK parts
would be delivered unless all of the hostages were freed.  He had expected the
hostages' release upon his arrival.  He had allowed the Iranians to temporize
for 3 days.  He once again rejected the last-minute compromise and ordered the
plane airborne.  As McFarlane left, he asked the Second Iranian to tell his
"superiors that this was the fourth time that they had failed to honor an
agreement.  The lack of trust will endure for a long time."

     The plane left Tehran at 8:55 a.m. and landed in Tel Aviv several hours
later.  During the layover there, North consoled McFarlane with the news that
the efforts with Iran had produced one benefit: some of the proceeds of the
arms sales were being used for the Contras.  McFarlane assumed that Poindexter
had approved this use of the money, as and that, because of the magnitude of
the decision, it was not something that Poindexter would have undertaken on
his own authority. McFarlane testified that he, therefore, never raised the
"diversion" with Poindexter or the President when he reported on the trip.

Why the Tehran Mission Failed

     The participants had different explanations for why the Tehran mission
failed.  Secord testified that McFarlane, who had demonstrated firmness, was
responsible for the failure by insisting on release of all the hostages:

But as far as I know and this will surprise some people I guess, but as far as
I know, there was no Iranian agreement to produce all the hostages at the time
of the meeting in Tehran . . . .  I don't know how exactly that expectation
got into McFarlane's head.

 Hakim, who had been the interpreter at Frankfurt, agreed:

I cannot recall any time that was spoken that all hostages would be released.
That must have been [a] misconception by someone at sometime somewhere.

     McFarlane testified that he was "surprised" at Secord's statement:  "[I]n
talking to my own staff at the time, Colonel North and others, all of them
reconfirmed, yes, we do expect and have all along the complete release of the
hostages."  And North's messages and reports to Poindexter before the Tehran
mission confirm that the President and Poindexter shared that understanding.
Indeed, in conveying the President's approval for the mission, Poindexter made
clear to North that he would tolerate no more backing down on the conditions.
He wrote North more than a month before the trip:

You may go ahead and go, but I want several points made clear to them [the
Iranians].  There are not to be any parts delivered until all the hostages are
free in accordance with the plan that you layed out for me before.  None of
this half shipment before any are released crap.  It is either all or nothing.
Also you may tell them that the President is getting very annoyed at their
continued stalling.

     North and Cave blamed the misunderstanding, and the consequent failure of
the mission, on Ghorbanifar.  North testified that "it turns out that the
Iranians did not" agree to the release of all the hostages, even though
Ghorbanifar said they had.  In his report on the trip, Cave stated that
Ghorbanifar was a "dishonest interlocutor," who "gave each side a different
picture of the structure of the deal."  But Cave was confident that greed
would overcome the problems, and he favored continuing the initiative:  "Since
both Gorba and the Second Iranian stood to make a lot of money out of the
deal, they presumably will work hard to bring it off."

     Based on long experience with Iranians, Cave was not wholly optimistic.
He detected in the Tehran discussions a new dimension to the problem.  He
concluded that the Kuwaitis held the key to the impasse, and that the American
hostages would not be released until Kuwait released the Da'wa prisoners.  He
grounded his conclusion on the independence of the hostage-holders in Lebanon.
Until then, he believed that the Hizballah would not release all the hostages.
The Iran initiative now threatened to move from an arms-for-hostage exchange
to an arms-and-prisoners-for-hostages trade.