Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0105/01051.txt

Text File | 1993-07-27 | 11KB | 210 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01051}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 12E  The Meeting Is Set}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{parts
hawk
items
north
poindexter
cia
israel
spare
deposit
meeting}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 12E  The Meeting Is Set

     By May 6, North told Poindexter that he had achieved what Poindexter
demanded - all hostages would be released before the parts were delivered.  He
reported this to Poindexter in a hopeful PROF note:

I believe we have succeeded.  Deposit being made tomorrow (today is a bank
holiday in Switzerland).  Release of hostages set for 19 May in sequence you
have specified.  Specific date to be determined by how quickly we can assemble
requisite parts.  Thank God - he answers prayers. V/R, North.

     Following the London meeting, North and North's deputy, Robert Earl, met
with Clair George, C/NE, and Cave of the CIA to review the status of the
initiative.  From that meeting, North produced a memorandum setting forth the
unresolved issues.  The memo specifically noted that Clair George "wanted to
ensure that Secretary Weinberger, Casey, and Secretary Shultz would all be
briefed on the project."

     As a first step in moving the HAWK parts, Secord was to receive $15
million in Iranian funds.  Only then would Secord transfer Enterprise funds to
the CIA and begin acquiring parts.  But Ghorbanifar had difficulty in
transferring the money.  Instead of receiving $15 million in deposit, Secord
had to settle for $10 million as the first step.  Secord sent a KL-43 message
to North on May 14:

     1.  We have just received 10 M in the lake via a contorted process but
our lawyer says it is good and he is now moving it out of the lake to another
acct.  Still no sign of the remaining 5 M but I assume it is enroute.

     2.  I will advise Adam ASAP . . . .

     On May 12, C/NE had advised the CIA Office of Finance that they should
expect a deposit of $13 million to the CIA account in Switzerland.  The
deposit would allow the CIA to purchase the 240 HAWK spare parts and two
radars from DOD.  Two days later, C/NE changed the amount the Office of
Finance should expect to $10 million.  Finally, on May 16, 1986, the CIA Swiss
account received a deposit of $6.5 million from "Hyde Park Square."  C/NE
advised North of the deposit and recalled North's comments:  "Yes, 6.5. is in
and the remaining 6.5 is going to come later [for the radars]."  Iranian funds
were never sent for the radars.  Additionally, C/NE was not certain of
arrangements to pay for the 508 TOWs and had assumed that the Israeli
Government handled that expense in a separate transaction.

The National Security Planning Group Meeting

     Also on May 16, Poindexter and North attended a National Security
Planning Group meeting chaired by the President.  They discussed soliciting
financial support from third countries to support the Nicaraguan Resistance.
Poindexter recalled that Secretary of State Shultz said that Congress would
probably not renew funding for the Contras as early as Administration
officials had hoped.  To develop "bridge funding" for the Contras, Poindexter
asked Secretary Shultz to prepare a list of countries for the President to
consider for solicitation.

     Following the meeting, Poindexter received a PROF message from North
declaring, "There is now $6 M available to the resistance forces."  This
message was sent the same day one of the Enterprise's Swiss accounts received
a deposit toward the purchase of spare parts.  Poindexter testified that he
understood the $6 million had come from the diversion; however, the National
Security Adviser claimed he did not tell the President of the sudden
availability of "bridge funds."  Generally, according to Poindexter, when
opportunities arose for him to discuss the diversion with President Reagan, he
avoided doing so in order to permit the President to be able to deny knowledge
of the issue.  Poindexter claimed that he never volunteered to the President
that diverted funds were available to "bridge" the Contra financial
requirements.

Final Planning for Tehran

     With the 1-week delay in receiving the deposit from Ghorbanifar,
participants in the initiative adjusted their schedules.  North notified
Poindexter on May 17 of travel plans for the Americans going to Tel Aviv and
Tehran.  Additionally, he requested a military aircraft for the trip to Israel
and a last-minute meeting among McFarlane, the President, Casey, Shultz, and
Weinberger.  Poindexter opposed both ideas:

I have problems with this plan.  An A/C request is too closely linked to what
is happening.  I don't see how we can use a military A/C.  Why do you have to
stay so long in Israel?  I had in mind you would travel separately,
rdvu[rendezvous] in Israel at a covert location, and proceed to Iran.  I don't
want a meeting with RR, Shultz, and Weinberger.

     North's reply was a comprehensive schedule of events that detailed the
American travel itinerary with the commercial delivery of military materials
for Iran.  Even though the delegation's flight arrangements were later
altered, the military arms were shipped as noted below:

Thursday:  May 22

1000 - 240 items + 508 TOWs moved . . . to Kelly AFB by CIA
1100 - Commercial 707 (#1) arrives Kelly to load most of 240 items
1700 - Commercial 707 (#1) Dep Kelly for Israel w/bulk of 240 items aboard

Friday:  May 23

1400 - Commercial 707 (#2) Dep Kelly AFB w/508 TOWs for IDF [Israeli Defense
       Force] enr Israel
1400 - Commercial 707 (#1) Arr Israel w/bulk of 240 items; commence xfr to
       IAF 707s prior to commencement of Sabbath

Saturday:  May 24

1700 - Commercial 707 (#2) Arrives w/508 TOWs & remainder of 240 items;
       complete xfr of 240 items to IAF 707s after sunset (end of Sabbath)
2200 - bulk of 240 items transloaded fm Commercial 707 (#2) to IAF 707 (#B)

     The final travel itinerary was eventually outlined by North.  After
Poindexter asked North to consider using a CIA proprietary for a segment of
the flight to Israel, North responded that he would make arrangements that did
not include military aircraft.  His final recommendation included the use of a
Democracy, Inc. aircraft to fly the delegation to Rhein Main, Germany.

     On May 22, a Southern Air Transport 707 airplane delivered 13 pallets of
HAWK missile spare parts to Israel.  The following day, Southern Air Transport
flight crews arrived in Israel for the trips to Tehran.

     On May 24, a second 707 arrived in Israel with 508 TOW missiles to
replace the Israeli arms issued to Iran in 1985.  After an examination by
Israeli Defense Force personnel, the weapons were judged to be in "poor
condition" and were rejected.  One pallet of HAWK parts and the Tehran
delegation departed on May 25 aboard a disguised Israeli Government aircraft.
Another Israeli plane loaded with the remaining 12 pallets of HAWK spare parts
was ready for immediate departure to Tehran.

U.S. War Readiness Suffers

     The CIA obtained the 13 pallets of HAWK missile spare parts using much
the same procedures employed to obtain the TOWs a few months earlier.  Once
again, the usual method of dealing with CIA requests for weapons from DOD was
ignored.  Bypassing the system in February created a large enough pricing
error to make the diversion of excess profits feasible.  Bypassing the system
in obtaining the HAWK spare parts was equally serious, this time affecting
U.S. war readiness.

     When the Army received from the CIA the list of HAWK spare parts the
Iranians were demanding, Major Simpson began to fill the order.  But the
Iranians had prepared the list using outdated documents and obsolete stock
numbers, making it difficult for the Army to identify the parts; indeed, HAWK
Project officials could not identify 11 of the items on the list.

     Out of 148 items, only 99 existed in the Army's stocks in sufficient
quantities such that the transfer to Iran would have no readiness impact. In
the case of 15 items, Army stocks would be completely depleted if the Army
provided all quantities requested.  Supplying 11 items would have depleted
more than half the available stocks.

     Simpson was able to adjust the quantities on many of the items requested.
On April 23, however, he instructed his subordinates to ship all of the items
on the revised list.  Readiness impact remained critical for 10 to 12 of the
parts.  The parts were ordered to be shipped even though U.S. HAWK missile
batteries would be deficient if they were needed.

     The availability of one part was particularly acute.  The Iranians had
requested a quantity of one particular part used in the HAWK radar.  If the
part fails, the system does not work; if there are no replacements, the system
remains useless.  The Army had only a limited supply of this part. Shipping
the parts would put the readiness impact in the "high risk" category.  Simpson
protested to his superiors that the Army's stock of this part could not be
depleted.  The CIA insisted on delivery, and all of the parts were shipped.
U.S. readiness was thus adversely affected.

Conclusion

     The President's decision to sign the Finding in mid-January 1986 carried
with it a decision not to notify Congress of the covert operation. As the
participants recalled, the scheme contemplated a quick sale of weapons and an
immediate release of all the hostages.  Indeed, the memorandum accompanying
the Presidential Finding provided that the initiative would be closed down if
the hostages were not released after the first 1,000 TOWs were sold.

     By the end of May, the Americans had seen one pledge after another
evaporate.  When the first sales took place in mid-February they were not
followed by a hostage release.  Iran was subsequently rewarded with the
promise of the sale of HAWK parts, but the Americans insisted that all the
hostages first had to be released.  That American demand was abandoned as
well, however, as the McFarlane delegation prepared for their trip to Tehran
in an airplane containing a quantity of HAWK spare parts.

     While freedom for American hostages had not materialized, a funding
mechanism to support various clandestine programs was flourishing.  By the
time McFarlane and North were preparing for their journey to Tehran, part of
the profits obtained from the sale to Iran of both the TOW missiles and the
HAWK spare parts had been diverted to support the Nicaraguan Resistance
movement.  The remainder of the profits were stored in secret Swiss bank
accounts to support "off-the-shelf" clandestine operations.