Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0104/01041.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01041}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 10B  The November HAWK Shipment}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{country
north
secord
cia
iran
november
clarridge
chief
missiles
shipment}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 10B  The November HAWK Shipment

     By the third week of November, the Israeli intermediaries and the
Americans believed they had reached an agreement with Ghorbanifar on a plan
that would gain release of all the hostages by Thanksgiving.  The plan was, in
essence, a straight swap:  U.S.-made missiles in Israeli stocks would be sold
to Iran in exchange for American hostages.  As the exchange date approached,
many details remained unresolved.  They were only hammered out in separate and
frantic long-distance negotiations among the Israeli intermediaries and
Ghorbanifar, Ghorbanifar and his contacts in the Iranian Government, and
Israeli Government officials and NSC officials.

How Many Missiles?

     One critical component of the plan was unsettled until the eleventh hour
- the number and type of missiles that the Israelis would ship to Iran. As
evidenced by their late October proposal, the Iranians wanted to purchase
immediately hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated U.S.-made
missile systems for use in their war with Iraq.  The Israelis were concerned
about depleting their stocks.  The Americans, who had not found a solution to
the replenishment requirements arising out of the August and September missile
shipments, sought an agreement involving smaller quantities of missiles
shipped over time.  The middlemen in the transaction - Ghorbanifar and Al
Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi, Israeli arms dealers also involved in the
negotiations - had substantial monetary incentives to negotiate a deal in
which large quantities of weapons and money would change hands.

     By Sunday, November 17, the planners had decided on an initial shipment
of 80 HAWK missiles.  This shipment was to be just the start of a much larger,
phased transaction.

     On November 18, North called Schwimmer, who was in direct contact with
Ghorbanifar.  They discussed a sale of 600 HAWKs to Iran in groups of 100
spread out over the next 3 or 4 days.  Schwimmer told North that the first
shipment of 100 missiles had been "approved" in Tel Aviv and that it was to
be followed by the release of five "boxes," the code name for the American
hostages.  After the call, North wrote in his Notebook:  "Schwimmer to P/U
[pick up] HAWKs in U.S."  That day, an Israeli official told Prime Minister
Shimon Peres that the Americans were willing for 500 HAWK missiles to be
supplied, but it was proposed that Israel supply 80 HAWKs.

     There is other evidence of plans for a very large weapons shipment, to
Iran:  In mid-November a European broker sought an air carrier to transport
immediately 10 planeloads of armaments in long crates from the capital of
Country 15 to Tehran.  An airline owned by the CIA became aware of the
shipment.  This CIA airline proprietary learned that "[t]he cargo is declared
to be medicine but is in reality ammunition etc."  When this same proprietary
was called in about 10 days later by CIA officials to move HAWK missiles, the
company's manager concluded that the cargo was the same as what the European
broker had offered earlier.

     By November 20, the plan - as reported by North to Poindexter - had moved
away from one involving 500 to 600 HAWKs toward one that included these
components:  First, 80 HAWKs from Israeli stocks were to be moved to Iran on
Friday, November 22, on three planes spaced apart by 2 hour intervals.  After
the planes were launched, but before they landed in Iran, five American and
possibly one French hostage would be released.  After the hostages were freed,
40 more HAWKs would be moved to Iran.  The United States would replenish
Israel's stocks promptly by sale at a mutually agreed price.

     North's notes from the same day confirm that the initial delivery was to
be 80 items, but indicate a key difference from what he had reported to
Poindexter: the American hostages would not to be freed all at once in advance
of the arrival of any HAWKs, but rather would be released sequentially after
each shipment.  After referring to the total of 80 HAWKs, North wrote:

     - One 27 - 2
       27 - 3
       26 - 1
       6 + 1 French

     This notation appears to mean that 2 hostages were to be released after a
first shipment of 27 missiles, 3 hostages were to be released after a second
shipment of the same amount, and 1 hostage would be released after a third
shipment of the remaining 26 items.  In fact, within a few days, an initial
load of HAWKs arrived in Tehran without any prior hostage release.

     McFarlane's instruction not to ship weapons without the prior release of
the hostages thus was not followed.  From this point on, the Iranians would
always insist on sequential delivery of weapons, followed by the release of
hostages.  On November 20, North wrote in his notebook:  "120 HAWKs =
1) 5 Amcits, 2) Guarantee that no more."

     North's notes also suggest that although the initial shipment quantity
had been reduced from 600 HAWKs, additional arms shipments to Iran were
contemplated after the shipment of 120 HAWKs.  Following a description of the
sequence of delivery for the first 80 HAWKs and the hostage releases, North
wrote:  "After - 40 more HAWKs, 200 SW [Sidewinder] missiles, 1900 TOWs."

McFarlane Puts North in Charge

     While McFarlane was at the Geneva summit with the President, North became
immersed in the details of the HAWK transaction.  North testified that he was
"thrown into this on the night of November 17," in almost simultaneous
telephone calls from Rabin and McFarlane.  Rabin told North that the plan
called for Israel to move 80 HAWK missiles by November 20.  He said that
Israel was unwilling to commence the shipment without satisfactory
arrangements for replenishment by the United States.  According to North's
notes, McFarlane told North to solve Rabin's replenishment problem, and "to
keep orders under $14 M" each - the threshold figure for reporting foreign
military sales to Congress.  After the calls from McFarlane and Rabin, North
"flew up immediately [to New York] to talk with Mr. Rabin."  In New York, he
met with officials of the Israeli Ministry of Defense Procurement Mission, who
wanted to arrange replenishment sales to Israel of 508 TOWs and 120 HAWK
missiles.

     The next day, North or Poindexter asked Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, then
military assistant to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, about the
availability and price of HAWKs and TOWs, and the legality and method of
transferring such missiles.  The requester initially sought information on a
proposed transfer of 500 HAWKs, but, in accordance with the evolving plan,
soon cut the number to 120.  Powell understood that the ultimate destination
of the weapons would be Iran and that Israel was acting as an intermediary.

     After receiving this request, Powell contacted Noel Koch, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who
in turn asked Henry Gaffney, Director of Plans, Defense Security Assistance
Agency (DSAA), to find out how many HAWKs were available for immediate
transfer.  DSAA is the entity within the Department of Defense that is
primarily responsible for arms sales to other governments.  Koch asked Gaffney
to prepare a Point Paper examining the requirements for notification of
Congress and whether the ultimate destination of the weapons might be
concealed.

     Gaffney testified that he understood from his superiors that the Point
Paper should cast a negative view of the transaction to reflect Secretary
Weinberger's presumed opposition to arms transfers to Iran.  He completed his
paper, entitled "HAWK Missiles for Iran," on November 22 or 23 and submitted
it to Powell.  Powell testified that he gave the paper to Secretary
Weinberger, who did not, however, recall receiving it.

     Gaffney's Point Paper included important information about the price and
availability of HAWKs:  164 missiles were available for foreign sale at that
time; the missiles cost the United States approximately $300,000 per unit; and
replacement cost would be as much as $437,700 per unit.  Transportation and
administration charges would have to be added.  Seventy-nine of the missiles
were available for immediate shipment.  This state of the inventory may be one
reason why the number of HAWKs planned for immediate shipment from Israel to
Iran - and therefore the number which the United States would have to quickly
replenish - was set at 80.  Gaffney's Point Paper also described political
drawbacks of a weapons transfer to Iran.

     Gaffney testified that under the Arms Export Control Act, Iran was not an
eligible country for direct sales from the United States, and that, in his
view, even if Iran were to become eligible, the contemplated sales of HAWKs
could not be made directly or indirectly (through Israel or otherwise) unless
the President notified Congress.  In addition, Gaffney testified that if the
transfer were to be made by Israel, U.S.-Israeli agreements require advance,
written U.S. consent.  U.S. law mandates that the President cannot give that
consent without certain conditions being met in advance, including obtaining
assurance from Iran that it would use the weapons only for self-defense and
would comply with U.S. restrictions on retransfer to another country.  These
were conditions that Iran could not or would not meet.

McFarlane Informs the President and the Secretary of State

     While they were still in Geneva, McFarlane updated the President and
Chief of Staff Donald Regan on the status of the HAWK shipment and the
anticipated hostage release.  McFarlane informed them that the Israelis were
about to ship the weapons, and expressed hope that the hostages would come out
by the end of the week.  McFarlane specifically told the President that Israel
was about to deliver 80 HAWK missiles to Iran via a warehouse in Country 15,
and that Israel wanted the United States to replace those missiles.

     McFarlane testified that he simply told the President that the Israelis
were about to act, but did not ask for specific approval:

[T]he President provided the authority in early August for Israel to
undertake, to sell arms to Iran, and to then come to the United States for
replenishment, to buy new ones.  That didn't require then the Israelis to come
back to us on each occasion and get new approval.

The President asked McFarlane to arrange a meeting at which the President and
his top advisers would review the initiative after the summit.

     At about the same time, McFarlane also told Secretary of State George
Shultz of the impending arms-for-hostages swap.  McFarlane called Secretary
Shultz by secure phone "out of the blue, about a hostages release and arms
sales to Iran."  McFarlane explained that Israel was about to ship 100 HAWKs
to Iran through Country 15, that the shipment would occur only if the hostages
were released, and that the United States would sell replacements to Israel.
Secretary Shultz understood it as "a straight out arms-for-hostages deal."  He
expressed his opposition, and rebuked McFarlane for not informing him about it
earlier:  "I told him I hoped that the hostages would get out, but I was
against it, and I was upset that he was telling me about it as it was just
about to start so there was no way I could do anything about it."  When asked
about Secretary Shultz' account, McFarlane testified:  "I don't recall it that
way."

     Even as McFarlane was filling in Shultz on the broad outline of the plan,
his NSC subordinates took steps to keep the Department of State hierarchy in
the dark about the complex diplomatic problems caused by the operation.  For
instance, Secretary Shultz was not told of the back-channel communications and
actions of State Department officials, taken at the behest of CIA and NSC
officials, to support the HAWK shipment.

North Recruits Secord

     As McFarlane had explained to the President and Secretary Shultz, the
plan was to move 80 HAWKs from Tel Aviv to the capital of Country 15, transfer
them to other planes, and then ship them on to Iran.  The planners chose this
circuitous routing because direct flights from Israel to Iran would draw
attention given the poor relations between Israel and Iran. Because the cargo
was arms, special clearances had to be obtained from the government of Country
15.  As the pilot who ultimately flew the HAWKs to Iran stated:

Everybody can fly [in Europe] without clearances unless you have . . .
sensitive stuff like arms aboard, and then you have to have diplomatic
clearance.

     A problem developed on November 18:  The government of Country 15 was
unwilling to grant the special clearances.  On that day, North asked Richard
Secord - his confederate in the covert operation supporting the Contras - to
fly to Country 15 to "see what he could do to straighten out the mess."
Secord said this was when he learned of the Iran arms initiative.  North
explained the secret operation to Secord, indicating that it had been
sanctioned by the United States, that it had run into difficulties in Country
15, and that there was "quite a bit of urgency" to get Secord to go there.
According to Secord, North "knew that we had - my organization had had
extensive deals with the armament [industry]" in Europe and "wondered if I
could arrange for this transshipment."

     The next day, North gave Secord a letter on White House stationery,
signed by North "for" McFarlane, stating

Your discrete [sic] assistance is again required in support of our national
interests.  At the earliest opportunity, please proceed to [the capital of
Country 15] and other locations as necessary in order to arrange for the
transfer of sensitive materiel being shipped from Israel.

As in the past, you should exercise great caution that this activity does not
become public knowledge.  You should ensure that only those whose discretion
is guaranteed are involved.

     McFarlane testified he was not aware that North was providing this letter
to Secord, and that his permission was not sought to send it out.

     Secord arrived in Country 15 on November 20.  He and his associate Thomas
Clines, who Secord said "had really been handling all of the matters for the
Enterprise" in Europe, together started "to work the problem . . . through our
colleagues in the armament industry."

Million-Dollar Deposit to Lake Resources

     On November 18 - the same day that he brought Secord into the deal -
North began to arrange for a $1-million transfer from Israeli intermediaries
to the account of Lake Resources, a Panamanian company controlled by Secord
and referred to by North as "our Swiss Co[mpany]."  Lake Resources and its
account at Credit Suisse in Geneva had been established by North and Secord in
May 1985 "to receive monies in support of the covert operations."  Prior to
this deposit, which was made on November 20, Secord and North had used the
company exclusively for supporting the Contras.

     The purpose for this $1-million deposit is unclear.  North and Secord
testified that the payment was for chartering planes to move the 80 HAWKS to
Iran.  The Israeli Historical Chronology affirms this explanation.  North and
Secord, however, were unable to explain why they were asking for
transportation expenses on November 18 when, according to Secord, his original
assignment was only to help obtain landing clearances for planes already
chartered by Schwimmer.  It was not until November 22, when Schwimmer's
charter unexpectedly fell through, that Secord's role was expanded.  At that
time, the amount Secord expected to pay for chartering planes was less than $1
million.

     Some evidence suggests that Secord made, or contemplated making,
expenditures in Country 15.  One of the persons with whom Secord was working,
an officer of a European arms company, reportedly attempted to bribe an
official of the government of Country 15 to obtain the necessary clearances,
and there are references to Secord having spent substantial sums in Country
15.  However, bank records do not show any such payments out of the Lake
Resources account.

     Whatever the initial purpose of the deposit, the Committees have
ascertained its use.  Secord used approximately $150,000 to pay for air
charters relating to the HAWK shipment, and the remaining $850,000 was spent
to support the Contras and to make profit distributions to Secord and his
business associates, Albert Hakim and Thomas Clines.  North testified that in
early 1986 he told the Israelis that the money had been used "for the purpose
of the Contras" and that they acquiesced.  The first "diversion" to the
Contras of money received in connection with the Iranian arms sales had
occurred.

Confusion in Country 15

     The plan to ship the HAWKs through Country 15 faced collapse because the
government there refused to grant the necessary clearances.  Upon arriving in
Country 15, Secord and his associates - the European businessman and Clines -
tried to overcome this problem.  All three were fully aware that the cargo to
be moved was HAWK missiles.  Because their efforts were outside normal
diplomatic channels and in contradiction to stated U.S. policy, they were not
well received by the government of Country 15.

     The European businessman may have tried to solve the problem even before
Secord arrived.  The Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Country 15
recalled learning on November 23 that about one week earlier the European
businessman had approached an official of Country 15 and offered what the
official considered to be a bribe to assist in the transit of a shipment
involving the United States, Israel, and Iran.  If this approach occurred
around November 16, as the evidence suggests, then it draws into question
Secord's testimony that he was not brought in until November 18.

     On November 20, the European businessman called an official of Country
15's Foreign Ministry and expressed the hope that the Foreign Ministry would
grant permission for two aircraft carrying weapons from Israel for Iran to
transit the country.  To the official, the businessman appeared to be "acting
as a broker for the arms deal."  The European businessman referred to an
"American general," presumably Secord, involved in the undertaking.  The
foreign government was disturbed by the businessman's approach, and the next
day another official asked the American Embassy for "information about this
strange case."  The Embassy, unaware that the U.S. Government supported this
shipment of weapons to Iran, told the Foreign Ministry that the shipment was
not authorized by the United States and was contrary to U.S. Government policy
strongly opposing arms sales to Iran.

     Contributing to the confusion of the government of Country 15 was another
incident on November 21.  "Anonymous people claiming to 'represent the
American administration'" attempted to intercept the country's Foreign
Minister and Prime Minister at the airport of the capital of Country 15
following their return from the European Economic Summit in Brussels.  A CIA
cable reporting this incident stated that this approach, while unsuccessful,
was "particularly upsetting" to the foreign government because it "aroused
both attention and suspicion."

North Updates Poindexter

     As the operation faltered on November 20, North reported to Poindexter
and portrayed a mission well under control.  He made no mention of the
obstacles faced in Country 15:

The Israelis will deliver 80 Mod HAWKS to [the capital of Country 15] at noon
on Friday 22 Nov.  These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered aircraft,
owned by a proprietary which will take off at two hour intervals for Tabriz,
[Iran].  The aircraft will file for overflight through the [capital of Country
16] FIR en route to Tabriz [from Country 15].  Appropriate arrangements have
been made with the proper . . . [Country 16] air control personnel.  Once the
aircraft have been launched, their departure will be confirmed by Ashghari [a
pseudonym for Ghorbanifar] who will call [the Second Iranian official] who
will call [an Iranian in Damascus] who will direct [another Iranian in Beirut]
to collect the five rpt five Amcits [American citizen hostages] from Hizballah
and deliver them to the U.S. Embassy.  There is also the possibility that they
will hand over the French hostage who is very ill.

There is a requirement for 40 additional weaps of the same nomenclature for a
total requirement of 120.  $18 M in payment for the first 80 has been
deposited in the appropriate account.  No acft will land in Tabriz until the
AMCITS have been delivered to the embassy.  The Iranians have also asked to
order additional items in the future and have been told that they will be
considered after this activity has succeeded.  All transfer arrangements have
been made by Dick Secord, who deserves a medal for his extraordinary short
notice efforts.

Replenishment arrangements are being made through the MOD [Israeli Ministry of
Defense] purchasing office in NYC.  There is, to say the least, considerable
anxiety that we will somehow delay on their plan to purchase 120 of these
weapons in the next few days.  IAW [in accordance with] your instructions I
have told their agent that we will sell them 120 items at a price that they
can meet.  I have further told them that we will make no effort to move on
their purchase LOA [Letter of Offer and Acceptance] request until we have all
five AMCITS safely delivered. In short, the pressure is on them.

This PROF message is clear evidence that North informed Poindexter in detail
of the HAWK transaction - including the involvement of Secord and the
replenishment arrangements - well in advance of the shipment.

North Asks the CIA for Assistance

     Secord and the European businessman were unable to budge the government
of Country 15.  With only hours left before an Israeli plane carrying 80 HAWKs
was to depart for the capital of Country 15, North urgently sought assistance
from McFarlane, the CIA, and the State Department.  North called McFarlane on
the evening of November 21; they discussed whether McFarlane should call
Country 15's Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in the morning.

     Informed by Secord of the difficulties in Country 15, North immediately
asked CIA official Duane Clarridge to assist in obtaining clearances for the
plane going there.  Clarridge said Secord should contact the CIA Chief in
Country 15, whose name North then relayed to Secord.  At the same time,
Clarridge sent "flash" cables instructing the CIA Chief in Country 15 and his
deputy to report immediately to the office for a "special assignment."  The
next morning, November 22, Secord, using his Copp pseudonym, called the CIA
Chief and said that he urgently needed clearance for an El Al charter flight
scheduled to leave Tel Aviv in 20 minutes and fly to the capital of Country
15.  Secord urged the CIA Chief to call an official of Country 15 and
emphasize the urgency of obtaining the clearance.  At this point, the CIA
Chief suggested enlisting the help of the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy in Country 15.

North Brings State Into the Operation

     At about this time, North pressed to involve the U.S. Embassy directly in
the efforts to obtain the clearances.  North accurately told Robert B. Oakley,
then Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning at the
Department of State, that Israel had encountered problems obtaining clearances
in Country 15 for a transshipment of HAWK missiles for Iran.  In contrast,
North falsely told Oakley that he had learned of the shipment when "'one of
his people' went to an arms warehouse [in Country 15] to obtain arms for the
Nicaraguan Resistance, and learned that the Israelis had been obtaining arms
from the same source for shipment to Iran."  In any event, Oakley gave North
permission to tell the Embassy in Country 15 that the State Department was
"aware" of the unfolding operation and that the Embassy "could request
clearances."  Thereafter, the CIA Chief was instructed to insure that if the
Deputy Chief of Mission felt compelled to communicate with the State
Department, he should use only the CIA channel.

     The NSC also involved Oakley and the State Department in another
capacity.  On November 21, Oakley notified the CIA's counterterrorism
component that "information from the NSC indicated that one or more U.S.
hostages would soon be released in Lebanon."  Oakley reported that a team was
departing for Wiesbaden, West Germany, to await the arrival of the hostages.
The team arrived in Wiesbaden the following day, and remained there until
November 27.

     On November 22, Oakley reported to Secretary Shultz (who had returned
from Geneva) and others at the State Department "that the hostages would be
released that afternoon in exchange for 120 HAWKs at $250,000 each - worth $30
million in all."  Secretary Shultz and his advisers, Deputy Secretary John C.
Whitehead and Undersecretary Michael Armacost, shared their apprehension about
the endeavor.  The Secretary, who "regarded it as a $30 million weapons
payoff," told his deputies:  "Bud [McFarlane] says he's cleared with the
President."

     The next day, Secretary Shultz was told that no hostage had been released
and that the deal had collapsed.  That was false.  The operation was still
being actively pursued, and the movement of 18 HAWKs was yet to occur.

Jumbo Jet Departs for Country 15 Transit Point

     Although the clearance for landing in Country 15 had not been authorized
on the morning of November 22, the El Al 747 carrying the 80 HAWK missiles was
ordered to take off for that country's capital.  As the plane neared its
"go-no go point," frantic efforts were underway to change the country's
government's position.  Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in Country 15 and
ordered him to "pull out all the stops" to solve the problem.  Secord called
an official in Country 15's foreign ministry, who said that the government had
decided to withhold permission based upon the U.S. Embassy's previous
statement that the United States did not concur in the shipment.  Hoping to
reverse this position, the Deputy Chief of Mission made hurried phone calls
attempting to summon the Country 15 Foreign Minister out of a cabinet meeting;
and Secord told the CIA Chief that "McFarlane was being pulled out of [a]
meeting with [the] Pope" to call the Foreign Minister.

     All these efforts were in vain.  By early afternoon, Secord, who was in
radio contact with the El Al plane, telephoned North and informed him that the
government of Country 15 had refused permission.  He said the aircraft had
been ordered back to Tel Aviv.

North and Clarridge Bring in a CIA Airline

     Due to the delays, the El Al plane, which the Israelis had reserved for
this operation for only a limited time, was no longer available.  Clarridge,
North, and Secord scrambled to find other ways to transport the HAWK missiles
to Iran.  Within hours, Clarridge met with the Chief of the CIA's air branch
and told him "we [have] a very sensitive mission in the Middle East and we
need a 747 aircraft right away."  The branch chief could not locate such a,
large aircraft on short notice, but suggested that a CIA airline proprietary
might be able to move the cargo.  At 4 p.m. on November 22, an air branch
official called the CIA project officer for the proprietary, and asked whether
its Boeing 707 cargo planes were available to move 80 pieces of "sensitive hi
priority cargo" from Tel Aviv to the capital of Country 15.  The project
officer reported that at least one of the airline proprietary's planes was
available.

     Clarridge's actions resulting in the involvement of the air proprietary
were at North's request and with the authority of CIA Associate Deputy
Director of Operations, Edward Juchniewicz.  Juchniewicz spoke with both
Clarridge and North on November 22, and told them he had no objection to
giving Secord the commercial name of the airline proprietary to charter the
necessary flights.  Over the next 48 hours, Clarridge and CIA air branch
personnel closely managed the proprietary's flight activities in support of
this covert operation.  Before the operation was over, the proprietary's
project officer also became directly involved in coordinating matters.

Clarridge Brings in Another CIA Chief

     Even as the problems in Country 15 remained unresolved, Clarridge, on the
evening of November 22, moved to obtain clearances from another country,
Country 16, for overflight rights into Iran.  Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief
in Country 16 proposing that he ask Government authorities for "overflight
clearances for three commercial DC-8 aircraft (or similar aircraft) flying on
a chartered basis from [Country 15] to Tabriz and then retracing their route."
Clarridge explained that this was "a National Security Council initiative and
has the highest level of USG [United States Government] interest."  The CIA
Chief was to explain that "the purpose of the flight is humanitarian in nature
and is in response to terrorist acts."  Clarridge specifically instructed that
the U.S. Ambassador to Country 16 "should not be informed."

Schwimmer's DC-8 Charter Falls Through

     On the evening of November 22, Schwimmer called North to say the charter
of the DC-8s for the Country 15-to-Iran leg of the mission had fallen through.
In a PROF note to Poindexter, North updated the situation as of 7:00 p.m.:

Unbelievable as it may seem, I have just talked to Schwimmer, in TA [Tel
Aviv,] who advises that they have released their DC-8s in spite of my call to
DK [David Kimche] instructing that they be put on hold until we could iron out
the clearance problem in [the capital of Country 15].  Schwimmer released them
to save $ and now does not think that they can be re-chartered before Monday.

     Within minutes of Schwimmer's call, North and Secord discussed a
substitute method of transporting the missiles from Country 15 to Iran. Secord
suggested that the European businessman's company try to find some planes.
North wrote to Poindexter that Secord would solve the problem by diverting a
plane from the Contra operation to the Iran operation:

Advised Copp of lack of p/u [pick up] A/C [aircraft].  He has advised that we
can use one of our LAKE Resources A/C which was at [the capital of Country 15]
to p/u a load of ammo for UNO [United Nicaraguan Opposition].  He will have
the a/c repainted tonight and put into service nlt [no later than] noon Sat so
that we can at least get this thing moving.  So help me I have never seen
anything so screwed up in my life. Will meet with Calero tonite to advise that
the ammo will be several days late in arriving.  Too bad, this was to be our
first direct flight to the resistance field . . . inside Nicaragua.  The ammo
was already palletized w/parachutes attached.  Maybe we can do it on Weds. or
Thurs.

More as it becomes available.  One hell of an operation.

In fact, it appears that Lake Resources had no planes at this time.
Nevertheless, this PROF note reveals that North was beginning to meld the two
operations he was overseeing and to recognize that the Lake Resources
enterprise could operate in a variety of settings.

     Over the next 12 hours, Secord and others tried to hire a cargo carrier
for the Country 15-to-Iran leg.  They unsuccessfully sought to convince
officials of a European national airline to take on the assignment.  By the
morning of November 23, Secord had identified an aircraft to make the flight,
but this plane was never used.

Clarridge's Office Becomes the Command Post

     By November 23, Clarridge's office at Langley had become the command post
for coordinating the HAWK transport.  North was there most of the day. Also
present and assisting were the CIA air branch chief, an intelligence officer,
and Charles E. Allen.  Numerous problems with aircraft and flight clearances
continued to crop up.  As the situation deteriorated, Clarridge sent cables to
the far-flung CIA stations involved, and North stayed in continuous contact
with Secord in Country 15 and Schwimmer in Israel.

     Clarridge's superiors, specifically Juchniewicz and McMahon, were aware
of at least some aspects of the activity being directed from Clarridge's
office.  Juchniewicz's office received all of the cables being sent to and
from Clarridge on the operation.  In a memorandum for the record written 2
weeks later, McMahon stated:

On Saturday, 23 November 1985, Ed Juchniewicz asked me if I was aware of all
the activity transpiring on the effort to get the hostages out. He showed me a
cable to [the capital of Country 15] asking that we pass a message to the
[Deputy Chief of Mission] from the Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs [Poindexter].  The message assured the [Deputy Chief
of Mission] that only the Secretary of State and Ambassador Oakley were aware
of the operation.  I told Juchniewicz that I was unaware of the specifics of
the operation but due to the sensitivity of the operation, it was appropriate
that we pass correspondence between the NSC and the ambassadors overseas, but
only communications, that we could not be involved without a Finding.

McMahon testified that he did not know then that the CIA's airline proprietary
had been brought into the operation.

     Allen also learned that day of the CIA role in the operation.  North
called him in the morning and asked him to deliver to Clarridge intelligence
data on the Iran initiative.  Allen showed the materials to Clarridge, who
told him that North "had requested some assistance in obtaining a name of a
reliable charter airline," that he was considering using the Agency's airline
proprietary, and that he was trying to obtain landing and transit clearances
in Country 15.

The Oil-Drilling Equipment Cover Story

     During the planning of the HAWK missile shipment, the Israeli and
American participants agreed to keep the true nature of the operation secret.
They would use a false "story line" that the cargo to Iran was oil-drilling
equipment.  Several American officials who knew of the operation were advised
of this cover story but understood that it was false and knew that the cargo
was missiles.

     At the time, the President and Regan knew that the cargo comprised HAWK
missiles and were specifically told of the false story before the shipment was
made, presumably by McFarlane.  Regan testified:  "I recall that that was to
have been a cover story if discovered, it was to have been said that these
were oil-drilling parts."

     The government of Country 15 also was aware that the clearances being
sought by Secord and others were for moving missiles through its capital and
into Iran as part of an effort to gain the release of American hostages.
Secord understood that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were
informed.  Indeed, Secord testified that it was not possible to ship HAWKs
through the foreign capital without the host country knowing, because special
handling of the weapons was required at the airport.

     North claims he used the cover story when he brought Clarridge and Allen
into the operation.  As he later testified, "I lied to the CIA because that
was the convention that we had worked out with the Israelis, that no one else
was to know."  Allen testified that North "stated emphatically" that the cargo
was oil-drilling equipment, but that he (Allen) had "serious doubts" about
whether this was true.

     If Clarridge did not know the contents of the cargo at the start, he soon
learned it.  In Country 15, late in the morning of November 23, Secord gave
the CIA Chief a full accounting of the mission.  Their meeting occurred in a
car in a hotel parking lot.  Secord revealed his identity, explained he was
formally associated with the NSC, and specifically told the officer that the
planned flight would contain HAWK missiles being sent to Iran in exchange for
hostages.

     The CIA Chief testified that he returned to his office and sent two
cables to Clarridge through the "Eyes Only" privacy channel he was using on
the HAWK project.  The first cable contained a general report, mentioning the
discussion with Secord but not setting forth the substance of the
conversation.  The second cable reported that the flights would contain HAWK
missiles sent to secure the release of the hostages.  The Committees'
investigation did not locate this cable.  But the CIA Chief's subsequent
testimony about its existence was corroborated in testimony by the CIA Deputy
Chief and by the Deputy Chief of Mission - who at the time either read the
cable or was told about it by the CIA Chief.  In addition, the CIA
communicator, who transmitted the cable from Country 15, vividly recalls being
shocked when he read the message and learned that the United States was
sending arms to Iran.

     Clarridge received additional information that revealed that the cargo
was HAWKs: North testified that shortly after the shipment occurred, if not
before, he had told Clarridge the true nature of the cargo.  Moreover, on
November 23, Allen showed Clarridge a report that, according to Allen, would
cause "one [to] think that this initiative had involved arms in the past."
Allen suspected that the November shipment also involved arms and "couldn't
help but believe that [Clarridge] suspected that.  Particularly he could see
the [report] as clearly as I, and he leafed through [its contents] . . . I
left the folder with him and then picked it up later."  After the shipment,
Clarridge received additional information that made clear that the cargo was
missiles.

     Clarridge insisted in testimony before these Committees that he had no
recollection of having learned that the cargo was missiles prior to early
1986.  This testimony conformed to the false story certain Administration
officials put out in November 1986 when they were trying to conceal the
advance knowledge in the U.S. Government of the shipment of HAWK missiles.

     The Committees are troubled by the fact that the cable informing
Clarridge of Secord's detailed account of the operation, and an earlier cable
Clarridge sent to the CIA Chief at the outset of the operation, are
inexplicably missing from an otherwise complete set of 78 cables sent by CIA
officials during the operation.

Country 15 Routing is Abandoned

     By the afternoon of November 23, the plan to transship the missiles
through Country 15 was abandoned.  The previous evening, McFarlane had called
the country's Foreign Minister and believed he had received a "green light"
for the flights.  However, the foreign government still insisted that the
United States provide a diplomatic note setting forth the nature of the cargo
and the shipping route, and stating that the release of American hostages was
the purpose of the shipment.  The foreign government wanted this documentation
because it saw the operation as "so directly in conflict with known U.S.
policy and [its own] policy."  The American planners balked, apparently out of
a concern about creating a formal paper record of the true nature of the
operation.  Later that day, the Deputy Chief of Mission, on instructions from
Poindexter, handed the  Foreign Minister a terse diplomatic note stating that
the U.S. Embassy "expresses regret that the Government of [Country 15] was
unable to fulfill the request of the Government of the United States for the
humanitarian mission."  Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in the capital of
Country 15 that in light of the diplomatic message, "it is obvious . . . that
we are closing down [the Country 15] aspect of this operation."

     As the Country 15 transit plan was falling through, North and Clarridge
sought a substitute transit point.  Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in the
capital of another country, Country 18, to request assistance in obtaining
landing rights in that country for sorties" by a CIA airline proprietary 707
airplane between Tel Aviv and Tabriz, the first to occur "in the next 12 hours
or so . . . and likely result in the release of the hostages."

     Meanwhile, still on November 23, Israeli military personnel began to load
the HAWKs into the CIA proprietary airplane at the Tel Aviv airport.  If they
had not already been told, the proprietary's crew surmised from the appearance
of the crates that their cargo was missiles and reported this to the airline
manager.

     Later that day, the participants decided to move the shipment directly
from Tel Aviv to Iran, without transiting a third country.  Under the new
plan, one of the proprietary's planes would make a series of flights to move
the 80 HAWKs.  After dismissing one route, the planners selected a shorter -
but more dangerous - route across Country 16.  But obtaining overflight
clearances from Country 16 remained a problem, so Clarridge once again cabled
the CIA Chief there.  Several hours later, the CIA Chief replied that the
Government of Country 16 was supportive, but needed "some idea of what the
aircraft would carry as presumably they would not be empty."  Late that night,
Clarridge sent two more increasingly urgent cables to the CIA Chief in Country
16.  In conformity with the cover story, these cables told the CIA Chief to
advise the government of Country 16 that "the aircraft are carrying
sophisticated spare parts for the oil industry" and that the five flights
would be spread over a number of days.

     North and Clarridge, working with Schwimmer, continued to coordinate the
flight activity on Sunday, November 24.  At the last minute, they decided
that, at least on the first sortie, the plane should land at a transit point
in another country, Country 17, to disguise the fact that the shipment was
moving from Israel to Iran.  While this decision was being made, the CIA Chief
in Country 16 informed Clarridge that the government there had approved the
five overflights, but that "incoming flight cannot come directly from [Country
17]."

CIA Airline Proprietary Moves the Missiles

     On November 24, the CIA proprietary aircraft carrying 18 HAWK missiles
flew from Tel Aviv to the transit point in Country 17.  Because Schwimmer had
sent the plane without a cargo manifest, the pilot lacked the documentation
required by customs officials at the transit point, who wanted to inspect the
cargo.  Simultaneously, Schwimmer and the proprietary manager, along with
North and Clarridge, frantically discussed how to solve this.  While there is
evidence to the contrary, it seems the pilot simply talked his way out of the
problem.

     After getting out of the transit point in Country 17, the pilot ran into
trouble while flying over Country 16.  According to the airline manager's
report,

nothing was prepared for overflight in [Country 16] and [the pilot] had again
to talk his way through.  Since they [the Country 16 ground controllers]
repeatedly insisted on a diplomatic clearance number, he made one up which was
not accepted after long negotiations and then he filibustered one hour and 30
min his way through [Country 16], using different altitudes, positions and
estimates that he told [Country 16's] Military with whom he was obviously in
radio contact . . .

However, radar realized his off-positions which gave additional reason for
arguments and time delays.

     Cables the next day from the CIA Chief in Country 16 to Clarridge
suggested several reasons why the pilot encountered these difficulties.  For
example, the destination of the plane was changed at the last minute from
Tabriz to Tehran, which "provoked query" from Country 16 because it did not
square with the clearance request.  Other discrepancies caused outright anger:

[An official of Country 16 was] quite upset over multiple flight plans
received, fact first flight came directly from [the transit point in Country
17] and did not request clearance beforehand and conflicting stories about
plane's cargo.  [The CIA Chief told [the official] it was oil industry spare
parts, telex from carrier stated medical supplies and the pilot told ground
controllers he was carrying military equipment . . . .

Bottom line is that [the government of Country 16] still wants to assist but
has developed a little cynicism about our interaction with them on the matter.

Ironically, the pilot reportedly told the flight controllers the true nature
of the cargo even while Clarridge was spreading the cover story to high level
officials of Country 16.

     The only part of the operation that went smoothly was the flight into
Tehran.  The Second Iranian Official and Ghorbanifar, who were in Geneva,
passed word to officials in Tehran to prepare to receive the plane.  The plane
landed in Tehran early in the morning.  After an encounter with a military
officer who apparently was unaware of the operation, "a civilian with a
submachine gun on his back" arrived at the aircraft.  The pilot understood
that this person was a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  He
instructed the pilot not to disclose to anyone at the airport that the flight
had originated in Israel, arranged for the unloading of the plane by military
personnel, and got the crew to a hotel - formerly the Sheraton - in downtown
Tehran.

     Fourteen hours later, after a warm send-off that included caviar, the
plane departed Tehran at 12:15 p.m. E.S.T., on Monday, November 25.  The
airline proprietary crew expected they would return shortly with more missiles
and told the Iranian at the airport, "Don't worry, we [will] come back."
However, the airline manager radioed them after they were airborne and
instructed them not to return to Israel.  Problems surfacing in both
Washington and Iran put an end to the CIA proprietary airline's role.  Within
a few days, Secord, using funds from the Lake Resources account, wired a
$127,700 payment to the proprietary.