$Unique_ID{bob01041} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 10B The November HAWK Shipment} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{country north secord cia iran november clarridge chief missiles shipment} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 10B The November HAWK Shipment By the third week of November, the Israeli intermediaries and the Americans believed they had reached an agreement with Ghorbanifar on a plan that would gain release of all the hostages by Thanksgiving. The plan was, in essence, a straight swap: U.S.-made missiles in Israeli stocks would be sold to Iran in exchange for American hostages. As the exchange date approached, many details remained unresolved. They were only hammered out in separate and frantic long-distance negotiations among the Israeli intermediaries and Ghorbanifar, Ghorbanifar and his contacts in the Iranian Government, and Israeli Government officials and NSC officials. How Many Missiles? One critical component of the plan was unsettled until the eleventh hour - the number and type of missiles that the Israelis would ship to Iran. As evidenced by their late October proposal, the Iranians wanted to purchase immediately hundreds of millions of dollars worth of sophisticated U.S.-made missile systems for use in their war with Iraq. The Israelis were concerned about depleting their stocks. The Americans, who had not found a solution to the replenishment requirements arising out of the August and September missile shipments, sought an agreement involving smaller quantities of missiles shipped over time. The middlemen in the transaction - Ghorbanifar and Al Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi, Israeli arms dealers also involved in the negotiations - had substantial monetary incentives to negotiate a deal in which large quantities of weapons and money would change hands. By Sunday, November 17, the planners had decided on an initial shipment of 80 HAWK missiles. This shipment was to be just the start of a much larger, phased transaction. On November 18, North called Schwimmer, who was in direct contact with Ghorbanifar. They discussed a sale of 600 HAWKs to Iran in groups of 100 spread out over the next 3 or 4 days. Schwimmer told North that the first shipment of 100 missiles had been "approved" in Tel Aviv and that it was to be followed by the release of five "boxes," the code name for the American hostages. After the call, North wrote in his Notebook: "Schwimmer to P/U [pick up] HAWKs in U.S." That day, an Israeli official told Prime Minister Shimon Peres that the Americans were willing for 500 HAWK missiles to be supplied, but it was proposed that Israel supply 80 HAWKs. There is other evidence of plans for a very large weapons shipment, to Iran: In mid-November a European broker sought an air carrier to transport immediately 10 planeloads of armaments in long crates from the capital of Country 15 to Tehran. An airline owned by the CIA became aware of the shipment. This CIA airline proprietary learned that "[t]he cargo is declared to be medicine but is in reality ammunition etc." When this same proprietary was called in about 10 days later by CIA officials to move HAWK missiles, the company's manager concluded that the cargo was the same as what the European broker had offered earlier. By November 20, the plan - as reported by North to Poindexter - had moved away from one involving 500 to 600 HAWKs toward one that included these components: First, 80 HAWKs from Israeli stocks were to be moved to Iran on Friday, November 22, on three planes spaced apart by 2 hour intervals. After the planes were launched, but before they landed in Iran, five American and possibly one French hostage would be released. After the hostages were freed, 40 more HAWKs would be moved to Iran. The United States would replenish Israel's stocks promptly by sale at a mutually agreed price. North's notes from the same day confirm that the initial delivery was to be 80 items, but indicate a key difference from what he had reported to Poindexter: the American hostages would not to be freed all at once in advance of the arrival of any HAWKs, but rather would be released sequentially after each shipment. After referring to the total of 80 HAWKs, North wrote: - One 27 - 2 27 - 3 26 - 1 6 + 1 French This notation appears to mean that 2 hostages were to be released after a first shipment of 27 missiles, 3 hostages were to be released after a second shipment of the same amount, and 1 hostage would be released after a third shipment of the remaining 26 items. In fact, within a few days, an initial load of HAWKs arrived in Tehran without any prior hostage release. McFarlane's instruction not to ship weapons without the prior release of the hostages thus was not followed. From this point on, the Iranians would always insist on sequential delivery of weapons, followed by the release of hostages. On November 20, North wrote in his notebook: "120 HAWKs = 1) 5 Amcits, 2) Guarantee that no more." North's notes also suggest that although the initial shipment quantity had been reduced from 600 HAWKs, additional arms shipments to Iran were contemplated after the shipment of 120 HAWKs. Following a description of the sequence of delivery for the first 80 HAWKs and the hostage releases, North wrote: "After - 40 more HAWKs, 200 SW [Sidewinder] missiles, 1900 TOWs." McFarlane Puts North in Charge While McFarlane was at the Geneva summit with the President, North became immersed in the details of the HAWK transaction. North testified that he was "thrown into this on the night of November 17," in almost simultaneous telephone calls from Rabin and McFarlane. Rabin told North that the plan called for Israel to move 80 HAWK missiles by November 20. He said that Israel was unwilling to commence the shipment without satisfactory arrangements for replenishment by the United States. According to North's notes, McFarlane told North to solve Rabin's replenishment problem, and "to keep orders under $14 M" each - the threshold figure for reporting foreign military sales to Congress. After the calls from McFarlane and Rabin, North "flew up immediately [to New York] to talk with Mr. Rabin." In New York, he met with officials of the Israeli Ministry of Defense Procurement Mission, who wanted to arrange replenishment sales to Israel of 508 TOWs and 120 HAWK missiles. The next day, North or Poindexter asked Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, then military assistant to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, about the availability and price of HAWKs and TOWs, and the legality and method of transferring such missiles. The requester initially sought information on a proposed transfer of 500 HAWKs, but, in accordance with the evolving plan, soon cut the number to 120. Powell understood that the ultimate destination of the weapons would be Iran and that Israel was acting as an intermediary. After receiving this request, Powell contacted Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who in turn asked Henry Gaffney, Director of Plans, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), to find out how many HAWKs were available for immediate transfer. DSAA is the entity within the Department of Defense that is primarily responsible for arms sales to other governments. Koch asked Gaffney to prepare a Point Paper examining the requirements for notification of Congress and whether the ultimate destination of the weapons might be concealed. Gaffney testified that he understood from his superiors that the Point Paper should cast a negative view of the transaction to reflect Secretary Weinberger's presumed opposition to arms transfers to Iran. He completed his paper, entitled "HAWK Missiles for Iran," on November 22 or 23 and submitted it to Powell. Powell testified that he gave the paper to Secretary Weinberger, who did not, however, recall receiving it. Gaffney's Point Paper included important information about the price and availability of HAWKs: 164 missiles were available for foreign sale at that time; the missiles cost the United States approximately $300,000 per unit; and replacement cost would be as much as $437,700 per unit. Transportation and administration charges would have to be added. Seventy-nine of the missiles were available for immediate shipment. This state of the inventory may be one reason why the number of HAWKs planned for immediate shipment from Israel to Iran - and therefore the number which the United States would have to quickly replenish - was set at 80. Gaffney's Point Paper also described political drawbacks of a weapons transfer to Iran. Gaffney testified that under the Arms Export Control Act, Iran was not an eligible country for direct sales from the United States, and that, in his view, even if Iran were to become eligible, the contemplated sales of HAWKs could not be made directly or indirectly (through Israel or otherwise) unless the President notified Congress. In addition, Gaffney testified that if the transfer were to be made by Israel, U.S.-Israeli agreements require advance, written U.S. consent. U.S. law mandates that the President cannot give that consent without certain conditions being met in advance, including obtaining assurance from Iran that it would use the weapons only for self-defense and would comply with U.S. restrictions on retransfer to another country. These were conditions that Iran could not or would not meet. McFarlane Informs the President and the Secretary of State While they were still in Geneva, McFarlane updated the President and Chief of Staff Donald Regan on the status of the HAWK shipment and the anticipated hostage release. McFarlane informed them that the Israelis were about to ship the weapons, and expressed hope that the hostages would come out by the end of the week. McFarlane specifically told the President that Israel was about to deliver 80 HAWK missiles to Iran via a warehouse in Country 15, and that Israel wanted the United States to replace those missiles. McFarlane testified that he simply told the President that the Israelis were about to act, but did not ask for specific approval: [T]he President provided the authority in early August for Israel to undertake, to sell arms to Iran, and to then come to the United States for replenishment, to buy new ones. That didn't require then the Israelis to come back to us on each occasion and get new approval. The President asked McFarlane to arrange a meeting at which the President and his top advisers would review the initiative after the summit. At about the same time, McFarlane also told Secretary of State George Shultz of the impending arms-for-hostages swap. McFarlane called Secretary Shultz by secure phone "out of the blue, about a hostages release and arms sales to Iran." McFarlane explained that Israel was about to ship 100 HAWKs to Iran through Country 15, that the shipment would occur only if the hostages were released, and that the United States would sell replacements to Israel. Secretary Shultz understood it as "a straight out arms-for-hostages deal." He expressed his opposition, and rebuked McFarlane for not informing him about it earlier: "I told him I hoped that the hostages would get out, but I was against it, and I was upset that he was telling me about it as it was just about to start so there was no way I could do anything about it." When asked about Secretary Shultz' account, McFarlane testified: "I don't recall it that way." Even as McFarlane was filling in Shultz on the broad outline of the plan, his NSC subordinates took steps to keep the Department of State hierarchy in the dark about the complex diplomatic problems caused by the operation. For instance, Secretary Shultz was not told of the back-channel communications and actions of State Department officials, taken at the behest of CIA and NSC officials, to support the HAWK shipment. North Recruits Secord As McFarlane had explained to the President and Secretary Shultz, the plan was to move 80 HAWKs from Tel Aviv to the capital of Country 15, transfer them to other planes, and then ship them on to Iran. The planners chose this circuitous routing because direct flights from Israel to Iran would draw attention given the poor relations between Israel and Iran. Because the cargo was arms, special clearances had to be obtained from the government of Country 15. As the pilot who ultimately flew the HAWKs to Iran stated: Everybody can fly [in Europe] without clearances unless you have . . . sensitive stuff like arms aboard, and then you have to have diplomatic clearance. A problem developed on November 18: The government of Country 15 was unwilling to grant the special clearances. On that day, North asked Richard Secord - his confederate in the covert operation supporting the Contras - to fly to Country 15 to "see what he could do to straighten out the mess." Secord said this was when he learned of the Iran arms initiative. North explained the secret operation to Secord, indicating that it had been sanctioned by the United States, that it had run into difficulties in Country 15, and that there was "quite a bit of urgency" to get Secord to go there. According to Secord, North "knew that we had - my organization had had extensive deals with the armament [industry]" in Europe and "wondered if I could arrange for this transshipment." The next day, North gave Secord a letter on White House stationery, signed by North "for" McFarlane, stating Your discrete [sic] assistance is again required in support of our national interests. At the earliest opportunity, please proceed to [the capital of Country 15] and other locations as necessary in order to arrange for the transfer of sensitive materiel being shipped from Israel. As in the past, you should exercise great caution that this activity does not become public knowledge. You should ensure that only those whose discretion is guaranteed are involved. McFarlane testified he was not aware that North was providing this letter to Secord, and that his permission was not sought to send it out. Secord arrived in Country 15 on November 20. He and his associate Thomas Clines, who Secord said "had really been handling all of the matters for the Enterprise" in Europe, together started "to work the problem . . . through our colleagues in the armament industry." Million-Dollar Deposit to Lake Resources On November 18 - the same day that he brought Secord into the deal - North began to arrange for a $1-million transfer from Israeli intermediaries to the account of Lake Resources, a Panamanian company controlled by Secord and referred to by North as "our Swiss Co[mpany]." Lake Resources and its account at Credit Suisse in Geneva had been established by North and Secord in May 1985 "to receive monies in support of the covert operations." Prior to this deposit, which was made on November 20, Secord and North had used the company exclusively for supporting the Contras. The purpose for this $1-million deposit is unclear. North and Secord testified that the payment was for chartering planes to move the 80 HAWKS to Iran. The Israeli Historical Chronology affirms this explanation. North and Secord, however, were unable to explain why they were asking for transportation expenses on November 18 when, according to Secord, his original assignment was only to help obtain landing clearances for planes already chartered by Schwimmer. It was not until November 22, when Schwimmer's charter unexpectedly fell through, that Secord's role was expanded. At that time, the amount Secord expected to pay for chartering planes was less than $1 million. Some evidence suggests that Secord made, or contemplated making, expenditures in Country 15. One of the persons with whom Secord was working, an officer of a European arms company, reportedly attempted to bribe an official of the government of Country 15 to obtain the necessary clearances, and there are references to Secord having spent substantial sums in Country 15. However, bank records do not show any such payments out of the Lake Resources account. Whatever the initial purpose of the deposit, the Committees have ascertained its use. Secord used approximately $150,000 to pay for air charters relating to the HAWK shipment, and the remaining $850,000 was spent to support the Contras and to make profit distributions to Secord and his business associates, Albert Hakim and Thomas Clines. North testified that in early 1986 he told the Israelis that the money had been used "for the purpose of the Contras" and that they acquiesced. The first "diversion" to the Contras of money received in connection with the Iranian arms sales had occurred. Confusion in Country 15 The plan to ship the HAWKs through Country 15 faced collapse because the government there refused to grant the necessary clearances. Upon arriving in Country 15, Secord and his associates - the European businessman and Clines - tried to overcome this problem. All three were fully aware that the cargo to be moved was HAWK missiles. Because their efforts were outside normal diplomatic channels and in contradiction to stated U.S. policy, they were not well received by the government of Country 15. The European businessman may have tried to solve the problem even before Secord arrived. The Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Country 15 recalled learning on November 23 that about one week earlier the European businessman had approached an official of Country 15 and offered what the official considered to be a bribe to assist in the transit of a shipment involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. If this approach occurred around November 16, as the evidence suggests, then it draws into question Secord's testimony that he was not brought in until November 18. On November 20, the European businessman called an official of Country 15's Foreign Ministry and expressed the hope that the Foreign Ministry would grant permission for two aircraft carrying weapons from Israel for Iran to transit the country. To the official, the businessman appeared to be "acting as a broker for the arms deal." The European businessman referred to an "American general," presumably Secord, involved in the undertaking. The foreign government was disturbed by the businessman's approach, and the next day another official asked the American Embassy for "information about this strange case." The Embassy, unaware that the U.S. Government supported this shipment of weapons to Iran, told the Foreign Ministry that the shipment was not authorized by the United States and was contrary to U.S. Government policy strongly opposing arms sales to Iran. Contributing to the confusion of the government of Country 15 was another incident on November 21. "Anonymous people claiming to 'represent the American administration'" attempted to intercept the country's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister at the airport of the capital of Country 15 following their return from the European Economic Summit in Brussels. A CIA cable reporting this incident stated that this approach, while unsuccessful, was "particularly upsetting" to the foreign government because it "aroused both attention and suspicion." North Updates Poindexter As the operation faltered on November 20, North reported to Poindexter and portrayed a mission well under control. He made no mention of the obstacles faced in Country 15: The Israelis will deliver 80 Mod HAWKS to [the capital of Country 15] at noon on Friday 22 Nov. These 80 will be loaded aboard three chartered aircraft, owned by a proprietary which will take off at two hour intervals for Tabriz, [Iran]. The aircraft will file for overflight through the [capital of Country 16] FIR en route to Tabriz [from Country 15]. Appropriate arrangements have been made with the proper . . . [Country 16] air control personnel. Once the aircraft have been launched, their departure will be confirmed by Ashghari [a pseudonym for Ghorbanifar] who will call [the Second Iranian official] who will call [an Iranian in Damascus] who will direct [another Iranian in Beirut] to collect the five rpt five Amcits [American citizen hostages] from Hizballah and deliver them to the U.S. Embassy. There is also the possibility that they will hand over the French hostage who is very ill. There is a requirement for 40 additional weaps of the same nomenclature for a total requirement of 120. $18 M in payment for the first 80 has been deposited in the appropriate account. No acft will land in Tabriz until the AMCITS have been delivered to the embassy. The Iranians have also asked to order additional items in the future and have been told that they will be considered after this activity has succeeded. All transfer arrangements have been made by Dick Secord, who deserves a medal for his extraordinary short notice efforts. Replenishment arrangements are being made through the MOD [Israeli Ministry of Defense] purchasing office in NYC. There is, to say the least, considerable anxiety that we will somehow delay on their plan to purchase 120 of these weapons in the next few days. IAW [in accordance with] your instructions I have told their agent that we will sell them 120 items at a price that they can meet. I have further told them that we will make no effort to move on their purchase LOA [Letter of Offer and Acceptance] request until we have all five AMCITS safely delivered. In short, the pressure is on them. This PROF message is clear evidence that North informed Poindexter in detail of the HAWK transaction - including the involvement of Secord and the replenishment arrangements - well in advance of the shipment. North Asks the CIA for Assistance Secord and the European businessman were unable to budge the government of Country 15. With only hours left before an Israeli plane carrying 80 HAWKs was to depart for the capital of Country 15, North urgently sought assistance from McFarlane, the CIA, and the State Department. North called McFarlane on the evening of November 21; they discussed whether McFarlane should call Country 15's Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in the morning. Informed by Secord of the difficulties in Country 15, North immediately asked CIA official Duane Clarridge to assist in obtaining clearances for the plane going there. Clarridge said Secord should contact the CIA Chief in Country 15, whose name North then relayed to Secord. At the same time, Clarridge sent "flash" cables instructing the CIA Chief in Country 15 and his deputy to report immediately to the office for a "special assignment." The next morning, November 22, Secord, using his Copp pseudonym, called the CIA Chief and said that he urgently needed clearance for an El Al charter flight scheduled to leave Tel Aviv in 20 minutes and fly to the capital of Country 15. Secord urged the CIA Chief to call an official of Country 15 and emphasize the urgency of obtaining the clearance. At this point, the CIA Chief suggested enlisting the help of the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Country 15. North Brings State Into the Operation At about this time, North pressed to involve the U.S. Embassy directly in the efforts to obtain the clearances. North accurately told Robert B. Oakley, then Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning at the Department of State, that Israel had encountered problems obtaining clearances in Country 15 for a transshipment of HAWK missiles for Iran. In contrast, North falsely told Oakley that he had learned of the shipment when "'one of his people' went to an arms warehouse [in Country 15] to obtain arms for the Nicaraguan Resistance, and learned that the Israelis had been obtaining arms from the same source for shipment to Iran." In any event, Oakley gave North permission to tell the Embassy in Country 15 that the State Department was "aware" of the unfolding operation and that the Embassy "could request clearances." Thereafter, the CIA Chief was instructed to insure that if the Deputy Chief of Mission felt compelled to communicate with the State Department, he should use only the CIA channel. The NSC also involved Oakley and the State Department in another capacity. On November 21, Oakley notified the CIA's counterterrorism component that "information from the NSC indicated that one or more U.S. hostages would soon be released in Lebanon." Oakley reported that a team was departing for Wiesbaden, West Germany, to await the arrival of the hostages. The team arrived in Wiesbaden the following day, and remained there until November 27. On November 22, Oakley reported to Secretary Shultz (who had returned from Geneva) and others at the State Department "that the hostages would be released that afternoon in exchange for 120 HAWKs at $250,000 each - worth $30 million in all." Secretary Shultz and his advisers, Deputy Secretary John C. Whitehead and Undersecretary Michael Armacost, shared their apprehension about the endeavor. The Secretary, who "regarded it as a $30 million weapons payoff," told his deputies: "Bud [McFarlane] says he's cleared with the President." The next day, Secretary Shultz was told that no hostage had been released and that the deal had collapsed. That was false. The operation was still being actively pursued, and the movement of 18 HAWKs was yet to occur. Jumbo Jet Departs for Country 15 Transit Point Although the clearance for landing in Country 15 had not been authorized on the morning of November 22, the El Al 747 carrying the 80 HAWK missiles was ordered to take off for that country's capital. As the plane neared its "go-no go point," frantic efforts were underway to change the country's government's position. Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in Country 15 and ordered him to "pull out all the stops" to solve the problem. Secord called an official in Country 15's foreign ministry, who said that the government had decided to withhold permission based upon the U.S. Embassy's previous statement that the United States did not concur in the shipment. Hoping to reverse this position, the Deputy Chief of Mission made hurried phone calls attempting to summon the Country 15 Foreign Minister out of a cabinet meeting; and Secord told the CIA Chief that "McFarlane was being pulled out of [a] meeting with [the] Pope" to call the Foreign Minister. All these efforts were in vain. By early afternoon, Secord, who was in radio contact with the El Al plane, telephoned North and informed him that the government of Country 15 had refused permission. He said the aircraft had been ordered back to Tel Aviv. North and Clarridge Bring in a CIA Airline Due to the delays, the El Al plane, which the Israelis had reserved for this operation for only a limited time, was no longer available. Clarridge, North, and Secord scrambled to find other ways to transport the HAWK missiles to Iran. Within hours, Clarridge met with the Chief of the CIA's air branch and told him "we [have] a very sensitive mission in the Middle East and we need a 747 aircraft right away." The branch chief could not locate such a, large aircraft on short notice, but suggested that a CIA airline proprietary might be able to move the cargo. At 4 p.m. on November 22, an air branch official called the CIA project officer for the proprietary, and asked whether its Boeing 707 cargo planes were available to move 80 pieces of "sensitive hi priority cargo" from Tel Aviv to the capital of Country 15. The project officer reported that at least one of the airline proprietary's planes was available. Clarridge's actions resulting in the involvement of the air proprietary were at North's request and with the authority of CIA Associate Deputy Director of Operations, Edward Juchniewicz. Juchniewicz spoke with both Clarridge and North on November 22, and told them he had no objection to giving Secord the commercial name of the airline proprietary to charter the necessary flights. Over the next 48 hours, Clarridge and CIA air branch personnel closely managed the proprietary's flight activities in support of this covert operation. Before the operation was over, the proprietary's project officer also became directly involved in coordinating matters. Clarridge Brings in Another CIA Chief Even as the problems in Country 15 remained unresolved, Clarridge, on the evening of November 22, moved to obtain clearances from another country, Country 16, for overflight rights into Iran. Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in Country 16 proposing that he ask Government authorities for "overflight clearances for three commercial DC-8 aircraft (or similar aircraft) flying on a chartered basis from [Country 15] to Tabriz and then retracing their route." Clarridge explained that this was "a National Security Council initiative and has the highest level of USG [United States Government] interest." The CIA Chief was to explain that "the purpose of the flight is humanitarian in nature and is in response to terrorist acts." Clarridge specifically instructed that the U.S. Ambassador to Country 16 "should not be informed." Schwimmer's DC-8 Charter Falls Through On the evening of November 22, Schwimmer called North to say the charter of the DC-8s for the Country 15-to-Iran leg of the mission had fallen through. In a PROF note to Poindexter, North updated the situation as of 7:00 p.m.: Unbelievable as it may seem, I have just talked to Schwimmer, in TA [Tel Aviv,] who advises that they have released their DC-8s in spite of my call to DK [David Kimche] instructing that they be put on hold until we could iron out the clearance problem in [the capital of Country 15]. Schwimmer released them to save $ and now does not think that they can be re-chartered before Monday. Within minutes of Schwimmer's call, North and Secord discussed a substitute method of transporting the missiles from Country 15 to Iran. Secord suggested that the European businessman's company try to find some planes. North wrote to Poindexter that Secord would solve the problem by diverting a plane from the Contra operation to the Iran operation: Advised Copp of lack of p/u [pick up] A/C [aircraft]. He has advised that we can use one of our LAKE Resources A/C which was at [the capital of Country 15] to p/u a load of ammo for UNO [United Nicaraguan Opposition]. He will have the a/c repainted tonight and put into service nlt [no later than] noon Sat so that we can at least get this thing moving. So help me I have never seen anything so screwed up in my life. Will meet with Calero tonite to advise that the ammo will be several days late in arriving. Too bad, this was to be our first direct flight to the resistance field . . . inside Nicaragua. The ammo was already palletized w/parachutes attached. Maybe we can do it on Weds. or Thurs. More as it becomes available. One hell of an operation. In fact, it appears that Lake Resources had no planes at this time. Nevertheless, this PROF note reveals that North was beginning to meld the two operations he was overseeing and to recognize that the Lake Resources enterprise could operate in a variety of settings. Over the next 12 hours, Secord and others tried to hire a cargo carrier for the Country 15-to-Iran leg. They unsuccessfully sought to convince officials of a European national airline to take on the assignment. By the morning of November 23, Secord had identified an aircraft to make the flight, but this plane was never used. Clarridge's Office Becomes the Command Post By November 23, Clarridge's office at Langley had become the command post for coordinating the HAWK transport. North was there most of the day. Also present and assisting were the CIA air branch chief, an intelligence officer, and Charles E. Allen. Numerous problems with aircraft and flight clearances continued to crop up. As the situation deteriorated, Clarridge sent cables to the far-flung CIA stations involved, and North stayed in continuous contact with Secord in Country 15 and Schwimmer in Israel. Clarridge's superiors, specifically Juchniewicz and McMahon, were aware of at least some aspects of the activity being directed from Clarridge's office. Juchniewicz's office received all of the cables being sent to and from Clarridge on the operation. In a memorandum for the record written 2 weeks later, McMahon stated: On Saturday, 23 November 1985, Ed Juchniewicz asked me if I was aware of all the activity transpiring on the effort to get the hostages out. He showed me a cable to [the capital of Country 15] asking that we pass a message to the [Deputy Chief of Mission] from the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [Poindexter]. The message assured the [Deputy Chief of Mission] that only the Secretary of State and Ambassador Oakley were aware of the operation. I told Juchniewicz that I was unaware of the specifics of the operation but due to the sensitivity of the operation, it was appropriate that we pass correspondence between the NSC and the ambassadors overseas, but only communications, that we could not be involved without a Finding. McMahon testified that he did not know then that the CIA's airline proprietary had been brought into the operation. Allen also learned that day of the CIA role in the operation. North called him in the morning and asked him to deliver to Clarridge intelligence data on the Iran initiative. Allen showed the materials to Clarridge, who told him that North "had requested some assistance in obtaining a name of a reliable charter airline," that he was considering using the Agency's airline proprietary, and that he was trying to obtain landing and transit clearances in Country 15. The Oil-Drilling Equipment Cover Story During the planning of the HAWK missile shipment, the Israeli and American participants agreed to keep the true nature of the operation secret. They would use a false "story line" that the cargo to Iran was oil-drilling equipment. Several American officials who knew of the operation were advised of this cover story but understood that it was false and knew that the cargo was missiles. At the time, the President and Regan knew that the cargo comprised HAWK missiles and were specifically told of the false story before the shipment was made, presumably by McFarlane. Regan testified: "I recall that that was to have been a cover story if discovered, it was to have been said that these were oil-drilling parts." The government of Country 15 also was aware that the clearances being sought by Secord and others were for moving missiles through its capital and into Iran as part of an effort to gain the release of American hostages. Secord understood that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were informed. Indeed, Secord testified that it was not possible to ship HAWKs through the foreign capital without the host country knowing, because special handling of the weapons was required at the airport. North claims he used the cover story when he brought Clarridge and Allen into the operation. As he later testified, "I lied to the CIA because that was the convention that we had worked out with the Israelis, that no one else was to know." Allen testified that North "stated emphatically" that the cargo was oil-drilling equipment, but that he (Allen) had "serious doubts" about whether this was true. If Clarridge did not know the contents of the cargo at the start, he soon learned it. In Country 15, late in the morning of November 23, Secord gave the CIA Chief a full accounting of the mission. Their meeting occurred in a car in a hotel parking lot. Secord revealed his identity, explained he was formally associated with the NSC, and specifically told the officer that the planned flight would contain HAWK missiles being sent to Iran in exchange for hostages. The CIA Chief testified that he returned to his office and sent two cables to Clarridge through the "Eyes Only" privacy channel he was using on the HAWK project. The first cable contained a general report, mentioning the discussion with Secord but not setting forth the substance of the conversation. The second cable reported that the flights would contain HAWK missiles sent to secure the release of the hostages. The Committees' investigation did not locate this cable. But the CIA Chief's subsequent testimony about its existence was corroborated in testimony by the CIA Deputy Chief and by the Deputy Chief of Mission - who at the time either read the cable or was told about it by the CIA Chief. In addition, the CIA communicator, who transmitted the cable from Country 15, vividly recalls being shocked when he read the message and learned that the United States was sending arms to Iran. Clarridge received additional information that revealed that the cargo was HAWKs: North testified that shortly after the shipment occurred, if not before, he had told Clarridge the true nature of the cargo. Moreover, on November 23, Allen showed Clarridge a report that, according to Allen, would cause "one [to] think that this initiative had involved arms in the past." Allen suspected that the November shipment also involved arms and "couldn't help but believe that [Clarridge] suspected that. Particularly he could see the [report] as clearly as I, and he leafed through [its contents] . . . I left the folder with him and then picked it up later." After the shipment, Clarridge received additional information that made clear that the cargo was missiles. Clarridge insisted in testimony before these Committees that he had no recollection of having learned that the cargo was missiles prior to early 1986. This testimony conformed to the false story certain Administration officials put out in November 1986 when they were trying to conceal the advance knowledge in the U.S. Government of the shipment of HAWK missiles. The Committees are troubled by the fact that the cable informing Clarridge of Secord's detailed account of the operation, and an earlier cable Clarridge sent to the CIA Chief at the outset of the operation, are inexplicably missing from an otherwise complete set of 78 cables sent by CIA officials during the operation. Country 15 Routing is Abandoned By the afternoon of November 23, the plan to transship the missiles through Country 15 was abandoned. The previous evening, McFarlane had called the country's Foreign Minister and believed he had received a "green light" for the flights. However, the foreign government still insisted that the United States provide a diplomatic note setting forth the nature of the cargo and the shipping route, and stating that the release of American hostages was the purpose of the shipment. The foreign government wanted this documentation because it saw the operation as "so directly in conflict with known U.S. policy and [its own] policy." The American planners balked, apparently out of a concern about creating a formal paper record of the true nature of the operation. Later that day, the Deputy Chief of Mission, on instructions from Poindexter, handed the Foreign Minister a terse diplomatic note stating that the U.S. Embassy "expresses regret that the Government of [Country 15] was unable to fulfill the request of the Government of the United States for the humanitarian mission." Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in the capital of Country 15 that in light of the diplomatic message, "it is obvious . . . that we are closing down [the Country 15] aspect of this operation." As the Country 15 transit plan was falling through, North and Clarridge sought a substitute transit point. Clarridge cabled the CIA Chief in the capital of another country, Country 18, to request assistance in obtaining landing rights in that country for sorties" by a CIA airline proprietary 707 airplane between Tel Aviv and Tabriz, the first to occur "in the next 12 hours or so . . . and likely result in the release of the hostages." Meanwhile, still on November 23, Israeli military personnel began to load the HAWKs into the CIA proprietary airplane at the Tel Aviv airport. If they had not already been told, the proprietary's crew surmised from the appearance of the crates that their cargo was missiles and reported this to the airline manager. Later that day, the participants decided to move the shipment directly from Tel Aviv to Iran, without transiting a third country. Under the new plan, one of the proprietary's planes would make a series of flights to move the 80 HAWKs. After dismissing one route, the planners selected a shorter - but more dangerous - route across Country 16. But obtaining overflight clearances from Country 16 remained a problem, so Clarridge once again cabled the CIA Chief there. Several hours later, the CIA Chief replied that the Government of Country 16 was supportive, but needed "some idea of what the aircraft would carry as presumably they would not be empty." Late that night, Clarridge sent two more increasingly urgent cables to the CIA Chief in Country 16. In conformity with the cover story, these cables told the CIA Chief to advise the government of Country 16 that "the aircraft are carrying sophisticated spare parts for the oil industry" and that the five flights would be spread over a number of days. North and Clarridge, working with Schwimmer, continued to coordinate the flight activity on Sunday, November 24. At the last minute, they decided that, at least on the first sortie, the plane should land at a transit point in another country, Country 17, to disguise the fact that the shipment was moving from Israel to Iran. While this decision was being made, the CIA Chief in Country 16 informed Clarridge that the government there had approved the five overflights, but that "incoming flight cannot come directly from [Country 17]." CIA Airline Proprietary Moves the Missiles On November 24, the CIA proprietary aircraft carrying 18 HAWK missiles flew from Tel Aviv to the transit point in Country 17. Because Schwimmer had sent the plane without a cargo manifest, the pilot lacked the documentation required by customs officials at the transit point, who wanted to inspect the cargo. Simultaneously, Schwimmer and the proprietary manager, along with North and Clarridge, frantically discussed how to solve this. While there is evidence to the contrary, it seems the pilot simply talked his way out of the problem. After getting out of the transit point in Country 17, the pilot ran into trouble while flying over Country 16. According to the airline manager's report, nothing was prepared for overflight in [Country 16] and [the pilot] had again to talk his way through. Since they [the Country 16 ground controllers] repeatedly insisted on a diplomatic clearance number, he made one up which was not accepted after long negotiations and then he filibustered one hour and 30 min his way through [Country 16], using different altitudes, positions and estimates that he told [Country 16's] Military with whom he was obviously in radio contact . . . However, radar realized his off-positions which gave additional reason for arguments and time delays. Cables the next day from the CIA Chief in Country 16 to Clarridge suggested several reasons why the pilot encountered these difficulties. For example, the destination of the plane was changed at the last minute from Tabriz to Tehran, which "provoked query" from Country 16 because it did not square with the clearance request. Other discrepancies caused outright anger: [An official of Country 16 was] quite upset over multiple flight plans received, fact first flight came directly from [the transit point in Country 17] and did not request clearance beforehand and conflicting stories about plane's cargo. [The CIA Chief told [the official] it was oil industry spare parts, telex from carrier stated medical supplies and the pilot told ground controllers he was carrying military equipment . . . . Bottom line is that [the government of Country 16] still wants to assist but has developed a little cynicism about our interaction with them on the matter. Ironically, the pilot reportedly told the flight controllers the true nature of the cargo even while Clarridge was spreading the cover story to high level officials of Country 16. The only part of the operation that went smoothly was the flight into Tehran. The Second Iranian Official and Ghorbanifar, who were in Geneva, passed word to officials in Tehran to prepare to receive the plane. The plane landed in Tehran early in the morning. After an encounter with a military officer who apparently was unaware of the operation, "a civilian with a submachine gun on his back" arrived at the aircraft. The pilot understood that this person was a member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He instructed the pilot not to disclose to anyone at the airport that the flight had originated in Israel, arranged for the unloading of the plane by military personnel, and got the crew to a hotel - formerly the Sheraton - in downtown Tehran. Fourteen hours later, after a warm send-off that included caviar, the plane departed Tehran at 12:15 p.m. E.S.T., on Monday, November 25. The airline proprietary crew expected they would return shortly with more missiles and told the Iranian at the airport, "Don't worry, we [will] come back." However, the airline manager radioed them after they were airborne and instructed them not to return to Israel. Problems surfacing in both Washington and Iran put an end to the CIA proprietary airline's role. Within a few days, Secord, using funds from the Lake Resources account, wired a $127,700 payment to the proprietary.