Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0103/01036.txt

Text File | 1993-07-27 | 7KB | 138 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01036}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 8B   Iran's Support of Terrorism}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{lebanon
beirut
iran
terrorism
american
americans
hizballah
later
support
terrorists}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 8B   Iran's Support of Terrorism

     The long-suppressed Shiite community in Lebanon, with close religious and
familial ties to Iran, had found inspiration in the rule of the Ayatollah
Khomeini.  In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
some Shiite groups in Lebanon used political kidnappings and terrorism against
Americans and American institutions as retaliation against perceived U.S.
support for the Israeli invasion and occupation of their country.  The United
States became aware in July 1982 that Iran was supporting groups in Lebanon,
such as Islamic Jihad and the Hizballah (Party of God), that were suspected of
terrorism.

     United States Marines had been sent to Lebanon briefly in August and
September 1982 to supervise the withdrawal of forces of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut and returned to Lebanon soon
thereafter in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacres.  The purpose
of the U.S. presence in Beirut was to help support the Government of Lebanon
in its efforts to restore stability and its authority throughout Lebanon.  The
U.S. troops came to be perceived in Lebanon as a partisan militia, however,
working on behalf of the Maronite- and Christian-controlled government.

     A series of bold attacks followed against Americans and American
interests throughout Lebanon.  The U.S. Embassy in Beirut was destroyed in
April 1983, killing 63, including 17 Americans.  A suicide bombing on October
23, 1983, killed 241 Marines in their barracks in Beirut.  This incident was
followed in December by a series of bombing attacks against the U.S. and
French Embassies in Kuwait.  The 17 men who were apprehended in the Kuwait
attack were tried and sentenced to prison.  The release of these "Da'wa
prisoners" (as they came to be known after a pro-Khomeini party with
supporters in several countries) became a key demand of the Hizballah as
attacks against U.S. targets and the taking of American hostages continued in
Lebanon.

     The Hizballah, a loosely structured movement centered on the Shiite clans
of the Bekaa Valley, emerged as a principal opponent of the United States and
the Western presence in Lebanon.  The use of force - particularly terrorism -
against Western interests in Lebanon was viewed by the more militant members
of Hizballah as religiously sanctioned.

     From the outset, U.S. intelligence recognized that the Hizballah was
composed of competing political elements, not all of whom were controlled by
Iran.  But frustration mounted within the Administration in the aftermath of
the Marine barracks bombing, the Kuwait Embassy attack, and the assassination
on January 11, 1984, of the President of the American University in Beirut,
Malcolm Kerr.

     On January 20, 1984, the Secretary of State designated Iran a sponsor of
international terrorism.  This decision was followed 4 days later by the
announcement that Iran would be subjected to U.S. Government regulations
limiting the export of U.S. military equipment to "countries that have
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism."  The State
Department assured Congress that "[t]he question of further controls under
this rubric is currently under active review at senior levels of the
Administration."  The Department announced these additional measures based
upon what it termed convincing evidence of a broad Iranian policy furthering
terrorism beyond its borders, including public statements by Iranian officials
supporting those acts.

Hostage-Taking Begins

     The hostage-taking that was to propel the Iran-Contra Affair began 6
weeks later.

     Three Americans were seized in Beirut in 1984:  Jeremy Levin, Beirut
Bureau Chief for the Cable News Network, on March 7; William Buckley, CIA's
Chief of Station, on March 14; and the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian
minister who had lived in the Lebanese capital for 30 years, on May 8, 1984.
Buckley's capture was of special concern for CIA Director Casey.  It was
suspected at the time - and later confirmed - that Buckley was being tortured,
and Casey wanted to spare no effort to get him back.

     Citing a continuing pattern of Iranian support for terrorism, the State
Department imposed new restrictions in September 1984 on the export to Iran of
aircraft, spare parts for aircraft, and high-powered outboard motors.  The
Department also banned all other goods and technology to Iran intended for a
"military end-use or end-user."

     The Administration staked out an increasingly tough public position on
dealing with terrorists.  Speaking in New York on October 25, 1984, Secretary
Shultz called for "swift and sure measures" against terrorists, both to
prevent attacks and to retaliate for them:  "[W]e cannot allow ourselves to
become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to
respond," he said.

     Yet the hostage-taking continued.  Four Americans were seized in 1985:
Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, Director of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut,
on January 8; Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent for the
Associated Press, on March 16; David Jacobsen, Director of the American
University Hospital, on May 28; and Thomas P. Sutherland, Dean of the American
University's School of Agriculture, on June 9.

     Throughout this period, the only positive development on the hostages
came on February 13, when Jeremy Levin gained his freedom.  It remains
uncertain whether he escaped from, or was released by, his captors after
nearly 11 months of confinement.  Around the time that Levin was freed, the
NSC, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created an interagency Hostage Location
Task Force.

     On June 14, 1985, Shiite terrorists struck again, hijacking TWA flight
847 and murdering one of its passengers, Navy diver Robert Stetham.  National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane publicly stated:  "It is my purpose to
remind terrorists and to keep them on notice that no act of violence against
Americans will go without a response."

     The President spoke on the same subject on June 30, 1985, "The United
States gives terrorists no rewards and no guarantees.  We make no concessions.
We make no deals."

     These were strong and unambiguous words from the President and a senior
American official.  Yet a few weeks later, President Reagan authorized Israel
to sell TOW antitank missiles to the government of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the
Hizballah's spiritual leader.  Seven months later he authorized the direct
sale of arms to Iran.