Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0103/01035.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01035}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 8A   U.S.-Iran Relations and the Hostages in Lebanon}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{iran
arms
states
united
policy
war
american
interests
iranian
military}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 8A   U.S.-Iran Relations and the Hostages in Lebanon

     For many Americans, the most surprising and alarming aspect of the
Iran-Contra Affair was President Reagan's decision to sell arms to Iran.  Only
a few years before, that nation had humiliated the United States.  From
November 1979 to January 1981, Iran held American diplomats hostage, while
Iranian mobs in the streets of Tehran chanted slogans calling for the death of
President Carter and the destruction of U.S. interests throughout the Middle
East.

     Since November 14, 1979, first in response to the hostage crisis and then
because of the Iran-Iraq war, the United States had embargoed the sale of arms
to Iran.  Moreover, it had been the policy of the United States since December
1983 to pressure other governments, through "Operation Staunch," to stop the
sale of arms to Iran in order to help bring an early end to the Iran-Iraq war.

     The United States also opposed the transfer of arms to Iran because of
its involvement in terrorist activities.  Following repeated attacks against
Americans and U.S. interests in Lebanon, the Secretary of State officially
placed Iran on a list of countries supporting terrorism.  Reagan
Administration policy on terrorism was well known and was clearly stated by
the President:  "We make no concessions.  We make no deals."'

     Why did the Reagan Administration make a complete about-face on both of
these publicly stated policies - to sell no arms to Iran and to make no
concessions to terrorists?  The background of recent U.S. policy toward Iran
and of the seizure of American hostages in Lebanon provides a context in which
to assess those policy reversals.

No Regional Guarantees

     Partly in reaction to the war in Vietnam, the United States in 1969 began
to shift to a worldwide policy of no longer directly guaranteeing the security
of its regional allies.  Instead, the United States would work with its
friends to ensure that they had the military capability to defend themselves
against internal subversion or external threat.  Under the Nixon Doctrine, the
United States looked to regional powers, such as Iran, to serve as guardians
of American interests in distant corners of the world.

     Iran's armed forces, under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, served as a
deterrent to regional aggression in this conception of American policy.
"Iran," President Carter declared during a 1977 trip to Tehran, "because of
the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more
troubled areas of the world."  Equipped with the latest American weaponry and
backed by a 350,000-man army, Iran had become America's policeman in the Gulf.
The Shah relished the role and his power.  "Nobody can overthrow me," he once
boasted, "I have the support of 700,000 troops, all the workers, and most of
the people.  I have the power."

     The Shah's power proved illusory.  Growing protests by students,
leftists, and, most importantly, Muslim religious opponents led in February
1979 to the Shah's overthrow and his replacement by a Shiite Muslim religious
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been forced into exile in 1964, first to
Iraq and then to France.  The new regime was contemptuous of both the United
States - the "Great Satan" - and the West.  Fiery Shiite clerics accused the
United States of imperialism and the murder of thousands during the Shah's
rule.  America's fortunes in Iran had crumbled.

     If any doubt remained about the nature of the new regime, it was removed
on November 4, 1979, when youthful Iranian militants - the Revolutionary
Guards - stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American diplomats
hostage.  The hostage crisis lasted 444 days.  It helped to drive one
President from office and to elect another who pledged that America would not
be so humiliated again.

Arms Sales to Iran

     In response to the Embassy seizure, the United States on November 14,
1979, embargoed all arms shipments to Iran as part of a general embargo on
trade and financial transactions.  Ten months later, however, the invasion of
Iran by Iraq, on September 22, 1980, raised the question of who might
ultimately be punished by this punitive measure.  The prospect of an Iranian
defeat and an increase in Soviet influence in the region was of concern.

     Iran's armed forces were in disarray; the officer corps and enlisted
ranks had been decimated by government purges and desertions.  Iran's military
arsenal was also in poor shape.  Modern aircraft, armor, and naval vessels
purchased by the Shah had been left unattended during the 24-month revolution
and were badly in need of spare parts and maintenance.  Adding to Tehran's
vulnerability was the fact that most of the weaponry in the Shah's arsenal was
of American manufacture, and the U.S. embargo prevented resupply.  National
Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts
concluded that the Ayatollah Khomeini was ill-prepared to meet Iraq in a
modern war.

     Against this background, the Reagan Administration's Senior
Interdepartmental Group (SIG) convened on July 21, 1981, to discuss U.S.
policy toward Iran.  SIG members concluded "that U.S. efforts to discourage
third country transfers of non-U.S. origin arms would have only a marginal
effect on the conduct and outcome of the war, but could increase opportunities
for the Soviets to take advantage of Iran's security concerns and to persuade
Iran to accept Soviet military assistance."  While no agency representative
argued in favor of U.S. action to encourage an increase in arms supply to
Iran, some expressed concern that a rigid U.S. policy against all arms
transfers to Iran would not serve overall U.S. interests.

     The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, strongly opposed arms sales to Iran,
which they believed would represent a profound shift in U.S. policy that
"would be perceived by the moderate Arab states as an action directly counter
to their interests."  Similarly, they felt that any "[i]mprovement in the
Iranian arms supply would intensify the war with Iraq" and possibly spill over
into neighboring states.  Administration policy against arms sales to Iran
remained firm.

     Despite the U.S. embargo, Iran obtained weapons and military support
services on the thriving world arms market.  Oil was often the medium of
exchange in elaborate barter deals, and Persian Gulf trade became an
irresistible lure for international arms merchants.  The Reagan Administration
listed no fewer than 41 countries that had provided Iran with weapons since
the start of the war.

     As a result, by the spring of 1983, the tide in the Gulf war had turned
in favor of Iran.  A steady supply of munitions, artillery, and ground-to-air
and ground-to-ground missiles had enabled the more numerous Iranian armed
forces and Revolutionary Guards to expel Iraqi forces, seize and retain some
small pieces of Iraqi territory, and shell the major city of Basra and the
capital city, Baghdad.  Once thought by Western analysts to be on the verge of
collapse, Iran had rebounded from its earlier battlefield setbacks.

Operation Staunch

     At this point the Administration decided to initiate Operation Staunch, a
plan seeking the cooperation of other governments in an arms sales embargo
against Iran.  On December 14, 1983, the State Department instructed its
Embassies in countries believed to be involved in arms trade with Tehran to
urge their host governments to "stop transferring arms to Iran because of the
broader interests of the international community in achieving a negotiated end
to the Iran-Iraq war."

     Within the U.S. Government, authorities increased surveillance of
shipments of American equipment and spare parts destined (usually through
intermediaries) for Iran.  Between January 1984 and January 1987, the State
Department sent more than 400 cables to American overseas missions urging
compliance with Operation Staunch.  Secretary Shultz personally urged member
governments to work within the European Community to reduce the flow of
materiel to Iran.

     Reports persisted that Israel still actively supplied the Iranian
military despite U.S. efforts to stop arms sales through Operation Staunch.
Other reports hinted that U.S. and Israeli representatives met regularly to
discuss Tehran's war needs.  Widespread reports, particularly from the Middle
East, also suggested that the United States was violating its own arms
prohibitions.  The effectiveness of Operation Staunch was uncertain, but
Iran's military potential clearly grew.

     The U.S. Government repeatedly and publicly reaffirmed its commitment to
lessening the flow of armaments to Tehran.  A typical public statement from
the State Department, dated May 1985, noted that:  "The U.S. does not permit
U.S. arms and munitions to be shipped to either belligerent and has
discouraged all free-world arms shipments to Iran because, unlike Iraq, Iran
is adamantly opposed to negotiations or a mediated end to the conflict."