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$Unique_ID{bob01028}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 6C   McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{mcfarlane
north
documents
representative
barnes
contras
letter
military
congress
nsc}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 6C   McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions

     On August 28, McFarlane and North began a series of lengthy meetings to
fashion a response to the Congressional inquiries.  According to a chronology
prepared by McFarlane, they met six times and spoke by phone four times
between August 28 and September 12, the date of the response to Representative
Barnes.  Although both McFarlane and North acknowledged to the Committees that
they discussed altering the documents, the two dispute the purpose of the
meetings.

     McFarlane maintained that the meetings, together with the document
review, constituted his investigation into North's activities, an
investigation, he said, that turned up no proof of illegal activities.  For
example, he asked North about allegations relating to fundraising.  According
to McFarlane, North responded that he had not solicited or encouraged
donations, that he merely told potential donors, "if you want to be helpful to
the Contras, go to Miami, they're in the phone book they have an office, and
do it yourselves."

     The two reviewed the documents and, according to McFarlane, North
explained that his memos were being misinterpreted.  For example, in one memo
North wrote that the FDN "has responded well to guidance on how to build a
staff," and that "all FDN commanders have been schooled" in guerrilla warfare
tactics.  McFarlane said North told him, contrary to any implication in the
document, that the guidance came not from him but from retired military
officers hired by the Contras.  As McFarlane related the events, North offered
to alter the documents and McFarlane gave him a tentative go-ahead. McFarlane
testified:

Well, as we went through them, he pointed out where my own interpretation was
just not accurate . . . and he just said, you are misreading my intent, and I
can make it reflect what I have said if this is ambiguous to you, and I said
all right, do that.

North shortly returned with a sample alteration.  McFarlane's testimony
indicates that the document North had altered was "FDN Military Operations,"
dated April 11, 1985.  The recommendation in the document, "that the current
donors be approached to provide $15-20 M additional between now and June 1,
1985" was replaced with a recommendation that "an effort must be made to
persuade the Congress to support the Contras."  North had asserted, according
to McFarlane, that the problem with the documents was one of interpretation
and that the changes would be slight.  McFarlane acknowledged that this
alteration left the document "grossly at variance with the original text."

     McFarlane testified that he did not replace any original NSC documents
with altered documents and did not instruct North to do so.  He said he took
with him when he resigned the pages North had altered and eventually destroyed
them.

     North's version of events is substantially different.  McFarlane, North
testified, brought the selected documents to his attention, "indicated that
there were problems with them, and told me to fix them."  This meant, he
testified, that he was to "remove references to certain activities, certain
undertakings on my behalf or his, and basically clean up the record."  The
documents, North acknowledged, "clearly indicated that there was a covert
operation being conducted in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance."  That is
why, North testified, McFarlane instructed him to alter them:

The documents, after all, demonstrated his [McFarlane's] knowledge and
cognizance over what I was doing, and he didn't want that.  He was cleaning up
the historical record.  He was trying to preserve the President from political
damage.  I don't blame him for that.

North testified that he did not abide by McFarlane's instruction until shortly
before his dismissal:  "I saw towards the end of my tenure that this list
still had not been cleaned up, and so I went and got the documents out of the
system and started revising the documents."

     Although the record is inconclusive on what exactly McFarlane and North
discussed at their meetings, it is undisputed that both the National Security
Adviser and one of his principal staff members considered altering NSC
documents.  They discussed this course after receiving requests from several
Members of Congress for access to precisely those types of documents.

Responses to Congress:  The Denials

     Within days of his document review and discussions with North, McFarlane
sent the first of his responses to Congress.  In addition to the broad
assurance that the NSC staff was complying with the "letter and the spirit" of
the Boland Amendment, the responses contain specific denials of allegations
that the NSC staff had provided fundraising or military support to the
Nicaraguan resistance.

Fundraising

     McFarlane's September 11 response to Representative Barnes stated:  "None
of us has solicited funds, [or] facilitated contacts for prospective potential
donors . . .

     In his October 7 letter, McFarlane replied as follows to a written
question from Representative Hamilton:

     Mr. Hamilton:  The Nicaraguan freedom fighters, in the last two months,
are reported by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, to have received a large influx
of funds and equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as
$10 million or more.  Do you know where they have obtained this assistance?

     Mr. McFarlane:  No.

     In fact, according to his own testimony, McFarlane not only knew how the
Contras obtained financial assistance, he personally facilitated the main
donation to the Contras:

     Q: . . .  I was referring to Country Two and the fact that the actual
donors had, as I understand it, Country Two was the actual donors -

     A:  Yes.

     Q:  And that you had not only facilitated contacts, but you had
facilitated the actual contribution.

     A:  I will accept that, yes.

     Furthermore, according to Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur and
North, McFarlane was aware of Sigur's efforts to obtain a donation from a Far
Eastern country - efforts that took place while the responses to Congress were
being prepared.  North, of course, was aware of that approach.  Indeed, on
August 28, the day he and McFarlane had their first lengthy meeting to discuss
the Congressional inquiries, North reassured an official from that country
that the United States would be grateful if his country made a contribution to
the Contras.  The country responded with a $1 million gift.

     Also, in his letter of September 12, Representative Hamilton asked:

Has Colonel North been the focal point within the NSC staff for handling
contacts with private fundraising groups, such as the World Anti-Communist
League and the Council for World Freedom headed by retired Major General John
K. Singlaub?

     McFarlane replied, "No."  In fact, however, North had been dealing with
Singlaub on fundraising, as the December 4, 1984, North-to-McFarlane memo
showed.  As North told the Committees, he "certainly saw General Singlaub a
lot related to support for the Nicaraguan Resistance."

Military Assistance

In his September 5 letter, McFarlane stated:

At no time did we encourage military activities.  Our emphasis on a political
rather than a military solution to the situation was as close as we ever came
to influencing the military aspect of their struggle.

     North was heavily involved in the military aspect of the Contra struggle.
He testified that this statement was false.  In addition to helping arm the
Contras, and to providing intelligence and cash to Contra leaders, North also,
beginning in the summer of 1985, coordinated the efforts to set up a resupply
operation to provide lethal and nonlethal supplies to troops inside Nicaragua.
Several weeks before the letters were drafted, North asked Secord to set up
the operation, and he called on Ambassador Lewis Tambs to facilitate the
construction of an airfield for refueling resupply aircraft. Yet, McFarlane
wrote to Representative Hamilton on October 7:

Lieutenant Colonel North did not use his influence to facilitate the movement
of supplies to the resistance.

North acknowledged that this statement was false.

     It is unclear whether McFarlane was fully aware of North's activities.
McFarlane testified he was not.  But the documents McFarlane reviewed and
about which he was concerned shortly before drafting the first response to
Congress showed that North repeatedly attempted to influence the military
aspect of the Contras' struggle.

     Furthermore, McFarlane specifically denied in his October 7 letter to
Representative Hamilton that North had provided the Contras "tactical advice":

The allegation that Lieutenant Colonel North offered the resistance tactical
advice and direction is, as I indicated in my briefing, patently untrue.

North acknowledged to the Committees that although he never "sat down in the
battlefield and offered direct tactical advice . . .  I certainly did have a
number of discussions with the Resistance about military activities, yes, to
include the broader strategy for the Southern front and an Atlantic front and
an internal front."  And McFarlane testified:  "I felt it was likely that an
officer of the qualifications and excellence of Col. North, when he was down
visiting in Central America, probably did extend advice."  Indeed, McFarlane
admitted in his testimony that he felt in 1985 that "it was likely" that North
had gone "beyond the law" on giving military advice to the Contras. He
testified:  "But without certain evidence of it, not being able to disapprove
it, I accepted that [the denials McFarlane said North gave him] as sufficient
grounds for saying it as truth, and I believe that I was wrong to do so.  But
that is why I sent it."

     McFarlane maintained that he believed at the time that such advice was
not the "central concern" of Congress.  "It seemed to me that was
inconsequential to the outcome of the conflict, and probably not in the eyes
of Congress a serious matter," he said.  Representative Barnes' letter,
however, shows that one of his main concerns was about reports that North had
provided "'tactical influence' on rebel military operations."  In addition,
Representative Hamilton, in his first letter, expressed an interest "in
actions that supported the military activity of the contras."  Each of the
other letters from Congress asks McFarlane to respond to specific allegations
about NSC military support for the Contras.  In any case, McFarlane in his
letters offered no such explanation, merely a flat denial.

     Finally, despite his assertion in his letters to Congress, McFarlane
himself influenced the Contras' military struggle.  The $32 million obtained
with his help from Country 2 enabled the Resistance to purchase weapons to
continue fighting.  The April 11, 1985, memo from North describing how the
funds were expended stated clearly that the donation was being used to
purchase lethal supplies.

McFarlane's Meetings with Members

     The denials McFarlane made in his letters were repeated in face-to-face
meetings with Members of Congress.  On September 5, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Chairman Durenberger and Vice Chairman Leahy questioned McFarlane
in an hour-long private briefing.  At the start of their meeting, McFarlane
showed the two Senators a copy of the letter he would send to Representative
Hamilton that day.  McFarlane assured Senators Durenberger and Leahy that "no
law had been broken," and that "there was no intent to circumvent restrictions
Congress placed on aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance."  Asserting that he had
grilled North on his involvement with supporters of the Resistance, McFarlane
said he was confident that "[N]o NSC staff member either personally assisted
the Resistance or solicited outside assistance on their behalf."  Senator
Leahy described the meeting in a letter written shortly thereafter:

Mr. McFarlane said that the officer [North] had frequently received calls from
persons wishing to donate funds, and that he referred them to the Contra
leaders themselves.  He insisted that the officer never solicited funds,
encouraged donations or initiated contacts with potential donors.  He further
denied that the officer, in several personal meetings with Contra leaders,
both in Washington and in Central America, ever offered military advice.  The
officer's authorized role, Mr. McFarlane said, was to assure the Contras
during the time of the Congressional aid cutoff of the President's continued
moral support . . . .

McFarlane concluded by telling the Senators, "I can't believe everything
everyone says, but I do believe Ollie."

     After the session, Senator Durenberger told a reporter that he felt
McFarlane was candid about his knowledge, but that questions about U.S.
Government support for the Contras remained:

So we came away from the meeting feeling that from Bud McFarlane we're getting
what he believes to be the situation with regard to his staff. Are we
satisfied that this sort of concludes the matter and that no one in any way
involved was directing the effort?  No, you can't be satisfied.

     On September 10, McFarlane met with Representative Hamilton and other
Members of the House Intelligence Committee.  As Representative Hamilton later
summarized the meeting in a letter to a colleague, McFarlane told the
Committee Members that President Reagan had made clear that the entire
executive branch had to comply with the Boland Amendment.  McFarlane said he
had conducted a thorough investigation into allegations made about the NSC
staff and concluded that North had not "given military advice of any kind to
the Contras," nor had he "solicited, accepted, transmitted or in any other way
been involved with funds for the Contras."

     The House Intelligence Committee Chairman accepted the denials of the
National Security Adviser.  At the close of the session, Mr. Hamilton told
McFarlane, "I for one am willing to take you at your word."

McFarlane-Barnes Document Dispute

     In his first response to Representative Barnes on September 12, McFarlane
ignored the Congressman's request for documents.  A PROF note to Paul Thompson
on September 20 indicated that McFarlane believed he had successfully
sidestepped the document issue:  "Now that we have the Barnes letter behind us
you can return the Contra papers to Ollie please."

     Ten days later, however, Representative Barnes renewed his document
request.  In a letter to McFarlane dated September 30, 1985, the Congressman
wrote:

I am sure you understand that the pertinent documents must be provided if the
Committee is to be able to fulfill its obligation to adopt legislation
governing the conduct of United States foreign policy and to oversee the
implementation of that policy under the law.

Congressman Barnes went on to explain why he felt strongly about his
Committee's need to review the documents:

It may be helpful if I spell out more clearly the interest of the Committee.
The Committee retains its concern about possible violations of federal law by
members of the NSC staff.  However, that is not the Committee's only - or even
primary - concern, given that the enforcement of the law is an Executive
Branch function.  It is the Committee's responsibility, however, to conduct
oversight of laws that limit the activities of the Executive Branch under the
Committee's jurisdiction, and to reach judgments as to whether changes in the
law are indicated by those activities.  Even if the Committee determined that
the activities of the NSC staff on this matter were entirely legal, the
Committee might still determine that changes in the law were necessary. I am
sure it is obvious to you that the Committee cannot make those judgments
unless it has in its possession all information, including memorandums and
other documents, pertaining to any contact between the NSC staff and
Nicaraguan rebel leaders.  I would hereby renew my request for such
information, both oral and documentary.

     Thus, the Barnes letter of September 30 emphasized that Congress was
entitled to know about the NSC's efforts to support the Contras, even if those
efforts were legal.  Once apprised of the facts, Congress would determine
whether additional legislation was required, including closing any loophole in
the Boland Amendment that the NSC staff might have claimed.

     Representative Barnes and McFarlane met at the White House on October 17.
The day before the meeting, NSC General Counsel Paul Thompson prepared a memo
for McFarlane suggesting that Representative Barnes should be told that the
National Security Adviser had no legal authority to turn over the documents.
North's actions, Thompson wrote, were at the National Security Adviser's
direction "in furtherance of the President's initiatives."  Documents
pertaining to North's actions in carrying out the President's instructions
"are internal and deliberative in nature and are furthermore not NSC agency
documents.  As Presidential advisory papers, they fall under the dominion of
the President and are no longer subject to your disposition."

     At the meeting with Congressman Barnes, McFarlane, referring to a stack
of documents on his desk, explained that a document search had been made and
that McFarlane had selected documents relevant to Congressional inquiries. He
told Congressman Barnes he would not permit the documents to leave his office
but would allow the Congressman to read them there.  McFarlane acknowledged
that he made the offer knowing Representative Barnes would likely refuse it:

     Q:  And I take it - it was part of your thinking that if a busy
Congressman came down to your office and saw a substantial stack of documents,
and you were having a short meeting [McFarlane had budgeted one hour for the
session], it was very unlikely that he would ask to read through the documents
from one end to the other?

     A:  I think that is true, yes.

     Indeed, Representative Barnes deemed the offer not to be serious.  He
understood McFarlane to imply that the documents on the desk were not all the
documents but only the ones McFarlane had concluded were "relevant."  This,
Barnes felt, "was not an adequate way to ascertain the truth of the
allegations."  Furthermore, Representative Barnes believed that prohibiting
staff from reviewing the documents would result in an incomplete
investigation:  "[I]n my experience the only way you can do a good
investigation is to compare documents - one to another - and to analyze these
with staff who have the time and background to work at putting them in
context."  McFarlane's offer, therefore, "didn't seem like a serious
proposal."

     On October 29, Representative Barnes wrote McFarlane again expressing his
view that the procedures mandated by McFarlane were "inadequate."  He
requested that McFarlane turn the documents over to the House Intelligence
Committee, thereby assuring that the classified materials would be
appropriately handled. Representative Barnes wrote:  "I believe that this
proposal would surely resolve any concerns that the Administration might have
about the security of the information, while at the same time fulfilling the
responsibilities of the House."  This was the last correspondence between
McFarlane and Representative Barnes on this issue.

     North, however, tried unsuccessfully to convince McFarlane to send one
more letter - a response North maintained he would have preferred to send at
the start.  In the draft letter, McFarlane refused outright to turn over
documents claiming that they were "internal Presidential documents regarding
sensitive relations with other governments."  The executive branch, the letter
said, "must abide by its commitments to other governments not to compromise
sensitive information."  The letter stated that disclosure of the documents
sought by Barnes would "adversely effect the national security of the United
States and endanger our citizens."