Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0102/01027.txt

Text File | 1993-07-27 | 26KB | 474 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01027}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 6B   Casey Briefing of Senate Intelligence Committee}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
memo
mcfarlane
contras
nsc
staff
military
support
intelligence
operations}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 6B   Casey Briefing of Senate Intelligence Committee

     In late 1984 and early 1985, North sent CIA intelligence information to
the Contras through Robert Owen.  The CIA Chief of the Central American Task
Force (C/CATF), who ordinarily passed that information to North, denied to
these Committees that he knew intelligence was being transmitted by North via
Owen to the Contras.  On April 17, 1985, CIA Director Casey, accompanied by
Deputy Secretary of State Dam, briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee on
intelligence operations in Nicaragua.  Casey told Committee members that,
apart from intelligence which might jeopardize the lives of Americans, "we've
kept out of any intelligence exchange . . . .  We haven't been providing
intelligence."

     Prior to the date of the briefing, North had obtained Richard Secord's
assistance to purchase weapons for the Contras with the funds donated from
Country 2.  North testified that Casey suggested Secord for this purpose.
However, Casey assured the Members that "over the past year, we strictly
honored in practice and in spirit the Congressionally mandated restrictions on
military aid to the Contras."  He testified:

     CASEY:  [W]e have carefully kept away from anything which would suggest
involvement in their activities which have been carried on quite effectively
and with considerable success in getting support and getting weapons and
getting ammunition on their own.  They've gone into the international arms
markets.  We know that from lots of sources that they were buying things from
other countries and bringing in ammunition and been raising money.  But we
don't have any idea as to the quantity, what they got in the pipeline or -

     CHAIRMAN:  That's all I wanted to establish.

Deflecting Media Inquiries

     By June 1985, reporters were close to establishing a link between the NSC
staff and Contra support.  A June 3 memo from North to Poindexter illustrates
North's efforts to discourage reporters from pursuing the story.  North
boasted in the memo that at his request, Adolfo Calero told Alfonso Chardy of
the Miami Herald "that if he (Chardi) [sic] printed any derogatory comments
about the FDN or its funding sources that Chardi [sic] would never again be
allowed to visit FDN bases or travel with their units."  North added:  "At no
time did my name or an NSC connection arise during their discussion."

     North and retired Major General John K. Singlaub had already devised a
plan to divert press attention away from the NSC staffs Contra operation,
which by then was being coordinated under North by Richard Secord, Richard
Gadd, and their employees.  North encouraged Singlaub to court the media,
realizing that, as Singlaub put it, "If I [Singlaub] had high visibility, I
might be the lightning rod and take the attention away from himself [North]
and others who were involved in the covert side of support."

     The plan seems to have had some success.  Shortly after his discussion
with North, Singlaub was the subject of a long article in The Washington Post
connecting him to support for the Contras, and in the coming months, he would
be featured in virtually all the major newspapers.  Although North himself
soon would be the subject of press reports, Secord was not mentioned in the
media until mid-1986, and details of North's resupply operation were not
revealed until the plane carrying Eugene Hasenfus was shot down in October
1986.

June-August 1985:  Press Reports on NSC Staff and Contra Support

     By April, third-country funding had not only sustained the Contras but
had "allowed the growth of the Resistance from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to
over 16,000 today - all with arms," according to an April 11, 1985, memo from
North to McFarlane.  During May, according to a May 31 memo, "the Nicaraguan
Resistance recorded significant advances in their struggle against the
Sandinistas."

     In June, reporters first linked the Contras' success with North.  By
mid-August, most major news organizations had published or broadcast reports
on this "influential and occasionally controversial character in the
implementation of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy."

     News stories in June 1985 explored the sources of Contra funding.  On
June 10, the Associated Press distributed an article by Robert Parry
suggesting that the White House had lent support to private fundraising
efforts.  The article named North as the White House contact for such efforts,
which according to the report, revolved around John Singlaub.

     Two weeks later, the Miami Herald reported that the Administration
"helped organize" and continued to support "supposedly spontaneous" private
fundraising efforts.  The article quoted extensively from ousted Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) leader Edgar Chamorro, who described a trip by North
and a CIA officer to a Contra base in the spring of 1984.  North and the CIA
officer assured the rebels, according to the article, that the White House
would "find a way" to keep the movement alive.  Neither North nor the CIA
officer specifically promised private aid, although "it was clear that was
their intent," Chamorro was quoted as saying.

     In August, reports in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other
major newspapers asserted that White House support for the Contras involved
more than fundraising.  Oliver North had given the Contras "direct military
advice" on rebel attacks, exercising "tactical influence" on military
operations, The New York Times reported.  The newspaper reported that North
had also "facilitated the supplying of logistical help" to the Contras,
filling in where the CIA could no longer help.  The information was attributed
to anonymous "administration officials."

Denials

     The day after this story appeared, President Reagan responded to the
allegations.  "[W]e're not violating any laws," the President said as he
signed legislation providing $27 million in humanitarian aid for the Contras
and authorizing the exchange of intelligence.  In a statement released later
that day, the President added that he would "continue to work with Congress to
carry out the program as effectively as possible and take care that the law be
faithfully executed."

     The National Security Adviser made his first comments on the allegations
about North in an interview with The Washington Post.  In an August 11
article, McFarlane said he had told his staff to comply with the Boland
Amendment.  "We could not provide any support," he said, but he also stated
that the NSC staff could and did maintain contact with the Contras.

Summer and Fall August 1985:  Congressional Inquiries

     In the third week of August, Representative Michael Barnes, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, separately wrote the President's
National Security Adviser, inquiring into NSC support for the Contras.
Representative Barnes' letter, dated August 16, cited press accounts as the
cause of concern about NSC staff support for the Contras. The reports, Barnes
wrote, "raise serious questions regarding the violation of the letter and
spirit of U.S. law."  The letter summarized the focus of his inquiry: Whether
the NSC staff provided "tactical influence on rebel military operations;"
whether the NSC staff was engaged in "facilitating contacts for prospective
financial donors;" and whether the NSC staff was involved in "otherwise
organizing and coordinating rebel efforts."

     Barnes made clear his view that such activities would violate the intent,
if not the letter, of Congressional restrictions on aid to the Contras:
"Congressional intent in passing the Boland Amendment was to distance the
United States from the Nicaraguan rebel movement, while the Congress and the
nation debated the appropriateness of our involvement in Nicaragua."  The
letter continued, "The press reports suggest that, despite congressional
intent, during this period the U.S. provided direct support to the Nicaraguan
rebels."  Barnes' letter concluded with a request for all information and
documents "pertaining to any contact between Lt. Col. North and Nicaraguan
rebel leaders as of enactment of the Boland Amendment in October, 1984."

     Representative Hamilton's letter also cited press accounts and expressed
a concern about "actions that supported the military activity of the contras."
He requested "a full report on the kinds of activities regarding the contras
that the NSC carried out and what the legal justification is for such actions
given the legislative prohibitions that existed last year and earlier this
year."

     In addition to the requests from Representatives Hamilton and.  Barnes,
two other inquiries were sent to McFarlane.  On October 1, Senators David
Durenberger and Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter with specific questions,
following up on a meeting with McFarlane.  And on October 21, Representative
Richard J.  Durbin wrote McFarlane asking him to respond to charges made in
the media.

Responses to Congress:  The McFarlane Letters

     As described fully in Chapter 3, the covert Contra support operation
expanded substantially in the summer and fall of 1985.  Until that point,
North had arranged for funding, coordinated the purchase of arms, and passed
military intelligence to the Contras.  Beginning with the July meeting at the
Miami Airport hotel, North sought to broaden the project, attempting to
replicate the earlier CIA covert operation.  The Enterprise took control of
third-country funds and other money obtained with the help of the NSC staff,
and began to set up its own air resupply operation to provide weapons and
material to Resistance troops inside Nicaragua.

     On September 5, McFarlane sent the first of his responses to Congress. He
wrote to Representative Hamilton:  "I can state with deep personal conviction
that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff
violate the letter or spirit" of Congressional restrictions on aid to the
Contras.  In denying allegations about NSC staff activities, the letter echoed
the language of the Boland Amendment:

I am most concerned . . . there be no misgivings as to the existence of any
parallel efforts to provide, directly or indirectly, support for military or
paramilitary activities in Nicaragua.  There has not been, nor will there be,
any such activities by the NSC staff.

     This letter, drafted by McFarlane himself, served as the model for five
additional letters prepared by North, signed by McFarlane, and sent in
September and October in response to Congressional inquiries.  In testimony
before these Committees, McFarlane called these responses "too categorical."
He said:  "I did not give as full an answer as I should have."  North went
further, acknowledging that statements in the letters were "false," and
summarizing the responses as "erroneous, misleading, evasive, and wrong."

     McFarlane wrote to Hamilton that he made his categorical denials only
after he "thoroughly examined the facts and all matters which in any remote
fashion could bear upon these charges."  A review by the NSC staff did take
place, but the actions taken in conjunction with that review leave it open to
question.

First Reaction:  Conceal the Facts

     When the Barnes letter arrived, Poindexter, who was then the Deputy
National Security Adviser, assigned North to draft the response, noting on a
memo he had received from a subordinate:  "Barnes is really a trouble maker.
We have good answers to all of this."  The "good answers," Poindexter
acknowledged in testimony, involved concealing NSC staff activities supporting
the Contras:

     Q:  And when you suggested that he prepare the first draft of the
response, was it your intention that Colonel North be able to answer that
letter with finessing a description of his activities?

     A:  That is exactly right.

     Q:  That is why you designated him as the action officer?

     A:  That is right, because my objective here again would have been to
withhold information.

     McFarlane, meanwhile, had decided to draft the initial response himself.
In preparation, he instructed Poindexter to assemble "records, files of all
memorandums, papers, travel vouchers, and so forth" relating to the
Congressional inquiries.  The Committees uncovered no evidence to suggest that
the officers who conducted the document search were aware of or attempted to
conceal the full extent of NSC staff activities.  The search, however, was
conducted narrowly.  The information policy officer assigned by Poindexter to
conduct the search wrote the following in a memo presenting plans for the
document search:

[T]he search should be as narrowly focused as was the request.  In this case,
Congressman Barnes has focused on '. . . documents, pertaining to any contact
between Lt. Col. North and Nicaraguan rebel leaders as of . . . October,
1984.' . . .  Fishing expeditions in all files relating to Central America and
or Nicaragua are NOT necessary to respond to the request.

     The officer ruled out a search of the files in North's office,
explaining, "they are 'convenience files' generally made up of drafts, and/or
copies of documentation in the institutional and Presidential Advisory files."
North's files, in fact, included nonlog memos, many PROF notes, his notebooks,
and letters to Calero, Owen, and others.

     Finally, the officer noted that appointment and telephone logs had become
"favorite targets" of such Congressional inquiries, and suggested "[i]t may be
in our interest to be terribly forthcoming and bury Mr. Barnes in logs of
dates and/or names re meetings and telecons or perhaps to offer to do so
putting him on notice that the logs give times and dates but no substance."
She recommended, however, "that for now we limit the search of appointment and
telephone logs to Ollie," thus leaving the search to the main target of the
inquiry.  Under the recommendation, North would be asked to sample the logs
and "give us a sense of what they consist of and of the potential relevance to
the request."

     Poindexter approved that recommendation, along with the other
recommendation to begin a search of all Presidential and official NSC files.
He also did not indicate any disagreement with the officer's statement that
North's office files ought not be searched.  Within a few days, some 50
relevant documents were identified, and 10 to 20 were deemed worthy of review.
They were given to Commander Paul Thompson, the NSC's General Counsel.  On or
about August 26, Thompson gave the documents to McFarlane, warning him that
some warranted concern and raising the possibility of asserting executive
privilege in response to the Barnes inquiry.

The Six "Troubling" Memos

     McFarlane reviewed the documents and selected six memorandums which,
despite the narrow focus of the search, "seemed to me to raise legitimate
questions about compliance with the law."  He added:  "[A]n objective reading
would have taken passages in each of these memorandums to be either reflective
of a past act that was not within the law or a recommendation that a future
act be carried out that wouldn't be."

     A summary of the six documents, all memos from North to McFarlane,
follows:

Memo of December 4, 1984:  "Assistance for the Nicaraguan Resistance."

     The memo described a meeting between North and an official of Country 4,
a totalitarian country, a meeting undertaken "in accord with prior
understanding."

     At the meeting, according to the memo, North attempted to convince the
official to permit a sale of antiaircraft missiles and launchers to the
Contras.  The official had mistakenly believed that the weapons were intended
for the Central American country listed on the end-user certificate.  The memo
shows North's efforts, only months after the most restrictive Boland Amendment
went into effect, to obtain sophisticated weapons for the Contras.

     The memo also recounted a meeting with Singlaub, who described his
efforts to solicit aid for the Contras from two other countries located in the
Far East.  North wrote, "If it is necessary for a USG official to verify
Calero's bona fides, this can be arranged."  Such an arrangement would
constitute facilitation of a contribution to the Contras.  Finally, the memo
discussed David Walker, a former British Special Air Services officer who, in
a meeting with North, offered to conduct sabotage operations for the
Resistance.  "Unless otherwise directed," North wrote, "Walker will be
introduced to Calero and efforts will be made to defray the cost of Walker's
operations from other than Calero's limited assets."

     McFarlane testified that upon receiving this memo he believed that he
asked Poindexter to investigate and "find out from Colonel North what had
happened and how his actions squared with the law."  The memo contains the
notation:  "Noted JP" in Poindexter's handwriting.

Memo of February 6, 1985:  "Nicaraguan Arms Shipment."

     The memo noted that the Nicaraguan merchant ship, Monimbo, was about to
pick up a load of arms for delivery to Nicaragua, a delivery that North urged
should be stopped.  North noted, "if asked, Calero would be willing to finance
the operation" to seize or sink the ship but does not have the personnel to do
so.  North suggested that foreign countries might be able to help.

     North added that if time did not permit a "special operation" to seize
the ship, "Calero can quickly be provided with the maritime assets required to
sink the vessel before it can reach port of Corinto."  North recommended "that
you authorize Calero to be provided with the information on Monimbo and
approached on the matter of seizing or sinking the ship."  National Security
Council records indicate that McFarlane saw this memo and did not approve or
disapprove.  McFarlane testified that he did not approve. Admiral Poindexter
wrote on the memo, "We need to take action to make sure ship does not arrive
in Nicaragua."  He attached a note saying, "Except for the prohibition of the
intelligence community doing anything to assist the Freedom Fighters I would
readily recommend I bring this up at CPPG [Crisis Pre-Planning Group meeting]
at 2:00 today.  Of course we could discuss it from the standpoint of keeping
the arms away from Nicaragua without any involvement of Calero and Freedom
Fighters."

Memo of March 5, 1985:  "[A Central American country's] Aid to the Nicaraguan
Resistance."

     The memo requested McFarlane's signature on memorandums to senior Cabinet
officers asking their views on increased U.S. aid to a Central American
country.  "The real purpose of your memo," North wrote, "is to find a way by
which we can compensate [the country] for the extraordinary assistance they
are providing to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters."  The attached memo did not
include a reference to such a purpose.  North attached to the memo for
McFarlane false end-user certificates provided by the Central American country
to cover nearly $8 million of munitions that were soon to be delivered to the
FDN.  The certificates, North wrote, "are a direct consequence of the informal
liaison we have established with [an official of the Central American country]
and your meeting with him and [the country's] President."  The certificates
were made out to Energy Resources International, a company owned by Albert
Hakim and Secord.

     North added in the memo, "Once we have approval for at least some of what
they have asked for, we can ensure that the right people in [the Central
American country] understand that we are able to provide results from their
cooperation on the resistance issue."

     North recommended that McFarlane sign and transmit the attached memo to
the other Cabinet officers.  NSC records reflect that McFarlane approved the
recommendation.  However, McFarlane testified that aid was sought on its
merits, and not to reward the Central American country for helping the
Contras.

Memo of March 16, 1985:  "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance."

     The memo set out a plan to aid the Contras in the event that Congress did
not do so.  It included several recommendations.  Among them:

     - The President publicly urge Americans to contribute funds for
humanitarian aid to the Contras.  McFarlane wrote in the margin, "Not yet."

     - Creation of a tax-exempt corporation for donations.  McFarlane wrote
"Yes."

     - "The current donors . . . be apprised of the plan and agree to provide
additional $25-30 M to the resistance for the purchase of arms and munitions."
McFarlane wrote "doubtful."

     According to McFarlane, the term "current donors" referred to Country 2.

Memo of April 11, 1985:  "FDN Military Operations."

     In the memo, North described how the Contras spent the $24.5 million
"made available since USG funding expired," making clear that the funds
obtained by McFarlane went mostly for "arms, ammunition, and other ordnance
items."

     North also wrote:

Despite the lack of any internal staff organization . . . when the USG
withdrew, the FDN has responded well to guidance on bow to build a staff.
Although there was a basic lack of familiarity with how to conduct
guerrilla-type operations, since July, all FDN commanders have been schooled
in these techniques and all new recruits are now initiated in guerrilla
warfare tactics before being committed to combat.  In short, the FDN has tell
used the funds provided and has become an effective guerrilla army in less
than a year.

     North described Contra plans for "future operations," including a further
increase in troops, a special operations attack against the Sandinista Air
Force, a ground military operation against a mine complex and, "the opening of
a southern front . . . which will distract EMS units currently committed to
the northern front."  He continued:

It is apparent that the $7mM remaining will be insufficient to allow the
resistance to advance beyond these limited objectives, unless there is a
commitment for additional funds.  The $14mM which the USG may be able to
provide will help to defray base camp, training, and support expenses but will
not significantly affect combat operations until early Autumn due to lead-time
requirements.  Efforts should, therefore, be made to seek additional funds
from the current donors ($15-20 M) which will allow the force to grow to
30-35,000.

     North recommended "that the current donors be approached to provide
$15-20 M additional between now and June 1, 1985."  NSC records showed that
McFarlane indicated no decision and returned the memo to the System IV files.
McFarlane testified that he rejected North's recommendation and sought no
further aid from Country 2.

Memo of May 31, 1985:  "The Nicaraguan Resistance's Near-Term Outlook."

     In the memo, North provided an update of Contra political and military
activities.  Among other things, he listed several important FDN military
successes and concluded:  "These operations were conducted in response to
guidance that the resistance must cut Sandinista supply lines and reduce the
effectiveness of the Sandinista forces on the northern frontier."  North
concluded by noting, "[P]lans are underway to transition from current
arrangements to a consultative capacity by the CIA for all political matters
and intelligence, once Congressional approval is granted on lifting Section
8066 restrictions [the Boland Amendment]."  He added:  "The only portion of
current activity which will be sustained as it has since last June, will be
the delivery of lethal supplies."

     North recommended that McFarlane brief the President on these matters.
NSC records do not indicate whether McFarlane approved this recommendation.

Undiscovered Documents

     The memos Thompson presented to McFarlane in late August 1985 did not
represent all the memos written by North to McFarlane demonstrating North's
involvement in supporting the Contras.  Because it was limited by the
information policy officer to official NSC and Presidential Advisory files,
the search would not uncover "nonlog" memorandums.  In one such memo, dated
November 7, 1984, North made clear that he was attempting to pass intelligence
information about Sandinista HIND helicopters to Calero.

     Nor did the search turn up relevant logged memorandums in which North
indicated that he and Contra leaders had planned the timing of rebel military
operations.  For example, a March 20, 1985, memo stated:

In addition to the events depicted on the internal chronology at Tab A, other
activities in the region continue as planned - including military operations
and political action.  Like the chronology, these events are also timed to
influence the vote:

     - planned travel by Calero, Cruz and Robelo;

     - various military resupply efforts timed to support significantly
increased military operations immediately after the vote (we expect major
Sandinista crossborder attacks in this time frame - today's resupply . . .
went well); and

     - special operations attacks against highly visible military targets in
Nicaragua.