Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0101/01017.txt

Text File | 1993-07-27 | 31KB | 508 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01017}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 3B   New Legislation - Congressional Support Increases}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
southern
secord
fdn
airbase
dutton
operation
drop
front
resupply}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 3B   New Legislation - Congressional Support Increases

     On November 21, 1985, the Senate agreed to a conference report on the
Intelligence Authorization Bill providing two significant Contra support
measures: the CIA was granted additional money to provide communications
equipment to the Contras and the bill specifically provided that the State
Department was not precluded from soliciting third countries for humanitarian
assistance.  The U.S. Government was still barred from expending funds to
provide lethal assistance to the Contras but, according to North, "the
instructions were to bite off a little at a time and start moving back toward
full support."

Poindexter Visits Central America

     On December 12, 1985, the newly appointed National Security Adviser,
Admiral Poindexter, took a trip with North to Central America.

     In a PROF note to Poindexter, North recommended the trip, suggesting that
it be "billed as a quick tour through the region to confer w/top ranking U.S.
officials to reinforce the continuity of U.S. policy in the region."  That
explanation would be a "plausible cover" for the real purpose of the trip,
which included delivering to Central American officials "the messages we need
sent."

     One of the messages was that "we [the United States] intend to pursue a
victory and that [a Central American country] will not be forced to seek a
political accommodation with the Sandinistas."  North noted that this Central
American country was attempting to use support of the Contras as leverage to
force U.S. aid.

     The Santa Elena airstrip in Costa Rica was also an issue raised in
discussions during the trip.  North brought Poindexter up to date on the
progress of the Santa Elena airstrip, and they discussed what measures "could
be taken to encourage" Costa Rica to be more cooperative with the Contras.
When Poindexter returned from his one-day trip to Central America, he briefed
the President on the morning of December 13, including informing the President
of the efforts to secure the land necessary for the airstrip.  Poindexter
testified, and his notes reflect, that Poindexter "did talk to him [the
President] about the private airstrip."

Continued Funding Problems

     By the end of 1985, North had put into motion the airlift operation and
the beginnings of the Southern front.  A critical problem remained how to fund
these efforts.  Throughout 1985, North, Casey, and Singlaub discussed a
variety of methods to fund support for the Contras.  In early 1985, in
connection with his solicitation of Country 3, Singlaub suggested to Country 3
officials and to North that a portion of his proposed arms sales to Country 3
be diverted and applied to the benefit of the Contras.  During the summer of
1985, Singlaub worked without success through Geomilitech Consultants, owned
by Barbara Studley, on diverting part of a $75 million proposed sale of
torpedoes to Country 3.  In the fall of 1985, Singlaub arranged for both North
and Casey to meet with Studley to present yet another plan to aid the Contras
and democratic resistance forces worldwide.  Geomilitech would be a vehicle
for a three-way trade to "enable the U.S. Government, the Administration, to
acquire some Soviet-bloc weapons without having to go through the painful
process of appropriations," in order to furnish weapons to anti-Communist
insurgencies in Nicaragua and around the world.  The proposed trade entailed
the U.S.'s giving credit for high technology purchases to another country,
that country using the credit to deliver military equipment to a totalitarian
country, which would then transfer Soviet-compatible weapons to a trading
company.  According to the plan, the company, at the direction of the NSC and
CIA, would distribute the weapons to the Contras and other resistance
movements, "mandating neither the consent or awareness of the Department of
State or Congress."  These fundraising ideas were never approved.  The
diversion from the Iranian arms sales would provide the needed funds.

Legislative Plans and a New Finding

     At a January 10, 1986, NSC meeting, the first in 15 months on Nicaragua,
the President heard the views of his advisers.  CIA Director Casey described a
buildup of Soviet weaponry and increasing Sandinista repression in Nicaragua;
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., discussed the inability of the Department of
Defense to provide logistical assistance that the Contras badly needed; and
Secretary Shultz voiced his approval for resumption of Congressional funding
for a covert program.  The President ended the meeting by instructing his
advisers to prepare to go back to Congress with a request for full funding
($100 million) of a covert action program.

     A week after the meeting, the President signed a new Finding on
Nicaragua, consolidating what had been separate Findings governing various
aspects of the program.  The Finding authorized the CIA to implement the newly
granted aid and to establish the communications network for which Congress had
just provided funding.

The Resupply Operation Begins

     In January 1986, the plans set in motion by North in the fall of 1985
were beginning to give shape to the resupply operation.  Gadd recruited flight
crews, agreed with Southern Air Transport that it would handle all aircraft
maintenance, and purchased the first aircraft, a C-7 Caribou.  A team was also
sent to Santa Elena and construction of the airstrip began in earnest.
Moreover, the problem of secure communications was solved with the help of the
National Security Agency.

     According to North, both Casey and Poindexter had told him to seek some
type of secure communications support.  North turned to the National Security
Agency for secure communications equipment.

     The National Security Agency provided KL-43 encryption devices to North.
On January 15, North gave KL-43s to the principal members of the covert
operation: Secord, Gadd, Steele, Castillo, Quintero, and William Langton,
president of Southern Air Transport.  North also put a device in his office at
the Old Executive Office Building.  Each month newly keyed material was
distributed to the group to enable them to communicate with each other in a
secure manner.

     Throughout January 1986, North also pursued discussions with Steele and
CIA representatives about arrangements for using the Airbase and for
establishing the airstrip at Santa Elena.  North's notebooks indicate a series
of telephone conversations with Steele relating to obtaining the permission of
Central American officials for the resupply aircraft to operate from the
Airbase.

     During that same period, North wrote to Poindexter that General John
Galvin, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, was "cognizant of the activities
under way in both Costa Rica and at [the Airbase] in support of the DRF
[Democratic Resistance Force]."  North added, "Gen. Galvin is enthusiastic
about both endeavors."  According to North's notebooks, North, Poindexter, and
others met with Galvin on January 16 to discuss, among other items, "covert
strategy/training/planning/support" for the Nicaraguan Resistance.  General
Galvin testified that he knew of the air resupply operation, but believed that
it was being financed and run by private individuals, not the NSC staff.

     Meanwhile, North continued his discussions on the details of construction
of the airstrip at Santa Elena.  His discussions covered arrangements for fuel
storage on site, the construction of guard quarters and even instructions to
the bulldozer operation.

     In February, after consultation with Enrique Bermudez and various
commanders connected with the Southern front, North and Secord decided to
deliver approximately 90,000 pounds of small arms and ammunition geared for
airdrop to the FDN, which also could be delivered to the Southern front.  This
was the first delivery of arms that North and Secord provided to the Contras
without payment from them and out of funds that had been contributed directly
to the Enterprise.

     Yet by February, supply problems still plagued the operation.  There was
only one plane at the Airbase, and it was damaged.  On its arrival flight, the
C-7 plane had developed mechanical problems.  The crew jettisoned spare parts,
and even training manuals, but the plane crash-landed nonetheless.

     Faced with the Contras' requests for resupply and lacking aircraft to
perform the job, North sought to deliver arms to the Contra soldiers using
aircraft that had been chartered by NHAO to take humanitarian supplies from
the United States to Central America.

     In February 1986, North called Gadd at home and told him to charter an
NHAO flight from New Orleans to the Airbase in Central America.  Once the
plane arrived at the Airbase, it was directed to an FDN base where ammunition
and lethal supplies were loaded and airdropped to the FDN.  NHAO later refused
to pay for the portion of the charter that covered the delivery of lethal
supplies.

     In the South, however, the Contra forces remained without necessary
supplies.  In part, the problem was logistical: the Costa Rican airfield was
not yet open and the only planes available at the Airbase could not make the
flight to southern Nicaragua.  The problem was also political: the FDN did not
want to share its scarce resources with the southern forces.  In early
February, Owen warned North that "our credibility will once again be zero in
the south" if deliveries did not soon start:

[T]hey have been promised they will get what they need.  Who is to be the
contact for these goods and who is to see that they are delivered?  A critical
stage is being entered in the Southern Front and we have to deliver.

     In early March, North asked Owen to travel with another NHAO humanitarian
aid flight that, upon unloading, would be reloaded at the Enterprise's expense
with lethal supplies for airdrop to the Southern front. However, the FDN never
produced the munitions promised, even though CIA officials tried to persuade
the FDN to release the munitions.  The mission thus resulted in failure.  As
Owen later wrote North, "the main thing to be learned from this latest
exercise is . . . the FDN cannot be relied upon to provide material in a
timely manner."

The President Meets a Costa Rican Official

     In March 1986, a meeting North arranged for a Costa Rican Official with
President Reagan at the White House occurred.  The meeting was simply a photo
opportunity, attended as well by North and Castillo.

     After the Oval Office visit, North asked the Official to meet with Secord
that afternoon to work out some issues concerning the airstrip.  At the
meeting, the Official asked Secord for a letter, which the Official dictated,
to the effect that the Costa Rican Civil Guard maintain control of the
airstrip, have access to it for training purposes, and that ecological and
environmental considerations apply.

Lethal Deliveries Begin

     By the end of March 1986, the C-7 Caribou aircraft was operating and
flights finally began to ferry lethal and nonlethal supplies for the FDN in
the North.  But the problem of resupplying the Southern front remained.

     On March 28, Owen wrote to North that he, Steele, Rodriguez, and Quintero
reached a consensus on what steps had to be taken to successfully resupply the
South:  lethal and nonlethal supplies should be stockpiled at the Airbase; the
Caribou or better yet a C-123 should load at the Airbase, deliver to the
South, and refuel at Santa Elena on the return to the Airbase; and the
Southern Air Transport L-100 should be used until Santa Elena was prepared to
refuel the C-7 and C-123.

     While Gadd completed the purchase of a second C7 Caribou and the first
C-123 in early April, North responded to the growing needs of the southern
forces.  Between early April and April 11, North coordinated virtually every
aspect of the first drop of lethal supplies into Nicaragua by way of the
Southern front.  He was in regular communication with Secord and others to
ensure that the drop was successful.  KL-43 messages among the planners
involved in this drop show both the level of detail in which North was
concerned and the coordination among various U.S. Government agencies to
ensure that the drop succeeded.  The first message, from North to Secord,
established the essential elements of the drop:

The unit to which we wanted to drop in the southern quadrant of Nicaragua is
in desperate need of ordnance resupply . . . .  Have therefore developed an
alternative plan which [Chief of the CIA's CATF] has been briefed on and in
which he concurs.  The L-100 which flies from MSY to [an FDN base] on
Wednesday should terminate it's NHAO mission on arrival at [the FDN base].  At
that point it should load the supplies at [the Airbase] which - theoretically
[the CIA's Chief of Station in the Central American country] is assembling
today at [the FDN base] - and take them to [the Airbase].  These items should
then be transloaded to the C-123 . . . .  On any night between Wednesday, Apr
9, and Friday, Apr 11 these supplies should be dropped by the C-123 in the
vicinity of [drop zone inside Nicaragua].  The A/C shd penetrate Nicaragua
across the Atlantic Coast . . . .  If we are ever going to take the pressure
off the northern front we have got to get this drop in - quickly.  Please make
sure that this is retransmitted via this channel to [Castillo], Ralph, Sat and
Steele.  Owen already briefed and prepared to go w/the L-100 out of MSY if
this will help.  Please advise soonest.

     Secord and Gadd arranged to lease the L-100 plane from Southern Air
Transport.  Secord transmitted the following instructions to Quintero on April
8:

CIA and Goode [North's code name] report Blackys [a Southern front military
commandante] troops in south in desperate fix.  Therefore, [CIA's Chief of
Station in a Central American country] is supposed to arrange for a load to
come from [the FDN base] to [the Airbase] via L100 tomorrow afternoon . . . .
Notify Steele we intend to drop tomorrow nite or more like Thurs nite . . . .
Meanwhile, contact [Castillo] via this machine and get latest on DZ [drop
zone] coordinates and the other data I gave you the format for . . . .  CIA
wants the aircraft to enter the DZ area from the Atlantic . . . .

     On April 9, Secord relayed to North that "all coordination now complete
at [the Airbase] for drop - [Castillo] has provided the necessary inputs."
After the Southern military commanders relayed the drop zone information to
Castillo's communications center, Castillo sent a cable to the Chief of the
CATF at CIA headquarters, requesting flight path information, vectors based on
the coordinates of the drop zone, and hostile risk evaluation to be passed to
the crew.  CIA headquarters provided the information, as it did on three other
occasions that spring.

     After Secord's April 9 message, the L-100 arrived and was loaded with a
considerable store of munitions for airdrop to the South on April 10. Castillo
had provided the location of the drop zone to Quintero, and Steele told the
Southern Air Transport crew how to avoid Sandinista radar.  Despite North's
intricate planning, the L-100 was unable to locate the Contra forces. The
maiden flight to the Southern front had failed.

     On April 11, the L-100 tried again, airdropping more than 20,000 pounds
of lethal supplies inside Nicaragua.  This was the first successful drop to
the southern forces.  Before the plane left, Steele checked the loading of the
cargo, including whether the assault rifles were properly padded.  Castillo
reported the drop to North in glowing terms:

Per UNO South Force, drop successfully completed in 15 minutes . . . .  Our
plans during next 2-3 weeks include air drop at sea for UNO/KISAN indigenous
force . . . maritime deliveries NHAO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UNO
South, but with certified air worthy air craft, lethal drop to UNO South
. . . .  My objective is creation of 2,500 man force which can strike
northwest and link-up with quiche to form solid southern force.  Likewise,
envisage formidable opposition on Atlantic Coast resupplied at or by sea.
Realize this may be overly ambitious planning but with your help, believe
we can pull it off.

The Resupply Operation Steps Up Its Activities

     While the April 11 mission to the South was the only successful airdrop
in that region, the air resupply operation was, by April, operating regular,
almost daily, supply missions for the FDN in the North.  Most missions
delivered supplies from the main FDN base to the FDN's forward-operating
positions.  Other flights dropped lethal cargo to units operating inside
Nicaragua.  Many of these flights were helped informally by CIA field officers
on the ground, who prepared flight plans for aerial resupply missions, briefed
the air crews on Nicaraguan antiaircraft installations, and provided minor
shop supplies to the mechanics.  On one occasion, the CIA operations officer
at an FDN base flew Ian Crawford, a loadmaster for the resupply operation, in
a CIA helicopter with lethal supplies on board over the border area so
Crawford could see where he and his crew were airdropping cargo three to four
times daily.  However, the resupply operation was not without problems.  Poor
maintenance hampered the performance of the aircraft and a lack of a closely
knit organization contributed to the Enterprise's troubles.

     Because of these problems, North and Secord flew to the Airbase in
Central America on April 20 for a one-day meeting with the Commander, Steele,
Rodriguez, and the military leadership of the FDN.  During the meeting, North
and Secord emphasized the importance of the Southern front and complained
about the difficulty of getting stocks out of the FDN, thus preparing the FDN
for the future storage of Southern front supplies directly at the Airbase.
There was some misunderstanding as to whether the FDN were the legal owners of
the aircraft, but North and Secord stated that the aircraft belonged to a
private company dedicated to support all the Contras, both the FDN and the
Southern front.  In turn, the FDN leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with
the C-7 aircraft.  They were simply "too old" to operate effectively, Bermudez
told them.  He wanted bigger and faster aircraft.  North responded that if he
had the money to buy better aircraft, he would, but they were financing the
operation with donated funds.

     The possible purchase for the FDN of Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to
use against the Sandinista HIND-D helicopters was also raised.  In December
1985, Secord and Calero had tried to purchase Blowpipes from a Latin American
country.  The transaction proceeded to the point where the Enterprise placed a
deposit on the missiles.  But necessary approvals for the sale could not be
secured, even though North enlisted the help of Poindexter and of McFarlane,
who remained in contact with North by PROF machine even after he left the
Government.

     After the April 20, 1986, meeting, the first shipment of lethal supplies
by the Enterprise for the Southern front arrived at the Airbase to be stored
by the resupply operation.  At North's request, the Enterprise paid David
Walker $110,000 for two foreign pilots and a loadmaster to fly missions inside
Nicaragua so that U.S. citizens would not be exposed to possible shootdown or
capture.

     Secord took another step to overcome the resupply problems.  He recruited
Col.  Robert Dutton to manage the resupply operation on a daily basis.  Secord
knew Dutton from their active duty together in the U.S. Air Force, where
Dutton had considerable experience in managing covert air resupply operations.
Gadd's role was phased out and on May 1, Dutton, retiring from the Air Force,
was placed in operational command of the resupply operation, reporting to
Secord, and increasingly over time, directly to North on all operational
decisions of consequence.

     At the outset, Secord emphasized to Dutton that the air program would
receive very little in the way of additional funding.  Dutton was instructed
to manage the operation with existing equipment and conserve resources
carefully as the money provided was all "donated."

     When Dutton took over, he traveled to Central America to assess the
operation.  There were approximately 19 pilots, loadmasters and maintenance
operators at the Airbase.  In addition, Felix Rodriguez and his associate
Ramon Medina coordinated with the Commander and oversaw the local fuel
account.  Dutton also examined the aircraft - two C-7s, one C-123, and the
Maule - and found that, indeed, they were in "very poor operating condition."

     The resupply operation at the Airbase maintained a warehouse stocked with
an assortment of munitions - light machine guns, assault rifles, ammunition,
mortars, grenades, C-4 explosive, parachute rigging, uniforms, and other
military paraphernalia.  The crews lived in three safe houses and used a
separate office with maps and communications equipment.  By May, the Santa
Elena airstrip, along with emergency fuel storage space and temporary housing,
was finished.

     Because Secord (and later North) had impressed on Dutton the need for
strict accountability given the limited nature of the donated funds, Dutton
enforced a stringent set of accounting requirements: Expenditures had to be
carefully documented and all missions fully reported.  Moreover, Dutton
devised an organization, based on a military hierarchy, that delineated each
person's role and responsibility.  Dutton also defined the legal constraints
on the organization as he had understood from Secord: no Contra combatants
could be airdropped into battle.  These new requirements of accountability,
reporting, and organization were followed for the remaining life of the
operation.

     Despite these impending changes, North wrote to Poindexter expressing his
weariness and warning that without Congressional authorization for CIA
involvement, "we will run increasing risks of trying to manage this program
from here with the attendant physical and political liabilities.  I am not
complaining, and you know that I love the work, but we have to lift some of
this onto the CIA so that I can get more than 2-3 hrs. of sleep at night."

Dutton's Reorganization Plan

     Following his first trip to Central America in May, Dutton began drafting
a reorganization plan for the Enterprise "to outline in one document exactly
what the basic operating locations were, and who the key people were and what
their responsibilities were."  The plan was reviewed, edited, and approved by
both Secord and North.  The plan stated that "B.C. Washington has operational
control of all assets in support of Project Democracy."  While Secord
maintained that B.C. Washington meant "primarily myself and Robert Dutton,"
Dutton testified that "B.C. Washington" described North and Secord.

     According to Dutton, the purpose of the reorganization plan was to
disguise the role of Secord and North.  The lawsuit brought by freelance
journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey had named Secord and was generating
publicity.  North and Secord, according to Dutton, were concerned that
Rodriguez, who had become disaffected, was providing information about the
operation to Avirgan and Honey.  North and Secord, therefore, wanted to create
the pretense that they "had withdrawn from the operation, they were no longer
part of it, and this new company called B.C. Washington, which represented the
donators [sic], therefore the benefactors - that they had come in to take over
the operation."  But, according to Dutton, "the fact was that Colonel North
and General Secord's relationship with the organization had not changed one
bit."  As Dutton acknowledged, "B.C. Washington" was a facade that North and
Secord developed in order to cloak their role.

The Southern Front Resupply

     On May 24, 1986, the day after Dutton left Central America, another
planeload of munitions, paid for by the Enterprise arrived at the Airbase for
the Southern front.  Because the FDN was reluctant to make arms available to
the independent southern Contra forces, North and Secord decided in April 1986
that arms and other supplies would now be stored under the control of the
Enterprise at the Airbase.  This second direct shipment of arms to the Airbase
to be delivered to the Southern front was part of the new plan. Together with
the late April shipment, there were now more than $1 million in arms at the
Airbase available for airdrop to the Southern front forces.

     The warehouse, however, was not large enough to accommodate the new
munitions.  Dutton had to ask the Commander for permission to expand the
warehouse, while seeking North's approval for the additional cost of
construction.  After the Commander authorized the expansion, North relayed to
Secord his approval for construction to proceed.

     With new arms and an expanded warehouse, Dutton had the material to
deliver to the Southern front.  However, while regular deliveries with the C-7
continued to the FDN in the North, no flights were being made to the South.
North told Dutton that the Southern forces were adding 150 new recruits a day,
but that they had neither enough weapons for the fighters nor enough medicine
to treat the growing problem of mountain leprosy.

     On June 2, Castillo called North and told him that drops to the southern
units were needed as soon as possible.  Castillo advised North that Quintero
had all the necessary vector information to make the drops.  Following
Castillo's request, two deliveries were prepared for the South totalling about
39,000 pounds, and on June 9, after coordinating with Castillo the location
and needs of the Southern troops, the C-123 airplane tried to make an air
drop.  However, the plane could not locate the troops inside Nicaragua, and
when it landed at the Santa Elena airstrip, it got stuck in the mud.

     The stuck plane caused consternation at the U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica.
The month before, Oscar Arias had been inaugurated as the new President of
Costa Rica.  The new Costa Rican Government had told Ambassador Tambs that it
had instructed that the airstrip not be utilized.  Tambs, in turn, told
Castillo to notify North and Udall Corporation that the airstrip had to be
closed.  Now Tambs was faced with explaining to President Arias why a
munitions-laden airplane was stuck in the mud at Santa Elena.  A plan was
devised by Tambs, Castillo, and others at the U.S. Embassy to borrow trucks
from a nearby facility to free the aircraft, but the plane was able to take
off before the plan could be carried out.

     The needs of the FDN still had to be met.  On June 10, North met with
Calero who requested that the Caribou planes fly more missions inside
Nicaragua.  The Enterprise was just about to purchase additional arms for the
FDN.  However, the most pressing need, North wrote to Poindexter, was neither
money nor arms, but rather:  "to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that
it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine Lt.
Col."  North further reported to Poindexter that "several million rounds of
ammo are now on hand . . . Critically needed items are being flown in from
Europe to the expanded warehouse facility at [the Airbase].  At this point,
the only liability we still have is one of Democracy, Inc.'s airplanes is
mired in the mud (it is the rainy season down there) on the secret field in
Costa Rica."  The decision to purchase additional millions of dollars in arms
for the FDN was taken after the Enterprise learned from Bermudez and the FDN
leaders that FDN stocks were getting low.  Hundreds of tons of East European
weapons were paid for in three installments between June 27 to July 16.  The
shipment, the last arms purchased for the Contras by North and Secord, never
reached them.

     Despite the difficulties, North wanted to continue to airdrop supplies,
especially to the South.  As soon as the C-123 was freed from the mud, it
embarked on another mission with a full lethal load for the southern troops.
But this time, fog covered a mountain, and William Cooper, the chief pilot for
the resupply operation, hit the top of a tree, knocking out an engine. After
the plane reached the drop zone, Cooper could not locate the troops.

     Communicating by KL-43, North told Castillo that to facilitate further
airdrops to the southern forces, he had "asked Ralph [Quintero] to proceed
immediately to your location.  I do not think we ought to contemplate these
operations without him being on scene.  Too many things go wrong that then
directly involve you and me in what should be deniable for both of us."

     Meanwhile, North made further plans to ensure resupply to the Southern
front.  With the C-123 damaged in flight, the remaining C-7 aircraft could
only make the trip to the South if it were able to refuel before the return
trip, and the Santa Elena strip was not operational.  North asked Dutton to
look for another C-123, and with Tambs' assistance, arranged for a new flight
pattern in which the empty C-7 aircraft, after making its drops, refueled at
the San Jose International Airport in Costa Rica.  The new refueling plan
permitted two small drops of supplies to the Southern front.  But, by the
third week in July, $870,000 worth of munitions were still sitting at the
Airbase waiting for the Southern forces.  Despite all the efforts, the vision
of a year before for the Southern front had yet to become a reality.