$Unique_ID{bob01017} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 3B New Legislation - Congressional Support Increases} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{north southern secord fdn airbase dutton operation drop front resupply} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 3B New Legislation - Congressional Support Increases On November 21, 1985, the Senate agreed to a conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Bill providing two significant Contra support measures: the CIA was granted additional money to provide communications equipment to the Contras and the bill specifically provided that the State Department was not precluded from soliciting third countries for humanitarian assistance. The U.S. Government was still barred from expending funds to provide lethal assistance to the Contras but, according to North, "the instructions were to bite off a little at a time and start moving back toward full support." Poindexter Visits Central America On December 12, 1985, the newly appointed National Security Adviser, Admiral Poindexter, took a trip with North to Central America. In a PROF note to Poindexter, North recommended the trip, suggesting that it be "billed as a quick tour through the region to confer w/top ranking U.S. officials to reinforce the continuity of U.S. policy in the region." That explanation would be a "plausible cover" for the real purpose of the trip, which included delivering to Central American officials "the messages we need sent." One of the messages was that "we [the United States] intend to pursue a victory and that [a Central American country] will not be forced to seek a political accommodation with the Sandinistas." North noted that this Central American country was attempting to use support of the Contras as leverage to force U.S. aid. The Santa Elena airstrip in Costa Rica was also an issue raised in discussions during the trip. North brought Poindexter up to date on the progress of the Santa Elena airstrip, and they discussed what measures "could be taken to encourage" Costa Rica to be more cooperative with the Contras. When Poindexter returned from his one-day trip to Central America, he briefed the President on the morning of December 13, including informing the President of the efforts to secure the land necessary for the airstrip. Poindexter testified, and his notes reflect, that Poindexter "did talk to him [the President] about the private airstrip." Continued Funding Problems By the end of 1985, North had put into motion the airlift operation and the beginnings of the Southern front. A critical problem remained how to fund these efforts. Throughout 1985, North, Casey, and Singlaub discussed a variety of methods to fund support for the Contras. In early 1985, in connection with his solicitation of Country 3, Singlaub suggested to Country 3 officials and to North that a portion of his proposed arms sales to Country 3 be diverted and applied to the benefit of the Contras. During the summer of 1985, Singlaub worked without success through Geomilitech Consultants, owned by Barbara Studley, on diverting part of a $75 million proposed sale of torpedoes to Country 3. In the fall of 1985, Singlaub arranged for both North and Casey to meet with Studley to present yet another plan to aid the Contras and democratic resistance forces worldwide. Geomilitech would be a vehicle for a three-way trade to "enable the U.S. Government, the Administration, to acquire some Soviet-bloc weapons without having to go through the painful process of appropriations," in order to furnish weapons to anti-Communist insurgencies in Nicaragua and around the world. The proposed trade entailed the U.S.'s giving credit for high technology purchases to another country, that country using the credit to deliver military equipment to a totalitarian country, which would then transfer Soviet-compatible weapons to a trading company. According to the plan, the company, at the direction of the NSC and CIA, would distribute the weapons to the Contras and other resistance movements, "mandating neither the consent or awareness of the Department of State or Congress." These fundraising ideas were never approved. The diversion from the Iranian arms sales would provide the needed funds. Legislative Plans and a New Finding At a January 10, 1986, NSC meeting, the first in 15 months on Nicaragua, the President heard the views of his advisers. CIA Director Casey described a buildup of Soviet weaponry and increasing Sandinista repression in Nicaragua; Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., discussed the inability of the Department of Defense to provide logistical assistance that the Contras badly needed; and Secretary Shultz voiced his approval for resumption of Congressional funding for a covert program. The President ended the meeting by instructing his advisers to prepare to go back to Congress with a request for full funding ($100 million) of a covert action program. A week after the meeting, the President signed a new Finding on Nicaragua, consolidating what had been separate Findings governing various aspects of the program. The Finding authorized the CIA to implement the newly granted aid and to establish the communications network for which Congress had just provided funding. The Resupply Operation Begins In January 1986, the plans set in motion by North in the fall of 1985 were beginning to give shape to the resupply operation. Gadd recruited flight crews, agreed with Southern Air Transport that it would handle all aircraft maintenance, and purchased the first aircraft, a C-7 Caribou. A team was also sent to Santa Elena and construction of the airstrip began in earnest. Moreover, the problem of secure communications was solved with the help of the National Security Agency. According to North, both Casey and Poindexter had told him to seek some type of secure communications support. North turned to the National Security Agency for secure communications equipment. The National Security Agency provided KL-43 encryption devices to North. On January 15, North gave KL-43s to the principal members of the covert operation: Secord, Gadd, Steele, Castillo, Quintero, and William Langton, president of Southern Air Transport. North also put a device in his office at the Old Executive Office Building. Each month newly keyed material was distributed to the group to enable them to communicate with each other in a secure manner. Throughout January 1986, North also pursued discussions with Steele and CIA representatives about arrangements for using the Airbase and for establishing the airstrip at Santa Elena. North's notebooks indicate a series of telephone conversations with Steele relating to obtaining the permission of Central American officials for the resupply aircraft to operate from the Airbase. During that same period, North wrote to Poindexter that General John Galvin, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, was "cognizant of the activities under way in both Costa Rica and at [the Airbase] in support of the DRF [Democratic Resistance Force]." North added, "Gen. Galvin is enthusiastic about both endeavors." According to North's notebooks, North, Poindexter, and others met with Galvin on January 16 to discuss, among other items, "covert strategy/training/planning/support" for the Nicaraguan Resistance. General Galvin testified that he knew of the air resupply operation, but believed that it was being financed and run by private individuals, not the NSC staff. Meanwhile, North continued his discussions on the details of construction of the airstrip at Santa Elena. His discussions covered arrangements for fuel storage on site, the construction of guard quarters and even instructions to the bulldozer operation. In February, after consultation with Enrique Bermudez and various commanders connected with the Southern front, North and Secord decided to deliver approximately 90,000 pounds of small arms and ammunition geared for airdrop to the FDN, which also could be delivered to the Southern front. This was the first delivery of arms that North and Secord provided to the Contras without payment from them and out of funds that had been contributed directly to the Enterprise. Yet by February, supply problems still plagued the operation. There was only one plane at the Airbase, and it was damaged. On its arrival flight, the C-7 plane had developed mechanical problems. The crew jettisoned spare parts, and even training manuals, but the plane crash-landed nonetheless. Faced with the Contras' requests for resupply and lacking aircraft to perform the job, North sought to deliver arms to the Contra soldiers using aircraft that had been chartered by NHAO to take humanitarian supplies from the United States to Central America. In February 1986, North called Gadd at home and told him to charter an NHAO flight from New Orleans to the Airbase in Central America. Once the plane arrived at the Airbase, it was directed to an FDN base where ammunition and lethal supplies were loaded and airdropped to the FDN. NHAO later refused to pay for the portion of the charter that covered the delivery of lethal supplies. In the South, however, the Contra forces remained without necessary supplies. In part, the problem was logistical: the Costa Rican airfield was not yet open and the only planes available at the Airbase could not make the flight to southern Nicaragua. The problem was also political: the FDN did not want to share its scarce resources with the southern forces. In early February, Owen warned North that "our credibility will once again be zero in the south" if deliveries did not soon start: [T]hey have been promised they will get what they need. Who is to be the contact for these goods and who is to see that they are delivered? A critical stage is being entered in the Southern Front and we have to deliver. In early March, North asked Owen to travel with another NHAO humanitarian aid flight that, upon unloading, would be reloaded at the Enterprise's expense with lethal supplies for airdrop to the Southern front. However, the FDN never produced the munitions promised, even though CIA officials tried to persuade the FDN to release the munitions. The mission thus resulted in failure. As Owen later wrote North, "the main thing to be learned from this latest exercise is . . . the FDN cannot be relied upon to provide material in a timely manner." The President Meets a Costa Rican Official In March 1986, a meeting North arranged for a Costa Rican Official with President Reagan at the White House occurred. The meeting was simply a photo opportunity, attended as well by North and Castillo. After the Oval Office visit, North asked the Official to meet with Secord that afternoon to work out some issues concerning the airstrip. At the meeting, the Official asked Secord for a letter, which the Official dictated, to the effect that the Costa Rican Civil Guard maintain control of the airstrip, have access to it for training purposes, and that ecological and environmental considerations apply. Lethal Deliveries Begin By the end of March 1986, the C-7 Caribou aircraft was operating and flights finally began to ferry lethal and nonlethal supplies for the FDN in the North. But the problem of resupplying the Southern front remained. On March 28, Owen wrote to North that he, Steele, Rodriguez, and Quintero reached a consensus on what steps had to be taken to successfully resupply the South: lethal and nonlethal supplies should be stockpiled at the Airbase; the Caribou or better yet a C-123 should load at the Airbase, deliver to the South, and refuel at Santa Elena on the return to the Airbase; and the Southern Air Transport L-100 should be used until Santa Elena was prepared to refuel the C-7 and C-123. While Gadd completed the purchase of a second C7 Caribou and the first C-123 in early April, North responded to the growing needs of the southern forces. Between early April and April 11, North coordinated virtually every aspect of the first drop of lethal supplies into Nicaragua by way of the Southern front. He was in regular communication with Secord and others to ensure that the drop was successful. KL-43 messages among the planners involved in this drop show both the level of detail in which North was concerned and the coordination among various U.S. Government agencies to ensure that the drop succeeded. The first message, from North to Secord, established the essential elements of the drop: The unit to which we wanted to drop in the southern quadrant of Nicaragua is in desperate need of ordnance resupply . . . . Have therefore developed an alternative plan which [Chief of the CIA's CATF] has been briefed on and in which he concurs. The L-100 which flies from MSY to [an FDN base] on Wednesday should terminate it's NHAO mission on arrival at [the FDN base]. At that point it should load the supplies at [the Airbase] which - theoretically [the CIA's Chief of Station in the Central American country] is assembling today at [the FDN base] - and take them to [the Airbase]. These items should then be transloaded to the C-123 . . . . On any night between Wednesday, Apr 9, and Friday, Apr 11 these supplies should be dropped by the C-123 in the vicinity of [drop zone inside Nicaragua]. The A/C shd penetrate Nicaragua across the Atlantic Coast . . . . If we are ever going to take the pressure off the northern front we have got to get this drop in - quickly. Please make sure that this is retransmitted via this channel to [Castillo], Ralph, Sat and Steele. Owen already briefed and prepared to go w/the L-100 out of MSY if this will help. Please advise soonest. Secord and Gadd arranged to lease the L-100 plane from Southern Air Transport. Secord transmitted the following instructions to Quintero on April 8: CIA and Goode [North's code name] report Blackys [a Southern front military commandante] troops in south in desperate fix. Therefore, [CIA's Chief of Station in a Central American country] is supposed to arrange for a load to come from [the FDN base] to [the Airbase] via L100 tomorrow afternoon . . . . Notify Steele we intend to drop tomorrow nite or more like Thurs nite . . . . Meanwhile, contact [Castillo] via this machine and get latest on DZ [drop zone] coordinates and the other data I gave you the format for . . . . CIA wants the aircraft to enter the DZ area from the Atlantic . . . . On April 9, Secord relayed to North that "all coordination now complete at [the Airbase] for drop - [Castillo] has provided the necessary inputs." After the Southern military commanders relayed the drop zone information to Castillo's communications center, Castillo sent a cable to the Chief of the CATF at CIA headquarters, requesting flight path information, vectors based on the coordinates of the drop zone, and hostile risk evaluation to be passed to the crew. CIA headquarters provided the information, as it did on three other occasions that spring. After Secord's April 9 message, the L-100 arrived and was loaded with a considerable store of munitions for airdrop to the South on April 10. Castillo had provided the location of the drop zone to Quintero, and Steele told the Southern Air Transport crew how to avoid Sandinista radar. Despite North's intricate planning, the L-100 was unable to locate the Contra forces. The maiden flight to the Southern front had failed. On April 11, the L-100 tried again, airdropping more than 20,000 pounds of lethal supplies inside Nicaragua. This was the first successful drop to the southern forces. Before the plane left, Steele checked the loading of the cargo, including whether the assault rifles were properly padded. Castillo reported the drop to North in glowing terms: Per UNO South Force, drop successfully completed in 15 minutes . . . . Our plans during next 2-3 weeks include air drop at sea for UNO/KISAN indigenous force . . . maritime deliveries NHAO supplies to same, NHAO air drop to UNO South, but with certified air worthy air craft, lethal drop to UNO South . . . . My objective is creation of 2,500 man force which can strike northwest and link-up with quiche to form solid southern force. Likewise, envisage formidable opposition on Atlantic Coast resupplied at or by sea. Realize this may be overly ambitious planning but with your help, believe we can pull it off. The Resupply Operation Steps Up Its Activities While the April 11 mission to the South was the only successful airdrop in that region, the air resupply operation was, by April, operating regular, almost daily, supply missions for the FDN in the North. Most missions delivered supplies from the main FDN base to the FDN's forward-operating positions. Other flights dropped lethal cargo to units operating inside Nicaragua. Many of these flights were helped informally by CIA field officers on the ground, who prepared flight plans for aerial resupply missions, briefed the air crews on Nicaraguan antiaircraft installations, and provided minor shop supplies to the mechanics. On one occasion, the CIA operations officer at an FDN base flew Ian Crawford, a loadmaster for the resupply operation, in a CIA helicopter with lethal supplies on board over the border area so Crawford could see where he and his crew were airdropping cargo three to four times daily. However, the resupply operation was not without problems. Poor maintenance hampered the performance of the aircraft and a lack of a closely knit organization contributed to the Enterprise's troubles. Because of these problems, North and Secord flew to the Airbase in Central America on April 20 for a one-day meeting with the Commander, Steele, Rodriguez, and the military leadership of the FDN. During the meeting, North and Secord emphasized the importance of the Southern front and complained about the difficulty of getting stocks out of the FDN, thus preparing the FDN for the future storage of Southern front supplies directly at the Airbase. There was some misunderstanding as to whether the FDN were the legal owners of the aircraft, but North and Secord stated that the aircraft belonged to a private company dedicated to support all the Contras, both the FDN and the Southern front. In turn, the FDN leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the C-7 aircraft. They were simply "too old" to operate effectively, Bermudez told them. He wanted bigger and faster aircraft. North responded that if he had the money to buy better aircraft, he would, but they were financing the operation with donated funds. The possible purchase for the FDN of Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles to use against the Sandinista HIND-D helicopters was also raised. In December 1985, Secord and Calero had tried to purchase Blowpipes from a Latin American country. The transaction proceeded to the point where the Enterprise placed a deposit on the missiles. But necessary approvals for the sale could not be secured, even though North enlisted the help of Poindexter and of McFarlane, who remained in contact with North by PROF machine even after he left the Government. After the April 20, 1986, meeting, the first shipment of lethal supplies by the Enterprise for the Southern front arrived at the Airbase to be stored by the resupply operation. At North's request, the Enterprise paid David Walker $110,000 for two foreign pilots and a loadmaster to fly missions inside Nicaragua so that U.S. citizens would not be exposed to possible shootdown or capture. Secord took another step to overcome the resupply problems. He recruited Col. Robert Dutton to manage the resupply operation on a daily basis. Secord knew Dutton from their active duty together in the U.S. Air Force, where Dutton had considerable experience in managing covert air resupply operations. Gadd's role was phased out and on May 1, Dutton, retiring from the Air Force, was placed in operational command of the resupply operation, reporting to Secord, and increasingly over time, directly to North on all operational decisions of consequence. At the outset, Secord emphasized to Dutton that the air program would receive very little in the way of additional funding. Dutton was instructed to manage the operation with existing equipment and conserve resources carefully as the money provided was all "donated." When Dutton took over, he traveled to Central America to assess the operation. There were approximately 19 pilots, loadmasters and maintenance operators at the Airbase. In addition, Felix Rodriguez and his associate Ramon Medina coordinated with the Commander and oversaw the local fuel account. Dutton also examined the aircraft - two C-7s, one C-123, and the Maule - and found that, indeed, they were in "very poor operating condition." The resupply operation at the Airbase maintained a warehouse stocked with an assortment of munitions - light machine guns, assault rifles, ammunition, mortars, grenades, C-4 explosive, parachute rigging, uniforms, and other military paraphernalia. The crews lived in three safe houses and used a separate office with maps and communications equipment. By May, the Santa Elena airstrip, along with emergency fuel storage space and temporary housing, was finished. Because Secord (and later North) had impressed on Dutton the need for strict accountability given the limited nature of the donated funds, Dutton enforced a stringent set of accounting requirements: Expenditures had to be carefully documented and all missions fully reported. Moreover, Dutton devised an organization, based on a military hierarchy, that delineated each person's role and responsibility. Dutton also defined the legal constraints on the organization as he had understood from Secord: no Contra combatants could be airdropped into battle. These new requirements of accountability, reporting, and organization were followed for the remaining life of the operation. Despite these impending changes, North wrote to Poindexter expressing his weariness and warning that without Congressional authorization for CIA involvement, "we will run increasing risks of trying to manage this program from here with the attendant physical and political liabilities. I am not complaining, and you know that I love the work, but we have to lift some of this onto the CIA so that I can get more than 2-3 hrs. of sleep at night." Dutton's Reorganization Plan Following his first trip to Central America in May, Dutton began drafting a reorganization plan for the Enterprise "to outline in one document exactly what the basic operating locations were, and who the key people were and what their responsibilities were." The plan was reviewed, edited, and approved by both Secord and North. The plan stated that "B.C. Washington has operational control of all assets in support of Project Democracy." While Secord maintained that B.C. Washington meant "primarily myself and Robert Dutton," Dutton testified that "B.C. Washington" described North and Secord. According to Dutton, the purpose of the reorganization plan was to disguise the role of Secord and North. The lawsuit brought by freelance journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey had named Secord and was generating publicity. North and Secord, according to Dutton, were concerned that Rodriguez, who had become disaffected, was providing information about the operation to Avirgan and Honey. North and Secord, therefore, wanted to create the pretense that they "had withdrawn from the operation, they were no longer part of it, and this new company called B.C. Washington, which represented the donators [sic], therefore the benefactors - that they had come in to take over the operation." But, according to Dutton, "the fact was that Colonel North and General Secord's relationship with the organization had not changed one bit." As Dutton acknowledged, "B.C. Washington" was a facade that North and Secord developed in order to cloak their role. The Southern Front Resupply On May 24, 1986, the day after Dutton left Central America, another planeload of munitions, paid for by the Enterprise arrived at the Airbase for the Southern front. Because the FDN was reluctant to make arms available to the independent southern Contra forces, North and Secord decided in April 1986 that arms and other supplies would now be stored under the control of the Enterprise at the Airbase. This second direct shipment of arms to the Airbase to be delivered to the Southern front was part of the new plan. Together with the late April shipment, there were now more than $1 million in arms at the Airbase available for airdrop to the Southern front forces. The warehouse, however, was not large enough to accommodate the new munitions. Dutton had to ask the Commander for permission to expand the warehouse, while seeking North's approval for the additional cost of construction. After the Commander authorized the expansion, North relayed to Secord his approval for construction to proceed. With new arms and an expanded warehouse, Dutton had the material to deliver to the Southern front. However, while regular deliveries with the C-7 continued to the FDN in the North, no flights were being made to the South. North told Dutton that the Southern forces were adding 150 new recruits a day, but that they had neither enough weapons for the fighters nor enough medicine to treat the growing problem of mountain leprosy. On June 2, Castillo called North and told him that drops to the southern units were needed as soon as possible. Castillo advised North that Quintero had all the necessary vector information to make the drops. Following Castillo's request, two deliveries were prepared for the South totalling about 39,000 pounds, and on June 9, after coordinating with Castillo the location and needs of the Southern troops, the C-123 airplane tried to make an air drop. However, the plane could not locate the troops inside Nicaragua, and when it landed at the Santa Elena airstrip, it got stuck in the mud. The stuck plane caused consternation at the U.S. Embassy in Costa Rica. The month before, Oscar Arias had been inaugurated as the new President of Costa Rica. The new Costa Rican Government had told Ambassador Tambs that it had instructed that the airstrip not be utilized. Tambs, in turn, told Castillo to notify North and Udall Corporation that the airstrip had to be closed. Now Tambs was faced with explaining to President Arias why a munitions-laden airplane was stuck in the mud at Santa Elena. A plan was devised by Tambs, Castillo, and others at the U.S. Embassy to borrow trucks from a nearby facility to free the aircraft, but the plane was able to take off before the plan could be carried out. The needs of the FDN still had to be met. On June 10, North met with Calero who requested that the Caribou planes fly more missions inside Nicaragua. The Enterprise was just about to purchase additional arms for the FDN. However, the most pressing need, North wrote to Poindexter, was neither money nor arms, but rather: "to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine Lt. Col." North further reported to Poindexter that "several million rounds of ammo are now on hand . . . Critically needed items are being flown in from Europe to the expanded warehouse facility at [the Airbase]. At this point, the only liability we still have is one of Democracy, Inc.'s airplanes is mired in the mud (it is the rainy season down there) on the secret field in Costa Rica." The decision to purchase additional millions of dollars in arms for the FDN was taken after the Enterprise learned from Bermudez and the FDN leaders that FDN stocks were getting low. Hundreds of tons of East European weapons were paid for in three installments between June 27 to July 16. The shipment, the last arms purchased for the Contras by North and Secord, never reached them. Despite the difficulties, North wanted to continue to airdrop supplies, especially to the South. As soon as the C-123 was freed from the mud, it embarked on another mission with a full lethal load for the southern troops. But this time, fog covered a mountain, and William Cooper, the chief pilot for the resupply operation, hit the top of a tree, knocking out an engine. After the plane reached the drop zone, Cooper could not locate the troops. Communicating by KL-43, North told Castillo that to facilitate further airdrops to the southern forces, he had "asked Ralph [Quintero] to proceed immediately to your location. I do not think we ought to contemplate these operations without him being on scene. Too many things go wrong that then directly involve you and me in what should be deniable for both of us." Meanwhile, North made further plans to ensure resupply to the Southern front. With the C-123 damaged in flight, the remaining C-7 aircraft could only make the trip to the South if it were able to refuel before the return trip, and the Santa Elena strip was not operational. North asked Dutton to look for another C-123, and with Tambs' assistance, arranged for a new flight pattern in which the empty C-7 aircraft, after making its drops, refueled at the San Jose International Airport in Costa Rica. The new refueling plan permitted two small drops of supplies to the Southern front. But, by the third week in July, $870,000 worth of munitions were still sitting at the Airbase waiting for the Southern forces. Despite all the efforts, the vision of a year before for the Southern front had yet to become a reality.