Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0101/01013.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01013}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 2D   Contra Aid - Fall 1984 to Winter 1985}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
country
mcfarlane
contras
intelligence
calero
singlaub
boland
secord
poindexter}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 2D   Contra Aid - Fall 1984 to Winter 1985

     Boland II did not cause any immediate crisis for the Contras.  Steps
taken months before ensured their survival.  As McFarlane testified, "[T]here
wasn't any need" for funds at the time.  The $1 million-a-month pledged by
Country 2 in June 1984 would "bridge the gap" at least until December.  And as
North testified, by the time the Boland Amendment was passed, "General Secord
had been engaged and money had started to flow to the Nicaraguan Resistance
from outside sources."

Arms Shipments Begin and Blowpipes Are Sought

     While Secord undertook to procure weapons, North remained heavily
involved.  Calero testified that he consulted with North regarding weapons
needs and purchases and North's notebooks confirm this.

     In the fall, the Contras' most pressing need was ground-to-air missiles.
The Sandinistas had just obtained Soviet-designed HIND-D helicopters,
sophisticated assault helicopters.  North devoted his efforts to finding a
missile capable of shooting them down.

     North learned in December 1984 that Blowpipe missiles were available in a
Latin American country and, on his advice, Calero visited the country to
negotiate for their purchase.  On December 17, Calero reported back to North
that the Latin American country was willing to donate Blowpipes provided that
Calero bought eight launchers for $200,000.  Permission was required and North
tried to get that permission, recommending to McFarlane that the President
take it up directly with the pertinent head of state.  McFarlane denied he
ever asked "the President to intercede with any person for the obtaining of
Blowpipes for the Contras."  In any event, permission was not secured and on
January 3, 1985, Calero reported to North that the "Blow Pipe deal is off."
North would try the following year to revive it.

     In the meantime, Secord had located ground-to-air missiles in Country 4.
But in December, North learned that Secord was having difficulty in arranging
their shipment to the Contras.  North asked Gaston Sigur, an NSC consultant
and expert in Far Eastern Affairs, to set up a meeting in Washington between a
representative of the originating country, Country 4, and North.  At the
meeting, North told the Country 4 official that the missiles were going to the
Contras, not to the Central American country identified in the official
documents.  North said that while he was "actually seeking to facilitate the
transportation" of the missiles, he hoped that he could persuade Country 4 to
donate them.  Ultimately, Country 4 agreed to sell the missiles to the
Contras.

     North sent McFarlane and Poindexter a memorandum reporting on the
meeting.  Although McFarlane could not recall the memorandum, he testified
that it would likely have prompted him to ask "Admiral Poindexter to find out
what was going on - and how his [North's] actions squared with the law."
McFarlane did not recall how his questions were resolved.  North testified
that McFarlane and Poindexter approved the meeting with the Country 4
representative described in his memo.

     Meanwhile, the Contras were also running out of basic weapons.  According
to Secord, in November, Secord, using money provided by Calero, made a
downpayment on a shipment of arms which was to come by sea from the Far East.
But the shipment was delayed and, in fact, it would not arrive until the
spring of 1985.

     To make the first arms shipment, the Enterprise needed an end-user
certificate (EUC) - a document certifying that the arms were for the exclusive
use of the country to which the arms were being sent.  The Contras could not
issue end-user certificates because they were not a recognized government.
Thus, false certificates had to be procured for the Enterprise, and again it
fell to North to arrange their procurement.  By the end of January, he was
engaged in the task.  He wrote in his notebooks:  "Mtg. w/Adolfo [Calero] -
. . . . [Central American Leader] re:  EUC for M-79 Rounds.  [Leader of
Central American country] turned down."  "Private mtg. w/[U.S. Ambassador to a
Central American country], offline items - EUC $5000 M-79 Rds."  By early
February, there was urgency in the request:  Secord met with North and told
him that he "need[ed] to get a bunch of EUC's from [Country 14] NOW for next
shipment."  By February 14, 1985, North had the end-user certificates, and
Secord was able to ship more than 90,000 pounds of East European munitions by
chartered aircraft from Defex, a European arms dealer, to a Central American
country for the Contras.

Providing Intelligence and Military Advice

     North's role was not limited to assisting arms purchases.  On direction
from McFarlane, he gave political advice to the Contras on unifying the
different factions and adopting a platform recognizing human rights and
pledging a pluralistic society.  Even more critical for the Contras, North
provided military intelligence and advice.

     The CIA and the DOD could not provide military intelligence directly to
the Contras, so North provided it himself.  North would obtain maps and other
intelligence on the Sandinista positions from the CIA and DOD, ostensibly for
his own use.  North would then pass the intelligence to the Contras using Owen
as a courier.  North explained the reasons for this system:

     Q:  Did you believe that you were complying with Boland when you took
intelligence from the CIA and passed it to the Contras through Robert Owen?

     A:  Yes.  And the intelligence that I passed myself personally, and it
wasn't all from the CIA, much of it came from the Department of Defense.

     Q:  And did you understand at the time that the CIA and the Department of
Defense couldn't pass that intelligence directly?

     A:  Exactly.

     Q:  And you believed that it was compliance with Boland, that it was
fulfilling the purposes of Boland for you to take the intelligence from the
CIA or the Department of Defense and pass it to the Contras?  That is what you
are saying?

     A:  I am not saying that it was fulfilling the purposes of Boland.  I am
saying it was working around the problem that Boland would have created in
trying to comply with Boland that allowed me to do that.

     Director Casey was eager to keep the CIA bureaucracy insulated front
North's activities in supporting the Contras.  Indeed, in November, Casey
complained to Poindexter that North was conducting his support activities
"indiscreetly," and had disclosed to CIA officials that he was raising funds
for, and providing intelligence to, the Contras.

     Learning of the complaint, North wrote McFarlane on November 7, 1984, to
defend his behavior.  North insisted he had not implicated the Chief of the
CIA's Central American Task Force in his Contra support activities.
"Clarifying who said what to whom," North acknowledged that he had passed
intelligence to Calero to assist him in destroying the Sandinistas' newly
acquired HIND-D helicopters.  North stated that he had gone to both the CIA
and to the DOD for information on the helicopters' location and passed this on
to Calero.

     North denied, however, that he had disclosed his purpose to the Chief of
the Central American Task Force, or advised him about the "financial
arrangements of the FDN."  In fact, the memo recounts a conversation showing
that North misled the Task Force Chief, telling him that the intelligence
request had been "a fall out of the CPPG [the Crisis Pre-Planning Group]," and
that he (North) had no idea where the Contras were obtaining their funding.
In the memorandum, North reported that he encouraged the Task Force Chiefs
impression that the funding had been obtained from "outside" sources.

     McFarlane testified that he did not authorize North to pass intelligence
to the Contras and if, as the memo indicated, North had passed that
information to Calero, Boland II would have been violated.  North admitted
that he had provided the intelligence but maintained that Boland II did not
"prevent the transfer of basic intelligence information to the Contras."

     In early February 1985, North became concerned about a shipment of
weapons bound for the Sandinistas aboard the ship, the Monimbo.  In a
memorandum to McFarlane and Poindexter, North recommended the vessel be seized
or sunk:

If asked, Calero would be willing to finance the operation.  He does not,
however, have sufficient numbers of trained maritime special operations
personnel or a method of delivery for seizing the ship on the high seas
. . . .  If time does not permit a special operation [on the high seas] . . .
Calero can quickly be provided with the maritime assets required to sink the
vessel before it can reach port at Corinto.  He is in contact with maritime
operations experts and purveyors of materiel necessary to conduct such an
operation.

North asked McFarlane for authorization to provide Calero "with the
information on Monimbo" and for permission to approach him "on the matter of
seizing or sinking the ship."

     This time, Admiral Poindexter raised a legal question, but only to advise
McFarlane about how North's recommendation should be handled.  On the bottom
of the memorandum, Poindexter agreed with North that, "We need to take action
to make sure ship does not arrive in Nicaragua.  JP."  But in a cover note to
McFarlane, Admiral Poindexter wrote:

Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to
assist the Freedom Fighters I would readily recommend I bring this up to CPPG
[Crisis Pre-Planning Group] at 2:00 today.  Of course we could discuss it from
the standpoint of keeping the arms away from Nicaragua without any involvement
of Calero and Freedom Fighters.  What do you think?

No action was taken on North's recommendation to seize the Monimbo.

     In addition to providing intelligence, North also secured the logistical
assistance of a paramilitary operations expert.  He described those efforts in
the same December 4 memorandum to McFarlane in which he had outlined his
intervention with Country 4 to secure surface-to-air missiles.  According to
the memo, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had suggested to North that he
meet with David Walker, a former British SAS officer, to discuss the services
Walker's company could provide.  North met with Walker, and proposed to
McFarlane that Walker:

establish[ ] an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations
expertise aimed particularly at destroying HIND helicopters . . . .  Unless
otherwise directed, Walker will be introduced to Calero and efforts will be
made to defray the cost of operations from other than Calero's limited assets.

     In his testimony, North confirmed that he had arranged for Walker to
"provide operational support for certain activities in the region," and that
Walker was paid either by the Contras or Secord.  This step, according to
North, was approved by Poindexter or McFarlane.  McFarlane testified that he
referred North's memo on the subject to Poindexter, and Poindexter said that,
if asked, he would have approved North's actions.

     Three months later, Walker provided two technicians to help carry out a
military operation in Nicaragua.  North testified that he was involved in the
operation.  A subsequent PROF note confirms Walkers role.

Singlaub Efforts with Countries 3 and 5

     Country 2 had pledged funds only through the end of 1984.  Therefore, by
the end of the year, an urgent need existed to find money for the Contras to
continue into 1985.

     In late November 1984, North approved the efforts of Retired U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub to obtain funds from third countries to support the
Contras.  Singlaub met in Washington with officials of Country 3 and Country 5
to request aid.  Singlaub was blunt about the Contras' needs:  bullets, guns,
and antiaircraft missiles.  The foreign country officials, however, expressed
concern about running afoul of "Congress by openly defying the Boland
Amendment."  At the same time they were willing to help "if this could be done
in a way that did not attract attention."  They agreed to send Singlaub's
request to their respective governments.

     On November 28, Singlaub reported to North the reaction of the officials
of Countries 3 and 5, informing him he "was prepared to go and meet with
senior officials in those governments."  According to Singlaub, North
concurred and gave the plan "his blessing . . . .  [I]t was a good idea, he
saw no objection . . ."

     Whether North was authorized to "bless" Singlaub's efforts is a matter of
conflicting testimony.  According to McFarlane, to solicit or facilitate aid
from a third country was barred by the Boland Amendment and he did not
authorize North to pursue funding from third countries.  But according to
North, he believed McFarlane had approved:  "he was aware of each and every
one of [my] actions to obtain money from foreign countries and approved of
it."  North defended his actions, testifying that Country 3 had offered to
make a contribution; he had never made any "solicitation" because that would
be an improper act for a Government official.

     Singlaub followed up on his request, travelling to Countries 3 and 5 in
January.  He met with highly placed officials and reiterated his earlier
request for military donations to the Contras.  Singlaub provided the
officials with an index card bearing the name of the bank and account number,
under Calero's control, where the funds could be deposited directly.  Singlaub
told the officials he was a private citizen, but wanted to make it clear he
was not an "unguided missile ricocheting around to that part of the world."
He expressed the belief that "it would be possible . . . to have someone in
the Administration send a signal to them . . . to indicate that [he] . . . was
not operating entirely on [his] . . .  own, without the knowledge of the
Administration."

     On February 1, 1985, North's notes reflect that Singlaub called North and
told him that Country 3 needed a signal that the Administration would be
"greatly pleased" by a donation before Country 3 would be willing to
contribute.  On February 6, North wrote McFarlane and reported that:
"Singlaub will be here to see me tomorrow.  With your permission, I will ask
him to approach [the Country 3 and 5] Embass[ies] urging that they proceed
with their offer.  Singlaub would then put Calero in direct contact with each
of these officers.  No White House/NSC solicitation would be made."  McFarlane
made no response on the memo to North's recommendations.

     Singlaub testified that he returned to Washington on February 7, met with
North to report his results, and recounted his "entire presentation."  He
recommended that now was the time for a U.S. Government representative to send
a signal to Countries 3 and 5.  According to Singlaub's testimony, North
responded that he would "brief his superiors," and eventually told him
(Singlaub) that he had informed his superior, whom Singlaub assumed to be
McFarlane.

     Countries 3 and 5 did not contribute any money as a result of Singlaub's
efforts.  Not until late 1985, after a signal was in fact given by an NSC
official, did Country 3 make a contribution.

Country 2 Makes an Additional Contribution

     With the Contras running out of funds, McFarlane turned once more to
Country 2.  McFarlane made the initial approach to its Ambassador for more
funds.  He testified that he did not "solicit" funds because the Boland
Amendment prohibited such solicitation.  He merely told the Ambassador of the
plight of the Contras and hoped for a contribution.  According to Secord,
North asked him to follow up on McFarlane's initial meeting.

     Secord testified that he did in fact follow up with the Ambassador, with
whom he "had dealt . . . in the past with respect to possible contributions to
the Contras."  When Secord raised the subject, the Ambassador responded
curtly, "You can stop twisting my arm . . . .  I have decided to take it up
with the head of state."  McFarlane did not recall Secord's involvement.

     In early February 1985, Country 2 agreed to contribute an additional $24
million.  McFarlane informed the President of the contribution by placing a
note card in the President's daily briefing book.  The President again reacted
with "gratitude and satisfaction," expressing no surprise.  Unknown to
McFarlane, the Country 2 head of state had already informed the President
directly of the new contribution.  But the President did not mention this when
he briefed the Secretary of State and McFarlane on his meeting with the
government leader.

     Nor did McFarlane tell the Secretary of Defense.  Both Secretary
Weinberger and General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, learned of the contribution from other sources.  Secretary Shultz,
who dealt regularly with Country 2, was not told of the contribution until
June 1986.  This was an omission "not of conscious choice," according to
McFarlane.

     The new donation from Country 2, like its predecessor, was sent to
Cairo's accounts.  Between June 1984 and March 1985, Country 2's
contributions, totaling $32 million, were virtually the only funds the Contras
had.