$Unique_ID{bob01013} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 2D Contra Aid - Fall 1984 to Winter 1985} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{north country mcfarlane contras intelligence calero singlaub boland secord poindexter} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 2D Contra Aid - Fall 1984 to Winter 1985 Boland II did not cause any immediate crisis for the Contras. Steps taken months before ensured their survival. As McFarlane testified, "[T]here wasn't any need" for funds at the time. The $1 million-a-month pledged by Country 2 in June 1984 would "bridge the gap" at least until December. And as North testified, by the time the Boland Amendment was passed, "General Secord had been engaged and money had started to flow to the Nicaraguan Resistance from outside sources." Arms Shipments Begin and Blowpipes Are Sought While Secord undertook to procure weapons, North remained heavily involved. Calero testified that he consulted with North regarding weapons needs and purchases and North's notebooks confirm this. In the fall, the Contras' most pressing need was ground-to-air missiles. The Sandinistas had just obtained Soviet-designed HIND-D helicopters, sophisticated assault helicopters. North devoted his efforts to finding a missile capable of shooting them down. North learned in December 1984 that Blowpipe missiles were available in a Latin American country and, on his advice, Calero visited the country to negotiate for their purchase. On December 17, Calero reported back to North that the Latin American country was willing to donate Blowpipes provided that Calero bought eight launchers for $200,000. Permission was required and North tried to get that permission, recommending to McFarlane that the President take it up directly with the pertinent head of state. McFarlane denied he ever asked "the President to intercede with any person for the obtaining of Blowpipes for the Contras." In any event, permission was not secured and on January 3, 1985, Calero reported to North that the "Blow Pipe deal is off." North would try the following year to revive it. In the meantime, Secord had located ground-to-air missiles in Country 4. But in December, North learned that Secord was having difficulty in arranging their shipment to the Contras. North asked Gaston Sigur, an NSC consultant and expert in Far Eastern Affairs, to set up a meeting in Washington between a representative of the originating country, Country 4, and North. At the meeting, North told the Country 4 official that the missiles were going to the Contras, not to the Central American country identified in the official documents. North said that while he was "actually seeking to facilitate the transportation" of the missiles, he hoped that he could persuade Country 4 to donate them. Ultimately, Country 4 agreed to sell the missiles to the Contras. North sent McFarlane and Poindexter a memorandum reporting on the meeting. Although McFarlane could not recall the memorandum, he testified that it would likely have prompted him to ask "Admiral Poindexter to find out what was going on - and how his [North's] actions squared with the law." McFarlane did not recall how his questions were resolved. North testified that McFarlane and Poindexter approved the meeting with the Country 4 representative described in his memo. Meanwhile, the Contras were also running out of basic weapons. According to Secord, in November, Secord, using money provided by Calero, made a downpayment on a shipment of arms which was to come by sea from the Far East. But the shipment was delayed and, in fact, it would not arrive until the spring of 1985. To make the first arms shipment, the Enterprise needed an end-user certificate (EUC) - a document certifying that the arms were for the exclusive use of the country to which the arms were being sent. The Contras could not issue end-user certificates because they were not a recognized government. Thus, false certificates had to be procured for the Enterprise, and again it fell to North to arrange their procurement. By the end of January, he was engaged in the task. He wrote in his notebooks: "Mtg. w/Adolfo [Calero] - . . . . [Central American Leader] re: EUC for M-79 Rounds. [Leader of Central American country] turned down." "Private mtg. w/[U.S. Ambassador to a Central American country], offline items - EUC $5000 M-79 Rds." By early February, there was urgency in the request: Secord met with North and told him that he "need[ed] to get a bunch of EUC's from [Country 14] NOW for next shipment." By February 14, 1985, North had the end-user certificates, and Secord was able to ship more than 90,000 pounds of East European munitions by chartered aircraft from Defex, a European arms dealer, to a Central American country for the Contras. Providing Intelligence and Military Advice North's role was not limited to assisting arms purchases. On direction from McFarlane, he gave political advice to the Contras on unifying the different factions and adopting a platform recognizing human rights and pledging a pluralistic society. Even more critical for the Contras, North provided military intelligence and advice. The CIA and the DOD could not provide military intelligence directly to the Contras, so North provided it himself. North would obtain maps and other intelligence on the Sandinista positions from the CIA and DOD, ostensibly for his own use. North would then pass the intelligence to the Contras using Owen as a courier. North explained the reasons for this system: Q: Did you believe that you were complying with Boland when you took intelligence from the CIA and passed it to the Contras through Robert Owen? A: Yes. And the intelligence that I passed myself personally, and it wasn't all from the CIA, much of it came from the Department of Defense. Q: And did you understand at the time that the CIA and the Department of Defense couldn't pass that intelligence directly? A: Exactly. Q: And you believed that it was compliance with Boland, that it was fulfilling the purposes of Boland for you to take the intelligence from the CIA or the Department of Defense and pass it to the Contras? That is what you are saying? A: I am not saying that it was fulfilling the purposes of Boland. I am saying it was working around the problem that Boland would have created in trying to comply with Boland that allowed me to do that. Director Casey was eager to keep the CIA bureaucracy insulated front North's activities in supporting the Contras. Indeed, in November, Casey complained to Poindexter that North was conducting his support activities "indiscreetly," and had disclosed to CIA officials that he was raising funds for, and providing intelligence to, the Contras. Learning of the complaint, North wrote McFarlane on November 7, 1984, to defend his behavior. North insisted he had not implicated the Chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force in his Contra support activities. "Clarifying who said what to whom," North acknowledged that he had passed intelligence to Calero to assist him in destroying the Sandinistas' newly acquired HIND-D helicopters. North stated that he had gone to both the CIA and to the DOD for information on the helicopters' location and passed this on to Calero. North denied, however, that he had disclosed his purpose to the Chief of the Central American Task Force, or advised him about the "financial arrangements of the FDN." In fact, the memo recounts a conversation showing that North misled the Task Force Chief, telling him that the intelligence request had been "a fall out of the CPPG [the Crisis Pre-Planning Group]," and that he (North) had no idea where the Contras were obtaining their funding. In the memorandum, North reported that he encouraged the Task Force Chiefs impression that the funding had been obtained from "outside" sources. McFarlane testified that he did not authorize North to pass intelligence to the Contras and if, as the memo indicated, North had passed that information to Calero, Boland II would have been violated. North admitted that he had provided the intelligence but maintained that Boland II did not "prevent the transfer of basic intelligence information to the Contras." In early February 1985, North became concerned about a shipment of weapons bound for the Sandinistas aboard the ship, the Monimbo. In a memorandum to McFarlane and Poindexter, North recommended the vessel be seized or sunk: If asked, Calero would be willing to finance the operation. He does not, however, have sufficient numbers of trained maritime special operations personnel or a method of delivery for seizing the ship on the high seas . . . . If time does not permit a special operation [on the high seas] . . . Calero can quickly be provided with the maritime assets required to sink the vessel before it can reach port at Corinto. He is in contact with maritime operations experts and purveyors of materiel necessary to conduct such an operation. North asked McFarlane for authorization to provide Calero "with the information on Monimbo" and for permission to approach him "on the matter of seizing or sinking the ship." This time, Admiral Poindexter raised a legal question, but only to advise McFarlane about how North's recommendation should be handled. On the bottom of the memorandum, Poindexter agreed with North that, "We need to take action to make sure ship does not arrive in Nicaragua. JP." But in a cover note to McFarlane, Admiral Poindexter wrote: Except for the prohibition of the intelligence community doing anything to assist the Freedom Fighters I would readily recommend I bring this up to CPPG [Crisis Pre-Planning Group] at 2:00 today. Of course we could discuss it from the standpoint of keeping the arms away from Nicaragua without any involvement of Calero and Freedom Fighters. What do you think? No action was taken on North's recommendation to seize the Monimbo. In addition to providing intelligence, North also secured the logistical assistance of a paramilitary operations expert. He described those efforts in the same December 4 memorandum to McFarlane in which he had outlined his intervention with Country 4 to secure surface-to-air missiles. According to the memo, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman had suggested to North that he meet with David Walker, a former British SAS officer, to discuss the services Walker's company could provide. North met with Walker, and proposed to McFarlane that Walker: establish[ ] an arrangement with the FDN for certain special operations expertise aimed particularly at destroying HIND helicopters . . . . Unless otherwise directed, Walker will be introduced to Calero and efforts will be made to defray the cost of operations from other than Calero's limited assets. In his testimony, North confirmed that he had arranged for Walker to "provide operational support for certain activities in the region," and that Walker was paid either by the Contras or Secord. This step, according to North, was approved by Poindexter or McFarlane. McFarlane testified that he referred North's memo on the subject to Poindexter, and Poindexter said that, if asked, he would have approved North's actions. Three months later, Walker provided two technicians to help carry out a military operation in Nicaragua. North testified that he was involved in the operation. A subsequent PROF note confirms Walkers role. Singlaub Efforts with Countries 3 and 5 Country 2 had pledged funds only through the end of 1984. Therefore, by the end of the year, an urgent need existed to find money for the Contras to continue into 1985. In late November 1984, North approved the efforts of Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub to obtain funds from third countries to support the Contras. Singlaub met in Washington with officials of Country 3 and Country 5 to request aid. Singlaub was blunt about the Contras' needs: bullets, guns, and antiaircraft missiles. The foreign country officials, however, expressed concern about running afoul of "Congress by openly defying the Boland Amendment." At the same time they were willing to help "if this could be done in a way that did not attract attention." They agreed to send Singlaub's request to their respective governments. On November 28, Singlaub reported to North the reaction of the officials of Countries 3 and 5, informing him he "was prepared to go and meet with senior officials in those governments." According to Singlaub, North concurred and gave the plan "his blessing . . . . [I]t was a good idea, he saw no objection . . ." Whether North was authorized to "bless" Singlaub's efforts is a matter of conflicting testimony. According to McFarlane, to solicit or facilitate aid from a third country was barred by the Boland Amendment and he did not authorize North to pursue funding from third countries. But according to North, he believed McFarlane had approved: "he was aware of each and every one of [my] actions to obtain money from foreign countries and approved of it." North defended his actions, testifying that Country 3 had offered to make a contribution; he had never made any "solicitation" because that would be an improper act for a Government official. Singlaub followed up on his request, travelling to Countries 3 and 5 in January. He met with highly placed officials and reiterated his earlier request for military donations to the Contras. Singlaub provided the officials with an index card bearing the name of the bank and account number, under Calero's control, where the funds could be deposited directly. Singlaub told the officials he was a private citizen, but wanted to make it clear he was not an "unguided missile ricocheting around to that part of the world." He expressed the belief that "it would be possible . . . to have someone in the Administration send a signal to them . . . to indicate that [he] . . . was not operating entirely on [his] . . . own, without the knowledge of the Administration." On February 1, 1985, North's notes reflect that Singlaub called North and told him that Country 3 needed a signal that the Administration would be "greatly pleased" by a donation before Country 3 would be willing to contribute. On February 6, North wrote McFarlane and reported that: "Singlaub will be here to see me tomorrow. With your permission, I will ask him to approach [the Country 3 and 5] Embass[ies] urging that they proceed with their offer. Singlaub would then put Calero in direct contact with each of these officers. No White House/NSC solicitation would be made." McFarlane made no response on the memo to North's recommendations. Singlaub testified that he returned to Washington on February 7, met with North to report his results, and recounted his "entire presentation." He recommended that now was the time for a U.S. Government representative to send a signal to Countries 3 and 5. According to Singlaub's testimony, North responded that he would "brief his superiors," and eventually told him (Singlaub) that he had informed his superior, whom Singlaub assumed to be McFarlane. Countries 3 and 5 did not contribute any money as a result of Singlaub's efforts. Not until late 1985, after a signal was in fact given by an NSC official, did Country 3 make a contribution. Country 2 Makes an Additional Contribution With the Contras running out of funds, McFarlane turned once more to Country 2. McFarlane made the initial approach to its Ambassador for more funds. He testified that he did not "solicit" funds because the Boland Amendment prohibited such solicitation. He merely told the Ambassador of the plight of the Contras and hoped for a contribution. According to Secord, North asked him to follow up on McFarlane's initial meeting. Secord testified that he did in fact follow up with the Ambassador, with whom he "had dealt . . . in the past with respect to possible contributions to the Contras." When Secord raised the subject, the Ambassador responded curtly, "You can stop twisting my arm . . . . I have decided to take it up with the head of state." McFarlane did not recall Secord's involvement. In early February 1985, Country 2 agreed to contribute an additional $24 million. McFarlane informed the President of the contribution by placing a note card in the President's daily briefing book. The President again reacted with "gratitude and satisfaction," expressing no surprise. Unknown to McFarlane, the Country 2 head of state had already informed the President directly of the new contribution. But the President did not mention this when he briefed the Secretary of State and McFarlane on his meeting with the government leader. Nor did McFarlane tell the Secretary of Defense. Both Secretary Weinberger and General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learned of the contribution from other sources. Secretary Shultz, who dealt regularly with Country 2, was not told of the contribution until June 1986. This was an omission "not of conscious choice," according to McFarlane. The new donation from Country 2, like its predecessor, was sent to Cairo's accounts. Between June 1984 and March 1985, Country 2's contributions, totaling $32 million, were virtually the only funds the Contras had.