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$Title{History Of The Conquest Of Peru
Chapter VI: Part I}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Prescott, William H.}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{de
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$Date{1864}
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Title:       History Of The Conquest Of Peru
Book:        Book IV: Civil Wars Of The Conquerors
Author:      Prescott, William H.
Date:        1864

Chapter VI: Part I

Movements Of The Conspirators. - Advance Of Vaca De Castro - Proceedings Of
Almagro. - Progress Of The Governor. - The Forces Approach Each Other.  -
Bloody Plains Of Chupas.  - Conduct Of Vaca De Castro.

     1541-1543.

     The first step of the conspirators, after securing possession of the
capital, was to send to the different cities, proclaiming the revolution
which had taken place, and demanding the recognition of the young Almagro
as governor of Peru.  Where the summons was accompanied by a military
force, as at Truxillo and Arequipa, it was obeyed without much cavil.  But
in other cities a colder assent was given, and in some the requisition was
treated with contempt.  In Cuzco, the place of most importance next to
Lima, a considerable number of the Almagro faction secured the ascendency
of their party; and such of the magistracy as resisted were ejected from
their offices to make room for others of a more accommodating temper.  But
the loyal inhabitants of the city, dissatisfied with this proceeding,
privately sent to one of Pizarro's captains, named Alvarez de Holguin, who
lay with a considerable force in the neighbourhood; and that officer,
entering the place, soon dispossessed the new dignitaries of their honors,
and restored the ancient capital to its allegiance.

     The conspirators experienced a still more determined opposition from
Alonso de Alvarado. one of the principal captains of Pizarro, - defeated,
as the reader will remember, by the elder Almagro at the bridge of
Abancay, - and now lying in the north with a corps of about two hundred
men, as good troops as any in the land.  That officer, on receiving
tidings of his general's assassination, instantly wrote to the Licentiate
Vaca de Castro, advising him of the state of affairs in Peru, and urging
him to quicken his march towards the south. ^1

[Footnote 1: Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 4, cap. 13. - Herrera, Hist.
General, dec. 6, lib. 10, cap. 7. - Declaracion de Uscategui, Ms. - Carta
del Maestro, Martin de Arauco, Ms. - Carta de Fray Vicente Valverde, desde
Tumbez, Ms.]

     This functionary had been sent out by the Spanish Crown, as noticed
in a preceding chapter, to cooperate with Pizarro in restoring
tranquillity to the country, with authority to assume the government
himself, in case of that commander's death.  After a long and tempestuous
voyage, he had landed, in the spring of 1541, at the port of Buena
Ventura, and, disgusted with the dangers of the sea, preferred to continue
his wearisome journey by land.  But so enfeebled was he by the hardships
he had undergone, that it was full three months before he reached Popayan,
where he received the astounding tidings of the death of Pizarro.  This
was the contingency which had been provided for, with such judicious
forecast, in his instructions.  Yet he was sorely perplexed by the
difficulties of his situation.  He was a stranger in the land, with a very
imperfect knowledge of the country, without an armed force to support him,
without even the military science which might be supposed necessary to
avail himself of it.  He knew nothing of the degree of Almagro's
influence, or of the extent to which the insurrection had spread, -
nothing, in short, of the dispositions of the people among whom he was
cast.

     In such an emergency, a feebler spirit might have listened to the
counsels of those who advised to return to Panama, and stay there until he
had mustered a sufficient force to enable him to take the field against
the insurgents with advantage.  But the courageous heart of Vaca de Castro
shrunk from a step which would proclaim his incompetency to the task
assigned him.  He had confidence in his own resources, and in the virtue
of the commission under which he acted.  He relied, too, on the habitual
loyalty of the Spaniards; and, after mature deliberation, he determined to
go forward, and trust to events for accomplishing the objects of his
mission.

     He was confirmed in this purpose by the advices he now received from
Alvarado; and without longer delay, he continued his march towards Quito.
Here he was well received by Gonzalo Pizarro's lieutenant, who had charge
of the place during his commander's absence on his expedition to the
Amazon.  The licentiate was also joined by Benalcazar, the conqueror of
Quito, who brought a small reinforcement, and offered personally to assist
him in the prosecution of his enterprise.  He now displayed the royal
commission, empowering him, on Pizarro's death, to assume the government.
That contingency had arrived, and Vaca de Castro declared his purpose to
exercise the authority conferred on him.  At the same time, he sent
emissaries to the principal cities, requiring their obedience to him as
the lawful representative of the Crown, - taking care to employ discreet
persons on the mission, whose character would have weight with the
citizens.  He then continued his march slowly towards the south. ^2

[Footnote 2: Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 6, lib. 10, cap. 4. - Carta de
Benalcazar al Emperador, desde Cali, Ms., 20 Septiembre, 1542.

     Benalcazar urged Vaca de Castro to assume only the title of Judge,
and not that of Governor, which would conflict with the pretensions of
Almagro to that part of the country known as New Toledo and bequeathed to
him by his father "Porque yo le avise muchas veces no entrase en la tierra
como Governador, sino como Juez de V. M que venia a desagraviar a los
agraviados, porque todos lo rescibirian de buena gana." Ubi supra.]

     He was willing by his deliberate movements to give time for his
summons to take effect, and for the fermentation caused by the late
extraordinary events to subside.  He reckoned confidently on the loyalty
which made the Spaniard unwilling, unless in cases of the last extremity,
to come into collision with the royal authority; and, however much this
popular sentiment might be disturbed by temporary gusts of passion, he
trusted to the habitual current of their feelings for giving the people a
right direction.  In this he did not miscalculate; for so deep-rooted was
the principle of loyalty in the ancient Spaniard, that ages of oppression
and misrule could alone have induced him to shake off his allegiance.  Sad
it is, but not strange, that the length of time passed under a bad
government has not qualified him for devising a good one.

     While these events were passing in the north, Almagro's faction at
Lima was daily receiving new accessions of strength.  For, in addition to
those who, from the first, had been avowedly of his father's party, there
were many others who, from some cause or other, had conceived a disgust
for Pizarro, and who now willingly enlisted under the banner of the chief
that had overthrown him.

     The first step of the young general, or rather of Rada, who directed
his movements, was to secure the necessary supplies for the troops, most
of whom, having long been in indigent circumstances, were wholly
unprepared for service.  Funds to a considerable amount were raised, by
seizing on the moneys of the Crown in the hands of the treasurer.
Pizarro's secretary, Picado, was also drawn from his prison, and
interrogated as to the place where his master's treasures were deposited.
But, although put to the torture, he would not - or, as is probable, could
not - give information on the subject; and the conspirators, who had a
long arrear of injuries to settle with him, closed their proceedings by
publicly beheading him in the great square of Lima. ^3

[Footnote 3: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Carta de Barrio Nuevo,
Ms. - Carta de Fray Vicente Valverde, desde Tumbez, Ms.]

     Valverde, Bishop of Cuzco, as he himself assures us, vainly
interposed in his behalf.  It is singular, that, the last time this
fanatical prelate appears on the stage, it should be in the benevolent
character of a supplicant for mercy. ^4 Soon afterwards, he was permitted,
with the judge, Velasquez, and some other adherents of Pizarro, to embark
from the port of Lima.  We have a letter from him, dated at Tumbez, in
November, 1541; almost immediately after which he fell into the hands of
the Indians, and with his companions was massacred at Puna.  A violent
death not unfrequently closed the stormy career of the American
adventurer.  Valverde was a Dominican friar, and, like Father Olmedo in
the suite of Cortes, had been by his commander's side throughout the whole
of his expedition.  But he did not always, like the good Olmedo, use his
influence to stay the uplifted hand of the warrior.  At least, this was
not the mild aspect in which he presented himself at the terrible massacre
of Caxamalca.  Yet some contemporary accounts represent him, after he had
been installed in his episcopal office, as unwearied in his labors to
convert the natives, and to ameliorate their condition; and his own
correspondence with the government, after that period, shows great
solicitude for these praiseworthy objects.  Trained in the severest school
of monastic discipline, which too often closes the heart against the
common charities of life, he could not, like the benevolent Las Casas,
rise so far above its fanatical tenets as to regard the heathen as his
brother, while in the state of infidelity; and, in the true spirit of that
school, he doubtless conceived that the sanctity of the end justified the
means, however revolting in themselves.  Yet the same man, who thus freely
shed the blood of the poor native to secure the triumph of his faith,
would doubtless have as freely poured out his own in its defence.  The
character was no uncommon one in the sixteenth century. ^5

[Footnote 4: "Siendo informado que andavan ordenando la muerte a Antonio
Picado secretario del Marques que tenian preso, fui a Don Diego e a eu
Capitan General Joan de Herrada e a todos sus capitanes, i les puse
delante el servicio de Dios i de S. M. i que bastase en lo fecho por
respeto de Dios, humillandome a sus pies porque no lo matasen: i no basto
que luego dende a pocos dias lo sacaron a la plaza desta cibdad donde le
cortaron la cabeza." Carta de Fray Vicente de Valverde, desde Tumbez, Ms]

[Footnote 5: "Quel Senor obispo Fray Vicente de Balverde como persona que
jamas ha tenido fin ni zelo al servicio de Dios ni de S. M. ni menos en la
conversion de los naturales en los poner e dotrinar en las cosas de
nuestra santa fee catholica, ni menos en entender en la paz e sosiego
destos reynos, sino a sus intereses propios dando mal ejemplo a todos."
(Carta de Almagro a la Audiencia de Panama, Ms. , 8 de Nov. 1541.) The
writer, it must be remembered was his personal enemy.]

     Almagro's followers, having supplied themselves with funds, made as
little scruple to appropriate to their own use such horses and arms, of
every description, as they could find in the city.  And this they did with
the less reluctance, as the inhabitants for the most part testified no
good-will to their cause.  While thus employed, Almagro received
intelligence that Holguin had left Cuzco with a force of near three
hundred men, with which he was preparing to effect a junction with
Alvarado in the north.  It was important to Almagro's success that he
should defeat this junction.  If to procrastinate was the policy of Vaca
de Castro, it was clearly that of Almagro to quicken operations, and to
bring matters to as speedy an issue as possible; to march at once against
Holguin, whom he might expect easily to overcome with his superior
numbers; then to follow up the stroke by the still easier defeat of
Alvarado, when the new governor would be, in a manner, at his mercy.  It
would be easy to beat these several bodies in detail, which, once united,
would present formidable odds.  Almagro and his party had already arrayed
themselves against the government by a proceeding too atrocious, and which
struck too directly at the royal authority, for its perpetrators to
flatter themselves with the hopes of pardon.  Their only chance was boldly
to follow up the blow, and, by success, to place themselves in so
formidable an attitude as to excite the apprehensions of government.  The
dread of its too potent vassal might extort terms that would never be
conceded to his prayers.

     But Almagro and his followers shrunk from this open collision with
the Crown.  They had taken up rebellion because it lay in their path, not
because they had wished it.  They had meant only to avenge their personal
wrongs on Pizarro, and not to defy the royal authority.  When, therefore,
some on the more resolute, who followed things fearlessly to their
consequences, proposed to march at once against Vaca de Castro, and, by
striking at the head, settle the contest by a blow, it was almost
universally rejected; and it was not till after long debate that it was
finally determined to move against Holguin, and cut off his communication
with Alonso de Alvarado.

     Scarcely had Almagro commenced his march on Xauxa, where he proposed
to give battle to his enemy, than he met with a severe misfortune in the
death of Juan de Rada.  He was a man somewhat advanced in years; and the
late exciting scenes, in which he had taken the principal part, had been
too much for a frame greatly shattered by a life of extraordinary
hardship.  He was thrown into a fever, of which he soon after died.  By
his death, Almagro sustained an inestimable loss; for, besides his devoted
attachment to his young leader, he was, by his large experience, and his
cautious though courageous character, better qualified than any other
cavalier in the army to conduct him safely through the stormy sea on which
he had led him to embark.

     Among the cavaliers of highest consideration after Rada's death, the
two most aspiring were Christoval de Sotelo, and Garcia de Alvarado; both
possessed of considerable military talent, but the latter marked by a
bold, presumptuous manner, which might remind one of his illustrious
namesake, who achieved much higher renown under the banner of Cortes.
Unhappily, a jealousy grew up between these two officers; that jealousy,
so common among the Spaniards, that it may seem a national characteristic;
an impatience of equality, founded on a false principle of honor, which
has ever been the fruitful source of faction among them, whether under a
monarchy or a republic.

     This was peculiarly unfortunate for Almagro, whose inexperience led
him to lean for support on others, and who, in the present distracted
state of his council, knew scarcely where to turn for it.  In the delay
occasioned by these dissensions, his little army did not reach the valley
of Xauxa till after the enemy had passed it.  Almagro followed close,
leaving behind his baggage and artillery that he might move the lighter.
But the golden opportunity was lost.  The rivers, swollen by autumnal
rains, impeded his pursuit; and, though his light troops came up with a
few stragglers of the rear-guard, Holguin succeeded in conducting his
forces through the dangerous passes of the mountains, and in effecting a
junction with Alonso de Alvarado, near the northern seaport of Huaura.

     Disappointed in his object, Almagro prepared to march on Cuzco, - the
capital, as he regarded it, of his own jurisdiction, - to get possession
of that city, and there make preparations to meet his adversary in the
field.  Sotelo was sent forward with a small corps in advance.  He
experienced no opposition from the now defenceless citizens; the
government of the place was again restored to the hands of the men of
Chili, and their young leader soon appeared at the head of his battalions,
and established his winter-quarters in the Inca capital.

     Here, the jealousy of the rival captains broke out into an open feud.
It was ended by the death of Sotelo, treacherously assassinated in his own
apartment by Garcia de Alvarado.  Almagro, greatly outraged by this
atrocity, was the more indignant, as he felt himself too weak to punish
the offender.  He smothered his resentment for the present, affecting to
treat the dangerous officer with more distinguished favor.  But Alvarado
was not the dupe of this specious behaviour.  He felt that he had
forfeited the confidence of his commander.  In revenge, he laid a plot to
betray him; and Almagro, driven to the necessity of self-defence, imitated
the example of his officer, by entering his house with a party of armed
men, who, laying violent hands on the insurgent, slew him on the spot. ^6

[Footnote 6: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru,
lib. 4, cap. 10 - 14. - Gomara, Hist. de las Ind., cap. 147.

     Declaracion de Uscategui, Ms. - Carta de Barrio Nuevo, Ms. - Herrera,
Hist. General, dec. 6 lib. 10, cap. 13; dec. 7 lib. 3 cap. 1, 5.]

     This irregular proceeding was followed by the best consequences.  The
seditious schemes of Alvarado perished with him.  The seeds of
insubordination were eradicated, and from that moment Almagro experienced
only implicit obedience and the most loyal support from his followers.
From that hour, too, his own character seemed to be changed; he relied far
less on others than on himself, and developed resources not to have been
anticipated in one of his years; for he had hardly reached the age of
twenty-two. ^7 From this time he displayed an energy and forecast, which
proved him, in despite of his youth, not unequal to the trying emergencies
of the situation in which it was his unhappy lot to be placed.

[Footnote 7: "Hico mas que su edad requeria, porque seria de edad de
veinte i dos anos." Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 4, cap. 20.]

     He instantly set about providing for the wants of his men, and
strained every nerve to get them in good fighting order for the
approaching campaign.  He replenished his treasury with a large amount of
silver which he drew from the mines of La Plata Saltpetre, obtained in
abundance in the neighbourhood of Cuzco, furnished the material for
gunpowder.  He caused cannon, some of large dimensions, to be cast under
the superintendence of Pedro de Candia, the Greek, who, it may be
remembered, had first come into the country with Pizarro, and who, with a
number of his countrymen, - Levantines, as they were called, - was well
acquainted with this manufacture.  Under their care, fire-arms were made,
together with cuirasses and helmets, in which silver was mingled with
copper, ^8 and of so excellent a quality, that they might vie, says an old
soldier of the time, with those from the workshops of Milan. ^9 Almagro
received a seasonable supply, moreover, from a source scarcely to have
been expected.  This was from Manco, the wandering Inca, who, detesting
the memory of Pizarro, transferred to the young Almagro the same friendly
feelings which he had formerly borne to his father; heightened, it may be,
by the consideration that Indian blood flowed in the veins of the young
commander.  From this quarter Almagro obtained a liberal supply of swords,
spears, shields, and arms and armour of every description, chiefly taken
by the Inca at the memorable siege of Cuzco.  He also received the
gratifying assurance, that the latter would support him with a detachment
of native troops when he opened the campaign.

[Footnote 8: "Y demas de esto hico armas para la Gente de su Real, que no
las tenia, de pasta de Plata, i Cobre, mezclado, de que salen mui buenos
Coseletes: haviendo corregido, demas de esto, todas las armas de la
Tierra; de manera, que el que menos Armas tenia entre su Gente, era Cota,
i Coracinas, o Coselete, i Celadas de la mesma Pasta, que los Indios hacen
diestramente, por muestras de las Milan." Zarate, Conq. de Peru, lib. 4,
cap. 14.]

[Footnote 9: "Hombres de armas con tan buenas celadas borgonesas como se
hacen en Milan." Carta de Ventura Beltran al Emperador, Ms desde Vilcas, 8
Octubre, 1542.]

     Before making a final appeal to arms, however, Almagro resolved to
try the effect of negotiation with the new governor.  In the spring, or
early in the summer, of 1542, he sent an embassy to the latter, then at
Lima, in which he deprecated the necessity of taking arms against an
officer of the Crown.  His only desire, he said, was to vindicate his own
rights; to secure the possession of New Toledo, the province bequeathed to
him by his father, and from which he had been most unjustly excluded by
Pizarro.  He did not dispute the governor's authority over New Castile, as
the country was designated which had been assigned to the marquess; and he
concluded by proposing that each party should remain within his respective
territory until the determination of the Court of Castile could be made
known to them.  To this application, couched in respectful terms, Almagro
received no answer.

     Frustrated in his hopes of a peaceful accommodation, the young
captain now saw that nothing was left but the arbitrament of arms.
Assembling his troops, preparatory to his departure from the capital, he
made them a brief address.  He protested that the step which he and his
brave companions were about to take was not an act of rebellion against
the Crown.  It was forced on them by the conduct of the governor himself.
The commission of that officer gave him no authority over the territory of
New Toledo, settled on Almagro's father, and by his father bequeathed to
him.  If Vaca de Castro, by exceeding the limits of his authority, drove
him to hostilities, the blood spilt in the quarrel would lie on the head
of that commander, not on his.  "In the assassination of Pizarro," he
continued, "we took that justice into our own hands which elsewhere was
denied us.  It is the same now, in our contest with the royal governor.
We are as true-hearted and loyal subjects of the Crown as he is." And he
concluded by invoking his soldiers to stand by him heart and hand in the
approaching contest, in which they were all equally interested with
himself.

     The appeal was not made to an insensible audience.  There were few
among them who did not feel that their fortunes were indissolubly
connected with those of their commander; and while they had little to
expect from the austere character of the governor, they were warmly
attached to the person of their young chief, who, with all the popular
qualities of his father, excited additional sympathy from the
circumstances of his age and his forlorn condition.  Laying their hands on
the cross, placed on an altar raised for the purpose, the officers and
soldiers severally swore to brave every peril with Almagro, and remain
true to him to the last.

     In point of numbers, his forces had not greatly strengthened since
his departure from Lima.  He mustered but little more than five hundred in
all; but among them were his father's veterans, well seasoned by many an
Indian campaign.  He had about two hundred horse, many of them clad in
complete mail, a circumstance not too common in these wars, where a
stuffed doublet of cotton was often the only panoply of the warrior.  His
infantry, formed of pikemen and arquebusiers, was excellently armed.  But
his strength lay in his heavy ordnance, consisting of sixteen pieces,
eight large and eight smaller guns, or falconets, as they were called,
forming, says one who saw it, a beautiful park of artillery, that would
have made a brave show on the citadel of Burgos. ^10 The little army, in
short, though not imposing from its numbers, was under as good discipline,
and as well appointed, as any that ever fought on the fields of Peru; much
better than any which Almagro's own father or Pizarro ever led into the
field and won their conquests with.  Putting himself at the head of his
gallant company, the chieftain sallied forth from the walls of Cuzco about
midsummer, in 1542, and directed his march towards the coast in
expectation of meeting the enemy. ^11

[Footnote 10: "El artilleria hera suficiente para hazer bateria en el
castillo de Burgos." Dicho del Capitan Francisco de Carvajal sobre la
pregunta 38 de la informacion hecha en el Cuzco en 1543, a favor de Vaca
de Castro, Ms.]

[Footnote 11: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Declaracion de
Uscategui, Ms. - Garcilasso, Com. Real, Real., Parte 2, lib. 2, cap. 13. -
Carta del Cabildo de Arequipa al Emperador, San Joan de la Frontera, Ms.,
24 de Sep. 1542 - Herrera, Hist. General, dez lib. 3, cap. 1, 2.]

     While the events detailed in the preceding pages were passing, Vaca
de Castro, whom we left at Quito in the preceding year, was advancing
slowly towards the south.  His first act, after leaving that city, showed
his resolution to enter into no compromise with the assassins of Pizarro.
Benalcazar, the distinguished officer whom I have mentioned as having
early given in his adherence to him, had protected one of the principal
conspirators, his personal friend, who had come into his power, and had
facilitated his escape.  The governor, indignant at the proceeding, would
listen to no explanation, but ordered the offending officer to return to
his own district of Popayan.  It was a bold step, in the precarious state
of his own fortunes.

     As the governor pursued his march, he was well received by the people on
the way; and when he entered the city of San Miguel, he was welcomed with
loyal enthusiasm by the inhabitants, who readily acknowledged his authority
though they showed little alacrity to take their chance with him in the coming
struggle.

     After lingering a long time in each of these places, he resumed his
march and reached the camp of Alonso de Alvarado at Huaura, early in 1542.
Holguin had established his quarters at some little distance from his
rival; for a jealousy had sprung up, as usual, between these two captains,
who both aspired to the supreme command of Captain-General of the army.
The office of governor, conferred on Vaca de Castro, might seem to include
that of commander-in-chief of the forces.  But De Castro was a scholar,
bred to the law; and, whatever authority he might arrogate to himself in
civil matters, the two captains imagined that the military department he
would resign into the hands of others.  They little knew the character of
the man.

     Though possessed of no more military science than belonged to every
cavalier in that martial age, the governor knew that to avow his
ignorance, and to resign the management of affairs into the hands of
others, would greatly impair his authority, if not bring him into contempt
with the turbulent spirits among whom he was now thrown.  He had both
sagacity and spirit, and trusted to be able to supply his own deficiencies
by the experience of others.  His position placed the services of the
ablest men in the country at his disposal, and with the aid of their
counsels he felt quite competent to decide on his plan of operations, and
to enforce the execution of it.  He knew, moreover, that the only way to
allay the jealousy of the two parties in the present crisis was to assume
himself the office which was the cause of their dissension.

     Still he approached his ambitious officers with great caution; and
the representations, which he made through some judicious persons who had
the most intimate access to them, were so successful, that both were in a
short time prevailed on to relinquish their pretensions in his favor.
Holguin, the more unreasonable of the two, then waited on him in his
rival's quarters, where the governor had the further satisfaction to
reconcile him to Alonso de Alvarado.  It required some address, as their
jealousy of each other had proceeded to such lengths that a challenge had
passed between them.

     Harmony being thus restored, the licentiate passed over to Holguin's
camp, where he was greeted with salvoes of artillery, and loud
acclamations of "Viva el Rey" from the loyal soldiery.  Ascending a
platform covered with velvet, he made an animated harangue to the troops;
his commission was read aloud by the secretary; and the little army
tendered their obedience to him as the representative of the Crown.

     Vaca de Castro's next step was to send off the greater part of his
force, in the direction of Xauxa, while, at the head of a small corps, he
directed his march towards Lima.  Here he was received with lively
demonstrations of joy by the citizens, who were generally attached to the
cause of Pizarro, the founder and constant patron of their capital.
Indeed, the citizens had lost no time after Almagro's departure in
expelling his creatures from the municipality, and reasserting their
allegiance.  With these favorable dispositions towards himself, the
governor found no difficulty in obtaining a considerable loan of money
from the wealthier inhabitants.  But he was less successful, at first, in
his application for horses and arms, since the harvest had been too
faithfully gleaned, already, by the men of Chili.  As, however, he
prolonged his stay some time in the capital, he obtained important
supplies, before he left it, both of arms and ammunition, while he added
to his force by a considerable body of recruits. ^12

[Footnote 12: Declaracion de Uscategui, Ms. - Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y
Conq., Ms. - Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 7, lib. 1, cap. 1. - Carta de
Barrio Nuevo, Ms. - Carta de Benalcazar al Emperador, Ms.]

     As he was thus employed, he received tidings that the enemy had left
Cuzco, and was on his march towards the coast.  Quitting Los Reyes,
therefore, with his trusty followers, Vaca de Castro marched at once to
Xauxa, the appointed place of rendezvous.  Here he mustered his forces,
and found that they amounted to about seven hundred men.  The cavalry, in
which lay his strength, was superior in numbers to that of his antagonist,
but neither so well mounted or armed.  It included many cavaliers of
birth, and well-tried soldiers, besides a number who, having great
interests at stake, as possessed of large estates in the country, had left
them at the call of government, to enlist under its banners. ^13 His
infantry, besides pikes, was indifferently well supplied with fire-arms;
but he had nothing to show in the way of artillery except three or four
ill-mounted falconets.  Yet, notwithstanding these deficiencies, the royal
army, if so insignificant a force can deserve that name, was so far
superior in numbers to that of his rival, that the one might be thought,
on the whole, to be no unequal match for the other. ^14

[Footnote 13: The Municipality of Arequipa, most of whose members were
present in the army, stoutly urge their claims to a compensation for thus
promptly leaving their estates, and taking up arms at the call of
government.  Without such reward, they say, their patriotic example will
not often be followed.  The document, which is important for its
historical details, may be found in the Castilian, in Appendix, No. 13.]

[Footnote 14: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq. del
Peru, lib. 4, cap. 15. - Carta de Barrio Nuevo, Ms