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$Unique_ID{bob00277}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Israel
Chapter 5D.   Foreign Contacts}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richard F. Nyrop}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{idf
military
israeli
defense
israel
foreign
government
territories
political
officers}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Title:       Israel
Book:        Israel, A Country Study
Author:      Richard F. Nyrop
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1979

Chapter 5D.   Foreign Contacts

     Before independence and the establishment of the IDF, Great Britain
played a role in the development and training of various Jewish military
organizations, including the Special Night Squads and the Jewish Brigade.
British influence carried over to the IDF, and in the 1970s various aspects of
the IDF, including their British-style uniforms, provided evidence of the
importance of those early contacts. Another vital early foreign influence was
Switzerland, whose reserve system served as a model to the original architects
of the IDF for the fulfillment of large manpower needs in a small country with
limited human resources (see Historical Background, this ch.).

     During the War of Independence, the IDF relied on Jewish volunteers from
the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and South Africa to provide much of
the skilled manpower for the fledgling air force and navy; the naval commander
was in fact an American volunteer. It was not until 1952 that all air force
pilots were Israeli citizens. During the formative years of the IDF, no
Western country agreed to sell weapons to Israel, and Czechoslovakia was the
only legal government-to-government source of arms. Czechoslovakia also
contributed to the training of Israeli pilots and paratroopers for a brief
period. By the early 1950s the IDF was able to purchase a variety of small
jets and war-surplus weapons from several West European countries, including
Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Sweden.

     Since the mid-1950sp the most important aspect of the IDF's contacts with
foreign governments has stemmed from its need to have a reliable source of
arms. France fulfilled that need for over a decade beginning in 1955 with the
delivery of twenty-four jet fighters. Although Israel had to pay full
commercial prices, it was able to buy whatever it requested-which were
primarily jet aircraft. West Germany also began to supply Israel with a large
quantity of other kinds of modern weapons, as did Great Britain after 1956.
Not until the mid-1960s did the United States openly agree to sell weapons to
Israel.

     Just before the six-day war, France served notice that it would no longer
be a reliable source of weapons by blocking delivery of fifty fighter-bombers.
In January 1969 France completed its political realignment within the
Arab-Israeli conflict and imposed a total embargo on arms sales to Israel.
These actions prompted Israel to speed up its efforts both to develop its own
arms industry and to seek American weapons.

     After the first agreement to deliver Hawk antiaircraft missiles in 1962,
United States foreign military sales to Israel grew substantially, though at
an uneven clip (see table 23, Appendix A). The unusually high figures for
fiscal year (FY-see Glossary) 1974 reflect the granting of US $2.2 billion in
emergency military assistance and the airlifting of nearly US $1 billion in
emergency supplies to Israel during the October 1973 War.

     By the mid-1970s the United States was clearly the largest foreign
supplier of arms to Israel, though other countries, including Great Britain
and West Germany, continued as lesser suppliers. As part of its efforts to
ensure that foreign countries would continue to supply vital weapons, the IDF
operated special arms purchasing missions throughout the world; its mission in
the United States was the largest, said in 1977 to have over 200 members. The
United States Foreign Military Sales Program with Israel was one of the
largest in the world; it ranked fourth during FY 1977 in terms of agreements,
third in terms of deliveries, and first in terms of loans and grants. From
1973 to 1978 Israel was the only country in the world to have part of its
payment under the financing program waived. In 1977 and 1978, in addition to
loans and grants under the Foreign Military Sales Program, the United States
also granted Israel some US $750 million annually in economic aid.

     The Foreign Military Sales Program is guided by the United States Mutual
Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement of 1952, which require that military equipment supplied to Israel
"will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate
self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of
which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and
measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any
other state."

     During the mid-1970s, as Israel became increasingly capable of fulfilling
its requirements for arms through its own defense industries, its need for
foreign weapons became limited to the most modern and sophisticated equipment,
such as the most advanced jet aircraft, for which Israel lacked either the
technology or the economic resources to develop (see Economic Impact, this
ch.). As Israel became less dependent on foreign arms suppliers for small arms
and ammunition during the 1970s, however, it also became more dependent, at
least in money terms, on foreign supplies of the modern most weaponry, which
became increasingly expensive throughout the decade. The need to replace the
aging F-4 fighters with more modern aircraft for the 1980s led to considerable
controversy both in Israel and the United States. Although Israeli Aircraft
Industries (IAI) had designed a suitable successor, it was generally felt to
be more economical to purchase American models, the F-15 and F-16, rather than
spend the estimated US $500 million necessary to develop an Israeli aircraft.
Some felt, however, that the investment would be rapaid in relieving Israel's
dependence on the United States.

     This latter argument was reinforced in late 1977, when President Jimmy
Carter agreed to sell Israel fewer F-16s than it had requested and tied his
approval of their sale, along with that of further F-15s, to the sale of
American jet aircraft to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Many IDF officials saw this
as a confirmation of the dangers of dependence on foreign weapons suppliers;
and just before his resignation as IDF chief of staff in April 1978, Mordecai
Gur recommended withdrawing Israel's request in an effort to prevent the sale
to Saudi Arabia. Despite the political controversies surrounding Israeli
procurement of United States weapons, it was clear in mid-1978 that IDF
officials saw the ongoing relationship as vital; in March 1978 Minister of
Defense Weizman requested some US $12 billion in arms over the next ten years.

     In addition Israel has been the influential partner in a large number of
other contacts with foreign military establishments, most of which were from
African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Israeli influence has spread
through military advisers, most important from Nahal, and through the
exportation of equipment from its own rapidly growing defense industries.

     During the 1960s and 1970s, with the interest among military
establishments of the developing world in civic action programs in which armed
forces personnel actively participate in the nation's social and economic
change, scores of countries have looked to the IDF, and to Nahal in
particular, as a successful example. One count made in 1976 listed
thirty-seven countries-twenty-one in Africa, five in Asia, and eleven in
Latin America-that had received instruction and/or assistance in Nahal-type
programs. Nahal officers instructed foreign officers in both military and
agricultural matters, which proved particularly useful in countries with
relatively uninhabited and unintegrated regions.

     Not all instruction is in Nahal-type programs: in 1970, for example,
Israeli missions in four African and two Asian countries offered specialized
military training. In addition to training military personnel in their home
countries, Israel had trained a large number (20,000 between 1960 and 1970) of
foreign officers (from forty-seven countries in 1970 alone) for six months to
two years in IDF schools in Israel.

     For security reasons, Israeli officials were reluctant to discuss arms
exports in detail, although the broad outlines of this aspect to Israel's
foreign military contacts have come to light during the mid-1970s. Israeli
arms exports became significant after the mid-1960s, hovered around US $60
million annually during the early 1970s, and increased dramatically after
1973. IDF officials reported that total sales for 1976 were US $320 million and
were expected to reach US $400 million during 1977, although some foreign
sources contended that actual figures were much higher. It was clear,
nevertheless, that arms exports rose substantially during the mid-1970s and
that their continued growth was an important goal of Israeli economic and
defense planners (see Economic Impact, this ch.).

     No complete authoritative published list of the countries to which
Israel exports arms exists, but in a 1974 study Zeev Schiff asserted that
Israel's customers totaled nearly fifty countries. The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute documented sales during the mid-1970s to Malaysia,
Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Other sources have
listed Kenya, Ethiopia, and the United States (whose Secret Service uses
Israeli-built Uzi submachine guns) as customers as well.

     Israeli sales to foreign military establishments included a wide variety
of weapons and ordnance, from basic ammunition to sophisticated missiles,
patrol boats, and transport aircraft, as well as such nonlethal equipment as
tents. As of mid-1978, however, Israel had been frustrated in its efforts to
sell the Kfir jet fighter. Although highly price-competitive, the Kfir was
equipped with American built engines and thus subject to United States
approval for export from Israel (see Economic Impact, this ch.; Industry, ch.
4).

The IDF as an Army of Occupation

     Since Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza
Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula during the six-day war, the IDF has carried the
burden of responsibility for implementing Israeli government policy in the
territories. As an army of occupation, the IDF has been the primary guarantor
of security in the territories and, although municipal government has remained
in the hands of the local Arab population, IDF officers have assumed senior
administrative positions and thus held ultimate responsibility for governing
the areas under the terms of martial law. The post-1967 experience was not the
first such responsibility for the IDF: between 1950 and 1966 three regions
inside Israel with large Arab populations-the Northern Area (also known as
Galilee Area), the so-called Arab Triangle in central Israel, and the Negev-
were governed by the IDF under the provisions of the 1945 Defense (Emergency)
Regulations of the British Mandate government (see Israeli Arabs, Arab Land,
Arab Refugees, ch. 1).

     Ultimate executive responsibility for the occupied territories is held by
the minister of defense, who is advised by the Ministerial Committee for
Security and the Territories, which consists of several cabinet members and is
headed by the prime minister. Two less important ministerial committees, the
Committee for Coordinated Action in the Territories and the Committee of
Directors-General for Economic Affairs, also advise on political and security,
and civil and socioeconomic matters, respectively. From the minister of
defense, command is passed to the Department of Military Government, which is
a functional command within the general staff headed by the coordinator of
governmental operations in the administered territories, a position held by
Major General Slomo Gazit from 1967 to 1973 and by Major General Raphael Vardi
after January 1974.

     Day-to-day administrative matters are dealt with in the next level of
command by regional commanders (commonly referred to as military governors).
In the original legislation for the administration of the occupied
territories, there were five regional commanders; but subsequently the command
for the central Sinai was dropped, leaving commands for north Sinai and the
Gaza Strip, the southern Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. In the
mid-1970s these commands were headquartered in Al Arish, Sharm ash Shayhk,
Nazareth, and Ramallah, respectively, each of which contained two small staffs
for security and civil matters (the Golan Heights was administered by the IDF
Northern Command because the area was virtually without an Arab population in
the mid-1970s). Regional commands are further subdivided into several district
commands, stationed in key cities within the territories; each district
command also has small staffs for security and civil affairs. The command
structure at the lower levels is generally quite fluid, and district commands,
in particular, often change locations, consolidating or expanding as specific
needs arise.

     Although IDF officials hold the top administrative positions in the
territories, Arabs hold the vast majority of total government administrative
and staff positions: in December 1972 then-defense minister Dayan stated that
Israelis held only 3 percent of staff positions, excluding customs officials,
in the territories. This procedure is part of the overall IDF guideline to
minimize the Israeli presence in the territories. Moreover many Israeli
officials, particularly those concerned with socioeconomic policies, are
civilians from one of several government ministries.

     The major task of the military government has been to uphold internal
security in the territories. Immediately upon Israel's occupation in June
1967, an intense pacification program was launched, and harsh measures were
carried out to suppress local expressions of dissent, such as noncooperation
campaigns, strikes, and especially terrorist activities. Methods used in the
pacification included the widespread deportation of local residents whom
Israeli officials deemed subversive, the destruction of Arab homes believed to
house subversives and their supporters, preventive detention for up to six
months, which could be extended indefinitely, and other repressive measures
derived from the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations of the British Mandate
period. By 1971 the territories were relatively secure, due as much to the PLO
debacle in Jordan as to Israeli security measures; and Israeli use of such
extreme measures subsequently declined precipitously, although deportations,
the destruction of property, and preventive detention continued to be
practiced on a much smaller scale.

     The pre-1967 legal system in the territories remained largely intact,
but security offenders there, as in Israel, were tried in Israeli military
courts (see Discipline and Military Justice, this ch.). The death sentence
is permissible under Israeli military law, though as of mid-1978 it had not
been used in the occupied territories. Sentences from fifteen years to life
imprisonment for crimes ranging from belonging to a terrorist organization
to perpetrating terrorist acts are common, however. The United States
Department of State estimated that in July 1977 there were some 3,100
non-Israeli Arabs, mostly residents of the occupied territories, imprisoned
within Israel. Several of these security prisoners alleged that they had been
tortured during pretrial interrogations; their allegations were published in
a lengthy report by the Sunday Times of London in June 1977. The report
concluded that "torture of Arab prisoners is so widespread and systematic
that . . . it appears to be sanctioned as deliberate policy." Both the Israeli
government and the United States Department of State subsequently disagreed
with this conclusion, the latter reporting in its February 1978 human rights
report that "We know of no evidence to support allegations that Israel follows
a consistent practice or policy of using torture during interrogations.
However, there are documented reports of the use of extreme physical and
psychological pressures during interrogation, and instances of brutality
by individual interrogators cannot be ruled out."

     In contrast to the report in the Sunday Times, the Israeli government
and some neutral observers characterize Israel's occupation as benign or even
beneficial to the local population. They point to the increased standard of
living in the territories, the policy of open bridges to Jordan, the relative
freedom of expression enjoyed by West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs, and the
considerable Israeli efforts in developing health and education facilities
and economic infrastructure within the territories since 1967. Repressive
security measures, they contend, affect only a few inhabitants and are a
necessary part of any occupation of enemy territory.

     The IDF is genuinely concerned with the maintenance of a favorable public
image, both within the territories and abroad, as an army of occupation. After
an incident in March 1978 in which seven schoolchildren were injured as
soldiers lobbed tear gas into the school in an attempt to disperse their
demonstration, several IDF officers were prosecuted, and the military
governor of the West Bank was dismissed for misconduct during the incident.
Nevertheless the local population carries a natural resentment toward its IDF
occupiers; and in mid-1978 that resentment appeared to be increasing as the
growth of Israeli settlements in the territories was interpreted as proof
that at least some Israelis planned to remain permanently.

     The creation of pioneering outpost communities, or settlements, with
multiple purposes of agricultural development, establishing secure zones,
and proclaiming Jewish rule, has been a deliberate and consistent policy
of Zionism since the earliest settlers in Palestine in the late nineteenth
century. About two-thirds of the some 130 settlements established between
1967 and the end of 1977 have been located beyond the "green line," in
Israeli-occupied Arab territories (see fig. 13; fig 14; fig. 15). Most Israeli
government decisions on settlement beyond the green line were made by the
Ministerial Committee on Settlement, although ultimate authority concerning
settlement and all other matters pertaining to the occupied territories lay
with the minister of defense. In April 1978, however, in an apparent attempt
to reduce the public flow of information on this increasingly controversial
issue, responsibility for settlement policies was ordered shifted to the
Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs.

     In mid-1978 there was considerable controversy surrounding Israel's
program of settlement in the occupied territories, which for a time became
mirrored in open disagreement between Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon,
who headed the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, and Defense Minister
Weizman over the political wisdom of continuing the development of new
settlements while peace negotiations were in progress; for about a month land
preparation for new settlements was halted on Weizman's orders. Moreover
the issue of the continuing development of Israeli settlements and the
accompanying Israeli acquisition of sizable amounts of land in the occupied
territories isolated Israel from world public opinion. Many of its traditional
friends, including the United States, condemned the practices as in violation
of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War. Nevertheless the Israeli government argued that it did adhere to nearly
all components of the Geneva Convention and the convention did not in fact
apply to Israel's occupation from a strict international legal standpoint. The
proposed Israeli budget for FY1978 recommended a "substantially increased
development of new settlements."

     At the end of 1977 there were an estimated 10,000 Israeli settlers in
the occupied territories. Each settlement was populated by representatives
of one of a variety of political, religious, labor oriented, or paramilitary
organizations, the most important being Nahal, many of whose settlements are
transferred to civilian organizations after their initial development. During
the mid-1970s a growing number of unauthorized, or "illegal" settlements were
established in the West Bank by the ultra-Orthodox religious group known as
Gush Emunim (Faith Bloc). Whereas most government-approved settlements in the
West Bank were located in the relatively unpopulated eastern portion, those
established and proposed by Gush Emunim were mostly in the densely populated
hills of western Samaria.

     Security interests are traditionally cited as the primary motivation for
Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Armed settlements, they argue,
discourage guerrilla infiltration and act as a first line of defense and
tripline in the event of an enemy invasion. Critics argue that the settlements
are highly overrated in their value to Israeli security in this age of
high-firepower weaponry, pointing to the widely held opinion after the 1973
war that the settlements in the Golan Heights not only had no defense value
but actually were an obstacle to effective military action in repulsing the
Syrian invasion because essential time was lost during the evacuation of
women and children. Critics also quoted General Itzhak Hofi, head of Mossad,
Israel's primary intelligence agency: "The settlements on the Golan Heights
are not a factor of strength in the struggle for power between Israel and
Syria, and cannot play any role in resolving or balancing the military
problems."

     Many Israeli and foreign observers argued in the mid-1970s that the
strategic significance of the settlements had become secondary to their
political significance, either as bargaining chips in future peace
negotiations or, in the opinion of some, as an indication of Israel's
intention to retain the areas indefinitely. Uncertainty about the future
direction of Israeli government policies in the occupied territories was the
source of increasing dissent among Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza and
a mounting political controversy among Israelis themselves in mid-1978.

Armed Forces and Society

Economic Impact

     The economic impact of national security has always been large in Israel,
and during the 1970s that impact grew in a variety of ways. Government
expenditures for defense have grown markedly (see table 24, Appendix A). The
rather astounding increases in terms of current Israeli pounds, however, must
be tempered by the effects of double-digit inflation: for example, between
1970 and 1976, total defense expenditures increased over sevenfold in current
prices, but in terms of constant prices they increased only on the order of
100 percent. In FY 1978 proposed defense expenditures declined in real terms
over those approved for FY 1977 in an overall effort to trim government
expenses, although the costs of the Litani Campaign were likely to require a
supplement to the proposed budget. The reasons for the large increases in the
defense budget, particularly since the 1973 war, were many and included
rapidly rising costs of both equipment and manpower (see Role of Government,
ch. 4).

     A comparison of defense expenditure as a percentage of the total state
budget reveals a steady decline since 1973 and, in fact, a decline of more
than 5 percent between 1970 and 1976 despite the considerable increase in
absolute terms. Clearly other components of the state budget rose faster than
the defense sector during the 1970s. The debt component of the state budget
grew particularly rapidly, a phenomenon at least partially related to past
loans related to defense expenditure. Although American aid has contributed
greatly to Israel's ability to support its huge defense expenditures,
especially since 1973, and greatly relieved its immediate balance-of-payments
difficulties caused in large part by rising defense expenditures abroad
(largely for equipment), the long-run necessity to repay its foreign debts
surfaced during the period, thus creating, by 1978, a mounting debt crisis.
Defense spending has also contributed to Israel's inflationary problems
because it contributed to domestic financial flows without increasing the
supply of consumer goods and services (see Foreign Contacts, this ch.; Balance
of Payments, ch. 4).

     The financial burden of defense expenditures to the Israeli citizen was,
perhaps, the largest of any nation in the world. In terms of statistics
usually used to measure it, the defense burden was overwhelming: in 1977 the
equivalent of nearly US $1,200 per capita (well over twice the rate in the
United States or the Soviet Union) or more than 30 percent of the gross
national product (GNP) of Israel. Most analysts of the Israeli defense burden,
however, try to take into account Israel's large import surplus, which was
financed by a flow of funds from a variety of sources including United States
military aid; for example, in 1977 the defense burden dropped to 17.5 percent
of the country's resources. Official Israeli government statisticians measure
the defense burden similar to this latter figure. The burden of defense
expenditures was greatest in 1973, the year in which Israel fought a war that
several analysts estimate cost the Israelis an amount of money equivalent to a
full year's GNP.

     The economic impact of national security is also apparent in terms of
manpower, which is a vital resource in an industrialized nation of a little
more than 3.6 million people. This impact is felt especially during the
mobilization of the reserves, which has been an increasingly frequent event
since 1973, when the failure to mobilize promptly proved to be a very costly
mistake. A full mobilization of the nation's nearly 250,000 reserves has the
effect of nearly bringing the economy to a halt, this being a principal reason
for the importance to Israel that wars be of brief duration (see Israeli
Concepts of National Security, this ch.). Even partial mobilizations, which
regularly occur several times annually, have a profound impact on national
production, as does the regular yearly period of active duty served by each
reservist.

     Not all the economic impact of national security is negative, however.
The remarkable growth of Israel's defense industries, particularly since 1967,
has provided considerable employment, contributed to economic growth, and been
a positive factor in the nation's foreign trade accounts due both to import
substitution effects and the growth of exports of military equipment (see
Defense Industries, ch. 4). The original impetus behind the development of
Israel's defense industries, which by the late 1970s was expected to produce
fully half of Israel's total requirements for military equipment, was not
economic as much as it was strategic: that is, the need to reduce the nation's
dependence on not-always-reliable foreign sources of armaments. By 1978
independence from foreign arms suppliers was still a major concern, but the
steady growth of defense industries during the previous decade had shown them
to be a valuable economic asset as well.

     Defense industries included some 150 public and private firms in 1977,
but production was dominated by four major concerns: IAI, a semiautonomous
government conglomerate and one of the nation's largest manufacturing
concerns, which employs some 20,000 workers and has sales estimated at US $400
in 1977; Israel Military Industries, which concentrates on small arms and
ammunition; the Armament Development Authority, commonly known as Rafael,
which is the government's official agency for armament research and
development; and the Israel Shipyards in Haifa. A number of large private
firms engage in the manufacture of electronic equipment for military purposes.

Social Impact

     The tradition of the IDF as an institution of social service dates from
1949, when it played a major role in tackling sudden and widespread epidemics
of disease in transit camps for the flood of immigrants to the new nation. In
that same year, Ben-Gurion envisioned a vital educational mission for the IDF,
which he defined as "the duty of the army to educate a pioneer generation,
healthy in body and spirit, courageous and loyal, which will unite the broken
tribes and diasporas to prepare itself to fulfill the historical tasks of the
State of Israel through self-realization." Shortly thereafter a program was
begun, and by 1962 it was completely institutionalized, whereby the IDF would,
through a variety of means, contribute to the education and social integration
of immigrant youth. From the beginning, these efforts of the IDF concentrated
on the generally less educated Sephardic Jews.

     Probably the most important contribution made to the integration of
disparate elements into Israeli society by the IDF stems from the common
experience of conscription for some 90 percent of Jewish males and 50 percent
of Jewish females. The IDF makes a concerted effort to integrate within its
various units those from different social backgrounds; in many cases Sephardim
and Ashkenazim, rural and urban, and Sabra and immigrant Jewish youth mix for
the first time in their lives. The exception to this rule is in the minorities
unit, which consists primarily of Druzes and has no Jews (see The Arab
Minorities, ch. 2). Since the mid-1970s Druzes have been allowed to join other
units if they choose.

     The educational program of the IDF, in addition to contributing to the
manpower needs of the armed forces, assists those youths (largely Sephardim)
who were deprived of basic education as children, to integrate into the
Ashkenazic-dominated society of Israel (see The Sephardim, A Disadvantaged
Majority, ch. 2). Perhaps the most important educational function of the IDF
is the teaching of the national language, Hebrew. Each year some 5,000
soldiers are trained in Hebrew and introduced to the history and geography of
Israel. Additionally some 1,200 soldiers a year spend the last three months of
their period of conscription in basic education courses: a certificate of
elementary education is required before a soldier is honorably discharged. A
variety of other educational training, including secondary and vocational
school courses, are attended by considerably fewer soldiers.

     The IDF also plays a role in the education and socialization of immigrant
civilians. Several groups, but particularly young women within Gadna and
Nahal, are deployed for a time in rural settlements of recent immigrants,
where they teach much the same materials taught immigrant soldiers and inform
the new arrivals of state services available to them (see Nahal and Gadna,
this ch.).

     Many observers have noted that these IDF educational services have
provided an important service to the Sephardic community and to the entire
society in the integration of immigrants and in narrowing the educational gap
in Israel's Jewish population. Other observers argue that these efforts have
been successful in identifying the new immigrant with the State of Israel
but far less successful in integrating the Sephardic and Ashkenazic
communities. Maurice Roumani, for example, pointed out in a 1973 paper
entitled "Some Aspects of Socialization in the Israeli Army: The Case of
Oriental Jews" that the interethnic solidarity maintained within the IDF unit
is based on the rigors and dangers common to all Israel soldiers, and that
solidarity is lost upon the soldiers' return to civilian life, where
Ashkenazim and Sephardim are, to a significant degree, segregated.

     In the case of Israel's Arab minority, societal patterns of segregation
are reinforced by the IDF. Israeli Arabs, save the tiny Druze community, are
for all practical purposes excluded from military service; although they are
free to volunteer, very few do so. Fully one-seventh of society is thus
excluded from an experience that is widely shared by the remainder of the
population.

     A newer aspect of the social impact of the IDF is its role in the
socialization of delinquent and ex-delinquent youth. In the early 1970s the
IDF reversed its previous policy and began conscripting all but the most
serious offenders among delinquent youth in an attempt both to increase its
manpower pool and to provide remedial socialization in the context of military
discipline. By 1978 it was clear that the policy had met with only partial
success. Approximately half the youths, generally the less serious offenders,
who had been released from detention to join the IDF, had adjusted
successfully; the other half had been less successful. Many returned to
criminal activity and contributed to growing disciplinary problems within the
IDF, which included a rising use of drugs among soldiers and thefts and
violent crimes within IDF units; others could not adjust to army life and
simply left or were expelled from the IDF. Despite the problems associated
with the new policy, IDF officials were proud of their role in youth
rehabilitation and felt that the opportunity afforded delinquent youth to be
reintegrated into society outweighed the associated disciplinary problems.

Political Impact

     The Jewish military organizations of Palestine before Israeli
independence were fiercely political; the Haganah and Palmach were closely
associated with the socialist-labor Mapai (see Glossary) and the kibbutz
programs, whereas the Irgun was intimately connected with the rightist
Revisionist Movement of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his disciple, Begin (see
Multiparty Septem, ch. 3). As the chief architect of the IDF, Ben-Gurion was
determined to eliminate all political overtones from Israel's unified,
national army and to establish clear civilian supremacy over the military. He
was extraordinarily successful in his efforts, and for the first thirty years
of its history, the IDF never once challenged the authority of its civilian
masters. This does not mean, however, that the IDF is a nonpolitical
institution. On the contrary, the significant political impact of the IDF can
be discussed in several categories: the influence of IDF personnel on
government policies relating to foreign affairs and national security; the
political orientation of the officer corps; and the political role of retired
officers.

     Under Israeli law policy relating to national security is set by the
cabinet, which can be convened as the Ministerial Committee for Security
Affairs to enforce the secrecy of its proceedings, and approved by the defense
and foreign affairs committee of the Knesset. The minister of defense is often
the principal policy formulator (though this depends on his personality as
well as that of the prime minister and the chief of staff) and may make urgent
decisions without the consultation of fellow cabinet members if the need
arises. In mid-1978 the minister of defense was a retired military officer,
as had been all of his predecessors since 1967. The paramountcy of civilian
control over the military has thus been maintained, but the sequence of former
military officers as defense ministers has raised questions as to their truly
nonmilitary status and their military impartiality.

     Active-duty IDF personnel are implementors of policy and do not directly
engage in the formulation of policy. In a variety of ways, however, IDF
officers play an indirect though significant role in creating governmental
policy. At least once a month, the chief of staff and the chief of military
intelligence meet with the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.
They also meet regularly with the Finance Committee of the Knesset and, when
called upon, attend cabinet meetings where, according to former chief of
military intelligence Eliahu Zeira, they "have a great deal of influence on
government policy." The decision to launch the 1967 Israeli offensive against
the Arab armies was the most clear-cut case, as of 1978, of the IDF acting as
a pressure group on civilian decisionmakers.

     The legally imprecise role in policymaking of the IDF officers, in part,
led to the enactment of the Basic Law in 1976, which attempted to define
the roles of the prime minister, minister of defense, and chief of staff. Upon
taking office in 1977, Minister of Defense Weizman declared the role of the
IDF was to execute policy and that in the past it had been too deeply involved
in the policymaking process.

     Although private official consultations vis-a-vis government policy are
condoned as essential in light of Israel's special need to be in a constant
state of military preparedness, public statements of opinion concerning
Israel's defense policy (i.e., opinions about when and where to go to war,
or when and how or with whom to make peace) are generally considered to be
in the realm of politics and off limits to active-duty personnel. On one of
the few instances during the 1970s when this unwritten law was violated, newly
appointed Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan discussed Israel's need to retain the
occupied territories during a television interview in May 1978, a time when
the seven-month-old negotiations toward a peace with Egypt were stalled:
"Despite the modern means of war, the IDF will not be able to defend the state
and maintain it as an independent state without Judea and Samaria, without the
Golan Heights. As regards the Sinai, things depend on the size, on the form
and on the agreement reached with the Egyptians." Many members of the
government's political opposition described the chief of staff's remarks as
clearly within the traditional boundaries of being political, although a vote
to officially censor Eytan was handily defeated in the cabinet. Nevertheless
shortly afterward Weizman issued directives to prevent similar occurrences in
the future.

     IDF soldiers are free to vote and to join political parties or
politically oriented groups and attend meetings, but they are barred from
taking an active role as spokesmen either for the IDF or the political group,
Little information is available on the political orientation of IDF officers,
but analysts who have sought to study the subject generally suggest that there
is little difference between the political orientation of military personnel
and those of the civilian population. One survey of senior reserve officers,
conducted during the early 1970s by Yoram Peri in connection with the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, found this to be the case, concluding that "the IDF,
as a social institution, has no decisive role in the determination of
ideological stands."

     In terms of orientation to a particular political party, several analysts
have noted that officers whose political opinions differed from those of the
party in power had less chance of advancement than those with government
party affiliation. It is not surprising, then, that in 1965, for example,
the percentage of senior reserve officers who voted for the Labor Alignment
was considerably greater than that of the general population. Edward Bernard
Glick, a prolific observer of the IDF, noted in 1975 that "None of the ten
Chiefs of Staff could have been named to the post if he was perceived as being
at odds with the general socialist-kibbutz-Histadrut (Labour Union)
orientation of the Labor Party, which has ruled Israel since its inception."
Although Chief of Staff Eytan was reputed to be apolitical at the time of his
appointment, his views as expressed in May 1978 indicated that he, too, was
not at odds with the political orientation of the government of Prime
Minister Begin (see Multiparty System, ch. 3).

     The political role of retired IDF officers is a subject that has been
discussed at length during the 1970s by Israelis, who term the growing
practice of retired officers pursuing a second career in politics as
"parachuting into politics." By 1978 retired officers served in political
positions ranging from cabinet posts and seats in the Knesset to municipal
government posts. This development was a cause of concern to a minority of
Israelis who feared a growth of militarism. A 1973 nationwide survey found
that 21 percent of the population thought it inadvisable that ex-generals
turn politicians. The majority saw the practice as no threat to civilian
control of the military. Parachuting into politics is a relatively new
phenomenon. No ex-IDF officer assumed a cabinet position until 1955, and it
was not until after the six-day war that it became a common practice. During
the 1970s the government of Golda Meir contained four ex-generals, that of
Yitzhak Rabin, four, and the government of Begin, five. Begin's cabinet
included Deputy Prime Minister Yadin, Minister of Defense Weizman, Minister of
Agriculture Sharon, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dayan, and Minister of
Transport and Communications Meir Amit.

     The practice became more common during the 1970s, and the period of time
between retirement from the IDF and the pursuit of a political career also
shortened. Early parachuters such as Allon waited years after their retirement
before attaining top political positions. However, Haim Bar-Lev entered the
cabinet in 1972 only a year after his retirement as IDF chief of staff.
Weizman was named minister of transport and communications in 1969 within
twenty-four hours of his retirement from the IDF. Israeli law prohibits
retired officers from running for the Knesset until 100 days after their
retirement, but no such law exists regarding accepting cabinet positions.

     Another problem presented by retired officers pursuing political careers
surfaces when they are called back to active duty (retired officers remain
reserve officers until age fifty-five). This became apparent in 1973 when
General Sharon retired in July to join the opposition Likud party only to
be recalled to active duty during the 1973 war. Sharon was highly critical of
the conduct of the war becoming the most vocal participant in the so-called
"War of the Generals," in which a number of active, retired, and reserve
general officers engaged in a public debate of the conduct of the 1973
war for several months during and after the hostilities. Sharon was elected
to the Knesset in the December 1973 elections, from where he continued to
criticize government policy while he remained a senior reserve officer.
As a result of this affair, the government barred Knesset members from
holding senior reserve appointments.

     Most foreign and Israeli observers agreed that despite the increasing
prominence and visibility of former military officers at the highest level of
government, the former officers do not form a cohesive and ideologically
united group. In the late 1970s there was no evidence of militarism in the
sense of dominance of the society by an identifiable military or officer
class. The IDF is commonly called a citizens' army because nearly two-thirds
of its soldiers are reservists, or "soldiers on leave for eleven months of the
year." Because service within the IDF is so widespread throughout all segments
of the Jewish majority of the country and because officers are almost
exclusively chosen from among the pool of conscripts rather than from a
military academy, which in some societies has been instrumental in the
creation of a military elite, a distinct military class has never existed in
Israel.

     Militarism is deeply antithetical to the democratic, civilian-oriented
concept of Israeli society held by the vast majority of Israelis. Prominent
military personalities, however, are often held in high esteem by society and
viewed as national heroes. This was particularly true after the stunning
victory of the six-day war. After the near disaster of 1973, however, the
prestige of military officers declined considerably; the dismissal of chief of
staff Daniel Elazar and chief of military intelligence Zeira after the
recommendations of the Agranat Commission showed that Israeli society is just
as likely to chastise its military leaders for their errors as to honor them
for their victories.