$Unique_ID{bob00277} $Pretitle{} $Title{Israel Chapter 5D. Foreign Contacts} $Subtitle{} $Author{Richard F. Nyrop} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{idf military israeli defense israel foreign government territories political officers} $Date{1979} $Log{} Title: Israel Book: Israel, A Country Study Author: Richard F. Nyrop Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 5D. Foreign Contacts Before independence and the establishment of the IDF, Great Britain played a role in the development and training of various Jewish military organizations, including the Special Night Squads and the Jewish Brigade. British influence carried over to the IDF, and in the 1970s various aspects of the IDF, including their British-style uniforms, provided evidence of the importance of those early contacts. Another vital early foreign influence was Switzerland, whose reserve system served as a model to the original architects of the IDF for the fulfillment of large manpower needs in a small country with limited human resources (see Historical Background, this ch.). During the War of Independence, the IDF relied on Jewish volunteers from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and South Africa to provide much of the skilled manpower for the fledgling air force and navy; the naval commander was in fact an American volunteer. It was not until 1952 that all air force pilots were Israeli citizens. During the formative years of the IDF, no Western country agreed to sell weapons to Israel, and Czechoslovakia was the only legal government-to-government source of arms. Czechoslovakia also contributed to the training of Israeli pilots and paratroopers for a brief period. By the early 1950s the IDF was able to purchase a variety of small jets and war-surplus weapons from several West European countries, including Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Sweden. Since the mid-1950sp the most important aspect of the IDF's contacts with foreign governments has stemmed from its need to have a reliable source of arms. France fulfilled that need for over a decade beginning in 1955 with the delivery of twenty-four jet fighters. Although Israel had to pay full commercial prices, it was able to buy whatever it requested-which were primarily jet aircraft. West Germany also began to supply Israel with a large quantity of other kinds of modern weapons, as did Great Britain after 1956. Not until the mid-1960s did the United States openly agree to sell weapons to Israel. Just before the six-day war, France served notice that it would no longer be a reliable source of weapons by blocking delivery of fifty fighter-bombers. In January 1969 France completed its political realignment within the Arab-Israeli conflict and imposed a total embargo on arms sales to Israel. These actions prompted Israel to speed up its efforts both to develop its own arms industry and to seek American weapons. After the first agreement to deliver Hawk antiaircraft missiles in 1962, United States foreign military sales to Israel grew substantially, though at an uneven clip (see table 23, Appendix A). The unusually high figures for fiscal year (FY-see Glossary) 1974 reflect the granting of US $2.2 billion in emergency military assistance and the airlifting of nearly US $1 billion in emergency supplies to Israel during the October 1973 War. By the mid-1970s the United States was clearly the largest foreign supplier of arms to Israel, though other countries, including Great Britain and West Germany, continued as lesser suppliers. As part of its efforts to ensure that foreign countries would continue to supply vital weapons, the IDF operated special arms purchasing missions throughout the world; its mission in the United States was the largest, said in 1977 to have over 200 members. The United States Foreign Military Sales Program with Israel was one of the largest in the world; it ranked fourth during FY 1977 in terms of agreements, third in terms of deliveries, and first in terms of loans and grants. From 1973 to 1978 Israel was the only country in the world to have part of its payment under the financing program waived. In 1977 and 1978, in addition to loans and grants under the Foreign Military Sales Program, the United States also granted Israel some US $750 million annually in economic aid. The Foreign Military Sales Program is guided by the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1952, which require that military equipment supplied to Israel "will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state." During the mid-1970s, as Israel became increasingly capable of fulfilling its requirements for arms through its own defense industries, its need for foreign weapons became limited to the most modern and sophisticated equipment, such as the most advanced jet aircraft, for which Israel lacked either the technology or the economic resources to develop (see Economic Impact, this ch.). As Israel became less dependent on foreign arms suppliers for small arms and ammunition during the 1970s, however, it also became more dependent, at least in money terms, on foreign supplies of the modern most weaponry, which became increasingly expensive throughout the decade. The need to replace the aging F-4 fighters with more modern aircraft for the 1980s led to considerable controversy both in Israel and the United States. Although Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) had designed a suitable successor, it was generally felt to be more economical to purchase American models, the F-15 and F-16, rather than spend the estimated US $500 million necessary to develop an Israeli aircraft. Some felt, however, that the investment would be rapaid in relieving Israel's dependence on the United States. This latter argument was reinforced in late 1977, when President Jimmy Carter agreed to sell Israel fewer F-16s than it had requested and tied his approval of their sale, along with that of further F-15s, to the sale of American jet aircraft to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Many IDF officials saw this as a confirmation of the dangers of dependence on foreign weapons suppliers; and just before his resignation as IDF chief of staff in April 1978, Mordecai Gur recommended withdrawing Israel's request in an effort to prevent the sale to Saudi Arabia. Despite the political controversies surrounding Israeli procurement of United States weapons, it was clear in mid-1978 that IDF officials saw the ongoing relationship as vital; in March 1978 Minister of Defense Weizman requested some US $12 billion in arms over the next ten years. In addition Israel has been the influential partner in a large number of other contacts with foreign military establishments, most of which were from African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Israeli influence has spread through military advisers, most important from Nahal, and through the exportation of equipment from its own rapidly growing defense industries. During the 1960s and 1970s, with the interest among military establishments of the developing world in civic action programs in which armed forces personnel actively participate in the nation's social and economic change, scores of countries have looked to the IDF, and to Nahal in particular, as a successful example. One count made in 1976 listed thirty-seven countries-twenty-one in Africa, five in Asia, and eleven in Latin America-that had received instruction and/or assistance in Nahal-type programs. Nahal officers instructed foreign officers in both military and agricultural matters, which proved particularly useful in countries with relatively uninhabited and unintegrated regions. Not all instruction is in Nahal-type programs: in 1970, for example, Israeli missions in four African and two Asian countries offered specialized military training. In addition to training military personnel in their home countries, Israel had trained a large number (20,000 between 1960 and 1970) of foreign officers (from forty-seven countries in 1970 alone) for six months to two years in IDF schools in Israel. For security reasons, Israeli officials were reluctant to discuss arms exports in detail, although the broad outlines of this aspect to Israel's foreign military contacts have come to light during the mid-1970s. Israeli arms exports became significant after the mid-1960s, hovered around US $60 million annually during the early 1970s, and increased dramatically after 1973. IDF officials reported that total sales for 1976 were US $320 million and were expected to reach US $400 million during 1977, although some foreign sources contended that actual figures were much higher. It was clear, nevertheless, that arms exports rose substantially during the mid-1970s and that their continued growth was an important goal of Israeli economic and defense planners (see Economic Impact, this ch.). No complete authoritative published list of the countries to which Israel exports arms exists, but in a 1974 study Zeev Schiff asserted that Israel's customers totaled nearly fifty countries. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute documented sales during the mid-1970s to Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Other sources have listed Kenya, Ethiopia, and the United States (whose Secret Service uses Israeli-built Uzi submachine guns) as customers as well. Israeli sales to foreign military establishments included a wide variety of weapons and ordnance, from basic ammunition to sophisticated missiles, patrol boats, and transport aircraft, as well as such nonlethal equipment as tents. As of mid-1978, however, Israel had been frustrated in its efforts to sell the Kfir jet fighter. Although highly price-competitive, the Kfir was equipped with American built engines and thus subject to United States approval for export from Israel (see Economic Impact, this ch.; Industry, ch. 4). The IDF as an Army of Occupation Since Israel's occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula during the six-day war, the IDF has carried the burden of responsibility for implementing Israeli government policy in the territories. As an army of occupation, the IDF has been the primary guarantor of security in the territories and, although municipal government has remained in the hands of the local Arab population, IDF officers have assumed senior administrative positions and thus held ultimate responsibility for governing the areas under the terms of martial law. The post-1967 experience was not the first such responsibility for the IDF: between 1950 and 1966 three regions inside Israel with large Arab populations-the Northern Area (also known as Galilee Area), the so-called Arab Triangle in central Israel, and the Negev- were governed by the IDF under the provisions of the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations of the British Mandate government (see Israeli Arabs, Arab Land, Arab Refugees, ch. 1). Ultimate executive responsibility for the occupied territories is held by the minister of defense, who is advised by the Ministerial Committee for Security and the Territories, which consists of several cabinet members and is headed by the prime minister. Two less important ministerial committees, the Committee for Coordinated Action in the Territories and the Committee of Directors-General for Economic Affairs, also advise on political and security, and civil and socioeconomic matters, respectively. From the minister of defense, command is passed to the Department of Military Government, which is a functional command within the general staff headed by the coordinator of governmental operations in the administered territories, a position held by Major General Slomo Gazit from 1967 to 1973 and by Major General Raphael Vardi after January 1974. Day-to-day administrative matters are dealt with in the next level of command by regional commanders (commonly referred to as military governors). In the original legislation for the administration of the occupied territories, there were five regional commanders; but subsequently the command for the central Sinai was dropped, leaving commands for north Sinai and the Gaza Strip, the southern Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. In the mid-1970s these commands were headquartered in Al Arish, Sharm ash Shayhk, Nazareth, and Ramallah, respectively, each of which contained two small staffs for security and civil matters (the Golan Heights was administered by the IDF Northern Command because the area was virtually without an Arab population in the mid-1970s). Regional commands are further subdivided into several district commands, stationed in key cities within the territories; each district command also has small staffs for security and civil affairs. The command structure at the lower levels is generally quite fluid, and district commands, in particular, often change locations, consolidating or expanding as specific needs arise. Although IDF officials hold the top administrative positions in the territories, Arabs hold the vast majority of total government administrative and staff positions: in December 1972 then-defense minister Dayan stated that Israelis held only 3 percent of staff positions, excluding customs officials, in the territories. This procedure is part of the overall IDF guideline to minimize the Israeli presence in the territories. Moreover many Israeli officials, particularly those concerned with socioeconomic policies, are civilians from one of several government ministries. The major task of the military government has been to uphold internal security in the territories. Immediately upon Israel's occupation in June 1967, an intense pacification program was launched, and harsh measures were carried out to suppress local expressions of dissent, such as noncooperation campaigns, strikes, and especially terrorist activities. Methods used in the pacification included the widespread deportation of local residents whom Israeli officials deemed subversive, the destruction of Arab homes believed to house subversives and their supporters, preventive detention for up to six months, which could be extended indefinitely, and other repressive measures derived from the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations of the British Mandate period. By 1971 the territories were relatively secure, due as much to the PLO debacle in Jordan as to Israeli security measures; and Israeli use of such extreme measures subsequently declined precipitously, although deportations, the destruction of property, and preventive detention continued to be practiced on a much smaller scale. The pre-1967 legal system in the territories remained largely intact, but security offenders there, as in Israel, were tried in Israeli military courts (see Discipline and Military Justice, this ch.). The death sentence is permissible under Israeli military law, though as of mid-1978 it had not been used in the occupied territories. Sentences from fifteen years to life imprisonment for crimes ranging from belonging to a terrorist organization to perpetrating terrorist acts are common, however. The United States Department of State estimated that in July 1977 there were some 3,100 non-Israeli Arabs, mostly residents of the occupied territories, imprisoned within Israel. Several of these security prisoners alleged that they had been tortured during pretrial interrogations; their allegations were published in a lengthy report by the Sunday Times of London in June 1977. The report concluded that "torture of Arab prisoners is so widespread and systematic that . . . it appears to be sanctioned as deliberate policy." Both the Israeli government and the United States Department of State subsequently disagreed with this conclusion, the latter reporting in its February 1978 human rights report that "We know of no evidence to support allegations that Israel follows a consistent practice or policy of using torture during interrogations. However, there are documented reports of the use of extreme physical and psychological pressures during interrogation, and instances of brutality by individual interrogators cannot be ruled out." In contrast to the report in the Sunday Times, the Israeli government and some neutral observers characterize Israel's occupation as benign or even beneficial to the local population. They point to the increased standard of living in the territories, the policy of open bridges to Jordan, the relative freedom of expression enjoyed by West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs, and the considerable Israeli efforts in developing health and education facilities and economic infrastructure within the territories since 1967. Repressive security measures, they contend, affect only a few inhabitants and are a necessary part of any occupation of enemy territory. The IDF is genuinely concerned with the maintenance of a favorable public image, both within the territories and abroad, as an army of occupation. After an incident in March 1978 in which seven schoolchildren were injured as soldiers lobbed tear gas into the school in an attempt to disperse their demonstration, several IDF officers were prosecuted, and the military governor of the West Bank was dismissed for misconduct during the incident. Nevertheless the local population carries a natural resentment toward its IDF occupiers; and in mid-1978 that resentment appeared to be increasing as the growth of Israeli settlements in the territories was interpreted as proof that at least some Israelis planned to remain permanently. The creation of pioneering outpost communities, or settlements, with multiple purposes of agricultural development, establishing secure zones, and proclaiming Jewish rule, has been a deliberate and consistent policy of Zionism since the earliest settlers in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. About two-thirds of the some 130 settlements established between 1967 and the end of 1977 have been located beyond the "green line," in Israeli-occupied Arab territories (see fig. 13; fig 14; fig. 15). Most Israeli government decisions on settlement beyond the green line were made by the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, although ultimate authority concerning settlement and all other matters pertaining to the occupied territories lay with the minister of defense. In April 1978, however, in an apparent attempt to reduce the public flow of information on this increasingly controversial issue, responsibility for settlement policies was ordered shifted to the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs. In mid-1978 there was considerable controversy surrounding Israel's program of settlement in the occupied territories, which for a time became mirrored in open disagreement between Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, who headed the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, and Defense Minister Weizman over the political wisdom of continuing the development of new settlements while peace negotiations were in progress; for about a month land preparation for new settlements was halted on Weizman's orders. Moreover the issue of the continuing development of Israeli settlements and the accompanying Israeli acquisition of sizable amounts of land in the occupied territories isolated Israel from world public opinion. Many of its traditional friends, including the United States, condemned the practices as in violation of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Nevertheless the Israeli government argued that it did adhere to nearly all components of the Geneva Convention and the convention did not in fact apply to Israel's occupation from a strict international legal standpoint. The proposed Israeli budget for FY1978 recommended a "substantially increased development of new settlements." At the end of 1977 there were an estimated 10,000 Israeli settlers in the occupied territories. Each settlement was populated by representatives of one of a variety of political, religious, labor oriented, or paramilitary organizations, the most important being Nahal, many of whose settlements are transferred to civilian organizations after their initial development. During the mid-1970s a growing number of unauthorized, or "illegal" settlements were established in the West Bank by the ultra-Orthodox religious group known as Gush Emunim (Faith Bloc). Whereas most government-approved settlements in the West Bank were located in the relatively unpopulated eastern portion, those established and proposed by Gush Emunim were mostly in the densely populated hills of western Samaria. Security interests are traditionally cited as the primary motivation for Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Armed settlements, they argue, discourage guerrilla infiltration and act as a first line of defense and tripline in the event of an enemy invasion. Critics argue that the settlements are highly overrated in their value to Israeli security in this age of high-firepower weaponry, pointing to the widely held opinion after the 1973 war that the settlements in the Golan Heights not only had no defense value but actually were an obstacle to effective military action in repulsing the Syrian invasion because essential time was lost during the evacuation of women and children. Critics also quoted General Itzhak Hofi, head of Mossad, Israel's primary intelligence agency: "The settlements on the Golan Heights are not a factor of strength in the struggle for power between Israel and Syria, and cannot play any role in resolving or balancing the military problems." Many Israeli and foreign observers argued in the mid-1970s that the strategic significance of the settlements had become secondary to their political significance, either as bargaining chips in future peace negotiations or, in the opinion of some, as an indication of Israel's intention to retain the areas indefinitely. Uncertainty about the future direction of Israeli government policies in the occupied territories was the source of increasing dissent among Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza and a mounting political controversy among Israelis themselves in mid-1978. Armed Forces and Society Economic Impact The economic impact of national security has always been large in Israel, and during the 1970s that impact grew in a variety of ways. Government expenditures for defense have grown markedly (see table 24, Appendix A). The rather astounding increases in terms of current Israeli pounds, however, must be tempered by the effects of double-digit inflation: for example, between 1970 and 1976, total defense expenditures increased over sevenfold in current prices, but in terms of constant prices they increased only on the order of 100 percent. In FY 1978 proposed defense expenditures declined in real terms over those approved for FY 1977 in an overall effort to trim government expenses, although the costs of the Litani Campaign were likely to require a supplement to the proposed budget. The reasons for the large increases in the defense budget, particularly since the 1973 war, were many and included rapidly rising costs of both equipment and manpower (see Role of Government, ch. 4). A comparison of defense expenditure as a percentage of the total state budget reveals a steady decline since 1973 and, in fact, a decline of more than 5 percent between 1970 and 1976 despite the considerable increase in absolute terms. Clearly other components of the state budget rose faster than the defense sector during the 1970s. The debt component of the state budget grew particularly rapidly, a phenomenon at least partially related to past loans related to defense expenditure. Although American aid has contributed greatly to Israel's ability to support its huge defense expenditures, especially since 1973, and greatly relieved its immediate balance-of-payments difficulties caused in large part by rising defense expenditures abroad (largely for equipment), the long-run necessity to repay its foreign debts surfaced during the period, thus creating, by 1978, a mounting debt crisis. Defense spending has also contributed to Israel's inflationary problems because it contributed to domestic financial flows without increasing the supply of consumer goods and services (see Foreign Contacts, this ch.; Balance of Payments, ch. 4). The financial burden of defense expenditures to the Israeli citizen was, perhaps, the largest of any nation in the world. In terms of statistics usually used to measure it, the defense burden was overwhelming: in 1977 the equivalent of nearly US $1,200 per capita (well over twice the rate in the United States or the Soviet Union) or more than 30 percent of the gross national product (GNP) of Israel. Most analysts of the Israeli defense burden, however, try to take into account Israel's large import surplus, which was financed by a flow of funds from a variety of sources including United States military aid; for example, in 1977 the defense burden dropped to 17.5 percent of the country's resources. Official Israeli government statisticians measure the defense burden similar to this latter figure. The burden of defense expenditures was greatest in 1973, the year in which Israel fought a war that several analysts estimate cost the Israelis an amount of money equivalent to a full year's GNP. The economic impact of national security is also apparent in terms of manpower, which is a vital resource in an industrialized nation of a little more than 3.6 million people. This impact is felt especially during the mobilization of the reserves, which has been an increasingly frequent event since 1973, when the failure to mobilize promptly proved to be a very costly mistake. A full mobilization of the nation's nearly 250,000 reserves has the effect of nearly bringing the economy to a halt, this being a principal reason for the importance to Israel that wars be of brief duration (see Israeli Concepts of National Security, this ch.). Even partial mobilizations, which regularly occur several times annually, have a profound impact on national production, as does the regular yearly period of active duty served by each reservist. Not all the economic impact of national security is negative, however. The remarkable growth of Israel's defense industries, particularly since 1967, has provided considerable employment, contributed to economic growth, and been a positive factor in the nation's foreign trade accounts due both to import substitution effects and the growth of exports of military equipment (see Defense Industries, ch. 4). The original impetus behind the development of Israel's defense industries, which by the late 1970s was expected to produce fully half of Israel's total requirements for military equipment, was not economic as much as it was strategic: that is, the need to reduce the nation's dependence on not-always-reliable foreign sources of armaments. By 1978 independence from foreign arms suppliers was still a major concern, but the steady growth of defense industries during the previous decade had shown them to be a valuable economic asset as well. Defense industries included some 150 public and private firms in 1977, but production was dominated by four major concerns: IAI, a semiautonomous government conglomerate and one of the nation's largest manufacturing concerns, which employs some 20,000 workers and has sales estimated at US $400 in 1977; Israel Military Industries, which concentrates on small arms and ammunition; the Armament Development Authority, commonly known as Rafael, which is the government's official agency for armament research and development; and the Israel Shipyards in Haifa. A number of large private firms engage in the manufacture of electronic equipment for military purposes. Social Impact The tradition of the IDF as an institution of social service dates from 1949, when it played a major role in tackling sudden and widespread epidemics of disease in transit camps for the flood of immigrants to the new nation. In that same year, Ben-Gurion envisioned a vital educational mission for the IDF, which he defined as "the duty of the army to educate a pioneer generation, healthy in body and spirit, courageous and loyal, which will unite the broken tribes and diasporas to prepare itself to fulfill the historical tasks of the State of Israel through self-realization." Shortly thereafter a program was begun, and by 1962 it was completely institutionalized, whereby the IDF would, through a variety of means, contribute to the education and social integration of immigrant youth. From the beginning, these efforts of the IDF concentrated on the generally less educated Sephardic Jews. Probably the most important contribution made to the integration of disparate elements into Israeli society by the IDF stems from the common experience of conscription for some 90 percent of Jewish males and 50 percent of Jewish females. The IDF makes a concerted effort to integrate within its various units those from different social backgrounds; in many cases Sephardim and Ashkenazim, rural and urban, and Sabra and immigrant Jewish youth mix for the first time in their lives. The exception to this rule is in the minorities unit, which consists primarily of Druzes and has no Jews (see The Arab Minorities, ch. 2). Since the mid-1970s Druzes have been allowed to join other units if they choose. The educational program of the IDF, in addition to contributing to the manpower needs of the armed forces, assists those youths (largely Sephardim) who were deprived of basic education as children, to integrate into the Ashkenazic-dominated society of Israel (see The Sephardim, A Disadvantaged Majority, ch. 2). Perhaps the most important educational function of the IDF is the teaching of the national language, Hebrew. Each year some 5,000 soldiers are trained in Hebrew and introduced to the history and geography of Israel. Additionally some 1,200 soldiers a year spend the last three months of their period of conscription in basic education courses: a certificate of elementary education is required before a soldier is honorably discharged. A variety of other educational training, including secondary and vocational school courses, are attended by considerably fewer soldiers. The IDF also plays a role in the education and socialization of immigrant civilians. Several groups, but particularly young women within Gadna and Nahal, are deployed for a time in rural settlements of recent immigrants, where they teach much the same materials taught immigrant soldiers and inform the new arrivals of state services available to them (see Nahal and Gadna, this ch.). Many observers have noted that these IDF educational services have provided an important service to the Sephardic community and to the entire society in the integration of immigrants and in narrowing the educational gap in Israel's Jewish population. Other observers argue that these efforts have been successful in identifying the new immigrant with the State of Israel but far less successful in integrating the Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities. Maurice Roumani, for example, pointed out in a 1973 paper entitled "Some Aspects of Socialization in the Israeli Army: The Case of Oriental Jews" that the interethnic solidarity maintained within the IDF unit is based on the rigors and dangers common to all Israel soldiers, and that solidarity is lost upon the soldiers' return to civilian life, where Ashkenazim and Sephardim are, to a significant degree, segregated. In the case of Israel's Arab minority, societal patterns of segregation are reinforced by the IDF. Israeli Arabs, save the tiny Druze community, are for all practical purposes excluded from military service; although they are free to volunteer, very few do so. Fully one-seventh of society is thus excluded from an experience that is widely shared by the remainder of the population. A newer aspect of the social impact of the IDF is its role in the socialization of delinquent and ex-delinquent youth. In the early 1970s the IDF reversed its previous policy and began conscripting all but the most serious offenders among delinquent youth in an attempt both to increase its manpower pool and to provide remedial socialization in the context of military discipline. By 1978 it was clear that the policy had met with only partial success. Approximately half the youths, generally the less serious offenders, who had been released from detention to join the IDF, had adjusted successfully; the other half had been less successful. Many returned to criminal activity and contributed to growing disciplinary problems within the IDF, which included a rising use of drugs among soldiers and thefts and violent crimes within IDF units; others could not adjust to army life and simply left or were expelled from the IDF. Despite the problems associated with the new policy, IDF officials were proud of their role in youth rehabilitation and felt that the opportunity afforded delinquent youth to be reintegrated into society outweighed the associated disciplinary problems. Political Impact The Jewish military organizations of Palestine before Israeli independence were fiercely political; the Haganah and Palmach were closely associated with the socialist-labor Mapai (see Glossary) and the kibbutz programs, whereas the Irgun was intimately connected with the rightist Revisionist Movement of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his disciple, Begin (see Multiparty Septem, ch. 3). As the chief architect of the IDF, Ben-Gurion was determined to eliminate all political overtones from Israel's unified, national army and to establish clear civilian supremacy over the military. He was extraordinarily successful in his efforts, and for the first thirty years of its history, the IDF never once challenged the authority of its civilian masters. This does not mean, however, that the IDF is a nonpolitical institution. On the contrary, the significant political impact of the IDF can be discussed in several categories: the influence of IDF personnel on government policies relating to foreign affairs and national security; the political orientation of the officer corps; and the political role of retired officers. Under Israeli law policy relating to national security is set by the cabinet, which can be convened as the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs to enforce the secrecy of its proceedings, and approved by the defense and foreign affairs committee of the Knesset. The minister of defense is often the principal policy formulator (though this depends on his personality as well as that of the prime minister and the chief of staff) and may make urgent decisions without the consultation of fellow cabinet members if the need arises. In mid-1978 the minister of defense was a retired military officer, as had been all of his predecessors since 1967. The paramountcy of civilian control over the military has thus been maintained, but the sequence of former military officers as defense ministers has raised questions as to their truly nonmilitary status and their military impartiality. Active-duty IDF personnel are implementors of policy and do not directly engage in the formulation of policy. In a variety of ways, however, IDF officers play an indirect though significant role in creating governmental policy. At least once a month, the chief of staff and the chief of military intelligence meet with the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. They also meet regularly with the Finance Committee of the Knesset and, when called upon, attend cabinet meetings where, according to former chief of military intelligence Eliahu Zeira, they "have a great deal of influence on government policy." The decision to launch the 1967 Israeli offensive against the Arab armies was the most clear-cut case, as of 1978, of the IDF acting as a pressure group on civilian decisionmakers. The legally imprecise role in policymaking of the IDF officers, in part, led to the enactment of the Basic Law in 1976, which attempted to define the roles of the prime minister, minister of defense, and chief of staff. Upon taking office in 1977, Minister of Defense Weizman declared the role of the IDF was to execute policy and that in the past it had been too deeply involved in the policymaking process. Although private official consultations vis-a-vis government policy are condoned as essential in light of Israel's special need to be in a constant state of military preparedness, public statements of opinion concerning Israel's defense policy (i.e., opinions about when and where to go to war, or when and how or with whom to make peace) are generally considered to be in the realm of politics and off limits to active-duty personnel. On one of the few instances during the 1970s when this unwritten law was violated, newly appointed Chief of Staff Rafael Eytan discussed Israel's need to retain the occupied territories during a television interview in May 1978, a time when the seven-month-old negotiations toward a peace with Egypt were stalled: "Despite the modern means of war, the IDF will not be able to defend the state and maintain it as an independent state without Judea and Samaria, without the Golan Heights. As regards the Sinai, things depend on the size, on the form and on the agreement reached with the Egyptians." Many members of the government's political opposition described the chief of staff's remarks as clearly within the traditional boundaries of being political, although a vote to officially censor Eytan was handily defeated in the cabinet. Nevertheless shortly afterward Weizman issued directives to prevent similar occurrences in the future. IDF soldiers are free to vote and to join political parties or politically oriented groups and attend meetings, but they are barred from taking an active role as spokesmen either for the IDF or the political group, Little information is available on the political orientation of IDF officers, but analysts who have sought to study the subject generally suggest that there is little difference between the political orientation of military personnel and those of the civilian population. One survey of senior reserve officers, conducted during the early 1970s by Yoram Peri in connection with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, found this to be the case, concluding that "the IDF, as a social institution, has no decisive role in the determination of ideological stands." In terms of orientation to a particular political party, several analysts have noted that officers whose political opinions differed from those of the party in power had less chance of advancement than those with government party affiliation. It is not surprising, then, that in 1965, for example, the percentage of senior reserve officers who voted for the Labor Alignment was considerably greater than that of the general population. Edward Bernard Glick, a prolific observer of the IDF, noted in 1975 that "None of the ten Chiefs of Staff could have been named to the post if he was perceived as being at odds with the general socialist-kibbutz-Histadrut (Labour Union) orientation of the Labor Party, which has ruled Israel since its inception." Although Chief of Staff Eytan was reputed to be apolitical at the time of his appointment, his views as expressed in May 1978 indicated that he, too, was not at odds with the political orientation of the government of Prime Minister Begin (see Multiparty System, ch. 3). The political role of retired IDF officers is a subject that has been discussed at length during the 1970s by Israelis, who term the growing practice of retired officers pursuing a second career in politics as "parachuting into politics." By 1978 retired officers served in political positions ranging from cabinet posts and seats in the Knesset to municipal government posts. This development was a cause of concern to a minority of Israelis who feared a growth of militarism. A 1973 nationwide survey found that 21 percent of the population thought it inadvisable that ex-generals turn politicians. The majority saw the practice as no threat to civilian control of the military. Parachuting into politics is a relatively new phenomenon. No ex-IDF officer assumed a cabinet position until 1955, and it was not until after the six-day war that it became a common practice. During the 1970s the government of Golda Meir contained four ex-generals, that of Yitzhak Rabin, four, and the government of Begin, five. Begin's cabinet included Deputy Prime Minister Yadin, Minister of Defense Weizman, Minister of Agriculture Sharon, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dayan, and Minister of Transport and Communications Meir Amit. The practice became more common during the 1970s, and the period of time between retirement from the IDF and the pursuit of a political career also shortened. Early parachuters such as Allon waited years after their retirement before attaining top political positions. However, Haim Bar-Lev entered the cabinet in 1972 only a year after his retirement as IDF chief of staff. Weizman was named minister of transport and communications in 1969 within twenty-four hours of his retirement from the IDF. Israeli law prohibits retired officers from running for the Knesset until 100 days after their retirement, but no such law exists regarding accepting cabinet positions. Another problem presented by retired officers pursuing political careers surfaces when they are called back to active duty (retired officers remain reserve officers until age fifty-five). This became apparent in 1973 when General Sharon retired in July to join the opposition Likud party only to be recalled to active duty during the 1973 war. Sharon was highly critical of the conduct of the war becoming the most vocal participant in the so-called "War of the Generals," in which a number of active, retired, and reserve general officers engaged in a public debate of the conduct of the 1973 war for several months during and after the hostilities. Sharon was elected to the Knesset in the December 1973 elections, from where he continued to criticize government policy while he remained a senior reserve officer. As a result of this affair, the government barred Knesset members from holding senior reserve appointments. Most foreign and Israeli observers agreed that despite the increasing prominence and visibility of former military officers at the highest level of government, the former officers do not form a cohesive and ideologically united group. In the late 1970s there was no evidence of militarism in the sense of dominance of the society by an identifiable military or officer class. The IDF is commonly called a citizens' army because nearly two-thirds of its soldiers are reservists, or "soldiers on leave for eleven months of the year." Because service within the IDF is so widespread throughout all segments of the Jewish majority of the country and because officers are almost exclusively chosen from among the pool of conscripts rather than from a military academy, which in some societies has been instrumental in the creation of a military elite, a distinct military class has never existed in Israel. Militarism is deeply antithetical to the democratic, civilian-oriented concept of Israeli society held by the vast majority of Israelis. Prominent military personalities, however, are often held in high esteem by society and viewed as national heroes. This was particularly true after the stunning victory of the six-day war. After the near disaster of 1973, however, the prestige of military officers declined considerably; the dismissal of chief of staff Daniel Elazar and chief of military intelligence Zeira after the recommendations of the Agranat Commission showed that Israeli society is just as likely to chastise its military leaders for their errors as to honor them for their victories.