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$Unique_ID{bob00267}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Israel
Chapter 3E.   Religious Parties}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richard F. Nyrop}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{party
religious
political
election
labor
knesset
likud
seats
parties
electoral}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Title:       Israel
Book:        Israel, A Country Study
Author:      Richard F. Nyrop
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1979

Chapter 3E.   Religious Parties

     Those in Israel for whom Jewish religious principles constituted a major
if not the only frame of value reference accounted for about 36 percent of the
population in the 1970s; of this total about 15 percent-a proportion that was
established early in the life of the state-continued to vote for the country's
three major religious parties. Among this politically conscious religious
group, the adherents of the moderate National Religious Party (Mafdal)
outnumbered the ultra-Orthodox by two to one. Some Israelis once held the view
that the supporters of the ancient ultra-Orthodox principles and practices
would, by the attrition of time, significantly diminish in number; by the late
1970s, however, that prognostication had not been borne out; and in fact
ultraconservative orthodoxy continued to account for roughly 6 percent of
the country's population (see Introduction, ch. 2).

     Politically and economically the religious parties are to the right of
center but are distinct from the secular Likud and other minor center-right
political organizations. They have a common dedication to Orthodox Judaism,
meaning that the Jewish patterns of life should be based on the principles and
practical precepts of the Torah. They are organized not to seize the reigns
of power but rather to engage in what American scholar Norman L. Zucker calls
"theopolitics"-the "attempt to attain theological ends by means of political
activity." Despite their common religious orientation, however, these parties
have differed in the methods of relating themselves to the domain of practical
politics.

     By far the most popular religious group is the National Religious Party,
formed in 1956 to influence legislation based on the Hebrew scriptures and
to promote immigration, settlement, labor union activities, and religious
education in a religious context. Actually this party was a merger of two
historical antecedents-Mizrahi and HaPoel HaMizrahi (Mizrahi Workers)-that
together offered a moderate alternative to the intransigency of
ultra-orthodoxy. The Mizrahi group was formed as a political party in 1918
to engage mainly in matters of religious education. Its economic orientation
was conservative, but it tended to support the moderate policies of Mapai
in exchange for concessions on religious matters. Nevertheless a socialist
faction of the Mizrahi party split off in 1922 to form the more popular
HaPoel HaMizrahi Party-its objective being to combine socialism and religious
orthodoxy.

     The National Religious Party has participated in every coalition
government since independence (before 1956 by way of Mizrahi, which had been
a member of the Mapai-led coalition from 1948 to 1955). Invariably the
Ministry for Religious Affairs has been headed by a Knesset member nominated
by this party. Evidently the party's record of working with and frequently
influencing the dominant socialist partner suggested that Israel's Jews for
whom religion is important might have found satisfactory religious values in
more temperate forms of observance and in accommodation with a secular
society.

     Agudat Israel (Association of Israel) is ultra-Orthodox and aggressive
in its opposition to secularism in all its manifestations. Founded in 1912
the Agudat, as this group is commonly known, advocates that the state should
be governed under rabbinical authority since the Torah not only unites the
Jewish people but also is the ultimate source of Jewish sovereignty; it also
calls for traditional Jewish education in schools at all levels and proposes
state control of health and welfare funds. The Agudat maintains its own
schools, the expenses of which-as much as 85 percent-are provided by the
government.

     Poalei Agudat Israel (Workers of the Association of Israel) is a
religiopolitical labor movement, advocating development of the state, land
pioneering, mass immigration, and the protection of workers' rights in the
spirit of the Torah and tradition. It was originally founded in 1922 as the
labor wing of Agudat to counter-act the growth of secularist, socialist and
antireligious tendencies among the workers. Its political objective is
essentially the same as that of the parent body, but unlike the Agudat it
practiced what it preached, namely, the establishment of agricultural
settlements. The Poalei Agudat Israel maintained that the messiah would come
only if Jews merited redemption by settling on the land. In 1946 it became
independent of the Agudat, but its political and educational aims have not
changed over the years.

     Since independence the religious parties have sought to enhance their
influence in the Knesset in one form or another. In 1949 the four religious
groups existing at that time formed the United Religious Front for a single
electoral alliance, but they campaigned separately in 1951. For the elections
of 1955 and 1959, the Agudat and Poalei Agudat Israel formed the Torah
Religious Front, excluding the Mizrahi parties, which they claimed were not
sufficiently dedicated to the concept of the Torah state. The Torah front was
dissolved in time for separate campaigning in 1961 but was revived for the
election of 1973.

     Taken together, the religious parties have commanded from fifteen to
eighteen seats in the Knesset over the years, or about 12 to 15 percent of
total Knesset seats. Their influence on the legislative and decisionmaking
processes has been undeniably greater, however, than their absolute numbers
seemed to indicate. This can be attributed to the politics of coalition
building, a political necessity that has confronted every dominant
political party since 1949. Because the dominant party invariably had a
shortfall of from fourteen to twenty-one seats for the parliamentary majority
of sixty-one seats, it had to seek additional support from other parties, the
political demands of which were relatively compatible with the plank of the
dominant party. Under the circumstances, much of that extra margin of support
came from the religious bloc, especially the National Religious Party. Thus by
joining the coalition governments, the Orthodox Jews were able to trade their
support of the dominant group for concessions over matters of religious
importance.

Other Parties

     There are a number of organizations seeking to achieve disparate
objectives. Secular rather than religious, they generally represent minority
or special interest groups and, although they held a total of thirteen seats
in the Ninth Knesset (1977- ), did not act together as a bloc, nor did they
attempt to do so. Seven of the sixteen miscellaneous groups or lists that
contested the 1977 elections won at least one Knesset seat.

     Rakah (New Communist) party was renamed the Democratic Front for Peace
and Equality in 1973 in an attempt to broaden constituency and attract more
noncommunist Arab voters. Led by Meir Vilner, Rakah broke away from the
smaller pro-Zionist Maki Communist Party-founded in 1919-and draws its main
support from the Israeli Arabs under a plank calling for a total withdrawal
of Israeli forces from all occupied territories, equal rights for the Arab
community, the establishment of a democratic, socialist, and secular state in
Palestine, peace with the Arab states, and non-alignment in foreign policy.
The support for Rakah has risen steadily since 1965 when this group received
23.6 percent of the Arab vote; in 1977 one out of every two Arab voters who
constituted about 9 percent of the national electorate supported the Rakah
group. The mostly Jewish-backed Maki group was absorbed in 1973 into the
left-wing Moked (Focus) party.

     Evidently Rakah appeals more to the younger Arabs who have become
radicalized and grown disenchanted with their older leaders. In the past many
of these older Arabs who were wealthy and had extensive clan connections
tended to support Mapai and its heir; in 1977 Arab support for the old guard
declined sharply. Efforts to enhance the Arab position as a single, unified
voting bloc have not been successful because of intra-Arab frictions. If
united, however, the Arabs may well emerge as a more effective pressure
group with as many as eight or nine Knesset seats.

     The left-wing Shelli (Equality and Peace for Israel) was formed in
early 1977 by Arie Eliav, a former Labor Party secretary general. It absorbed
various leftist intellectual and peace groups including the pro-Zionist
communist Moked. The Shelli group advocated the establishment of a Palestinian
Arab state alongside the state of Israel, the withdrawal of Israel to its
pre-1967 borders, and political negotiations with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) on the basis of mutual recognition.

     Shlomzion (Realization of Zion) was founded in October 1976 as a
right-wing party by former general and military hero Ariel Sharon; its
platform was similar to that of Likud. This affinity came as no surprise since
it was Sharon who in 1973 took the lead in the formation of the Likud
alliance, elevating it to the status of a major political force with prestige
and credible alternative to the Labor-Mapam Alignment. At that time the
alliance was regarded as necessary if the Herut-led Gahal was to regain
respectability in the wake of a factional strife between Begin and ex-air
force commander Weizman.

     Before the election of 1973 Weizman, who was popular with the Herut's
younger echelons, called for the democratization of the party in an apparent
effort to broaden its power base; but such reformist demand was not taken
kindly by Begin who saw it as a challenge to his authoritarian leadership.
After Weizman's attempted reform was thwarted by the Begin-controlled old
guard, there emerged the distinct possibility of Weizman's faction bolting
the party to join a new political grouping. Against this backdrop Sharon, then
a member of the Liberal Party, called on the Gahal and other center-right
groups to realign and expand themselves into what was to become the Likud;
the move was considered critical as much for internal fencemending as for
bolstering the splintered bloc of center-right political groups.

     The minor groups winning one Knesset seat each were the Independent
Liberal Party that lost three of its four seats in 1977 and the Civil Rights
Movement that was formed in 1973 after breaking away from the Labor Party and
that advocated, inter alia, freedom from the influence of the religious
"establishment," electoral reform, women's liberation, and minority rights.
At the end of 1976 some of the founding members of the movement split and
joined the new DMC. In 1977 the familiar Arab candidates did not fare as well
as they had in 1973 when three Arabs had been elected to the Knesset on two
electoral lists affiliated with the Labor Party; in 1977 only one Arab was
elected on the United Arab List. The Flatto-Sharon List received 35,000 votes,
enough for the party to send two deputies to the Knesset. But this was a
one-man party-the only candidate being the founder of the list, Samuel
Flatto-Sharon, who was a financier of French origin and who, at the time of
the 1977 election, faced the possibility of extradition to France on charges
of tax evasion. Legal proceedings against him were rendered moot after his
election, which assured him parliamentary immunity.

The Electoral Process

     The Israelis are highly conscious of political rights and the electoral
process. This is reflected in the consistently high voter participation,
averaging over 80 percent in nine successive elections from 1949 to 1977.
Political empathy is also indicated by the year-round vigor of party
competition, intensified in an election year. The electoral process is free
from fraud and corruption and is almost universally accepted as the most
practical means of resolving partisan conflicts and of advancing the
pluralistic, special interests of varied social groups.

     National and local elections are based on universal suffrage, the secret
ballot, and proportional representation. Unless otherwise provided, they are
held regularly nationwide at four-year intervals on the same day. All Israeli
citizens eighteen years of age and older (2,236,293) have the right to vote,
unless legally barred by the courts. To be eligible as a candidate for the
120-member Knesset, an individual must be an Israeli citizen twenty-one years
of age or older; the same holds true for elective offices in the
municipalities and local councils, the membership of these local bodies
varying from one place to another.

     Three distinct features of the electoral system-the "party list"
procedure, the single national constituency, and proportional
representation-are derived from the Jewish community experience in Palestine
under the British Mandate. Under the party list procedure, the voter casts a
ballot not for individual candidates of his choice but rather for a whole
package of candidates known as the party list. The list, which ranges from a
single candidate to as many as 120 names, is prepared by each party in an
order of priority based on criteria known only to the select few party bosses.
In national and local elections, the individual voter has no control over the
choice of candidates; he votes for a party organization in all its
manifestations-its leadership, its ideology, its program and policies, and
its record of performance.

     Each party list stands for the entire country as a single electoral
constituency; there is no system of local constituencies. The outcome of
election is determined by the proportion of valid votes obtained by each list;
for instance, a 40 percent of the vote means approximately forty-eight of the
120 Knesset seats. These seats are then filled by individual candidates
according to the order of ranking in which they are listed, working down from
the top-meaning the first forty-eight names on the party list. A party
obtaining at least 1 percent of the vote is entitled to one Knesset seat.

     Predictably the sequence of listing is a matter of utmost concern to all
party politicians; usually the first name on a list is that of the party's
leader. The names closes to the top are called "safe seats" and, not
surprisingly, are a major focus of political infighting among all parties.
Without exception the listing procedure is used by party machines to ensure
discipline and compliance with directives from the party centers. Meritorious
service is rewarded with a safe seat.

     Judges and clergy may not become candidates; members of the armed forces
and civil service, although not precluded, are subject to certain restrictions
to ensure their impartiality. It is not necessary to conduct by-elections
for or make appointments to any vacancies created by death or resignation.
Such a vacancy is automatically filled by the next person on the same party
list at the last election.

     Supervision of elections is in the hands of the Central Election
Committee composed of thirty to thirty-five members formed by the political
parties on the basis of one member for every four seats each party holds in
the outgoing Knesset, providing that each party represented in the Knesset
shall have at least one member on the Central Election Committee. The chairman
of the committee is a judge of the Supreme Court chosen by the court and
additional to the party members. Ministers, members of the armed forces, and
state officials generally may not be members of the committee.

     Since the first general election of 1949, the issue of electoral reform
has been a topic of major political debate in Israel. Part of the reason
derives from the argument that the existing proportional election procedure
contributes to the proliferation of small or minor parties. The number of
party lists in elections through 1977 has averaged no fewer than nineteen, of
which about twelve have won one or more Knesset seats. To be sure, the
proportional scheme ensures a fair representation of all political viewpoints
to the extent that the parties or groups concerned can garner the minimum 1
percent of the vote. Checks and balances are inherent in this system, which
has provided safeguards as much against the possibility of tyranny by a
dominant party as against the possibility of a government representing a
minority. However, proportional election is often blamed not only for the
fractionation of the electorate but also for the political horse trading that
is part and parcel of Israeli coalition governments.

     Proponents of reform have taken issue also with the single nationwide
constituency and the procedure of party bosses drawing up the list of
candidates. These features are criticized as undemocratic and contributing to
grass-roots alienation, partly because the individual voter is excluded from
the process of candidate selection and partly because machine politics
thrives at the expense of local or community interests.

     As a result, consensus has evolved over the years among most parties on
the need for a change, but the agreement has been largely in principle. It is
generally recognized that there should be some form of compromise under which
proportional representation could be combined with a modified constituency
scheme that is partly national and partly local. As of 1978 there was as yet
no agreement on how the change could be translated into concrete measures;
resistance to any substantial change in the existing electoral process came
from small or minor parties that are principal beneficiaries of the status
quo.

The 1977 Election

     The election of 1977 had mixed results. It confirmed the staying power
of proportional representation-no single power was able to win an absolute
parliamentary majority. The result was the familiar coalition government. It
was different, however, from any of the preceding eight national elections.
For the first time a right-of-center bloc was voted into power-the Likud bloc.
More significant, the 1977 election helped demonstrate the viability of
democratic institutions and procedures in Israel even under trying external
circumstances; it also showed that the electoral process can be fairly
accurate barometer of public mood and of social changes in the body politic.

     In reflecting on the results of the 1977 election, some Israeli as well
as foreign commentators seem to agree that the Labor Party lost more than
Likud won. There are, to be sure, reasons to corroborate such a view, but when
the outcome of that election is seen in a broader context, it can be stated
also that Labor's loss was perhaps inevitable.

     Likud's success derives from the confluence of many intersecting factors.
Foremost among these was a change in the demographic character of the
electorate. Whereas in 1948 only 23 percent of the population was Sephardic,
this proportion had risen to nearly 50 percent by 1964 and to 52 percent by
1970; this increase was attributable as much to mass immigration as to higher
birth-rate among the Sephardim. This factor, coupled with the coming of age
of Sabras after the mid-1960s, had a critical effect on the 1977 election
and appeared likely to affect the future elections significantly.

     Generally the Sephardim are underrepresented politically and are
disadvantaged socially and economically as well (see The Sephardim: A
Disadvantaged Majority, ch. 2). They have a decisive numerical asset that they
can translate into power through proportional representation. If successful,
such power will likely correlate with ethnicity and pose a major challenge
to the traditional Ashkenazic monopoly of political and economic power. Yet
the Sephardim have been unable to obtain a power status commensurate with
their number partly because of internal factional strife and partly because
of their residual passivity. In any case, the established political parties
are in the hands of Ashkenazic elements, and not many Sephardic politicians
have rated top spots on any party lists.

     A small through growing number of Sephardic youths have attempted to
express their disaffection through radical political demands. Generally,
however, Sephardim have sought accommodations through established channels,
especially the opposition Likud that has for years courted the support of low
income, undereducated, and deprived Israelis. Not surprisingly, in election
after election, the Sephardic voters have been drawn to Likud as much because
they liked what they were promised as because of a protest motive against
the Ashkenazic-dominated Labor Party regimes. Moreover the Likud bloc has been
regarded by them as more hawkish than the Labor Party toward Arab states, a
factor of considerable psychological importance to the Sephardic immigrants
who have the residual memories of unhappy life under Arab rule.

     In the 1977 election Likud obtained 33.2 percent of the popular vote, a
net gain of 3.2 percent over the 1973 election. In terms of Knesset seats,
Likud's gain in 1977 was only four for a total of forty-three seats, but
these indications were significant if nothing else because they occurred
against the backdrop of a steady erosion of support for the Labor-Mapam
Alignment since 1969.

     Apart from the demographic factor discussed earlier, it can be stated
that Likud's gains are attributable to growing popular acceptance of the
center-right alliance as a responsible and legitimate political force. In a
society where the sense of insecurity is pervasive, Begin's Likud has drawn
mixed reactions for years because of its image, rightly or wrongly, as a
hard-line party. The Labor Party was not loath to exploit that image; in 1973,
according to political scientist Asher Arian, the Labor Party mounted a major
electoral campaign insinuating that "the Likud was headed by adventures who
would stubbornly refuse compromise and peace initiatives and would blindly
follow the 'not one inch' doctrine." The Likud bloc countered, then and ever
since, with proposals designed to present itself as politically dependable; in
the campaign for the 1977 election, it sought to dispel its extremely hawkish
image by declaring that the primary aim of a national unity government to be
headed by Likud would be to prevent war and that limited withdrawals would be
possible in Sinai and the Golan Heights-if not the West Bank.

     In retrospect, Likud's acceptability was based not so much on the merits
of its own declaratory posture as on the narrowing of policy differences
between the incumbent Labor Party and the opposition Likud on the issues of
peace and territory (see Aspects of Foreign Relations, this ch.). After the
six-day war, Israeli public opinion gradually shifted to the right in support
of hard-line positions taken by the governments of Meir and Rabin; against
this setting, Likud's rhetoric no longer seemed unpalatable. The support for
hard-line positions, be they of the Labor Party or Likud, was particularly
strong among Sabras.

     On balance, however, the Labor-Mapam Alignment might well have retained
public mandate, albeit with reduced strength, if it had not appeared to be
scandal ridden, divided, and drifting from its pioneering socialist roots.
Since the 1973 war the Labor Party has suffered one setback after another.
The Israelis were jolted by the government's less than impressive performance
in the war; almost overnight the image of the Labor Part as being destined to
rule forever was shattered.

     The leadership void left vacant by Meir's resignation as prime minister
in early 1974 could not be readily filled; she was the last of the old guard
who could shield the Labor Party from the debilitating effects of factional
infighting. Her departure left the party divided into two warring groups: the
dovish wing of Rabin and the hawkish wing under Peres. Then the party's image
was damaged by scandals involving some of its influential figures; in the eyes
of the concerned public, the party was regressing to politics of
opportunism-away from devotion, idealism, and regeneration. Furthermore the
ever-rising tax burdens, inflation, and the persistence of socioeconomic
inequities compounded the difficulties of the government, already troubled by
spiraling defense costs, deficit spendings, the balance-of-payments deficit,
and labor strikes.

     The Labor Party's electoral defeat was foreshadowed in 1976 by the birth
of DMC under Yadin and Rubenstein. The DMC became symptomatic of popular
disenchantment with the Labor Party. Two-thirds of the vote obtained by the
DMC in 1977 came from those who had supported Labor in previous elections. Of
the nineteen seats lost by the Labor-Mapam Alignment, fifteen seats were
captured by the DMC; this development, plus the four more seats that Likud
won, was enough to tip the scale of electoral balance in Likud's favor.