$Unique_ID{bob00267} $Pretitle{} $Title{Israel Chapter 3E. Religious Parties} $Subtitle{} $Author{Richard F. Nyrop} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{party religious political election labor knesset likud seats parties electoral} $Date{1979} $Log{} Title: Israel Book: Israel, A Country Study Author: Richard F. Nyrop Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 3E. Religious Parties Those in Israel for whom Jewish religious principles constituted a major if not the only frame of value reference accounted for about 36 percent of the population in the 1970s; of this total about 15 percent-a proportion that was established early in the life of the state-continued to vote for the country's three major religious parties. Among this politically conscious religious group, the adherents of the moderate National Religious Party (Mafdal) outnumbered the ultra-Orthodox by two to one. Some Israelis once held the view that the supporters of the ancient ultra-Orthodox principles and practices would, by the attrition of time, significantly diminish in number; by the late 1970s, however, that prognostication had not been borne out; and in fact ultraconservative orthodoxy continued to account for roughly 6 percent of the country's population (see Introduction, ch. 2). Politically and economically the religious parties are to the right of center but are distinct from the secular Likud and other minor center-right political organizations. They have a common dedication to Orthodox Judaism, meaning that the Jewish patterns of life should be based on the principles and practical precepts of the Torah. They are organized not to seize the reigns of power but rather to engage in what American scholar Norman L. Zucker calls "theopolitics"-the "attempt to attain theological ends by means of political activity." Despite their common religious orientation, however, these parties have differed in the methods of relating themselves to the domain of practical politics. By far the most popular religious group is the National Religious Party, formed in 1956 to influence legislation based on the Hebrew scriptures and to promote immigration, settlement, labor union activities, and religious education in a religious context. Actually this party was a merger of two historical antecedents-Mizrahi and HaPoel HaMizrahi (Mizrahi Workers)-that together offered a moderate alternative to the intransigency of ultra-orthodoxy. The Mizrahi group was formed as a political party in 1918 to engage mainly in matters of religious education. Its economic orientation was conservative, but it tended to support the moderate policies of Mapai in exchange for concessions on religious matters. Nevertheless a socialist faction of the Mizrahi party split off in 1922 to form the more popular HaPoel HaMizrahi Party-its objective being to combine socialism and religious orthodoxy. The National Religious Party has participated in every coalition government since independence (before 1956 by way of Mizrahi, which had been a member of the Mapai-led coalition from 1948 to 1955). Invariably the Ministry for Religious Affairs has been headed by a Knesset member nominated by this party. Evidently the party's record of working with and frequently influencing the dominant socialist partner suggested that Israel's Jews for whom religion is important might have found satisfactory religious values in more temperate forms of observance and in accommodation with a secular society. Agudat Israel (Association of Israel) is ultra-Orthodox and aggressive in its opposition to secularism in all its manifestations. Founded in 1912 the Agudat, as this group is commonly known, advocates that the state should be governed under rabbinical authority since the Torah not only unites the Jewish people but also is the ultimate source of Jewish sovereignty; it also calls for traditional Jewish education in schools at all levels and proposes state control of health and welfare funds. The Agudat maintains its own schools, the expenses of which-as much as 85 percent-are provided by the government. Poalei Agudat Israel (Workers of the Association of Israel) is a religiopolitical labor movement, advocating development of the state, land pioneering, mass immigration, and the protection of workers' rights in the spirit of the Torah and tradition. It was originally founded in 1922 as the labor wing of Agudat to counter-act the growth of secularist, socialist and antireligious tendencies among the workers. Its political objective is essentially the same as that of the parent body, but unlike the Agudat it practiced what it preached, namely, the establishment of agricultural settlements. The Poalei Agudat Israel maintained that the messiah would come only if Jews merited redemption by settling on the land. In 1946 it became independent of the Agudat, but its political and educational aims have not changed over the years. Since independence the religious parties have sought to enhance their influence in the Knesset in one form or another. In 1949 the four religious groups existing at that time formed the United Religious Front for a single electoral alliance, but they campaigned separately in 1951. For the elections of 1955 and 1959, the Agudat and Poalei Agudat Israel formed the Torah Religious Front, excluding the Mizrahi parties, which they claimed were not sufficiently dedicated to the concept of the Torah state. The Torah front was dissolved in time for separate campaigning in 1961 but was revived for the election of 1973. Taken together, the religious parties have commanded from fifteen to eighteen seats in the Knesset over the years, or about 12 to 15 percent of total Knesset seats. Their influence on the legislative and decisionmaking processes has been undeniably greater, however, than their absolute numbers seemed to indicate. This can be attributed to the politics of coalition building, a political necessity that has confronted every dominant political party since 1949. Because the dominant party invariably had a shortfall of from fourteen to twenty-one seats for the parliamentary majority of sixty-one seats, it had to seek additional support from other parties, the political demands of which were relatively compatible with the plank of the dominant party. Under the circumstances, much of that extra margin of support came from the religious bloc, especially the National Religious Party. Thus by joining the coalition governments, the Orthodox Jews were able to trade their support of the dominant group for concessions over matters of religious importance. Other Parties There are a number of organizations seeking to achieve disparate objectives. Secular rather than religious, they generally represent minority or special interest groups and, although they held a total of thirteen seats in the Ninth Knesset (1977- ), did not act together as a bloc, nor did they attempt to do so. Seven of the sixteen miscellaneous groups or lists that contested the 1977 elections won at least one Knesset seat. Rakah (New Communist) party was renamed the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in 1973 in an attempt to broaden constituency and attract more noncommunist Arab voters. Led by Meir Vilner, Rakah broke away from the smaller pro-Zionist Maki Communist Party-founded in 1919-and draws its main support from the Israeli Arabs under a plank calling for a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories, equal rights for the Arab community, the establishment of a democratic, socialist, and secular state in Palestine, peace with the Arab states, and non-alignment in foreign policy. The support for Rakah has risen steadily since 1965 when this group received 23.6 percent of the Arab vote; in 1977 one out of every two Arab voters who constituted about 9 percent of the national electorate supported the Rakah group. The mostly Jewish-backed Maki group was absorbed in 1973 into the left-wing Moked (Focus) party. Evidently Rakah appeals more to the younger Arabs who have become radicalized and grown disenchanted with their older leaders. In the past many of these older Arabs who were wealthy and had extensive clan connections tended to support Mapai and its heir; in 1977 Arab support for the old guard declined sharply. Efforts to enhance the Arab position as a single, unified voting bloc have not been successful because of intra-Arab frictions. If united, however, the Arabs may well emerge as a more effective pressure group with as many as eight or nine Knesset seats. The left-wing Shelli (Equality and Peace for Israel) was formed in early 1977 by Arie Eliav, a former Labor Party secretary general. It absorbed various leftist intellectual and peace groups including the pro-Zionist communist Moked. The Shelli group advocated the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state alongside the state of Israel, the withdrawal of Israel to its pre-1967 borders, and political negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the basis of mutual recognition. Shlomzion (Realization of Zion) was founded in October 1976 as a right-wing party by former general and military hero Ariel Sharon; its platform was similar to that of Likud. This affinity came as no surprise since it was Sharon who in 1973 took the lead in the formation of the Likud alliance, elevating it to the status of a major political force with prestige and credible alternative to the Labor-Mapam Alignment. At that time the alliance was regarded as necessary if the Herut-led Gahal was to regain respectability in the wake of a factional strife between Begin and ex-air force commander Weizman. Before the election of 1973 Weizman, who was popular with the Herut's younger echelons, called for the democratization of the party in an apparent effort to broaden its power base; but such reformist demand was not taken kindly by Begin who saw it as a challenge to his authoritarian leadership. After Weizman's attempted reform was thwarted by the Begin-controlled old guard, there emerged the distinct possibility of Weizman's faction bolting the party to join a new political grouping. Against this backdrop Sharon, then a member of the Liberal Party, called on the Gahal and other center-right groups to realign and expand themselves into what was to become the Likud; the move was considered critical as much for internal fencemending as for bolstering the splintered bloc of center-right political groups. The minor groups winning one Knesset seat each were the Independent Liberal Party that lost three of its four seats in 1977 and the Civil Rights Movement that was formed in 1973 after breaking away from the Labor Party and that advocated, inter alia, freedom from the influence of the religious "establishment," electoral reform, women's liberation, and minority rights. At the end of 1976 some of the founding members of the movement split and joined the new DMC. In 1977 the familiar Arab candidates did not fare as well as they had in 1973 when three Arabs had been elected to the Knesset on two electoral lists affiliated with the Labor Party; in 1977 only one Arab was elected on the United Arab List. The Flatto-Sharon List received 35,000 votes, enough for the party to send two deputies to the Knesset. But this was a one-man party-the only candidate being the founder of the list, Samuel Flatto-Sharon, who was a financier of French origin and who, at the time of the 1977 election, faced the possibility of extradition to France on charges of tax evasion. Legal proceedings against him were rendered moot after his election, which assured him parliamentary immunity. The Electoral Process The Israelis are highly conscious of political rights and the electoral process. This is reflected in the consistently high voter participation, averaging over 80 percent in nine successive elections from 1949 to 1977. Political empathy is also indicated by the year-round vigor of party competition, intensified in an election year. The electoral process is free from fraud and corruption and is almost universally accepted as the most practical means of resolving partisan conflicts and of advancing the pluralistic, special interests of varied social groups. National and local elections are based on universal suffrage, the secret ballot, and proportional representation. Unless otherwise provided, they are held regularly nationwide at four-year intervals on the same day. All Israeli citizens eighteen years of age and older (2,236,293) have the right to vote, unless legally barred by the courts. To be eligible as a candidate for the 120-member Knesset, an individual must be an Israeli citizen twenty-one years of age or older; the same holds true for elective offices in the municipalities and local councils, the membership of these local bodies varying from one place to another. Three distinct features of the electoral system-the "party list" procedure, the single national constituency, and proportional representation-are derived from the Jewish community experience in Palestine under the British Mandate. Under the party list procedure, the voter casts a ballot not for individual candidates of his choice but rather for a whole package of candidates known as the party list. The list, which ranges from a single candidate to as many as 120 names, is prepared by each party in an order of priority based on criteria known only to the select few party bosses. In national and local elections, the individual voter has no control over the choice of candidates; he votes for a party organization in all its manifestations-its leadership, its ideology, its program and policies, and its record of performance. Each party list stands for the entire country as a single electoral constituency; there is no system of local constituencies. The outcome of election is determined by the proportion of valid votes obtained by each list; for instance, a 40 percent of the vote means approximately forty-eight of the 120 Knesset seats. These seats are then filled by individual candidates according to the order of ranking in which they are listed, working down from the top-meaning the first forty-eight names on the party list. A party obtaining at least 1 percent of the vote is entitled to one Knesset seat. Predictably the sequence of listing is a matter of utmost concern to all party politicians; usually the first name on a list is that of the party's leader. The names closes to the top are called "safe seats" and, not surprisingly, are a major focus of political infighting among all parties. Without exception the listing procedure is used by party machines to ensure discipline and compliance with directives from the party centers. Meritorious service is rewarded with a safe seat. Judges and clergy may not become candidates; members of the armed forces and civil service, although not precluded, are subject to certain restrictions to ensure their impartiality. It is not necessary to conduct by-elections for or make appointments to any vacancies created by death or resignation. Such a vacancy is automatically filled by the next person on the same party list at the last election. Supervision of elections is in the hands of the Central Election Committee composed of thirty to thirty-five members formed by the political parties on the basis of one member for every four seats each party holds in the outgoing Knesset, providing that each party represented in the Knesset shall have at least one member on the Central Election Committee. The chairman of the committee is a judge of the Supreme Court chosen by the court and additional to the party members. Ministers, members of the armed forces, and state officials generally may not be members of the committee. Since the first general election of 1949, the issue of electoral reform has been a topic of major political debate in Israel. Part of the reason derives from the argument that the existing proportional election procedure contributes to the proliferation of small or minor parties. The number of party lists in elections through 1977 has averaged no fewer than nineteen, of which about twelve have won one or more Knesset seats. To be sure, the proportional scheme ensures a fair representation of all political viewpoints to the extent that the parties or groups concerned can garner the minimum 1 percent of the vote. Checks and balances are inherent in this system, which has provided safeguards as much against the possibility of tyranny by a dominant party as against the possibility of a government representing a minority. However, proportional election is often blamed not only for the fractionation of the electorate but also for the political horse trading that is part and parcel of Israeli coalition governments. Proponents of reform have taken issue also with the single nationwide constituency and the procedure of party bosses drawing up the list of candidates. These features are criticized as undemocratic and contributing to grass-roots alienation, partly because the individual voter is excluded from the process of candidate selection and partly because machine politics thrives at the expense of local or community interests. As a result, consensus has evolved over the years among most parties on the need for a change, but the agreement has been largely in principle. It is generally recognized that there should be some form of compromise under which proportional representation could be combined with a modified constituency scheme that is partly national and partly local. As of 1978 there was as yet no agreement on how the change could be translated into concrete measures; resistance to any substantial change in the existing electoral process came from small or minor parties that are principal beneficiaries of the status quo. The 1977 Election The election of 1977 had mixed results. It confirmed the staying power of proportional representation-no single power was able to win an absolute parliamentary majority. The result was the familiar coalition government. It was different, however, from any of the preceding eight national elections. For the first time a right-of-center bloc was voted into power-the Likud bloc. More significant, the 1977 election helped demonstrate the viability of democratic institutions and procedures in Israel even under trying external circumstances; it also showed that the electoral process can be fairly accurate barometer of public mood and of social changes in the body politic. In reflecting on the results of the 1977 election, some Israeli as well as foreign commentators seem to agree that the Labor Party lost more than Likud won. There are, to be sure, reasons to corroborate such a view, but when the outcome of that election is seen in a broader context, it can be stated also that Labor's loss was perhaps inevitable. Likud's success derives from the confluence of many intersecting factors. Foremost among these was a change in the demographic character of the electorate. Whereas in 1948 only 23 percent of the population was Sephardic, this proportion had risen to nearly 50 percent by 1964 and to 52 percent by 1970; this increase was attributable as much to mass immigration as to higher birth-rate among the Sephardim. This factor, coupled with the coming of age of Sabras after the mid-1960s, had a critical effect on the 1977 election and appeared likely to affect the future elections significantly. Generally the Sephardim are underrepresented politically and are disadvantaged socially and economically as well (see The Sephardim: A Disadvantaged Majority, ch. 2). They have a decisive numerical asset that they can translate into power through proportional representation. If successful, such power will likely correlate with ethnicity and pose a major challenge to the traditional Ashkenazic monopoly of political and economic power. Yet the Sephardim have been unable to obtain a power status commensurate with their number partly because of internal factional strife and partly because of their residual passivity. In any case, the established political parties are in the hands of Ashkenazic elements, and not many Sephardic politicians have rated top spots on any party lists. A small through growing number of Sephardic youths have attempted to express their disaffection through radical political demands. Generally, however, Sephardim have sought accommodations through established channels, especially the opposition Likud that has for years courted the support of low income, undereducated, and deprived Israelis. Not surprisingly, in election after election, the Sephardic voters have been drawn to Likud as much because they liked what they were promised as because of a protest motive against the Ashkenazic-dominated Labor Party regimes. Moreover the Likud bloc has been regarded by them as more hawkish than the Labor Party toward Arab states, a factor of considerable psychological importance to the Sephardic immigrants who have the residual memories of unhappy life under Arab rule. In the 1977 election Likud obtained 33.2 percent of the popular vote, a net gain of 3.2 percent over the 1973 election. In terms of Knesset seats, Likud's gain in 1977 was only four for a total of forty-three seats, but these indications were significant if nothing else because they occurred against the backdrop of a steady erosion of support for the Labor-Mapam Alignment since 1969. Apart from the demographic factor discussed earlier, it can be stated that Likud's gains are attributable to growing popular acceptance of the center-right alliance as a responsible and legitimate political force. In a society where the sense of insecurity is pervasive, Begin's Likud has drawn mixed reactions for years because of its image, rightly or wrongly, as a hard-line party. The Labor Party was not loath to exploit that image; in 1973, according to political scientist Asher Arian, the Labor Party mounted a major electoral campaign insinuating that "the Likud was headed by adventures who would stubbornly refuse compromise and peace initiatives and would blindly follow the 'not one inch' doctrine." The Likud bloc countered, then and ever since, with proposals designed to present itself as politically dependable; in the campaign for the 1977 election, it sought to dispel its extremely hawkish image by declaring that the primary aim of a national unity government to be headed by Likud would be to prevent war and that limited withdrawals would be possible in Sinai and the Golan Heights-if not the West Bank. In retrospect, Likud's acceptability was based not so much on the merits of its own declaratory posture as on the narrowing of policy differences between the incumbent Labor Party and the opposition Likud on the issues of peace and territory (see Aspects of Foreign Relations, this ch.). After the six-day war, Israeli public opinion gradually shifted to the right in support of hard-line positions taken by the governments of Meir and Rabin; against this setting, Likud's rhetoric no longer seemed unpalatable. The support for hard-line positions, be they of the Labor Party or Likud, was particularly strong among Sabras. On balance, however, the Labor-Mapam Alignment might well have retained public mandate, albeit with reduced strength, if it had not appeared to be scandal ridden, divided, and drifting from its pioneering socialist roots. Since the 1973 war the Labor Party has suffered one setback after another. The Israelis were jolted by the government's less than impressive performance in the war; almost overnight the image of the Labor Part as being destined to rule forever was shattered. The leadership void left vacant by Meir's resignation as prime minister in early 1974 could not be readily filled; she was the last of the old guard who could shield the Labor Party from the debilitating effects of factional infighting. Her departure left the party divided into two warring groups: the dovish wing of Rabin and the hawkish wing under Peres. Then the party's image was damaged by scandals involving some of its influential figures; in the eyes of the concerned public, the party was regressing to politics of opportunism-away from devotion, idealism, and regeneration. Furthermore the ever-rising tax burdens, inflation, and the persistence of socioeconomic inequities compounded the difficulties of the government, already troubled by spiraling defense costs, deficit spendings, the balance-of-payments deficit, and labor strikes. The Labor Party's electoral defeat was foreshadowed in 1976 by the birth of DMC under Yadin and Rubenstein. The DMC became symptomatic of popular disenchantment with the Labor Party. Two-thirds of the vote obtained by the DMC in 1977 came from those who had supported Labor in previous elections. Of the nineteen seats lost by the Labor-Mapam Alignment, fifteen seats were captured by the DMC; this development, plus the four more seats that Likud won, was enough to tip the scale of electoral balance in Likud's favor.