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$Title{Brazil
Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations}
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$Author{James D. Rudolf}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{brazil
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$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Title:       Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      James D. Rudolf
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations

     Brazilian foreign relations are highly complex and fraught with
subtleties that often defy attempts to peg Brazil in easily definable
categories. During the early 1970s Brazil's rapid economic growth, coinciding
with the rapid expansion of its diplomatic pursuits, frequently led analysts
to refer to Brazil in such sanguine terms as "future world power" and "the
first Southern Hemisphere star in the world galaxy." A decade later the
increases in world petroleum prices, triggered by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the growth of Brazil's foreign debt had
dramatically illustrated Brazil's ongoing vulnerabilities and led analysts to
be much more circumspect in their projections of Brazil's future place in the
world. Nevertheless, given that solutions would be found to these important
problems of economic dependency, many observers continued to view Brazil as
emerging into a position as an important world power by the turn of the
twenty-first century.

     The nation's leaders were careful to avoid the expression of such
ambitions in an overt, chauvinistic fashion. Rather, they viewed Brazil's
importance as the inevitable result of its geographic domination of the South
American continent, its large population and, most importantly, its dynamic
economy. Foreign policy was viewed, first and foremost, as a tool for the
nation's economic development. In the early 1980s trade matters (particularly
access to foreign markets in order to finance the balance of paments) topped
the foreign policy agenda. For a nation that had been ruled by the military
for nearly two decades, there was a strikingly small component of military
power projection in its foreign relations.

     The nation's growing economic strength allowed it to pursue foreign
relations during the decade of the 1970s that were increasingly independent of
the hegemonic political interests of the United States in the region. This
orientation was in marked contrast to the periods prior to 1960 and
immediately following the 1964 coup, when Brazil was perhaps the most devoted
follower of United States leadership in the region. By the early 1980s
Brazil's foreign policy orientation had much in common with the so-called
"independent foreign policy" pursued under the administration of President
Goulart during the early 1960s. Whereas Goulart's foreign policy had been the
source of considerable controversy, two decades later similar policies failed
even to evoke a debate prior to the 1982 elections. Whereas abertura sparked
heated criticism of the domestic policies of the military government, in the
arena of foreign policy there existed a remarkable consensus among the
political elites in favor of the government's pragmatic, self-serving "no
automatic alliances" approach.

     Foreign policy continued, as in the past, to be directed by the political
elites surrounding the president. There was little room for policy input by
Congress, academia, business, labor, and other such groups that play roles in
the formation of foreign policy in more democratic countries. The Constitution
requires Congress to approve most presidential actions in foreign affairs,
including treaties, declarations of war and peace, the passage and stationing
of foreign troops, and the participation in international organizations. Since
1964, however, Congress' freedom to disagree with the president has been
severely restricted. This fact was most clearly illustrated in 1974 when,
having criticized Chilean president Augusto Pinochet, a congressman was
prosecuted under the statues of the National Security Law that forbids any
public insult of a foreign head of state. Although this law remained in effect
in 1982, it might be expected that if abertura continued apace during the
1980s, Congress would gain a larger role in foreign relations through the
participation of its foreign affairs committees.

     Even in that event the preponderant role in decisionmaking would continue
to reside with the president, his advisory and staff agencies, the military
hierarchy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as Itamaraty, after the
building it formerly occupied in Rio de Janeiro), and a number of other
ministries within the president's cabinet. The delegation of authority and the
interrelationships among these actors have varied according to the style of
decisionmaking preferred by each president. Two trends were discernible: the
growing importance of economics in foreign relations has brought influence to
economically related agencies at the expense of Itamaraty, and the post-1974
political liberalization has lessened the institutional role of the military
in foreign policy decisionmaking.

     While discussions of foreign policy among these actors were more wide
ranging under presidents Geisel and Figueiredo, the final decisions were more
likely to be made at the top. Under previous military presidents, decisions
were often delegated to military officials in the National Security Council
(Conselho de Seguranca Nacional-CSN), the National Intelligence Service
(Servico Nacional de Informacoes-SNI), or in the Armed Forces General Staff
(Estado-Maior das Forcas Armadas-EMFA). By the early 1980s the High Command
of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Forcas Armadas-ACFA) retained an
important foreign policy role through its control over military attaches
stationed in foreign embassies, over the war materiel industry (increasingly
important in Brazil's exports), over the Brazil-United States Military
Commission, and over the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG),
which remained influential in defining national security concerns. Other
individuals and bodies within the military establishment continued to
influence foreign policy decisions, though largely on an ad hoc, rather than
institutionalized basis.

     Itamaraty has a proud tradition of service of over 100 years. It is
considered one of the most professionally organized bureaucracies within the
government and the most competent diplomatic corps among the nations of Latin
America, or possibly the entire Third World. Candidates for Brazil's foreign
service must have completed a university degree, then compete in a rigid
entrance examination, attend the Rio Branco Institute for diplomats for two
years, then complete two additional years of one-the-job training before
joining the elite diplomatic corps. Promotion is based principally on merit,
although political considerations do play a part. In recent years the minister
of foreign affairs has nearly always been a career diplomat chosen from among
the so-called "inner circle" of Itamaraty. This group also includes the
ministry's secretary general, its chief of staff, and a handful of department
heads.

     As economic matters have grown to dominate Brazilian foreign policy,
numerous parts of the government's economic bureaucracy have entered the
foreign policy stage at the expense of Itamaraty. The degree of influence of
each often depends on the personalities involved. Under Delfim Netto, the
Planning Secretariat played a crucial coordinating role, and the
minister-secretary led many foreign trade missions abroad. During the Medici
administration, Delfim had served as minister of finance, and that ministry
often competed with Itamaraty for influence over foreign policy. The Ministry
of Mines and Energy, with authority over powerful state corporations, such as
Petrobras, Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises (Empresas Nucleares
Brasileiras-Nuclebras), and the Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, which had major
import-export roles, was also important. The Ministry of Agriculture and the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce also preside over numerous agencies involved
in the formulation and execution of foreign trade policy. The Central Bank of
Brazil and the interministerial National Monetary Council are the principal
policymaking bodies in the area of international finance.

Multilateral Relations

     Few countries in the world participate in as many intergovernmental
organizations, both global and regional in scope, as does Brazil. It was a
founding member of the League of Nations (although it dropped out in 1928),
and United Nations (UN), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD); and it held membership in nearly all other specialized
agencies of the UN. Brazil was one of the few nations that was a member of
both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Group of 77. It
was instrumental in the formation of the International Coffee Organization and
the Cocoa Producers Alliance and participated in a host of additional
multilateral commodity agreements. It was a member of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and its specialized agencies and a variety of other
inter-American regional organizations, including the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA); its successor, the Latin American Integration Association
(ALADI): and the Latin American Economic System (SELA). Finally, Brazil was an
active contributor and participant in major multilateral lending institutions,
the World Bank (see Glossary), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

     During the late 1960s, when Brazil's participation in these organizations
was growing precipitously, many observers saw Brazil as emerging as a natural
leader of the nations of the Third World within these multilateral forums. For
a variety of reasons, however, this never happened. In part this was due to
political differences (Brazil being pro-capitalist, favorable toward
multinational corporations, and not prone to blame the United States for the
world's ills) with the majority of Third World nations that formed the Group
of 77 within the UN. In part it was due to Brazil's own proclivities: "no
automatic alliances" could apply to the Group of 77 as well as the United
States. Brazil has proved to be a highly independent actor in the multilateral
arena, unwilling to sacrifice what it perceives as its own interests for the
sake of group solidarity.

     While Brazil retained membership in a wide array of intergovernmental
organizations, only rarely did it undertake major multilateral initiatives.
For the most part Brazil played a quiet role and held limited expectations of
its activities in multilateral forums. They were viewed as necessary for the
projection of international stature, to avoid isolation (particularly in
regional affairs), to prevent actions against Brazilian interests, and as
valuable for informational purposes and to make contacts for subsequent
bilateral diplomacy. Their value in the pursuit of national interests was seen
as clearly secondary to bilateral relations.

     Brazil was not averse, however, to assuming an active role when the
activities of international organizations were perceived to coincide with its
own national interest. This was the case particularly with the so-called
access issues (markets, technology, energy and raw materials, and
international financing) and commodity price stabilization concerns raised
within the overall discussions of the "new international economic order."
Thus, increasingly throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Brazil was
an active participant (although not a leader) in the so-called North-South
dialogue taking place within the UN and a number of its specialized agencies.
It is worth emphasizing that Brazil's position was not ideologically
motivated but was based on the priority given to trade issues within its
overall foreign policy goals. As one of the Third World nations with the
most at stake in the present economic order, Brazil was able to play a
moderating role in these forums, calling for orderly and gradual change.

     Pragmatic economic concerns dictated shifts in Brazil's stance in the
UN General Assembly during the 1970s. Being a major importer of Middle
Eastern oil, it became a supporter of the Arab position with respect to the
Arab-Israeli dispute following the 1973-74 oil crisis. The strength of that
support became apparent in November 1975 when, in a very controversial action,
Brazil voted in favor of Resolution 3379, which condemned Zionism as a form
of racism. Brazil has used an honor traditionally granted it-giving the
opening speech for each annual General Assembly-as an effective voice for
its foreign policy concerns. In 1979 Minister of Foreign Affairs Ramiro Elisio
Saraivo Guerreiro reiterated his nation's support for the end of apartheid in
South Africa-support that coincided neatly with a leap in Brazilian trade with
Black Africa. Then in 1982, when Brazil's foreign debt hovered precariously at
unprecedented levels estimated at between US$60 and US$90 billion, President
Figueiredo called on the General Assembly to help find solutions to the debt
crises facing a number of Third World countries.

     Access to international finance was also Brazil's major concern in its
relations with multilateral lending institutions. After the 1964 coup, World
Bank and IDB loans, which had virtually ceased in the inflationary and
politically uncertain atmosphere of the preceding years, returned as a major
component of Brazil's development financing. By the early 1970s Brazil was
among the largest Third World borrowers from each institution. In 1977 this
access was threatened by efforts in the United States Congress to link United
States contributions to these institutions to borrowers' adherence to minimum
standards of human rights. This effort failed, but in the early 1980s Brazil's
access to conciliatory financing (long-term, low-interest loans) was again
threatened by efforts to have Brazil reclassified, because of its rising gross
national product (GNP), from a "developing" to "newly industrializing"
country. Being pegged with the majority of Third World countries also afforded
Brazil important advantages in access, through GATT and UNCTAD mechanisms, to
markets in the developed world. As of late 1982 Brazil had successfully fought
for what one longtime analyst termed "the right to stay in kindergarten,"
although this issue was likely to reappear in the atmosphere of world
recession, rising trade barriers, and declining commitment to foreign aid
within the developed countries.

     Brazil participates in a wide range of regional and hemispheric
multilateral organizations, although it generally adopts a low profile. This
is due, in large part, to its position within the hemisphere as the largest
nation, after the United States and Canada, and as the only
Portuguese-speaking nation. It does not feel, on the one hand, that it needs
the force of numbers, as do smaller nations within the OAS, to negotiate with
the United States. On the other hand, it does not wish to alarm its
Spanish-speaking neighbors by assuming a hegemonic stance that could easily
arise were its profile raised. In either instance its preference was for
bilateral diplomacy within the hemisphere. In addition to the OAS and its
specialized agencies, Brazil participated in a number of regional trade
organizations, including ALADI, SELA, and the Rio de la Plata Basin Treaty
(with Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia). Again, however, it preferred
bilateral trade negotiations, in which Brazil could be more dominant. Some
analysts suggested that Brazil's primary interest in regional organizations
was to make sure that its Spanish-speaking neighbors did not collude against
that dominant position.

     Brazil's newest venture in regional multilateral relations, the Amazon
Pact, was initiated in July 1978 with the signing of the Treaty for Amazon
Cooperation by the eight nations within the Amazon Basin. It is not an
economic agreement, but a pledge by Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Suriname, Guyana, and Brazil to cooperate in the protection of the
Amazon ecology and in the planning of the development of the entire basin.
Brazil took the initiative in forming the Amazon Pact after its unilateral
efforts in the development of its massive Amazon region proved unsuccessful
in many respects.

Latin American Relations

     One author termed Brazil's 1978 Amazon Pact initiative as "the opening
salvo in a campaign to transform its relations with Latin America." Although
this may overstate the Brazilian effort of the subsequent five years, it does
point out two important facts: that Brazil uses its multilateral diplomatic
efforts in order to pave the way for efforts in the bilateral sphere and that
Brazil's economic development goals led it to upgrade substantially its
bilateral relations in Latin America between 1978 and 1980. Historically,
Brazil had been oriented toward Western Europe and the United States, turning
its back, in effect, on its Latin American neighbors. After the 1964 coup the
military regime's United States orientation, together with its colonization
projects bringing settlements along its frontiers (seen in light of Brazil's
adherence to the doctrine of uti possidetis-sovereignty based on
settlement-in the fixing of its western borders during the early twentieth
century), led to considerable unease among Brazil's neighbors (see Politics as
Usual, ch. 1). Only Chile and Ecuador-the two nations in South America that do
not border Brazil-did not fear, to some extent, potential Brazilian
expansionism. Although concerns over Brazilian hegemonic designs in South
America persisted in the early 1980s, they had been greatly alleviated by a
series of bilateral agreements signed in the wake of the creation of the
Amazon Pact.

     Rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, the two most powerful nations of
South America, has traditionally been one of the most salient features of the
region's diplomacy. During the 30 years prior to 1982, however, Brazil
steadily gained on its rival, which became mired in domestic political,
economic, and social decay. The rivalry remained, although its significance
diminished considerably.

     The 1967 Rio de la Plata Basin Treaty, instigated by Argentina, initiated
the continuing efforts by the two powers to moderate traditional rivalry with
cooperation in the exploitation of the region's resources. Further discussions
between 1977 and 1979 led to the resolution of the remaining differences over
hydroelectric plants on the upper tributaries of the Rio de la Plata and also
led to a series of agreements in the areas of trade, investment, and nuclear
technology. In 1980 presidents Figueiredo and Jorge Videla visited one
another's capitals: this was enormously important as a symbol of diplomatic
thaw, being the first such presidential exchange in some 40 years.

     Nevertheless, economic difficulties and fluid political situations,
together with a number of specific unresolved issues in both countries, left
the future course of Brazilian-Argentine relations uncertain. Although trade
between the two had picked up in recent years, Argentine pride and fear of
Brazilian domination could limit future growth. Argentina's reaction to the
reduced flows in its river system, once the Itaipu Dam and other massive
hydroelectric projects come on line during the 1980s, was also unpredictable
(see Hydrography, ch. 2). In the area of national security, analysts pointed
to a number of potential causes of strain. Further competition in the area of
nuclear technology, as well as the idea of one or both nations' building a
bomb, was the most dangerous long-term prospect. The two differed in their
approaches to security in the South Atlantic: Argentina looked toward an
alliance with Uruguay, South Africa, and Brazil, but the military leaders of
Brazil, as of late 1982, had shown no interest in such an alliance. The
Falklands/Malvinas war earlier in that year, during which Brazil remained
studiously neutral, dramatically brought the issue to the fore. Brazil's
imminent entrance into the arena of conflicting claims on territory in
Antarctica, in which its claims overlapped with those of Argentina, was also
expected to complicate their relations with respect to South Atlantic
security.

     A major source of competition between Brazil and Argentina has been
influence over the smaller, weaker so-called buffer states (Uruguay, Paraguay,
and Bolivia) bordering both nations. An important measure of Brazilian gains
in recent decades has been its diplomatic and economic inroads in these
nations. These have been most significant in the case of Paraguay, largely the
result of building the Itaipu Dam on the Rio Parana on their mutual border.
The political significance of the dam, the largest hydroelectric project in
the world, transcends its economic importance in supplying Sao Paulo with a
large percentage of its future energy needs and Paraguay with an estimated
US$130 million annually in foreign exchange from the sale of electricity to
Brazil. The project (financed entirely with Brazilian money) has led to the
settlement of Brazilians and their buying a considerable amount of land in
western Paraguay. In addition to increasing trade and financial dependence,
analysts have pointed out that the security of the dam could be a motive for
Brazilian intervention in Paraguay in the case of future civil disorders
there.

     After widespread, though unsubstantiated, reports of Brazilian
collaboration in the 1971 coup in Bolivia that returned conservative military
elements to power, Brazil was careful to project a low profile in its
political relations with its politically unstable neighbor. Economic relations
soared, however, after the signing of the Agreement on Industrial Trade
Completion by presidents Geisel and Hugo Banzer in 1974. Considerable Bolivian
development, particularly in its eastern lowlands around the city of Santa
Cruz, was financed by the Bank of Brazil, while Bolivia sold natural gas and
other raw materials to Brazil. Despite increased trade and substantial
landholdings by Brazilians in Uruguay, Brazil has not outstripped the
influence of Argentina in this final buffer state. One reason for this fact,
perhaps, lay in the revelation that Brazil had been prepared to invade Uruguay
during the early 1970s if it felt it necessary in order to keep the urban
guerrilla Tupamaro organization from coming to power.

     Chile has traditionally been Brazil's "ally" in its competition for
influence in southern South America. Two geopolitical realities underlay this
relationship: Chile's lack of fear of Brazilian expansionism because it does
not border Brazil; and Chile's continuing dispute with Argentina over their
boundary in the Beagle Channel, in which Brazil was officially neutral but
unofficially tilted toward Chile. ("The enemy of my enemy is my friend.")
Brazil's military leaders were glad to see Chile's Marxist regime overthrown
in 1973, and the new president, General Pinochet, visited Brasilia in 1974. A
public display of too close a friendship was prevented, however, by Chile's
pariah image in the United States and Europe and by its difficulties with
Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina. Pinochet emulated the success of Brazil's
military rulers, and close links were established between the security
services of the governments. The real success of bilateral relations after
1973, however, lay in the rather spectacular growth in trade, which approached
US$1 billion by the end of the decade. In general, Brazil exported
manufactured goods (including a growing amount of military hardware), while
Chile exported minerals, wood, and other agricultural products in return.
Brazil also found opportunities for banking and direct investment in Chile
during the late 1970s. Although superficially successful, the October 1980
visit by Figueiredo to Santiago revealed some mutual uneasiness between the
two governments as Brazil proceeded on its path of political liberalization
while Chile continued under an indefinite dictatorship. Ideology, which
brought Brazil and Chile together during the 1970s, could, ironically,
undermine that friendship in the 1980s.

     Brazil has traditionally viewed its relations with the rest of Latin
America as comparatively inconsequential. Brazil's drive to export
manufactures and import energy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, however,
did lead to several important breakthroughs in relations with countries that
previously had been ignored. The most significant involved Mexico and
Venezuela: exchanges of presidential visits between 1979 and 1981 with each
country resulted in agreements to export oil to Brazil. Remarkably,
Figueiredo's 1980 visit to Venezuela was the first by a Brazilian president in
the twentieth century. The two share a border of several hundred kilometers.
Bilateral relations had been severed between 1964 and 1969 and had languished
during the 1970s until the opening provided by the Amazon Pact. It was
uncertain what effect the 1982 announcement that Brazil planned to sell
military equipment to Guyana (with whom Venezuela had recently pressed a
substantial territorial claim) would have on the theretofore successful
diplomatic opening between Brazil and Venezuela.

     Figueiredo's 1981 visit to Peru, with which Brazil shares a border of
well over 1,000 kilometers, was the first ever by a Brazilian head of state.
Peruvian President Francisco Morales Bermudez had visited Brazil in 1979. In
addition to trade agreements, the Peruvian and Brazilian governments agreed to
construct a highway between the two nations's capitals, which would become
Brazil's first international highway link through its Amazon region. Visits
and trade agreements were also concluded with Colombia and Ecuador at about
the same time. Brazil would receive coking coal from Colombia and oil from
Ecuador, as it had for several years.

     In Central American and the Caribbean, Brazil generally deferred to the
overwhelming influence of the United States. Slight interest was indicated in
the early 1980s, however, by a five-year energy accord signed with the
revolutionary government in Nicaragua and a repudiation of foreign
intervention in the region. Brazil was very cautious in opening relations with
Cuba. An initial contact was not made until early 1982, when a group of
Brazilian businessmen visited the island.