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$Unique_ID{bob00140}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Brazil
Chapter 4C.   Electoral Politics}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{James D. Rudolf}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{party
elections
electoral
government
political
parties
local
pds
state
mdb}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Title:       Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      James D. Rudolf
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4C.   Electoral Politics

     Electoral politics have had a checkered history in post-World War II
Brazil. After being waged vigorously during the Second Republic by a
multiparty system and a growing electorate, the post-196 military government
imposed an artificial electoral system designed to give the illusion of
democratic competition while preserving the rule of the armed forces and their
civilian allies. By the mid-1970s, however, the contrived opposition began
acting like a real opposition, and the regime found it prudent to alter
drastically the system that had been in place since 1965. A new law
promulgated in 1979 governing political parties and a new electoral system,
which had its first test in November 1982, reinstated the popular election of
major federal, state, and local officials. (The president, however, continued
to be elected indirectly by an electoral college.) Critics argued, though,
that executive officials would continue to use their legislative prerogatives
(as they had in the past) to modify the electoral system further to their
advantage. The next test of the evolving electoral system lies in the
selection of the president: first, whether the opposition within the electoral
college will have a hand in naming Figueiredo's successor in 1984; and second,
whether future presidents will once again be elected by a popular, direct
vote.

Political Parties

     The origins of Brazil's political parties, like so many of its political
institutions, go back to Vargas, who organized the rural-based Social
Democratic Party (Partido Social Democratico-PSD) and the urban-based
Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro-PTB) in 1945 to support
his declining political fortunes (see The Crisis of 1945, ch. 1). The National
Democratic Union (Uniao Democratica Nacional-UDN), the last of the three major
parties that were to dominate electoral politics for two decades, was
organized by Vargas' opponents. Neither ideological nor representative of
constituent interests, these parties functioned to channel local political
machines, headed by paternalistic bosses (coronels in rural areas) into the
national electoral arena. Personalism pervaded the party machinery: delivering
votes brought patronage in the form of government jobs, federal development
projects, and cash to the local bosses. To a considerable extent this
characterization of Brazilian party politics persisted into the 1980s (see
Political Dynamics under the Second Republic, ch. 1).

     The PSD was the most successful of the Second Republic parties (see fig.
9). Its candidates won the presidency in 1945 and 1955, and the party
supported the PTB victor in 1950 (Vargas) and President Goulart (1961-64).
Only during the brief incumbency of Janio Quadros in 1961 was the PSD
"out of favor" with the president, and it consistently dominated both
houses of Congress. Nonideological, though conservative in the sense that
it supported the status quo, the PSD attracted many traditional coronels,
as well as bureaucrats, industrialists, landowners, and bankers who benefited
from the Vargas and PSD economic programs.

     The PTB acted as the "partner" of the PSD thoughout most of the 1945-64
period. Its strength grew steadily and culminated in the Goulart presidency.
Its appeal was populist, drawing on nationalistic sentiment in calling for
active state intervention in the economy and extended benefits for the working
class. The makeup of the PTB was heterogeneous: Goulart was one of the
nation's wealthiest landowners, while new urban middle and upper classes, as
well as leftist intellectuals, were party adherents. The PTB tried, but
generally failed, to gain a working-class following.

     Except during the brief rule of Quadros in 1961, the UDN acted as the
opposition party thoroughout the Second Republic. Moderate and middle class,
attracting urban professionals and conservative intellectuals, the UDN
espoused amorphous issues, such as individual liberties, honesty and
efficiency in government, and government decentralization. Essentially, it
wanted to reverse the Vargas legacy. Many civilian allies of the military
government were recruited from the UDN.

     Eleven other parties competed in elections between 1946 and 1964. Only
one of these, the Social Progressive Party (Partido Social Progressista-PSP),
was significant in the electoral arena. Dominated by its personalist leader,
Adhemar de Barros, it appealed to the urban lower class in the tradition of
Vargas. PSP success peaked in the mid-1950s, then gradually waned.

     Increasingly during the Second Republic, various parties formed temporary
alliances for electoral purposes. This was especially true in congressional
elections, where votes cast for alliances rose to over 40 percent of the total
by 1962. Alliances ended on election day, however, and candidates elected on
an alliance ticket assumed their positions in Congress as party members.
Indicative of the shallowness in party platforms, the electoral system thus
contributed to depriving the political parties of purpose beyond serving as
electoral machines for personalistic leaders.

     In the public's mind, nevertheless, these parties continued to retain
their identities long after they were officially abolished in October 1965
under the provisions of Institutional Act Number 2. Two months later two new
parties, the National Renovating Alliance (Alicanca Renovadora Nacional-Arena)
and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democratico Brasileiro-MDB),
were formed under the terms of restrictive legislation that required new
political parties to have at least 120 adherents in Congress. Arena, the
majority party of the government, was formed largely out of the UDN and the
conservative wing of the PSD; the MDB, the minority party of the opposition,
was made up largely of the PTB PSD liberals, and adherents of a wide spectrum
of smaller parties. The contrived nature of these two parties,
unrepresentative of national political sentiment, was widely acknowledged. For
years the Brazilian press continued to include the pre-1965 party affiliation,
in the political identification of politicians, e.g., MDB, ex-PSD.

     The party system that was to persist until 1979 was further distorted by
the government's practice of suspending for a period of 10 years, the
political rights of individuals they deemed threatening to their political
designs. This action was taken against over 1,500 persons, mostly politicians.
Not surprisingly, most were associated with the MDB. Such practices led to
widespread cynicism and apathy among both politicians and voters during the
first decade of military rule.

The Government Party

     Cynicism and apathy favored Arena, which in 1970 gained overwhelming
control of both houses of Congress, thanks largely to 6.6 million blank or
spoiled ballots and another 10 million voters who did not bother to
participate. Thereafter, however, Arena's fortunes steadily declined, and it
faced the possibility of losing its congressional majority in the 1978
elections. In 1977 the Geisel administration averted this possibility however,
by closing Congress and amending the Constitution by decree so that one-third
of the senators were elected in the state assemblies, which Arena controlled,
rather than in direct, popular elections. Arena's association with the
government gave it another advantage-access to patronage-which made it the
most important party in rural areas and in most state and local governments,
where the traditional political machinery of coronelismo was strongest.

     Factionalism within Arena threatened it from its birth to its death under
the November 1979 Law of Party Reform. The major division was defined by
individual pre-1965 party loyalties. In addition to PSD and UDN factions,
however, Arena was factionalized at the local level by personal loyalties. The
government dealt with this factionalism among its supporters by an electoral
device known as sublegenda, which allowed separate tickets to compete in
elections under the same party label. Its effect was to institutionalize
rather than resolve the factionalization that was inherited, in part, by
Arena's post-1979 reincarnation as the Democratic Social Party (Partido
Democratico Social-PDS).

     The end of the sublegenda electoral device led a considerable number of
Arenistas (members or adherents of Arena) in electoral districts where rival
factions predominated, to shun the PDS. Other Arenistas joined the opposition
in the belief that the momentum of political liberalization would inevitably
lead to a loss of popular support for the new government party. Nevertheless,
factional struggles between PDS candidates and powerful rivals within the
party cost the PDS a number of important races in the 1982 elections.

     Such factionalism was probably inevitable as long as the PDS lacked a
cohesive party platform, having little identity beyond being the party of the
government. The electoral strength of the PDS was strongest in rural areas and
in the Northeast and North, where the powers of patronage and the tradition of
"clientelistic" politics were strongest. Both its lack of ideological
definition and its reliance on local political machinery to deliver votes gave
the PDS a large measure of continuity with traditions first established in
Brazilian political parties during the Vargas era.

Opposition Parties

     The opposition party formed in December 1965, the MDB, was ineffective
for nearly a decade. With political rights stripped from many of its principal
leaders, gubernatorial and mayoral elections barred in many of its local
strongholds, and little access to the patronage and other prerogatives of
power granted its opponents, the MDB had few options. It boycotted the 1966
elections and lost disastrously in the 1970 national and 1972 local elections.
Then its fortunes began to change. In 1973, for the first time, it nominated
candidates for president and vice president, who gained a mere 76 of 502 votes
in the electoral college. In the 1974 popular elections for Congress, state
legislatures, and municipal councils, however, the MDB made a surprisingly
strong showing, adding 13 Senate seats and 78 seats in the Chamber of Deputies
to its previous total. The electoral success of the MDB, attributed largely to
the protest vote arising out of the nation's mounting economic difficulties,
continued in the 1976 local and 1978 national elections. In all probability
only the manipulation of the electoral system in 1977 and its complete
overhaul in 1979 prevented the MDB from shedding its minority status to become
the majority party in Congress.

     Factionalism within the MDB, a heteregeneous agglomeration of groups from
conservatives to Marxists who shared only their opposition to the government,
was more rife than that within Arena. During its early years the principal
division was between the "moderates and the more leftist "authentics." With
the passage of time each of these splintered further. The left was especially
factionalized, the "authentics" dividing into the "historical" and "new
authentics," and the "popular tendency" coalescing around Lula and others
associated with organized labor. The "moderates" were divided by the questions
of whether to collaborate with Marxists as well as whether to collaborate with
the government. As anticipated by its architects, the November 1979 Law of
Party Reform, which made it much easier to organize a political party than
had the 1965 legislation, led to various MDB factions each forming its own
party. A divided opposition, it was assumed, would be a less potent
opposition.

     Although some MDB leaders were glad of the opportunity to organize a
party to distinguish themselves from other MDB leaders with radically
different ideologies, still others held the opinion that a large, though
ideologically diverse, party of the opposition could successfully challenge
the PDS in the elections. It was this latter group that formed the core of
the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro-PMDB) in January 1980. A considerable number of disaffected
Arenistas also joined the PMDB over the course of the next two years.

     In February 1982 the PMDB received a tremendous boost when the
Popular Party (Partido Popular-PP), after two years as the third largest
party, disbanded in order to merge with the PMDB. The PP had been formed by
an MDB "moderate," Tancredo Neves, and a dissident Arenista, Magalhaes
Pinto, to represent businessmen who generally supported the status quo but
resented the domination of the government by the military and their
technocratic allies. By early 1982, to many observers' surprise, the PP had
gained nearly 100 adherents in Congress. The subsequent merger, prompted by a
government ruling that disallowed alliances for the 1982 elections,
contributed in large measure to the PMDB success in that election.

     The PMDB remained factionalized, though less so than its predecessor,
the MDB, had been. In 1982 the major sources of dispute seemed to be the
inclusion of the leadership of the outlawed Brazilian Communist Party
(Partido Comunista Brasileiro-PCB) on the one hand and former Arenistas
on the other. These disputes were suppressed for purposes of the 1982 election
but in all likelihood would reappear in the future. The business faction
surrounding Neves, formerly president of PP but made first vice president of
the PMDB in 1982, may also reassert its separate identity.

     In late 1982 the PMDB remained headed by Ulysses Guimaraes, who had
also served as president of the MDB. During the early 1980s the PMDB had
made a large effort to increase party membership and develop a widespread
base of local organizations. It had the most success in the urban areas of
southern Brazil.

     The program of the PMDB, as articulated in 1982, called for the full
exercise of the political rights of all citizens, including the rights of
illiterates to vote, and free and direct elections for governmental
representatives at all levels, including the presidency. Ultimately, the
PMDB called for the convocation of a representative constituent assembly
that would write a new, liberal-democratic constitution. Its economic program
called for the renegotiation of the foreign debt, the lowering of interest
rates, and public works programs to combat unemployment. It generally
supported the government's independent foreign policy.

     Although the 1979 Law of Party Reform was designed to ensure the
division of the MDB into a number of parties. requirements for legal
registration as a party were stringent enough to prevent an unstable
proliferation of small parties. To compete in the 1982 elections, a party,
therefore, was required to gain the support of at least 10 percent of the
members of Congress or to have branch organizations in at least one-fifth
of the municipios in each of at least nine of Brazil's 23 states. Three
parties, in addition to the PDS and the PMDB, met these qualifications.
To be legally recognized after 1982, a party will have had to receive 3
percent of the vote of nine states and 5 percent nationwide for the Chamber
of Deputies.

     The post-1982 fates of the three smaller opposition parties under such
restrictions were uncertain. Perhaps the most endangered was the Brazilian
Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro-PTB), organized in 1981 by
Ivete Vargas, the niece of the founder of the original PTB, and Quadros,
attempting a political comeback two decades after his brief presidential
tenure. Similarly attempting to resurrect the urban populist tradition of
the Second Republic was the Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democratico
Trabalhista-PDT) of Leonel Brizola. The symbol of radical popularism during
the early 1960s when he was governor of Rio Grande do Sul, then a federal
deputy from Rio de Janeira, Brizola undertook a more moderate stance while in
exile, where he was influenced by European social democrats.

     The third party to be formed out the of opposition MDB between 1980 and
1982 was the PT. The PT was unique among all post-World War II Brazilian
political parties in that it was organized in a grass-roots fashion, rather
than in the top-down, personalistic, and clientelistic tradition of other
parties. In one sense it was forced into this position by the Law of Party
Reform. Lacking the support of a sufficient number of congressmen to qualify
for the 1982 election, it was allowed to compete only because of its
widespread organization at the local level. Its grass-roots organization was,
in another sense, a product of the belief of the PT leadership in democratic
decisionmaking within the party to distinguish itself from the personalism
that pervaded other parties.

     Conceived in 1978 by the "authentic" trade union leadership, the PT
elected Lula as its president at its first national party congress in 1981.
Party membership was dominated by workers, both blue collar and white collar.
The PT also attracted a number of students, leftistss intellectuals and,
especially in the rural Northeast, the Roman Catholic clergy. In 1982 the
party claimed a membership of 300,000 in local organizations in all but one of
the 23 states.

     Because its membership adhered to a wide variety of leftist political
philosophies, the PT had difficulty in articulating a concise platform of its
own. Its long-term goal was the establishment of a vaguely defined socialism.
In the short term it sought restrictions on the activities of multinational
corporations operating in Brazil and a variety of benefits for workers,
including trade union freedoms and government programs to address
unemployment and low wages.

     Barred from participation in the 1982 elections, although operating
openly in the early 1980s for the first time since 1964, were the pro-Soviet
PCB and a variety of smaller, splinter communist groups. In 1980 the
aged and longtime general secretary of the PCB, Luis Carlos Prestes, was
ousted upon his return from exile and replaced by Giocondo Gervasi Dias. The
PCB subsequently supported the PMDB in the 1982 elections, while Prestes was
said to favor the PT. The major activity of the PCB during the early 1980s,
however, was its concerted effort to gain legal recognition. Other communist
parties, the products of earlier factionalization, included the Communist
Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil-PCdoB), formed in 1962, not to
be confused with the pre-1960 PCdoB, which was pro-Albanian (formerly
pro-Chinese); the pro-Cuba Revolutionary Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Revolucionaria-PCR); and another Castroite group that had been active in the
guerrilla activities of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Revolutionary
Movement of October 8 (Movimento Revolucionario 8 de Outubro-MR-8). A number
of Trotskyite groups also existed, one of which, Socialist Convergence, was
said to work closely with the PT (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5).

Elections under Military Rule

     One important characteristic that distinguished military rule in Brazil
from that in other Latin American nations ruled by military governments during
the same period was the fact that elections continued to be held after 1964.
Not all offices that had traditionally been filled by elected officials were
contested, however. Formally elected by an electoral college, the president
and vice president were, in fact, selected by the military hierarchy. From
October 1965 until November 1982 state governors were indirectly elected by
government-controlled state assemblies. After 1966 a large number of local
mayors and councilmen in many of the most important municipios were appointed
state governors. And finally, in 1978, half of the 44 contested senatorial
seats were selected by the government-controlled state assemblies.

     On one occasion-the 1980 elections for local government
officials-scheduled elections were canceled. The major reason given by
officials for this decision was that candidates would not have had time to
prepare themselves, given the newness of the Law of Party Reform. With this
exception, then, popular elections for some of the elected officials (federal
deputies and senators, state assembly members, and most local mayors and
councilmen) were held every two years between 1966 and 1982. (Another reason
given for the 1980 cancellation was to bring local elections into step with
state and national elections, so that henceforth there would be elections only
every four years.)

     There were very few accusations of vote fraud made during those years.
The Brazilian electoral code was administered and enforced by a widespread
system of electoral courts, headed by the Superior Electoral Tribunal, which
was generally accepted as efficient, honest, and nonpartisan. These courts
lacked any power to alter the electoral system, however. This prerogative was
used extensively by the federal executive through numerous constitutional
amendments, as well as a new electoral code in 1965 that was amended
repeatedly in subsequent years in order to retain political control over the
system of government under the guise of democratic procedures (see Structure
of Government, this ch.).

     Elections were halted during the mid-1960s for the president, governors,
and local officials in key municipios because military authorities believed
that they would lose control of these positions should they be contested in
popular elections. For a decade the government was able, through the Arena
party, to win comfortable margins in elections for federal and state
legislatures and in the overwhelming majority of local government contests.
This was made possible by a combination of its holding a near monopoly on the
benefits from patronage and coronelismo, gerrymandering and, when necessary,
intimidation (such as revoking the political rights of powerful opponents).
Heavy Arena losses in federal elections in 1974 and again in local elections
in 1976 led the government to amend substantially the electoral code governing
subsequent elections in order to retain its controlling majorities within the
elected bodies.

     The "April package," decreed in April 1977 after Congress had been
summarily closed, addressed the 1978 federal elections. To prevent the
opposition MDB from gaining a majority in the Senate, the regime amended the
Constitution so that one of each state's three senators was selected in the
Arena-controlled state assemblies. With respect to the Chamber of Deputies,
the system of proportional representation was changed in two ways designed to
increase the representation given to smaller rural states, where Arena held a
stronger voter appeal. First, the minimum number of deputies for the smallest
states was doubled to six; second, the number of seats accorded each state
became calculated on the basis of total population, rather than the number of
registered voters as in the past. Clearly, the higher proportion of nonvoters
in rural areas meant that this subtle change gave additional representation
to Arena-controlled states.

     The 1982 elections-the first conducted under the 1979 law that created a
multiparty system of electoral competition-were widely viewed as the most open
and free elections in 18 years of military rule. Indeed, they included the
first popular elections held for state governors since 1965. Of equal or
greater significance, they were the first elections under the political
liberalization of abertura that had allowed exiled opponents to return under
the 1979 amnesty, returned political rights to those who had previously had
them revoked (the so-called casados), and ended the harsh media censorship
that had been in place since 1968. More broadly, it was the first electoral
contest since the January 1979 abrogation of Institutional Act Number 5, which
had been the principal source of the military regime's dictatorial powers.
Potentially the most significant aspect of the 1982 elections was that its
victors-all the senators and deputies and six members of each state
assembly-would comprise the electoral college that two years later would
select the successor to President Figueiredo.

     The liberalized atmosphere of the 1982 elections did not prevent the
government, nevertheless, from what had become a tradition: the alteration of
the electoral system to the advantage of the government party, now under the
banner of the PDS. The size of the Chamber of Deputies was raised from 420 to
479; although government spokesmen stated that this reflected population
increases measured in the 1980 census, others labeled the redistricting as a
gerrymandering exercise and charged that the newly created districts were in
regions of PDS strength. More clearly partisan in design was the voting
procedure that emerged out of a series of electoral "reform packages"
introduced between November 1981 and August 1982. A single ballot was used for
all six electoral contests. The blank ballot contained only the title of each
position to be filled (governor, senator, deputy, state assemblyman, mayor,
and city councilman) followed by a blank space where the voter was required to
write in the candidate's name or four-digit number assigned to each
contestant. Furthermore, each voter was required to vote a straight party
ticket. Ballots with votes that crossed party lines, those without a name or
number after each position, and those indicating the name of the party, rather
than the individuals of choice, were declared invalid.

     All parties concerned agreed that these voting regulations were designed
to favor the PDS. Such manipulation, in the Brazilian context, was considered
a prerogative of those holding power. First of all, the complicated voting
procedure led to many ballots' being invalidated; had 50 percent or more been
invalidated, the entire election would have been annulled. Second, the
straight party ticket (voto vinculado) requirement led rural voters,
primarily concerned with local affairs in which PDS candidates were strongest,
to vote for the PDS at the national level, where their candidates were often
weaker than those of the opposition parties. Third, although the estimated 25
percent of the voting population that was illiterate had legally gained
suffrage rights, the complicated procedures and the need to write a name or
number on the ballot effectively barred them from casting a valid vote.

     Legal manipulations designed to hinder the oppositions in electoral
contests went beyond the electoral laws to include access to the mass media.
Restrictions on the media were far less than they had been previously,
however. Censorship was first imposed in 1968. The degree of censorship varied
greatly, from cases where every word was subject to prior censorship to those
where only occasional, ex post facto censorship came into play. In general,
however, it was not as stringent as the censorship practiced by many
comparable regimes.

     The most common explanation for this fact was the generally conservative
point of view of the majority of the mass media organs. The government's own
news service, Agencia Nacional, and its radio program, "Hora do Brasil," gave
widespread distribution to its interpretation of events. REDE Globo (formerly
known as TV Globo) was launched in the mid-1960s with considerable financial
backing from private United States interests, and by the mid-1970s the highly
successful network dominated 60 to 70 percent of the 45 million-viewer
television audience. Its apolitical programming and conservative projection of
the news made Globo enterprises, which diversified into magazines, newspapers,
and radio stations, as well as nonmedia concerns, an important de facto
supporter of the military government. A total of over 200 radio stations
broadcast to an audience estimated in the mid-1970s at 85 million. Low
literacy levels and a generally low consumption of printed media made
television and radio (along with word of mouth) particularly important
vehicles for the transmission of political values.

     The most important daily newspaper was the conservative O Estado de Sao
Paulo, having a daily circulation in early 1982 averaging 200,000 and nearly
twice that figure on Sundays. The three other major dailies-O Globo and Jornal
do Brasil, in Rio de Janeiro, and Folha de Sao Paulo-were also conservative.
There were 23 additional daily newspapers, although their circulations were
much smaller. A number of these smaller dailies, generally known as
"alternative dailies," were inaugurated in the late 1970s and were openly
critical of the government. Weekly newsmagazines had a considerable political
impact. By far the most influential was Veja, published by large Sao Paulo
corporate interests. Isto E, also from Sao Paulo, ran a poor second among
weeklies.

     Censorship was gradually eased during the late 1970s. By 1982 there was
no prior censorship of the variety that had been ubiquitous a decade earlier.
Even the technically outlawrd PCB published its own newspaper. By no means,
however, did it print whatever it wanted to: self-censorship was assiduously
practiced by the "alternative dailies" and all other media that criticized the
government. The 1979 National Security Law established prison terms up to 13
years for nebulous "crimes," such as "creating subversive propoganda" and
"enabling or permitting . . . the use of communications media for the
execution of a crime against national security." Television and radio station
managers and publishers were understandably careful to avoid such penalties.
Certain subjects, such as the private lives of military officials, were
taboo.

     Self-censorship played a major role in limiting the subjects of
discussion and moderating the tone of elcetoral campaigns. Another piece of
legislation, popularly known as the Falcao Law (after its primary author,
Armando Falcao) also restricted access to the media during the 1978 and 1982
electoral campaigns. During the two months prior to each of these elections,
the Falcao Law limited television and radio campaigning to a small number of
five-second spots (paid for by the government) showing only a photograph of
the candidate, his name, party, and the position for which he was running.
Debates or any statement of a candidate's position on an issue on radio or
television were outlawed. The law was widely criticized, particularly because
the president continued to appear on a weekly, prime-time television
discussion, called "The President and the People," throughout the period up to
the elections.

     As had been widely predicted before the 1982 elections, the manipulation
of the electoral laws and the mass media was not able to prevent (although it
undoubtedly did lessen its magnitude) the victory of the opposition parties
over the PDS in the gubernatorial and congressional races. Although the PDS
won 12 gubernatorial seats as opposed to nine for the PMDB, the opposition won
in all but one of the important industrial states in the populous southern
part of the country. PDS victories were concentrated in the rural northeast.
Brizola captured the state of Rio de Janeiro for the PDT; neither of the other
two parties competing gained a gubernatorial seat. One surprise of the
election was the poor showing of Lula's PT, which gained only about 10 percent
of the vote in Sao Paulo, its regional stronghold.

     The voto vinculado led to election results for other offices that closely
paralleled the vote for governor. The PDS won 15 Senate seats, giving them a
total of 46, or exactly two-thirds of the seats in that chamber. The PMDB won
nine Senate seats for a total of 21. In the Chamber of Deputies the PDS won
235 and the PMDB 200, so that neither major party commanded a majority. The
electoral college, to be made up of members of the national congress and
those elected in the state assemblies, remained firmly in control of the PDS,
thus enabling the government to control the indirect election of the
successor to President Figueiredo in October 1984.