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FEDERALIST No. 69

The Real Character of the Executive
From the New York Packet.
Friday, March 14, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed
 Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention.
 This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the
 representations which have been made in regard to it.
The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the
 executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a
 single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a
 point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this
 particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain,
 there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan
 of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of
 New York.
That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be
 re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think
 him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a
 total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is
 an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony
 descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy
 between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE
 years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we
 consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a
 dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like
 influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a
 duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a
 degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a
 duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.
The President of the United States would be liable to be
 impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other
 high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would
 afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
 course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred
 and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is
 amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without
 involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and
 important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of
 Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a
 governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of
 Maryland and Delaware.
The President of the United States is to have power to return a
 bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature,
 for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law,
 if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both
 houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute
 negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse
 of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the
 reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the
 crown's having found the means of substituting influence to
 authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of
 the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which
 could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national
 agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely
 from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies
 exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of
 this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this
 respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor
 of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the
 latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be
 precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose
 constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original
 from which the convention have copied.
The President is to be the ``commander-in-chief of the army and
 navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States,
 when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to
 have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
 United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to recommend to the
 consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary
 and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses
 of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement
 between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn
 them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the
 laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the
 United States.'' In most of these particulars, the power of the
 President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain
 and of the governor of New York. The most material points of
 difference are these: τFirst. The President will have only the
 occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by
 legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the
 Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have
 at all times the entire command of all the militia within their
 several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the
 President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the
 governor. Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief
 of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his
 authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great
 Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
 nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military
 and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy;
 while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and
 to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, τall which, by
 the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
 legislature.1 The governor of New York, on the other hand, is
 by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its
 militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States
 expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well
 of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those
 of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this
 instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than
 could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly.
 The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to
 all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York
 may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for
 treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this
 article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than
 that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the
 government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be
 screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the
 prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore,
 should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had
 been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices
 and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the
 other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in
 the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any
 degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not
 the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a
 greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise
 against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption
 from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design,
 upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last
 expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was
 computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might
 himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be
 incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired
 impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary
 to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of
 treason is limited ``to levying war upon the United States, and
 adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort''; and that
 by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds.
 Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature
 in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment.
 The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament.
 The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this
 State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may
 be employed to very important purposes.
The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of
 the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators
 present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute
 representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of
 his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of
 every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority
 in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with
 foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the
 ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never
 heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every
 jurist2 of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its
 Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of
 making treaties exists in the crown in its utomst plentitude; and
 that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most
 complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other
 sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing
 itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the
 stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given
 birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the
 obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary
 interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity
 of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and
 commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the
 treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new
 state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In
 this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended
 power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign.
 The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the
 concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted,
 that, in this instance, the power of the federal Executive would
 exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from
 the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy
 were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the
 Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that
 delicate and important prerogative.
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors
 and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme
 of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It
 is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the
 administration of the government; and it was far more convenient
 that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be
 a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches,
 upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to
 take the place of a departed predecessor.
The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT
 OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers,
 judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the
 United States established by law, and whose appointments are not
 otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The king of Great
 Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He
 not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can
 confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an
 immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great
 inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to
 that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor
 of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution
 of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power
 of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the
 governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly.
 The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of
 nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment.
 If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this
 respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the
 article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the
 Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the
 government of New York, if the council should be divided, the
 governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.3
 If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode
 of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national
 legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the
 governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most
 four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same
 time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small
 number of which a council of appointment consists, than the
 considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we
 cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate
 of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be
 greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of
 the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to
 determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess
 more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears
 yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel
 which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain.
 But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it
 may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude
 into a closer group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected
 by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a
 perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to
 personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred
 and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the
 acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative.
 The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces
 of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that
 of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by
 his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a
 branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other
 is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one
 would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices;
 the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can
 confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of
 aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the
 rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules
 concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in
 several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can
 establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can
 lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or
 prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle
 of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and
 governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those
 who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other?
 The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a
 government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the
 elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a
 monarchy, and a despotism.
PUBLIUS.
1 A writer in a &ennsylvania paper, under the signature of
 TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great Britain oweshis
 prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The
 truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is
 immenmorial, and was only disputed, ``contrary to all reason and
 precedent,'' as Blackstone vol. i., page 262, expresses it, by the
 Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th of Charles
 II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the
 sole supreme government and command of the militia within his
 Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land,
 and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the
 undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and
 queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament
 cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
2 Vide Blackstone's ``Commentaries,'' vol i., p. 257.
3 Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think
 the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded.
 Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a
 government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned.
 And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other
 considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we
 shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.