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FEDERALIST No. 60

The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
 Members)
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, February 26, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to
 the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to
 the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on
 the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of
 regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not
 pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of
 any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all
 would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is
 alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote
 the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others,
 by confining the places of election to particular districts, and
 rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in
 the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the
 most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of
 probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a
 conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find
 its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be
 concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever
 gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form
 altogether different and far more decisive.
The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred
 from this single reflection, that it could never be made without
 causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed
 and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to
 conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain
 turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a
 particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing
 majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so
 situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the
 great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the
 government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether
 inconceivable and incredible.
In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations
 of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the
 subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose
 the national government, and ╒still more in the manner in which they
 will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a
 powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of
 elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property,
 in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different
 parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition
 in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions
 in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same
 government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these
 respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which
 may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different
 propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance
 which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter,
 will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component
 parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be
 elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State
 legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by
 the people, there would be little probability of a common interest
 to cement these different branches in a predilection for any
 particular class of electors.
As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of ``time
 and manner,'' which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the
 national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit
 which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense
 of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous
 circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to
 satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be
 attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a
 preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what
 purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the
 legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The
 composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the
 other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the
 appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose
 the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make
 the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power
 in question is placedτwhether in their hands or in those of the
 Union.
But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in
 the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination
 between the different departments of industry, or between the
 different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of
 property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the
 moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing
 interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the
 adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of
 ``the wealthy and the well-born,'' to the exclusion and debasement
 of all the rest of the society?
If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are
 concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I
 presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it
 will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to
 affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should
 gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the
 other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The
 inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue
 preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than
 from the latter.
The several States are in various degrees addicted to
 agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture
 is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides
 its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of
 influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed
 into the national representation; and for the very reason, that
 this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and
 in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single
 State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a
 decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.
In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land,
 where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed
 interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As
 long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so
 long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national
 Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of
 those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice
 of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object
 of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus
 particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the
 situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that
 the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own
 principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped
 from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same
 situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition at
 least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias
 towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this
 quarter as from the other.
In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any
 rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in
 the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure
 a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As
 there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will
 have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a
 labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be
 sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere
 assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should
 prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its
 members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the
 Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would,
 in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as
 itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed to
 investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale,
 must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be
 inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the
 entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest
 from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce,
 in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the
 enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor,
 by the urgent calls of public necessity.
I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a
 preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds
 of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the
 meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of
 another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the
 preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they
 designate by the description of ``the wealthy and the well-born.''
 These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over
 the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their
 elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the
 representative body; at another time it is to be effected by
 depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their
 right of suffrage in the choice of that body.
But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of
 election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated
 preference? Are ``the wealthy and the well-born,'' as they are
 called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have
 they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of
 them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in
 the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over
 the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to
 cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is
 the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,1) is it not
 evident that the policy of confining the places of election to
 particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it
 would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that
 there is no method of securing to the rich the preference
 apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either
 for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of
 the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its
 authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the
 TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections. The qualifications of
 the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon
 other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are
 unalterable by the legislature.
Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the
 expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same
 time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a
 sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment
 might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers,
 still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever
 hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a
 military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body
 of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal
 to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different
 parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under
 consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be
 conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the
 national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession
 of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade
 the essential rights of the community, and with the means of
 gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who
 were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of
 fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite
 class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better
 adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not
 rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one
 decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients
 which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them,
 might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their
 authors? Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than
 conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of
 their respective States to the places of election, to voerthrow
 their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge
 the violated majesty of the people?
PUBLIUS.
1 Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.