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FEDERALIST No. 17

The Same Subject Continued
(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
 Union)
For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been
 stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise
 urged against the principle of legislation for the individual
 citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render
 the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb
 those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to
 leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost
 latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,
 I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons
 intrusted with the administration of the general government could
 ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that
 description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State
 appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition.
 Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the
 objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and
 all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first
 instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The
 administration of private justice between the citizens of the same
 State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a
 similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be
 provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a
 general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should
 exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with
 which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those
 powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the
 possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the
 dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national
 government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere
 wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that
 disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the
 constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other
 words, the people of the several States, would control the
 indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far
 more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
 authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the
 State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the
 greater degree of influence which the State governments if they
 administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will
 generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same
 time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in
 all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken
 in their organization, to give them all the force which is
 compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular
 governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of
 the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects
 to which the attention of the State administrations would be
 directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are
 commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the
 object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his
 family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the
 community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a
 stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the
 government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should
 be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
 auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily
 fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and
 which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every
 part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a
 detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the
 instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of
 the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a
 clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of
 criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most
 powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular
 obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and
 visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its
 terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all
 those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the
 sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes,
 more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of
 the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.
 This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost
 wholly through the channels of the particular governments,
 independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so
 decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them
 at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
 dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand,
 falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the
 citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and
 attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests,
 they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people;
 and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of
 obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by
 the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are
 acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to
 them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
 confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of
 association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign,
 whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of
 subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land
 allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or
 retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of
 fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each
 principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular
 demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual
 opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between
 the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the
 head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the
 public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of
 their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is
 emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
 temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight
 and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more
 regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons
 triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his
 dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected
 into independent principalities or States. In those instances in
 which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success
 was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their
 dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the
 sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and
 detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a
 union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the
 nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity
 and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between
 them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor,
 and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or
 conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be
 cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
 clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
 uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those
 of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the
 power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued
 its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those
 rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic
 system of civil polity had previously established in the latter
 kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared
 with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that
 from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the
 confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a
 support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the
 national government. It will be well if they are not able to
 counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of
 similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,
 and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the
 community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of
 individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
 governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an
 inattention to which has been the great source of our political
 mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.
 This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS.