by Tim Zimmermann; Matthew Cooper; David Makovsky; Linda Fasulo; Alan Cooperman; Robin Knight; Fred Coleman; Todd Shields; Julie Corwin; William J. Cook
The Clinton administration proved last week that coalition building in the Persian Gulf is not just a Republican skill. As American forces and equipment rushed to meet Saddam Hussein's latest lurch toward Kuwait's oil fields and Arab and European leaders rallied in step with Washington, Bill Clinton looked like a commander in chief, Warren Christopher looked like a secretary of state and American foreign policy looked decisive. By week's end, Saddam Hussein's vaunted Republican Guard troops, who had set the whole minicrisis in motion by reappearing on Kuwait's border, were withdrawing north. With Haiti's military leaders also in retreat, the president and his aides reveled in a tabloid headline from New York's Daily News: "Clinton 2, Bullies 0."
The Arab world's response to Hussein's most recent manic predations showed just how much things have changed since the last gulf war three years ago. Palestinians, their hopes and attentions distracted by the drama-filled peace process unfolding with Israel, did not again take to the streets en masse to shout their support for Hussein. Jordan's King Hussein, Saddam Hussein's most prominent Arab supporter last time around, spurned him this time. And Saudi officials, so nervous about welcoming a large Western presence to their insular desert kingdom just a few years ago, asked their surprised American allies only, "What do you need?" and "How quick do you need it?"
Craving crude. The more things change, however, the more certain fundamentals persist. The United States and the rest of the industrial world still crave gulf oil at affordable prices -- an addiction that has only grown since the last gulf war. That means Iraq and Iran both bear watching closely. Saddam Hussein still possesses one of the region's largest military forces. Iran, although preoccupied by its own internal political and economic struggles, nurtures a simmering hostility toward the West and its gulf neighbors. Behind closed doors, it continues work to develop the weapons of mass destruction that would transform the strategic equation in the Persian Gulf.
In response, the Clinton administration has developed a strategy for the region that it calls "dual containment." The notion is to try to isolate and squeeze both Iran and Iraq until they change their ways. It relies on the fact that each nation loathes the other, making a strategic alliance between them very unlikely. But containment in the gulf, just like containment during the cold war, requires a united front, and here there are signs of trouble. Ironically, just as most of the Arab world has lined up behind America's leadership in the region, fissures are developing between Washington and some of its allies over how to deal with the bully boy of the Persian Gulf. The division is fairly clear-cut: The Clinton administration and its gulf allies want to do in Saddam Hussein; much of the rest of the world wants to do business with him.
That difference has the potential to cause deep rifts in the coalition against Hussein. Some United Nations Security Council members, led by Russia and France, recently have been willing to consider easing the embargo on purchases of Iraqi oil in response to Baghdad's grudging compliance with the U.N. Special Commission that is dismantling Iraq's capability to produce weapons of mass destruction. Washington has set a stricter standard. "Our argument has been that you really need to look at Iraq and compliance in the larger context," says a State Department official. "You have to really look at Saddam's intentions."
Miscalculation? Hussein's latest threat to Kuwait has only helped the Clinton administration convince a softening Security Council that skepticism is justified. The conventional wisdom in the White House is that the Iraqi thrust toward Kuwait was a miscalculation by Hussein -- the latest in a long line. "He played his military card," says a senior administration official, "without even necessarily knowing what the game was."
But whether Hussein knew the game or not, the Iraqi military card may yet take a few tricks. While he condemned Iraq's actions, French Defense Minister Francois Leotard also said that the Clinton administration's rapid military buildup in the gulf was "not unconnected to domestic politics." Madeleine Albright, Washington's ambassador to the United Nations, snapped back: "Ludicrous, ill-informed and counterproductive." The flap was not without consequence. American consideration of a heavy-weapons exclusion zone in southern Iraq -- to preclude another rapid Iraqi military buildup against Kuwait -- died in the cradle asthe French government declared its opposition. A fallback resolution demanded that Republican Guard units returnto their bases in the north but contained no explicit ultimatum for fear ofdividing the Security Council.
A stalemate along these lines leaves Saddam Hussein with some leverage: the ability to threaten Kuwait and thus spark a costly crisis whenever he gets the urge. Already, U.S. officials are concerned by the more than 10,000 Iraqi Republican Guard troops that broke off their retreat north from the Kuwaiti border late last week.
Coping with the Iraqi threat will not be cheap. Secretary of Defense William Perry estimates the cost of the current emergency deployment at between $500 million and $1 billion, and administration officials are pondering the need to leave substantial forces in place for an indefinite period. Even with much of the tab being picked up by governments in the gulf, Washington and its allies are uncertain how to mount a more viable defense against Hussein's military potential. Some governments still worry about crippling Iraq -- and thus aiding Iran. But everyone is reluctant to create a large garrison in Kuwait or to use the forces there pre-emptively.
Meanwhile, the incentives to set a schedule for lifting the embargo will not fade. No government likes Saddam Hussein, but lots of governments intend to get rich off him, and they can do that only after Baghdad has resumed raking in its estimated $12 billion to $15 billion a year in oilrevenue. This year, trade delegations from France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Russia, among others, have visited Baghdad. The deals being contemplated by France and Russia alone -- which can be consummated only after the oil embargo is lifted -- are worth billions. Turkey, usually the staunchest of American allies, has also been agitating for a return to business as usual. Turkish government estimates put losses to trade and tourism resulting from the gulf war and its aftermath at around $19 billion.
Despite his reckless threat to Kuwait, Hussein can play on the desires of his would-be trading partners. Just last week, United Nations inspectors announced that long-term monitoring of weapons sites in Iraq has begun -- so far with compliance from Baghdad. And in what has become a familiar scene of diplomatic grandstanding, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev jetted into Baghdad to secure a pledge that Iraq would recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and borders in exchange for the removal of sanctions after six months.
No consensus. For the short term at least, the Clinton administration will find sympathy for its hard-line stand against Iraq. "The Russians have their own program," says a senior Clinton adviser. "We don't support negotiating with Iraq about sanctions." But as the memory of Saddam Hussein's latest indiscretion fades, Washington could find itself increasingly isolated, forced to choose between keeping pressure on Iraq and risking serious divisions with its allies.
Similar divisions undermine the Clinton administration's containment policy toward Iran. As with Iraq, U.S. officials believe that Tehran can be coerced into better behavior -- both in the gulf region and with regard to terrorism. And as with Iraq, critics in European capitals are skeptical of the
