Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0374/03742.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 26KB | 422 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03742}
$Pretitle{289}
$Title{Tunisia
Chapter 5C.   Military Structure and Training}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Frederick Ehrenreich}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
united
states
tunisia
air
tunisian
training
army
defense
equipment}
$Date{1986}
$Log{Figure 13.*0374202.scf
Figure 14.*0374203.scf
}
Country:     Tunisia
Book:        Tunisia, A Country Study
Author:      Frederick Ehrenreich
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1986

Chapter 5C.   Military Structure and Training

     Although Bourguiba served as the commander in chief of the armed forces
and remained the final arbiter on all major decisions, in the mid-1980s his
day-to-day influence over the military was limited. The National Defense
Council under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mzali appeared to take a more
active role in assessing security threats and directing the security forces.
In addition to the prime minister, the council also included Minister of
National Defense Slaheddine Baly, as well as the ministers of foreign affairs,
finance, and interior (a spot also held by Mzali in 1985). Its staff work was
directed by an ANT officer, army Colonel Abdel Massid Fehri in 1985.

     The council had originally been formed in 1970 to provide counsel on the
"application of the [security] policy defined by the President of the
Republic," but by the early 1980s it had ceased to operate. It was recreated
by presidential decree after the January 1984 riots to improve coordination
between the military and the forces under the authority of the Ministry of
Interior. Observers noted, however, that the reemergence of the council gave
the prime minister more influence and undercut the power and independence of
the minister of national defense, who was not considered to be a close
political ally of Mzali.

     The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for transmitting policy
decisions to the uniformed services as well as for administrative, logistical,
and personnel matters. In late 1985 the position of ANT chief of staff,
generally filled by the senior ANT officer, had been vacant since Major
General Fariq Abdel Hamid el Chiekh was transferred to become ambassador to
Sudan in 1984. The chief of staff normally did not command troops but served
as a policy coordinator among the three services and as the preeminent
military adviser to the minister of national defense. It appeared that, with
the reestablishment of the National Defense Council, the need for the position
had lessened.

     The Ministry of National Defense also included chiefs of staff for each
of the three services, but, rather than acting as a unified general staff,
each was considered to be the commander of his respective service. General
Muhammed Said el Kateb, who was the senior active ANT officer in 1985, served
as the inspector general of the armed forces. Under the authority of the
minister of national defense, he was responsible for ensuring discipline and
efficiency in all military units. Other elements of the general staff
organization were charged with carrying out the plans involving budgeting,
logistics, and various administrative support functions of their assigned
areas of responsibility.

Army

     Under the command of its chief of staff, General Youssef Baraket in 1985,
the army was the largest and most developed branch of the armed forces. With a
manned strength of 30,000 (of whom 26,000 were conscripts), the army was
gradually continuing the expansion that had increased its size by two-thirds
since 1979. More important, its units were absorbing new equipment that, it
was hoped, would significantly improve the force's effectiveness.

     According to The Military Balance, 1985-1986, published by the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the army was
tactically organized much as it had been in the late 1970s. At the core were
two combined arms brigades (each of which included one armored battalion and
two mechanized infantry battalions), one so-called paracommando brigade of
elite troops, and the Sahara Brigade headquartered in Remeda that was trained
to operate in the arid areas of the south. In addition to these units, which
had been in existence for more than a decade, the army also included one newly
formed armored reconnaissance regiment, one regiment of field artillery, one
so-called antitank regiment, two air defense regiments equipped with
antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles, and an engineer regiment.

     Although the army had undergone only slight organizational changes, the
infusions of manpower and equipment received in the early 1980s were thought
to have filled out what had long been an undermanned and ill-equipped force.
Most striking was the addition to the armored units of over 50 M-60A3 tanks
and 14 older but equally capable reconditioned M-48A5 tanks from the United
States. Other newly acquired armored vehicles included a large complement of
M-113 armored personnel carriers, some of which were armed with TOW anti-tank
missiles. Artillery had been upgraded by the acquisition of new weaponry, and
the force's air defense capabilities had been vastly improved by the addition
of relatively sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems purchased from
Sweden and the United States (see table 12, Appendix).

     In earlier times Tunisian soldiers had an excellent fighting record, as
demonstrated by their service in the French army before independence, but the
modern army has been largely untested. The battalions that assisted in the UN
peace-keeping forces in the Congo in the early 1960s saw little, if any,
combat action. Similarly a cease-fire was declared during the Arab-Israeli
June 1967 War before the symbolic contingent of army troops Bourguiba offered
to the Arabs could be committed. The small military contingent contributed by
Tunisia to the Arab cause in the October 1973 War with Israel may have gained
valuable experience in terms of wartime planning, military deployment, and
logistical support, but these forces did not gain combat experience.

     In the 1970s and 1980s the army saw more action in internal security
situations, where its record was mixed. The army was deployed in the Gafsa
crisis of 1980 to put down the Libyan-supported insurgents. Although it was
successful in the operation, shortcomings were pointed out by the army's delay
in deploying troops to Gafsa and their difficulty in overwhelming some 60
rebels. Similarly, when it was used in support of the police in the major
civil disturbances of 1978 and 1984, the army turned in a successful, but
flawed, performance. Untrained in crowd control, the troops on both occasions
used what observers considered to be excessive force to put down
demonstrators. Reportedly, ANT officers and conscripts alike resented their
role in these situations where their enemies were not foreign invaders but
fellow countrymen.

Air Force

     In the 1980s the air force was receiving new equipment and training to
enable it to more adequately perform its principal missions. As the sole
operator of military aircraft in Tunisia, the air force was responsible for
the aerial defense of national territory, close air support of the army, air
transport for the army and the police, and assistance to the navy in air-sea
rescue operations. Under the command of Brigadier General Abdel Hamid el
Farhi, who assumed the position of air force chief of staff in 1985, the force
had a personnel strength of some 2,500, about 500 of whom were conscripts.

     The last of the ANT elements to be established (in 1960), the air force
has since received valuable assistance from a variety of Western sources. It
commenced operations with the arrival of 15 Saab primary trainers and a
contingent of instructors from the Swedish air force. In the mid-1960s a
limited French training program coincided with the delivery of several
French-built light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In 1966 the Italians
provided, along with training, eight Aerm