Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0374/03741.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 33KB | 513 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03741}
$Pretitle{289}
$Title{Tunisia
Chapter 5B.   Military Tradition, Development, and Philosophy}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Frederick Ehrenreich}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
french
tunisian
defense
officers
national
government
tunisia
bourguiba
forces}
$Date{1986}
$Log{}
Country:     Tunisia
Book:        Tunisia, A Country Study
Author:      Frederick Ehrenreich
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1986

Chapter 5B.   Military Tradition, Development, and Philosophy

     Contemporary Tunisian society reflects little of the military tradition
that permeates the national life of the other Maghribi countries. Many
scholarly observers have attributed this anomaly partly to legacies of the era
before Tunisia's protectorate period and to experiences encountered during the
75 years of French domination. Political scientist Jacob C. Hurewitz has also
pointed to changes that have occurred within the society, including the
virtual disappearance of traditional Berber culture (see The Social System,
ch. 2). Thus Bourguiba and the PSD have not had to depend on the leverage of a
preeminent military establishment to settle internal disputes between
contending ethnic or regional groups as have leaders in other developing
countries. Neither has it required military help in unifying the large
homogeneous population behind the goals and aspiration that Bourguiba and his
political elite have upheld as national objectives. Even so, the national life
of the country has not been entirely devoid of military experience.

Early Development

     While under French control, Tunisia served France as an important source
of manpower. After establishing the protectorate, the French, under a beylical
decree in 1883, were granted the authority to recruit local Muslims for the
purpose of forming mixed French-Muslim military units. By 1893 all Muslim
males in Tunisia became subject to military duty, although it was possible
for those chosen for service to provide substitutes as long as induction
quotas were fulfilled. As a result, most of the recruits came from the poorer
classes of Tunisian society, and illiteracy was the norm among them.
Conscripted Muslim Tunisians were required to serve for three years, as were
French settlers, who were subject to the conscription laws of metropolitan
France.

     To assist in the pacification effort throughout the Maghrib, the
French-as they had done in Algeria-formed Muslim infantry regiments of
tirailleurs (riflemen) and spahis (cavalry) in Tunisia. In the late nineteenth
century some of these units joined with their Algerian counterparts in aiding
the French in military conquests south of the Sahara. Muslim Tunisian soldiers
also formed regiments in the Foreign Legion and served in southern Tunisia as
meharistes (camel corpsmen). Although Muslims served in all branches of the
French army, strict segregation was normal. Few Tunisian soldiers-unless they
were naturalized French citizens-were able to become officers, and of those
only a small number rose beyond the rank of captain. In mixed units Muslim
officers were not permitted command authority, and none were given high-level
staff positions anywhere in the French military organization. The infantry and
cavalry units were strictly divided on ethno-religious grounds; Muslim
soldiers served under the command of French officers and noncommissioned
officers (NCOs). More equality existed in artillery units, where Muslim
soldiers were assigned as drivers as the French served as gunners. Most of the
transportation corps consisted of Muslims under French command.

     Although recruited chiefly for military service in Africa, Tunisian
members of the French army were liable for service abroad and served with
courage and distinction in such divergent spots as France and Indochina. It
has been estimated that of the approximately 75,000 Tunisians who served
France during World War I, some 50,000 experienced combat in the trenches on
the western front, where they suffered a high casualty rate. Before France
collapsed under the onslaught of Hitler's troops in World War II, many
Tunisian soldiers and their counterparts from Algeria and Morocco were sent to
Europe to aid the French in their fight against the Germans. As part of
Hitler's June 1940 armistice agreement that accompanied German occupation,
France was permitted to retain 15,000 troops in Tunisia, of which roughly
10,500 were Muslims. After Allied successes in the fight to liberate North
Africa in 1943, Tunisian and other North African soldiers saw action in the
Italian campaign and the eventual liberation of France.

     After World War II the rise of Tunisian nationalism and the emergence of
sporadic guerrilla warfare directed against French interests heralded the
quest for independence (see Toward Independence, ch. 1). From early 1952
Tunisian guerrilla bands enjoyed considerable popular support and conducted
operations primarily in the south. Their activities consisted mainly of acts
of sabotage and coercion against the French community as well as against
Tunisians who sympathized with the French authorities. The Tunisians involved
in these demonstrations of militancy were labeled fellaghas (rebels) by the
French press. As a result of an intense counterinsurgency campaign waged
against them by the Foreign Legion, the fellaghas sought refuge in the central
and southern mountains, buying time and increasing their strength and support
from muslims who resented French administrative policies and practices.
Although the fellaghas were able to strike occasionally against French
authority, they were never able to muster a unified and cohesive force. It has
been estimated that their strength never exceeded 3,000 men. By early 1956
most of their bands were deactivated as an act of cooperation aimed at
enhancing the prospects of independence.

     In April 1956 the French transferred responsibility for Tunisia's
internal security to the new Tunisian government, including indigenous
elements of the police services that had operated under French control
during the protectorate era. The new Tunisian government used them to track
down militants connected with nationalist leader Ben Youssef, who challenged
Bourguiba's leadership of the Neo-Destour Party and the country. Some of the
agitators of this group were arrested, tried, and sentenced as an example of
the government's intention to ensure a climate of acceptable public order for
its development goals. Despite these efforts, however, the Youssefist threat
was controlled only with the force of large-scale operations by the French
army three months after Tunisian independence.

     In the matter of responsibility for defense-and the building of a
national military establishment-the transfer of authority was more difficult.
To support its activities in suppressing the revolution in neighboring
Algeria, the French government sought to maintain its military presence in
independent Tunisia, espousing the notion that both countries would share in
the new state's external defense needs. This form of interdependence, however,
drew a less than sympathetic response from Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour
Party hierarchy. It was only after long months of negotiations that in June
1956 the French government, beset with greater concerns for the Algerian
conflict, agreed to assist Tunisia in the formation of its own military arm.

     The nucleus of the new military force-the ANT-consisted of roughly 1,300
Muslim Tunisian soldiers, who were released from the French army, and some
600 ceremonial troops of the beylical guard, which the French had permitted
the Tunisian bey to retain as a personal bodyguard throughout the protectorate
era. These sources of military personnel were supplemented by volunteers-loyal
party youth and politically reliable fellaghas of the earlier resistance
movement. Key officer and NCO positions were filled by personnel carefully
selected by the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party. Many of