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$Unique_ID{COW03255}
$Pretitle{241}
$Title{South Korea
Chapter 5C. Conditions of Service: Pay and Benefits}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{united
states
south
defense
military
korean
forces
korea
air
plan}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country: South Korea
Book: South Korea, A Country Study
Author: Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1981
Chapter 5C. Conditions of Service: Pay and Benefits
Before 1961 military service had been considered a patriotic duty rather
than a professional career, and pay scales had been held to a token level.
Corruption often resulted as service members were forced to seek other sources
of income. Since 1961, however, regular salary increments have improved the
financial status of service members (see table 8, Appendix).
Paratroopers, medical officers, and professors at the KMA, among others,
were entitled to extra monthly allowances. Periodic pay increases kept wages
in line with inflation. Minimal health care was provided, but housing,
exchange, and commissary privileges were negligible.
A pension system administered by the Ministry of National Defense was
open to all service members who had volunteered for long-term service,
generally covering career officers and soldiers above the rank of sergeant.
Service members and the state each contributed to the fund. Benefits included
retirement pensions, lumpsum retirement allowances, disability pensions, and
survivor and disaster compensation. Because of a high rate of retirement in
the late 1970s the fund had to be augmented by assessments on active duty
personnel.
Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
The rank and grade structure of the three services corresponded, with
minor exceptions, to that of the United States as did the correlation between
rank and responsibility (see fig. 20). Service uniforms also resembled those
of the United States forces in color and style. Servicemen wore a summer
uniform of denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore a
more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned officers of the army and
air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top; navy noncommissioned officers wore
the United States-type seaman's blouse. Officer uniforms were similar to those
worn by officers of the United States forces.
Defense Spending
During the 1971-81 period defense spending increased an average of 12.5
percent annually, in real terms (see fig. 16). Rapid development of the
economy made this remarkable rise possible. Changes in the alliance between
South Korea and the United States, especially in South Korean perceptions of
that relationship, helped to spark the specific programs that resulted in the
steady rise.
In 1971 after the United States withdrew the Seventh Infantry Division
(leaving the Second Division in place), South Korea and the United States
began a five-year modernization program designed to make the South Korean
armed forces more militarily independent. Total funding for the plan was
budgeted at US $5 billion, of which US $1.5 billion was to be financed through
United States military assistance. (The United States' contribution was
actually fulfilled one year late in 1977 because of inflation and other
constraints.) The plan included improvements in ground forces and artillery
plus acquisition of surface-to-air HAWK anti-aircraft missiles.
In 1975 Park ordered his Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a five-year
multiproject plan to increase the ability to defend the nation to the point
where the United States would supply only logistical support. This Force
Improvement Plan was to be financed totally by Seoul. Many attributed the
decision to initiate the ambitious plan to South Korea's insecurity over the
quality of the United States commitment following the fall of Saigon in April
1975.
To finance the Force Improvement Plan, projected to cost over US $5
billion, the government imposed a National Defense Tax on imports, personal
earnings, and various other sources of income. By 1980, after adjusting for
inflation, defense spending had risen 213 percent over 1975 levels; South
Korea was devoting over 6 percent of its GNP to defense as compared with 4.6
percent in 1975. The Force Improvement Plan served as a working outline and
was revised several times to reflect changing requirements. In 1979 it was
extended a sixth year to cover 1981.
The Force Improvement Plan included some 130 items, principal among which
were increases in numbers of tanks and antitank weapons, artillery, naval
craft, and combat units and improvement of air defense capabilities. Special
attention was directed to expanding defense industries in order to decrease
dependence on foreign (predominantly United States) sources of supply, and, as
grants from that source continued to decrease, to reduce the amount of foreign
exchange spent on weaponry. In 1972 only military clothing and small arms had
been produced domestically, but by 1980 the government had established defense
industries to produce, among other things, artillery pieces, rocket launchers,
helicopters, military vehicles, and communications equipment. Plans were made
to assemble fighter planes and to increase the capacity to refit equipment
such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. More and more parts were being
manufactured in South Korea rather than bought abroad and assembled locally.
It was estimated that by the early 1980s the country would be able to supply
all of its own military equipment except for advanced, high technology
electronic equipment and fighter aircraft. Government policy was to limit
defense production to 30 percent of any company's business in order to secure
a diversified supply of military materiel.
In 1980 plans were proceeding for a second Force Improvement Plan to
cover the years 1982-86. This plan would emphasize continued investment in
areas covered by the first. In addition increased attention would be paid to
antisubmarine warfare, reserve munitions, and modern tactical aircraft. The
plan would also include funding for the thirty-six F-16 aircraft to be
purchased from the United States.
Government officials were hopeful in 1981 that the base for the nation's
defense industries could be used to generate foreign exchange through
development of arms exports. Both Asia and Africa were viewed as potential
markets. South Korean products, modeled on United States design and
technology, were both efficient and competitively priced. As of 1981 only a
minor role as arms exporter had developed-South Korea sold fast patrol boats
to India and Indonesia and small arms and ammunition to various countries.
Foreign Military Assistance
The nation's sole source of foreign military assistance in 1981 was the
United States. Aid was based on the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, under which
the United States recognized its interests in the security of South Korea and
was granted the right to maintain ground, air, and naval forces "in and about"
the nation.
The 1954 treaty did not obligate the United States to maintain forces and
bases in South Korea, however, nor did it guarantee United States aid except
in the event of an external attack on South Korea, in which case the United
States would act in accord with its "constitutional provisions" to meet the
danger such an attack would pose. These limits on formal obligations of the
United States to the maintenance of South Korean security were cause for
concern for some South Koreans in the 1970s.
Although the role of foreign military assistance could not be discounted
in the development of a modern military establishment, by 1981 such aid played
a very diminished role in national defense. The most significant form
consisted of the deterrent value of United States troops stationed in the
nation. Grant aid, which had once played a dominant role in sustaining and
developing the military, accounted for less than 1 per