$Unique_ID{COW03255} $Pretitle{241} $Title{South Korea Chapter 5C. Conditions of Service: Pay and Benefits} $Subtitle{} $Author{Melinda W. Cooke} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{united states south defense military korean forces korea air plan} $Date{1981} $Log{} Country: South Korea Book: South Korea, A Country Study Author: Melinda W. Cooke Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 5C. Conditions of Service: Pay and Benefits Before 1961 military service had been considered a patriotic duty rather than a professional career, and pay scales had been held to a token level. Corruption often resulted as service members were forced to seek other sources of income. Since 1961, however, regular salary increments have improved the financial status of service members (see table 8, Appendix). Paratroopers, medical officers, and professors at the KMA, among others, were entitled to extra monthly allowances. Periodic pay increases kept wages in line with inflation. Minimal health care was provided, but housing, exchange, and commissary privileges were negligible. A pension system administered by the Ministry of National Defense was open to all service members who had volunteered for long-term service, generally covering career officers and soldiers above the rank of sergeant. Service members and the state each contributed to the fund. Benefits included retirement pensions, lumpsum retirement allowances, disability pensions, and survivor and disaster compensation. Because of a high rate of retirement in the late 1970s the fund had to be augmented by assessments on active duty personnel. Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia The rank and grade structure of the three services corresponded, with minor exceptions, to that of the United States as did the correlation between rank and responsibility (see fig. 20). Service uniforms also resembled those of the United States forces in color and style. Servicemen wore a summer uniform of denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore a more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned officers of the army and air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top; navy noncommissioned officers wore the United States-type seaman's blouse. Officer uniforms were similar to those worn by officers of the United States forces. Defense Spending During the 1971-81 period defense spending increased an average of 12.5 percent annually, in real terms (see fig. 16). Rapid development of the economy made this remarkable rise possible. Changes in the alliance between South Korea and the United States, especially in South Korean perceptions of that relationship, helped to spark the specific programs that resulted in the steady rise. In 1971 after the United States withdrew the Seventh Infantry Division (leaving the Second Division in place), South Korea and the United States began a five-year modernization program designed to make the South Korean armed forces more militarily independent. Total funding for the plan was budgeted at US $5 billion, of which US $1.5 billion was to be financed through United States military assistance. (The United States' contribution was actually fulfilled one year late in 1977 because of inflation and other constraints.) The plan included improvements in ground forces and artillery plus acquisition of surface-to-air HAWK anti-aircraft missiles. In 1975 Park ordered his Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a five-year multiproject plan to increase the ability to defend the nation to the point where the United States would supply only logistical support. This Force Improvement Plan was to be financed totally by Seoul. Many attributed the decision to initiate the ambitious plan to South Korea's insecurity over the quality of the United States commitment following the fall of Saigon in April 1975. To finance the Force Improvement Plan, projected to cost over US $5 billion, the government imposed a National Defense Tax on imports, personal earnings, and various other sources of income. By 1980, after adjusting for inflation, defense spending had risen 213 percent over 1975 levels; South Korea was devoting over 6 percent of its GNP to defense as compared with 4.6 percent in 1975. The Force Improvement Plan served as a working outline and was revised several times to reflect changing requirements. In 1979 it was extended a sixth year to cover 1981. The Force Improvement Plan included some 130 items, principal among which were increases in numbers of tanks and antitank weapons, artillery, naval craft, and combat units and improvement of air defense capabilities. Special attention was directed to expanding defense industries in order to decrease dependence on foreign (predominantly United States) sources of supply, and, as grants from that source continued to decrease, to reduce the amount of foreign exchange spent on weaponry. In 1972 only military clothing and small arms had been produced domestically, but by 1980 the government had established defense industries to produce, among other things, artillery pieces, rocket launchers, helicopters, military vehicles, and communications equipment. Plans were made to assemble fighter planes and to increase the capacity to refit equipment such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. More and more parts were being manufactured in South Korea rather than bought abroad and assembled locally. It was estimated that by the early 1980s the country would be able to supply all of its own military equipment except for advanced, high technology electronic equipment and fighter aircraft. Government policy was to limit defense production to 30 percent of any company's business in order to secure a diversified supply of military materiel. In 1980 plans were proceeding for a second Force Improvement Plan to cover the years 1982-86. This plan would emphasize continued investment in areas covered by the first. In addition increased attention would be paid to antisubmarine warfare, reserve munitions, and modern tactical aircraft. The plan would also include funding for the thirty-six F-16 aircraft to be purchased from the United States. Government officials were hopeful in 1981 that the base for the nation's defense industries could be used to generate foreign exchange through development of arms exports. Both Asia and Africa were viewed as potential markets. South Korean products, modeled on United States design and technology, were both efficient and competitively priced. As of 1981 only a minor role as arms exporter had developed-South Korea sold fast patrol boats to India and Indonesia and small arms and ammunition to various countries. Foreign Military Assistance The nation's sole source of foreign military assistance in 1981 was the United States. Aid was based on the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, under which the United States recognized its interests in the security of South Korea and was granted the right to maintain ground, air, and naval forces "in and about" the nation. The 1954 treaty did not obligate the United States to maintain forces and bases in South Korea, however, nor did it guarantee United States aid except in the event of an external attack on South Korea, in which case the United States would act in accord with its "constitutional provisions" to meet the danger such an attack would pose. These limits on formal obligations of the United States to the maintenance of South Korean security were cause for concern for some South Koreans in the 1970s. Although the role of foreign military assistance could not be discounted in the development of a modern military establishment, by 1981 such aid played a very diminished role in national defense. The most significant form consisted of the deterrent value of United States troops stationed in the nation. Grant aid, which had once played a dominant role in sustaining and developing the military, accounted for less than 1 percent of the nation's 1979 defense expenditures. Aid in the form of training and education was also substantially reduced. National and military command authorities of the United States and South Korea met regularly to discuss changing conditions on the peninsula and to decide on common strategies. Beginning in 1968 Security Consultative Meetings were held yearly, except for 1980. Within the UN Command the United States had always been the predominant element. By 1979 only one platoon of British troops and one squad each of Thai and Filipino troops supported the UN efforts in the nation. Men and Units in United States Forces The United States maintained approximately 37,000 military personnel in South Korea in mid-1981. The primary mission of these forces was to deter a North Korean attack. The forces were intended to provide a margin of strength that would preclude North Korea from calculating that it could benefit from any conflict. The prospect of engaging United States forces stationed both in and out of South Korea was regarded as a strong disincentive for North Korean attack. Should conflict occur and United States forces be committed to South Korea's defense, ground elements would serve as reserve forces for the South Korean Army, while air force units would engage in strategic and tactical combat. The ground component was the largest force, having a strength of approximately 31,000. The principal element within the force was the Second Division stationed north of Seoul at Camp Casey. The division was placed in strategic reserve behind the front lines but on the main invasion corridor leading to Seoul. It would be very difficult for any attacking force to avoid engaging the Second Division. The division was a heavily armed, well-trained, and highly motivated unit. It could make a substantial, if not decisive, contribution to the defense of South Korea, even if other forces were not committed. Most analysts agreed that should the Second Division be attacked it would be very difficult for the president of the United States not to commit extra-peninsular forces to its defense, making the deterrent value of the ground troops far in excess of their actual firepower. United States ground forces were also deployed to both the headquarters of the Combined Forces Command, which oversaw some 500,000 troops, and to the headquarters of the Republic of Korea/United States Field Army, in command of over 185,000 troops. In both positions United States personnel were responsible for strategic guidance and exercised operational command over both South Korean and United States troops. The Second Division was supported by the Nineteenth Support Brigade and the Second Transportation Company. The Thirty-Eighth Air Defense Artillery Brigade provided an air defense system. Its HAWK surface-to-air missiles were the first line of air defense against a preemptive air attack. As of mid-1980 the brigade retained two battalions, both of which were scheduled to be turned over to South Korea, along with the missiles, in the 1980s. The First Signal Brigade, comprising about 3,000 men, operated the highly technical communications and surveillance networks upon which defense of the nation depended. No plans were in effect to release this function to the South Koreans. The 314th Air Division of the United States Air Force was to assist with delivery of close air support and interdiction of North Korean supply routes. Based at Osan, Kunsan, and Taegu, the division flew F-4 Phantoms. Plans called for eighteen F-16s to replace some of the older F-4s in the early 1980s. A squadron of A-10 close air support aircraft was to be deployed at Suwon by mid-1982. The United States Air Force also provided support elements and maintained two air bases in "caretaker" status to receive possible reinforcements from other United States air units stationed in Japan, Okinawa, and on Pacific-based aircraft carriers. As of 1981 contingency plans gave the United States Air Force the major role in the air defense of South Korea. South Korea's air force was considered no match for that of North Korea. A very small United States naval presence was maintained. In case of war, augmentation by the United States Seventh Fleet would be necessary were North Korean submarines to attempt to interdict vital shipping lanes, and these naval personnel performed liaison duties related to that possibility. In 1981 South Koreans continued to hold the perception that existing treaty arrangements made it incumbent upon the United States to employ its forces to aid in the defense of the nation should North Korea attack. In the minds of the South Korean national leadership, as recently as 1977, this did not preclude the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The United States, however, neither confirmed nor denied the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the country. Training A critical element in the development of a modern South Korean military establishment-the role of United States education and training programs-had diminished substantially by 1981. South Korean armed forces conducted their training on lines generally similar to those of the United States military, and the country ran all of its own service training schools independently. At the KMA, for instance, United States officers served only as English instructors. To help fund education of military personnel the United States supplied approximately US $8.5 million through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the 1976-80 period. During that time IMET funds helped defray expenses for 1,405 South Koreans to pursue higher level military education at various service training schools in the United States, including the Army Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Training and technical assistance also played a part in the development of the domestic defense industry. Coproduction contracts for helicopters and aircraft called for United States companies to provide instruction in the use of and development of advanced technology. United States military personnel were assigned to train members of the South Korean Air Force in the use of modern weapons systems. Similar on-the-job training was given to members of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA). To increase combat readiness the two nations engaged in combined training on a daily basis. In addition to this type of low-level integrated training, major exercises were held on a regular basis. In command post exercises, headquarters of both the United States and South Korean forces practiced for wartime contingencies, testing their abilities to coordinate operational concepts. Particular units conducted special exercises to prepare for joint action and to demonstrate readiness to North Korea. In 1978, for instance, after discovery of a third invasion tunnel near P'anmunjom, the two nations held a joint guerrilla warfare exercise to practice repelling a guerrilla invasion. A major joint field training exercise has been held each spring since 1976. Known as "Team Spirit," the exercise gave commanders the opportunity to practice troop-leading procedures on the terrain where they would fight should conflict break out. In 1981 the exercise lasted two months. United States forces were sent to South Korea from Okinawa, Japan, the Philippines, Hawaii, and the mainland of the United States, which provided practice for deployment and logistics support. "Team Spirit 81" included an amphibious assault by United States and South Korean marines and an emergency landing by fighter-bombers and cargo aircraft on a quickly cleared portion of the Seoul-Pusan expressway. While North Korea charged that the exercise was a preparation for war, Seoul viewed "Team Spirit" as providing North Korea with tangible evidence not only of South Korea's armed might but also of the willingness and the ability of the United States to augment South Korean defenses quickly should the need arise. Financial Assistance Under the United States Military Assistance Program (including the excess defense articles program) financial aid to the South Korean military totaled approximately US $5.8 billion between 1950 and 1980. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing added another US $1.2 billion in loans granted with favorable credit terms. This sizeable amount contributed substantially to the growth and development of the South Korean armed forces. In the 1976-80 period, however, grant aid and turnover of excess defense equipment played a diminished role in South Korean defense. Except for 1980, when weapons turnovers were increased to compensate for the then-planned withdrawal of United States ground troops, United States financial military assistance on a grant aid basis dropped steadily; in 1979 it accounted for under 1 percent of total defense expenditures. The FMS financing program, through which the United States furnished credits and guaranteed loans to foreign countries wishing to buy United States-made weapons, did play a part in financing the South Korean defense establishment in the 1976-80 period. Through this program the United States guaranteed loans of over US $1 billion with which Seoul purchased United States military equipment. As of mid-1981 South Korean repayment was regular and on time. In 1981, given the relatively poor economic situation in the nation, FMS credits were believed to provide a significant share of the foreign exchange necessary to develop the armed forces according to plan.