Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0308/03082.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 30KB | 465 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03082}
$Pretitle{251}
$Title{Saudi Arabia
Chapter 5B.   Legal Basis}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Eugene K. Keefe}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{saudi
military
states
united
arabia
saudis
kingdom
personnel
forces
defense}
$Date{1984}
$Log{}
Country:     Saudi Arabia
Book:        Saudi Arabia, A Country Study
Author:      Eugene K. Keefe
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1984

Chapter 5B.   Legal Basis

     The kingdom in early 1984 was not absolute monarchy, but neither was it
constitutional. In many ways it was still much like the patriarchal realm
founded by Abd al Aziz in 1932. Actually, the kingdom is the domain of the
House of Saud. Even the official title of the country denotes that the Saudi
royal family (some 3,000 to 4,000 princes) is predominant in the realm. The
king is the ruler; there is no formal constitution. Faisal, son of the founder
and third ruler of the Saudi dynasty, is quoted as having referred to the
Quran as the country's constitution and the sharia as the law of the land. In
practice, the king, who also acts as prime minister, is assisted by the deputy
and second deputy prime ministers and the entire Council of Ministers, but
the king is the ultimate authority (see The King and the Council of Ministers,
ch. 4). In the tradition established by Abd al Aziz, the king is commander in
chief of the armed forces, including the separate National Guard.

     Although the authority of the king, and the limits on that authority, are
not delineated in any basic written law, the reigning monarch's powers are
limited by the necessity to retain a working consensus within the royal
family, the ulama (religious leaders), the military leadership, and, to some
extent, the senior technocrats. When the throne is vacant, the royal family
chooses a successor, and there have been no uprisings among the people or from
within the military during the successions from Abd al Aziz to Saud to Faisal
to Khalid to Fahd. Under exceptional circumstances the royal family may depose
the king and choose another, as happened in 1964 (see The Politics of
Consultation and Consensus, ch. 4).

Personnel

     Saudi Arabia, a large country with a small population, has felt the
strains of modernization, particularly since about the mid-1960s. The
military, because of the increasing complexity of its arms and equipment, has
had a constantly increasing requirement for higher technical skills in its
ranks. As in many other countries-developing or developed-competition for
technicians has been very high among all sectors of the rapidly modernizing
economy, and, for the military, retaining trained technicians has been
difficult. Since the establishment of the kingdom, the Saudis have relied on
volunteers to fill the army, navy, and air force ranks. But as the forces grew
in size and complexity during the 1970s, some Saudi officials, as well as
outside observers, expressed the opinion that a system of conscription was
needed to maintain armed forces strength at the desired level. Kings Khalid
and Fahd have preferred to retain the volunteer system, and, although in 1984
conscription remained a topic of conversation in the kingdom, it had not been
instituted.

     The government conducted regular advertising campaigns to inform young
Saudi men of the benefits available to them in the armed forces. Recruiting
stations existed throughout the country, and, because of their nationwide
distribution, the three regular services included a representative cross
section of the general population. The National Guard continued to rely on an
old system of tribal levies to fill its ranks which, therefore, have been much
less representative of the nation as a whole. In fact, Guardsmen were levied
from only a few tribes of Najd, supposedly the most trustworthy in the
kingdom.

     The estimated population of 6 million Saudis was considered sufficient to
maintain the desired strength levels of the army, navy, and air force in raw
numbers, i.e., without regard to skill and skill levels required (see
Population, ch. 2). Young men become eligible for military service at age 18;
women are not allowed to serve. The number of males in the 15- to 49-year
age-group in 1983 was estimated at almost 2.2 million, of whom approximately
1.2 million were judged fit for service. An estimated 76,000 reached military
age each year.

     Pay scales in the military were set at levels considered competitive with
civilian employment of comparable skills. Allowances and fringe benefits for
military personnel were considered generous. The government has spent huge
sums of money for the construction of military infrastructure, that is, bases
and facilities to improve the country's defenses, and attention has been paid
to amenities and comfort for personnel in order to increase the attractiveness
of military careers. The so-called military cities that have been constructed
in various parts of the country, or were still under construction in early
1984, included excellent family housing for married officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), as well as modern barracks for unmarried
personnel. The military cities also included convenient mosques, hospitals,
schools, shopping centers, and extensive recreational facilities-in-short, all
of the conveniences available to civilians in major urban centers. Facilities
at the two main naval bases, Jiddah and Al Jubayl, have also been designed
with recruitment and retention of career personnel in mind.

     Career officer ranks were open to any young Saudi male who could meet the
basic requirements. By law the candidate for a commission had to be 18 years
old, a citizen by birth or one naturalized for at least five years, and able
to pass the physical and mental examinations. The candidate also had to be of
good reputation, having neither been subjected to a sharia penalty nor
imprisoned for a felony within five years of the date of his application.

     Because of the advanced technology inherent in the military modernization
programs that were begun in the 1960s and were continuing in the 1980s, large
numbers of expatriate military and civilian personnel have been required to
service and maintain weapons systems and to train Saudi armed forces personnel
in their use. The expansion of the military services, their deployment in
widely separated areas of the large country, the rapid absorption of highly
technical weapons, the low literacy rate of the country at the time the
military modernization began, and the demand from other sectors for trained
personnel were factors having a bearing on the combat readiness of the Saudi
forces. Foreign personnel involved in the training of Saudis continually
remark about the eagerness of the Saudi students and the speed at which they
adapt to new weapons systems; nevertheless, the Saudi armed forces in 1984 had
all they could do to man their tanks, ships, and aircraft, let alone to
service and maintain them and train new personnel in their use. Outside
observers expressed the opinion that the Saudi forces, in order to hold an
acceptable level of combat readiness, would require the services of
expatriate personnel in supporting roles well into the 1990s.

     A point of contention in any discussion of Saudi military affairs in the
early 1980s has been whether or not troop units of foreign armed forces have
been stationed in the kingdom to bolster Saudi forces. Specifically, it has
been reported in various publications that Pakistani units have been deployed
to Saudi Arabia as the result of an agreement between the two governments.
Saudi officials have been vociferous in their denials that such an arrangement
exists or that troop units of any foreign nation serve within the kingdom.

     In a 1981 article in Orbis, Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William O.
Staudenmaier suggested a rationale for a Saudi-Pakistani military
relationship. "Saudi Arabia with its gigantic economic power in the form of
oil revenues is heavily deficient in the trained mil