$Unique_ID{COW03082} $Pretitle{251} $Title{Saudi Arabia Chapter 5B. Legal Basis} $Subtitle{} $Author{Eugene K. Keefe} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{saudi military states united arabia saudis kingdom personnel forces defense} $Date{1984} $Log{} Country: Saudi Arabia Book: Saudi Arabia, A Country Study Author: Eugene K. Keefe Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1984 Chapter 5B. Legal Basis The kingdom in early 1984 was not absolute monarchy, but neither was it constitutional. In many ways it was still much like the patriarchal realm founded by Abd al Aziz in 1932. Actually, the kingdom is the domain of the House of Saud. Even the official title of the country denotes that the Saudi royal family (some 3,000 to 4,000 princes) is predominant in the realm. The king is the ruler; there is no formal constitution. Faisal, son of the founder and third ruler of the Saudi dynasty, is quoted as having referred to the Quran as the country's constitution and the sharia as the law of the land. In practice, the king, who also acts as prime minister, is assisted by the deputy and second deputy prime ministers and the entire Council of Ministers, but the king is the ultimate authority (see The King and the Council of Ministers, ch. 4). In the tradition established by Abd al Aziz, the king is commander in chief of the armed forces, including the separate National Guard. Although the authority of the king, and the limits on that authority, are not delineated in any basic written law, the reigning monarch's powers are limited by the necessity to retain a working consensus within the royal family, the ulama (religious leaders), the military leadership, and, to some extent, the senior technocrats. When the throne is vacant, the royal family chooses a successor, and there have been no uprisings among the people or from within the military during the successions from Abd al Aziz to Saud to Faisal to Khalid to Fahd. Under exceptional circumstances the royal family may depose the king and choose another, as happened in 1964 (see The Politics of Consultation and Consensus, ch. 4). Personnel Saudi Arabia, a large country with a small population, has felt the strains of modernization, particularly since about the mid-1960s. The military, because of the increasing complexity of its arms and equipment, has had a constantly increasing requirement for higher technical skills in its ranks. As in many other countries-developing or developed-competition for technicians has been very high among all sectors of the rapidly modernizing economy, and, for the military, retaining trained technicians has been difficult. Since the establishment of the kingdom, the Saudis have relied on volunteers to fill the army, navy, and air force ranks. But as the forces grew in size and complexity during the 1970s, some Saudi officials, as well as outside observers, expressed the opinion that a system of conscription was needed to maintain armed forces strength at the desired level. Kings Khalid and Fahd have preferred to retain the volunteer system, and, although in 1984 conscription remained a topic of conversation in the kingdom, it had not been instituted. The government conducted regular advertising campaigns to inform young Saudi men of the benefits available to them in the armed forces. Recruiting stations existed throughout the country, and, because of their nationwide distribution, the three regular services included a representative cross section of the general population. The National Guard continued to rely on an old system of tribal levies to fill its ranks which, therefore, have been much less representative of the nation as a whole. In fact, Guardsmen were levied from only a few tribes of Najd, supposedly the most trustworthy in the kingdom. The estimated population of 6 million Saudis was considered sufficient to maintain the desired strength levels of the army, navy, and air force in raw numbers, i.e., without regard to skill and skill levels required (see Population, ch. 2). Young men become eligible for military service at age 18; women are not allowed to serve. The number of males in the 15- to 49-year age-group in 1983 was estimated at almost 2.2 million, of whom approximately 1.2 million were judged fit for service. An estimated 76,000 reached military age each year. Pay scales in the military were set at levels considered competitive with civilian employment of comparable skills. Allowances and fringe benefits for military personnel were considered generous. The government has spent huge sums of money for the construction of military infrastructure, that is, bases and facilities to improve the country's defenses, and attention has been paid to amenities and comfort for personnel in order to increase the attractiveness of military careers. The so-called military cities that have been constructed in various parts of the country, or were still under construction in early 1984, included excellent family housing for married officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), as well as modern barracks for unmarried personnel. The military cities also included convenient mosques, hospitals, schools, shopping centers, and extensive recreational facilities-in-short, all of the conveniences available to civilians in major urban centers. Facilities at the two main naval bases, Jiddah and Al Jubayl, have also been designed with recruitment and retention of career personnel in mind. Career officer ranks were open to any young Saudi male who could meet the basic requirements. By law the candidate for a commission had to be 18 years old, a citizen by birth or one naturalized for at least five years, and able to pass the physical and mental examinations. The candidate also had to be of good reputation, having neither been subjected to a sharia penalty nor imprisoned for a felony within five years of the date of his application. Because of the advanced technology inherent in the military modernization programs that were begun in the 1960s and were continuing in the 1980s, large numbers of expatriate military and civilian personnel have been required to service and maintain weapons systems and to train Saudi armed forces personnel in their use. The expansion of the military services, their deployment in widely separated areas of the large country, the rapid absorption of highly technical weapons, the low literacy rate of the country at the time the military modernization began, and the demand from other sectors for trained personnel were factors having a bearing on the combat readiness of the Saudi forces. Foreign personnel involved in the training of Saudis continually remark about the eagerness of the Saudi students and the speed at which they adapt to new weapons systems; nevertheless, the Saudi armed forces in 1984 had all they could do to man their tanks, ships, and aircraft, let alone to service and maintain them and train new personnel in their use. Outside observers expressed the opinion that the Saudi forces, in order to hold an acceptable level of combat readiness, would require the services of expatriate personnel in supporting roles well into the 1990s. A point of contention in any discussion of Saudi military affairs in the early 1980s has been whether or not troop units of foreign armed forces have been stationed in the kingdom to bolster Saudi forces. Specifically, it has been reported in various publications that Pakistani units have been deployed to Saudi Arabia as the result of an agreement between the two governments. Saudi officials have been vociferous in their denials that such an arrangement exists or that troop units of any foreign nation serve within the kingdom. In a 1981 article in Orbis, Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William O. Staudenmaier suggested a rationale for a Saudi-Pakistani military relationship. "Saudi Arabia with its gigantic economic power in the form of oil revenues is heavily deficient in the trained military manpower and martial spirit necessary to protect itself from internal as well as external threats. The Pakistani armed forces-`the soldiers of Islam'-are first rate fighters, but are constrained by the lack of modern and sophisticated weaponry, as well as a need for a reliable source of income with which to underwrite military modernization." The authors said that such an affiliation was much more than a simple mercenary compact, i.e., Saudi money for Pakistani soldiers. An overriding concern for the two governments was the instability in the general area brought on by the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet inroads in the nearby Horn of Africa. The common desire of staunchly Islamic Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was to protect themselves in a cooperative venture to maintain their own stability. The authors concluded that this special military relationship would be beneficial to both countries and would be strategically important to the United States and the West in general. In The Military Balance, 1983-1984 the International Institute for Strategic Studies states that 10,000 "foreign contract military personnel" serve in Saudi Arabia. However, the Pakistan section of the same publication states that the number of Pakistani military personnel serving in Saudi Arabia was 20,000. Well-informed observers estimated that the higher figure was nearer the mark. Again, the Saudis have denied the reports completely. Foreign Alliances and Influences Saudi Arabia is a charter member of the UN and holds membership in most UN specialized agencies. It is also a charter member of the Arab League. Other affiliations include membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), International Wheat Council, Movement of Nonaligned Nations, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Intelsat, and Organization of the Islamic Conference. The GCC-formed in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-is an economic and defense pact that associates six of the Gulf states to pursue common goals (see Appendix C). The GCC countries held joint military maneuvers-called Shield of the Peninsula, or Dir al Jizara-in the UAE during October 1983 in which units of the armed forces of each member country participated under joint command. The object of Shield of the Peninsula was announced as the bringing together of the GCC Rapid Deployment Force to test its reaction time and capabilities. In later critiques of the exercises, the various chiefs of staff expressed satisfaction in this first joint field exercise of the GCC forces. Obviously, the political and military leaders of the six countries were concerned about the Iran-Iraq War and the threats of Iranian and Iraqi leaders to spread the hostilities beyond their own gulf littorals and possibly to close the Strait of Hormuz. The October maneuvers and projected future joint exercises were intended to demonstrate GCC preparedness and resolve. Until the 1930s Abd al Aziz, concerned with conquest and the reestablishment of the House of Saud on the peninsula, showed little interest in developing armed forces for national defense, relying instead on British support and diplomacy. After the establishment of the kingdom, the clash with Yemen in the early 1930s, and the discovery of oil, the Saudi king recognized the need for a standing army and sought assistance from Britain, Egypt, and the United States. By the mid-1940s the Saudis were relying more on the United States than on any other country, mostly because of the successful relations between Saudi officials and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). For the first three decades of its existence as a kingdom, that is, during the reigns of kings Abd al Aziz and Saud, Saudi Arabia gave little thought to, and spent only nominal sums on, defense. That changed with involvement in the Yemeni civil war of the early 1960s, when the need for national defense became apparent to the leadership. The Saudis had to depend on foreign assistance for armaments, military training, and the construction of facilities because of the small population and the lack of earlier training of the manpower pool. Under Faisal the long buildup of defense forces and infrastructure was emphasized, and the long-standing military relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States was particularly fostered. From 1947 through 1980 Saudi Arabia spent approximately US$56 billion on American goods and services, of which over 60 percent, or some US$34 billion, was spent on armaments, military construction, and military services. At least one-half of the military expenditures were made in the 1970s. Because of the October 1973 War, the subsequent oil embargo, and the huge rise in income because of oil price rises, the Saudis began to spend large sums on the equipping and training of the armed forces. In the 1980s it became common to read about multibillion-dollar arms deals contracted between Saudi Arabia and the United States or France, as well as deals with several other countries involving hundreds of millions of dollars. The first United States military mission of any consequence arrived in Saudi Arabia in July 1943, but the first significant mutual defense agreement was not formalized until June 18, 1951. Saudi Arabia was then included in the countries served by the Military Assistance Program (MAP). As a result of the 1951 agreement, a United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) arrived for duty in the kingdom in 1953 to begin a mission that operated successfully for more than three decades and remained active in 1984. (Similar missions in other countries were usually known as Military Assistance and Advisory Groups [MAAGS], but the Saudis objected to the term assistance; therefore, the name of that particular mission was changed to USMTM. Despite the name change, the mission of the USMTM remained the same, that is, to provide assistance to the Saudi armed forces, which it did until the late 1960s. During the reign of Saud, the government was continually faced with large budget deficits despite increasing oil revenues. During the reign of Faisal, the country was put on a better economic footing and has since paid for all of its military imports and services. Although Britain, France, and the United States have been the leading suppliers of arms and military equipment, several other countries have also been involved in the lucrative Saudi arms trade. The first major upsurge in Saudi military development-in the purchases of arms and equipment and contracts for training-came in 1964 after Saud had been deposed and Faisal had become king. In the succeeding two decades, using the services of the USMTM, as well as British and French training missions, the Saudi kings have modernized their armed forces (including the National Guard) and have overseen the building of an extensive military infrastructure. In short, a credible military force has been developed. Three groups have been involved in the implementation of United States-Saudi military agreements; the United States Department of Defense (particularly the United States Army Corps of Engineers), private subcontractors to the United States government, and private American corporations that have been awarded contracts directly by the Saudi government. American citizens, both military and civilian, have performed important functions in the development of the national defense organizations in Saudi Arabia. The Corps of Engineers has been particularly influential in Saudi military development projects for more than 30 years, beginning with its overseeing the construction of the Dhahran Air Base and the Dhahran Civil Air Terminal during the 1950s. The mission of the Corps of Engineers is to provide engineering and construction management services to Saudi military agencies, but it has also been involved in other than military programs, such as the development of radio and television facilities for the Ministry of Information and the Jiddah flood relief program of the mid-1970s. Ongoing programs in 1984 that the Corps of Engineers was overseeing, and the years in which they began, included the Engineer Assistance Agreement, 1965; the Saudi Ordnance Corps Program, 1966; the Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), 1972; the National Guard modernization program, 1972; Peace Sun II, 1979; and Peace Hawk VII, 1979. Peace Sun has dealt with the training of personnel for the operation and maintenance of the F-15s that had been ordered. Peace Hawk has been concerned with the modernization of the air force through the acquisition and incorporation of F-5 squadrons and has been run primarily by the Northrop Corporation, the American manufacturer of the F-5. In its construction management service to the Saudi Arabian government, the Corps of Engineers oversees projects not only of the American contractors working in the kingdom but also those of third country contractors. Over the many years of the United States-Saudi Arabian military relationship, the Saudis, in addition to becoming more proficient in training their own personnel, have also awarded direct contracts to American corporations for training functions as well as for construction and maintenance of facilities. Such direct contracts, which were intended to reduce the necessity for large numbers of American military personnel to be involved in training, placed that role in commercial channels selected by the United States Department of Defense under the Foreign Military Sales Act. One of the major contracts under this program was awarded to Vinnell Corporation for US$77 million to train National Guard units and construct National Guard facilities. In March 1976 a US$1.5 billion contract-the initiation of Peace Hawk-was awarded to the Northrop Corporation for training, maintenance support of aircraft, and construction of facilities for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF); it was probably the most substantial agreement concluded up to that time. Such major contracts, plus numerous smaller ones, were designed to modernize every aspect of the Saudi national defense system; as a side effect they strengthened the close ties that existed between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Although those relations remained intact during the October 1973 War, the strain brought on by the war was apparent to both sides. Saudi Arabia feared a halt of American arms deliveries, and the United States feared an oil embargo. As a result of the tension, then secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger and Prince Fahd (later crown prince and king) met in Washington in June 1974 to prepare and sign the document that established the Joint Commission on Security Cooperation (JCSC). The meeting of the JCSC later that year to assess the Saudi security needs for the 10-year period beginning in 1975 resulted in a buildup of Saudi defenses that surpassed even the major strides of the previous 10 years. The United States has no formal treaty commitment to Saudi Arabia, but every president since World War II has acknowledged the importance of the kingdom to the strategic interests of the United States. The largest arms transaction in the history of the American-Saudi relationship was the so-called AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sale of 1981. The package consisted of five E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, 202 specialized auxiliary fuel tanks for F-15 aircraft, six Boeing 707 aerial refueling tanker aircraft (with an option for two additional), and 1,177 AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Included in the contract were spare parts, support equipment, and contractor-provided logistics, maintenance, and training for a three-year period. Because the contractor support would probably be required well beyond the initial three years, it was expected that the eventual total cost would be considerably higher than the initial US$8.5 billion. The Saudis first expressed interest in acquiring AWACS aircraft when the United States Air Force E-3As were deployed to the kingdom in 1979 after the Saudis expressed concern that the Yemeni hostilities might spread across their borders. Senior Saudi officials were very favorably impressed with the capabilities of the surveillance aircraft, and in 1980, when they became concerned about the spread of the Iran-Iraq War, they requested that the AWACS again be deployed to the kingdom. Four E-3As, manned by Americans, have operated out of Riyadh's main airport since that second deployment, but the Saudi leadership became convinced that they needed their own AWACS capability and the F-15 enhancement to defend properly their own country. For the Saudis the purchase request became a test of the firmness of the relationship, but for the Americans it became a political nightmare as Israel and its supporters in the United States raised strenuous objections to the sale. After many congressional investigations and hearings, the sale package was carried over from President Jimmy Carter's administration to President Ronald Reagan's administration, which, after further investigation, gave its approval in late 1981. Delivery of the AWACS aircraft was scheduled for 1985. During the AWACS investigations and hearings in 1981, the evolving "special relationship" between Saudi Arabia and the United States was described in a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. Introducing the report, the authors stated: The United States and Saudi Arabia have established a special relationship, which had its genesis in the major role of U.S. companies in the development of Saudi petroleum resources in the 1930s. More recently, the relationship had been fostered by government to government assistance and cooperation. It has become apparent that officials in the governments of both countries consider that the preservation and enhancement of this relationship could provide a basis for resolving political, security, economic, and energy issues facing the United States and Saudi Arabia. From the U.S. perspective, decisions on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government potentially affect the U.S. balance of payments, the future of the dollar, the U.S. and world energy equation, the rate of world economic recovery, U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, and the objective of an overall resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The primary concern of the United States in maintaining the special relationship with Saudi Arabia has been to check the spread of Soviet influence in that general area of the world and the consequent threat to Middle East oil. In addition to those dangers, the Saudis perceive other threats. When Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger visited his Saudi counterpart in 1982, Minister of Defense Sultan and the ranking Saudi generals rated Israel and Iran as the principal threats to Saudi Arabia, and then the Soviet Union. The Saudis have always been conscious of the Soviet threat, and the royal family remains inherently anticommunist; nevertheless, because of proximity, the perceived threats from Israel and Iran appeared larger. The Saudis also state frankly and often that they do not want the Arabian Peninsula to become an arena of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union, and for that reason the number of American military personnel stationed in the kingdom has always been limited. Although the United States has been the dominant foreign influence in the post-World War II development of the Saudi military establishment, the kingdom has regularly awarded contracts to other governments or to private corporations in other countries in order to avoid complete dependence on a single supplier. Britain and France have been the other two major recipients of Saudi contracts for military development, that is, for weapons and equipment, maintenance, training, and construction of facilities. Other countries having personnel working in the country on military contracts in 1984 included Italy, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). After a visit to Spain by Sultan in October 1983, it was announced that Spain would supply the Saudi military with some tugboats, armored vehicles, and a number of CN-235 transport aircraft under a US$150 million contract. The CN-235s will be produced as a joint venture of Spain's CASA and Indonesia's PT Nurtanio, which have collaborated on aircraft production since the mid-1970s. Sultan also visited Indonesia in late 1983. In January 1984 it was disclosed in Paris that the French and Saudi governments had signed a US$4.5 billion contract for a mobile antiaircraft missile defense system to guard the Saudi oil fields and other potential target areas. The announcement said that the agreement had been signed by Charles Hernu, French minister of defense, and Abd ar Rahman bin Abd al Aziz, the Saudi deputy minister of defense and aviation. (Abd ar Rahman is another Sudairi brother). The missile system agreed on in negotiations that reportedly covered two years was a version of the Crotale (known as Shahine in Arab countries) mounted on AMX-30 chassis. Historically, this was the largest arms deal negotiated by the French government and was said to have given an important boost to the country's lagging arms industry. Nevertheless, France still ranked third in the world, behind the Soviet Union and the United States, as an exporter of weapons. In 1980 France and Saudi Arabia had agreed on a US$2.5 billion contract for naval ships, installations, and helicopters. During World War II the British, who had been the dominant foreign power in the Middle East for many years, and the Americans coordinated their efforts to professionalize Abd al Aziz' small armed forces. British training missions were active in the kingdom, and some Saudis were sent to Britain for military schooling. After the war the United States took over most of the training and modernization of the Saudi military, but Britain continued to share in the contracts for arms, equipment, and services. For many years, for example, a majority of the Saudi combat aircraft were British Lightnings and Strikemasters; one squadron of Lightnings continued to operate in an interceptor role in early 1984, although it was earmarked for early phaseout. The British have also maintained training missions in the kingdom, some of which continued in 1984. British Aerospace (BAe-formerly the British Aircraft Corporation), makers of the Lightning and Strikemaster aircraft, has had long-standing contracts to provide various services and maintenance to the Royal Saudi Air Force, in addition to which the corporation also operates the King Faisal Air Academy and the Technical Studies Institute. The Saudis continue to be interested in purchasing weapons from West Germany. In particular they have been interested in the possible purchase of Leopard II tanks, which had been a topic of conversation between Crown Prince Fahd and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt during the prince's visit to Bonn in October 1981. West Germany has traditionally exercised tight controls on arms exports and has been reluctant to supply the Leopard II tanks to the Saudis because of strong opposition at home as well as in Israel. Two years later, when Schmidt's successor, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, visited King Fahd, the possibility of a tank deal was the subject of much speculation in the West German, Saudi, and Israeli press, but once again no agreement was reached. If the Saudis were disappointed because of the failure to secure the Leopard IIs, such disappointment was not made public. Fahd later stated that the friendly relations existing between his country and West Germany did not depend on arms deals. A Saudi military delegation "shopping" in West Germany at the end of 1983 was expected to recommend purchase of Gepard self-propelled antiaircraft gun mounts and Marder armored personnel carriers, and analysts believed that the West Germans would be willing to sell those vehicles and weapons. In late 1983 there were reports concerning the possibility of Saudi Arabia developing its own arms industry, but such reports were generally discounted because of the country's chronic shortage of trained technicians. Nevertheless, the idea appealed to some Saudis because arms production would increase Saudi prestige, particularly in the smaller Gulf states. Earlier the Saudis had been involved with Egypt, Qatar, and the UAE in establishing the Arab Military Industries Organization, which became the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), but before it even became productive, the AOI foundered because of Arab anger with Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. The Saudi Arabians withdrew in 1979, but Egypt continued to use the AOI title. Some AOI plans had called for the establishment of a military electronics industry at Al Kharj, about 75 kilometers southeast of Riyadh, but the plans were set aside. Al Kharj, however, is the site of a small defense industry that produces American and West German rifles and machine guns under license. The new impetus toward an arms industry could possibly lead to further production under license or the assembly of aircraft and military vehicles within the kingdom rather than in the countries of origin. Local production or assembly could also reduce the number of foreign professionals and technicians living in the kingdom.