Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0264/02640.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 26KB | 407 lines

$Unique_ID{COW02640}
$Pretitle{357}
$Title{Nigeria
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Robert Rinehart}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{nigerian
nigeria
government
african
military
africa
war
security
french
libyan}
$Date{1981}
$Log{Benin Bronze Statue*0264001.scf
}
Country:     Nigeria
Book:        Nigeria, A Country Study
Author:      Robert Rinehart
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Benin Bronze Statue: Warrior chief of the seventeenth century]

     The state of national security has changed significantly in the two
decades of Nigerian independence. Since the mid-1970s the republic has emerged
as an influential middle power on the world scene, a role that would not have
been possible in its first decade of sovereignty. Paralyzed by political
strife, bloody coups, and civil war, a succession of governments had been
forced to look inward at the immediate problems threatening not only their
rule but also the survival of Nigeria as a political unit. But reduced
political and ethnic strife after the civil war of 1967-70, the strengthening
of the central government, and an influx of oil revenues have allowed Nigerian
leaders to perceive both opportunities and threats to national security
arising beyond national borders.

     Internationally, Nigeria's security policies since independence have been
defined largely by its position as the largest and most powerful state in
Black Africa and by its relative weakness when compared to the superpowers and
European nations interested in Africa. Seeking security by minimizing foreign
influence in Africa and by ameliorating potentially dangerous tensions between
African countries, successive Nigerian governments have aligned their foreign
policies with those of the Organization of African Unity and have avoided
taking sides in conflicts between the superpowers. The character of the
Organization of African Unity relationship gradually changed after the civil
war as Nigeria increasingly has played a leading role within the organization.

     Nigeria's international concerns heightened in 1981 after Libyan troops
intervened in the civil war in neighboring Chad and particularly after the
Libyan and Chadian governments announced an agreement to merge their two
countries. The presence of a well-equipped Libyan military force near the
Nigerian border encouraged the government of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari to
give priority to improvement of national defense capabilities and security
agencies. Modernization of the Nigerian armed forces has been an ongoing
effort since the mid-1970s; the military establishment comprising
approximately 146,000 personnel is the second largest in Black Africa. But
Nigerian servicemen are trained and equipped to standards lower than their
commanders would prefer. Moreover the military's large size is a reflection of
political problems encountered in reducing the army from its civil war
strength of about 250,000 rather than an indication of governmental concern
over threats to national security.

     After nearly fourteen years of military rule, Nigeria gradually achieved
a level of domestic stability and national confidence that in 1979 allowed the
return of an elected civilian government. In 1981 Shagari's administration
appeared to be genuinely popular, but a potential for conflict remained in
Nigerian society. Although the ethnic tensions that defined opposing factions
during the first republic and the civil war years appeared to have dissipated
somewhat, rapid urbanization, extremes of poverty and wealth, and
undereffective internal security forces have contributed to a severe crime
problem and could in the future lead to disruptive political divisions. The
longevity and stability of civilian government will depend to a marked degree
on its ability to deal with these problems.

International Security Concerns

     The range of Nigeria's security concerns has increased since the early
1970s as a result of its expanding international interests and influence, but
some continuity has been evident. The task of defending itself against
external aggression has always been made easier by the fact that the country
is surrounded by much smaller and weaker neighbors reluctant to bring their
disputes with Nigeria to more than occasional border skirmishes. With its
large population and a gross national product (GNP-see Glossary) greater than
that of all other Black African countries combined, Nigeria dominates West
Africa. The weakness of its neighbors, however, provides an opportunity for
stronger non-African countries to exert their influence on regional politics,
which Nigeria regards as a threat to its own national security. These facts of
relative weakness and strength have been a central influence on national
security perceptions and policies since independence from Britain in 1960.

     According to the federal government the country's primary national
interests-defined by former head of state Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo
as sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity-are best served by
limiting the political, economic, and military activities of non-African
powers in Africa. Conscious of its material and military weakness vis-a-vis
the superpowers and Europe and concerned with its own internal divisions,
Nigeria in its first decade of independence aligned its foreign policy closely
with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) but also maintained close ties
with Britain and other Western nations. The diplomatic strength of the OAU
when it acted in concert was one of the few weapons African states were able
to rely on to protect themselves against outside interference. Nigerian
support for the OAU was rewarded during the civil war when the organization's
heads of state, meeting in September 1967 soon after Nigeria's Eastern Region
seceded to form the state of Biafra, "condemn[ed] every act of secession by a
member state." Four African countries-Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and
Zambia-formally recognized Biafra, but general African diplomatic support for
the federal government prevented extensive non-African diplomatic and material
backing for the rebel regime, despite Biafra's political appeal in the United
States and Europe.

     In the 1970s the Nigerian government, boosted by oil revenues-which
increased nearly fifteenfold from 640 million naira (for value of the
naira-Naira-see Glossary) in fiscal year (FY-see Glossary) 1970-71 to 9.37
billion naira in FY 1979-80-hardened its attitude against the influence of
foreign powers on the continent (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). The country's
size, new wealth, and relative domestic peace allowed it to play a leading
role in African affairs. According to former Commissioner for External Affairs
Joseph N. Garba, its activism was "necessitated by the inactivity of the
Organization of African Unity and its agencies." With increasing frequency
since the mid-1970s, various Nigerian officials have called for the formation
of a regional or pan-African military force. But realizing that to a large
extent their country's security and international influence continued to
depend upon the support of other Black African states, Nigerian leaders sought
to avoid antagonizing other Africans unnecessarily and never deviated
significantly from an OAU consensus whenever one existed. Nigeria, as the
largest and most powerful member of the OAU, assumed responsibility for
maintaining OAU principles in public forums and, where practical, in practice.
To this end it vehemently protested (to no avail) the Tanzanian intervention
in Uganda that overthrew Idi Amin's unpopular regime in 1979. For Nigerians
the principle of nonintervention enshrined in the OAU charter and previously
accepted by all Black African states was more important than the particular
circumstances of the Tanzanian invasion. African consensus on acceptable
standards of international behavior for Africans and foreigners has remained
a