$Unique_ID{COW02640} $Pretitle{357} $Title{Nigeria Chapter 5A. National Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Robert Rinehart} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{nigerian nigeria government african military africa war security french libyan} $Date{1981} $Log{Benin Bronze Statue*0264001.scf } Country: Nigeria Book: Nigeria, A Country Study Author: Robert Rinehart Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 5A. National Security [See Benin Bronze Statue: Warrior chief of the seventeenth century] The state of national security has changed significantly in the two decades of Nigerian independence. Since the mid-1970s the republic has emerged as an influential middle power on the world scene, a role that would not have been possible in its first decade of sovereignty. Paralyzed by political strife, bloody coups, and civil war, a succession of governments had been forced to look inward at the immediate problems threatening not only their rule but also the survival of Nigeria as a political unit. But reduced political and ethnic strife after the civil war of 1967-70, the strengthening of the central government, and an influx of oil revenues have allowed Nigerian leaders to perceive both opportunities and threats to national security arising beyond national borders. Internationally, Nigeria's security policies since independence have been defined largely by its position as the largest and most powerful state in Black Africa and by its relative weakness when compared to the superpowers and European nations interested in Africa. Seeking security by minimizing foreign influence in Africa and by ameliorating potentially dangerous tensions between African countries, successive Nigerian governments have aligned their foreign policies with those of the Organization of African Unity and have avoided taking sides in conflicts between the superpowers. The character of the Organization of African Unity relationship gradually changed after the civil war as Nigeria increasingly has played a leading role within the organization. Nigeria's international concerns heightened in 1981 after Libyan troops intervened in the civil war in neighboring Chad and particularly after the Libyan and Chadian governments announced an agreement to merge their two countries. The presence of a well-equipped Libyan military force near the Nigerian border encouraged the government of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari to give priority to improvement of national defense capabilities and security agencies. Modernization of the Nigerian armed forces has been an ongoing effort since the mid-1970s; the military establishment comprising approximately 146,000 personnel is the second largest in Black Africa. But Nigerian servicemen are trained and equipped to standards lower than their commanders would prefer. Moreover the military's large size is a reflection of political problems encountered in reducing the army from its civil war strength of about 250,000 rather than an indication of governmental concern over threats to national security. After nearly fourteen years of military rule, Nigeria gradually achieved a level of domestic stability and national confidence that in 1979 allowed the return of an elected civilian government. In 1981 Shagari's administration appeared to be genuinely popular, but a potential for conflict remained in Nigerian society. Although the ethnic tensions that defined opposing factions during the first republic and the civil war years appeared to have dissipated somewhat, rapid urbanization, extremes of poverty and wealth, and undereffective internal security forces have contributed to a severe crime problem and could in the future lead to disruptive political divisions. The longevity and stability of civilian government will depend to a marked degree on its ability to deal with these problems. International Security Concerns The range of Nigeria's security concerns has increased since the early 1970s as a result of its expanding international interests and influence, but some continuity has been evident. The task of defending itself against external aggression has always been made easier by the fact that the country is surrounded by much smaller and weaker neighbors reluctant to bring their disputes with Nigeria to more than occasional border skirmishes. With its large population and a gross national product (GNP-see Glossary) greater than that of all other Black African countries combined, Nigeria dominates West Africa. The weakness of its neighbors, however, provides an opportunity for stronger non-African countries to exert their influence on regional politics, which Nigeria regards as a threat to its own national security. These facts of relative weakness and strength have been a central influence on national security perceptions and policies since independence from Britain in 1960. According to the federal government the country's primary national interests-defined by former head of state Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo as sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity-are best served by limiting the political, economic, and military activities of non-African powers in Africa. Conscious of its material and military weakness vis-a-vis the superpowers and Europe and concerned with its own internal divisions, Nigeria in its first decade of independence aligned its foreign policy closely with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) but also maintained close ties with Britain and other Western nations. The diplomatic strength of the OAU when it acted in concert was one of the few weapons African states were able to rely on to protect themselves against outside interference. Nigerian support for the OAU was rewarded during the civil war when the organization's heads of state, meeting in September 1967 soon after Nigeria's Eastern Region seceded to form the state of Biafra, "condemn[ed] every act of secession by a member state." Four African countries-Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia-formally recognized Biafra, but general African diplomatic support for the federal government prevented extensive non-African diplomatic and material backing for the rebel regime, despite Biafra's political appeal in the United States and Europe. In the 1970s the Nigerian government, boosted by oil revenues-which increased nearly fifteenfold from 640 million naira (for value of the naira-Naira-see Glossary) in fiscal year (FY-see Glossary) 1970-71 to 9.37 billion naira in FY 1979-80-hardened its attitude against the influence of foreign powers on the continent (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). The country's size, new wealth, and relative domestic peace allowed it to play a leading role in African affairs. According to former Commissioner for External Affairs Joseph N. Garba, its activism was "necessitated by the inactivity of the Organization of African Unity and its agencies." With increasing frequency since the mid-1970s, various Nigerian officials have called for the formation of a regional or pan-African military force. But realizing that to a large extent their country's security and international influence continued to depend upon the support of other Black African states, Nigerian leaders sought to avoid antagonizing other Africans unnecessarily and never deviated significantly from an OAU consensus whenever one existed. Nigeria, as the largest and most powerful member of the OAU, assumed responsibility for maintaining OAU principles in public forums and, where practical, in practice. To this end it vehemently protested (to no avail) the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda that overthrew Idi Amin's unpopular regime in 1979. For Nigerians the principle of nonintervention enshrined in the OAU charter and previously accepted by all Black African states was more important than the particular circumstances of the Tanzanian invasion. African consensus on acceptable standards of international behavior for Africans and foreigners has remained an important component of Nigeria's concepts of its own national security and that of Africa generally. The central point of agreement in the OAU has been opposition to colonialism and white minority governments on the continent. Nigeria's unrelenting hostility toward South Africa-the most powerful and in 1981 sub-Saharan Africa's sole remaining white-ruled state-is based on more than psychological resentments. The perceived military threat posed to Nigeria by South Africa is usually overrated by the Nigerian press because, although it possesses well-trained and -equipped armed forces, South Africa is some 2,000 miles from Nigeria-well beyond the range of its ability to sustain a protracted military operation. But oil facilities-the country's economic life blood-are vulnerably concentrated along the coastline, a situation that led the Nigerian government in the 1970s to expand its navy significantly while the capabilities of the other services remained virtually unchanged. The major threat posed to Nigeria by South Africa thus far has been of a nonmilitary nature. In the view of Nigerian leaders, barely two decades removed from colonialism, continued survival, viability, and international recognition of South Africa's apartheid regime indicates continued international acceptance of racism and colonialism. Relations-especially any official relations-between Black African countries and South Africa would imply a breakdown of the OAU consensus upon which Nigeria bases its leadership role in Africa and, to an extent, its defense against foreign aggression. Since independence Nigeria has considered itself nonaligned in the international confrontation between East and West. It was not until 1967, when the Soviet Union supplied weapons to the federal government in the civil war, that Nigeria consented to more than diplomatic and limited trade relations with Moscow. In pursuing its nonaligned policy, the government in Lagos has maintained good relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union but, to safeguard its independence and influence, has sought to minimize their political involvement on the African continent. French activism in Africa has been since independence a constant source of irritation to Nigerian governments. French nuclear tests in the Sahara caused Nigeria to break diplomatic relations for a period in 1961. All of Nigeria's neighbors are former French colonies, which as a result of their participation in the franc zone have maintained close economic relations with Paris. Several other former French colonies in West Africa still had French military facilities and troops on their soil in mid-1981. French policies threatened Nigeria directly during the civil war when the government of President Charles de Gaulle covertly supplied rebel forces with arms and supplies and all but officially recognized Biafra. Ivory Coast and Gabon, two of France's closest allies in the region, did extend recognition to Biafra, and Ivory Coast granted Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Biafran rebel leader, a home in exile after federal forces triumphed. Since the civil war Nigerian leaders have not trusted France, although the French government under former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing sought to improve diplomatic ties, and French firms led by Peugeot have come to play an important role in Nigeria's manufacturing sector. French military interventions in the late 1970s in African countries-Mauritania, Chad, Zaire (twice), and the Central African Republic-as well as the sale of nuclear reactors and arms to South Africa (officially halted only in 1977) contributed to Nigerian unease over French activities. Nigeria has forcefully made its attitudes toward France known in African and international councils, but French policy, which is based on close ties with sovereign states, and French power dictate that Nigeria must use economic leverage and diplomacy to wean other West African states from French influence. Nigeria is the cofounder and the most powerful member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which, by breaking down trade barriers between its members, was designed to decrease their economic dependence on foreign powers. While cooperating with France in projects to develop the Nigerian economy and-occasionally, with minimum publicity-in the diplomatic realm, Nigeria has sought to assert itself vis-a-vis France as the preeminent power in the West African region in 1981. French-Nigerian concern over Libyan activities in Chad appeared to offer possibilities for increased cooperation between Nigeria and the newly elected socialist government in France. Late in 1980 Libya came to be seen by the Shagari government as a potential threat to Nigerian national security after Libyan forces decisively intervened in the fifteen-year civil war in neighboring Chad, a former French colony (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). Nigerian governments had sought to assist in a solution to the war that would eliminate the need for a 1,200-man French military presence in Chad. To this end Nigeria had cosponsored a series of conferences to form a government of national unity and had sent an ineffective 800-man peacekeeping force to Chad in 1979. Partly because the Libyan intervention displaced French influence in Chad, the Nigerian government's first reaction was one of nonchalance. At an emergency OAU summit held in Lagos to discuss the situation, Nigeria refused to support a "specific and pointed" attack on the Libyan intervention. Although oil-rich Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al Qadhaafi had expressed dreams of forming a greater Saharan Empire, given material support to "terrorist" groups, and purchased large quantities of the latest Soviet equipment for his armed forces, Libya had been seen by the Nigerian government as more of a nuisance than a threat. Libya's distance from Nigeria across 1,500 kilometers of desert, Libyan soldiers' poor performance when they fought unsuccessfully against Tanzanian troops to defend the Amin regime in Uganda, and Nigerians' acceptance of Qadhaafi's opposition to Western involvement in Africa all indicated to Nigeria that Libya was not a threat to her security. The Nigerian government's attitude quickly changed when Libyan involvement was suspected in the bloody religious riots that broke out in the northern Nigerian city of Kano in December 1980 (a suspicion that was later abandoned) and when it was announced in January 1981 that Libya and Chad had agreed to a merger (see Public Order and Internal Security, this ch.). These concerns were heightened by the realization that a Libyan mechanized infantry force of 7,000 to 8,000 men and over fifty tanks had been moved 1,500 kilometers from Libya's southern border and was near Nigeria's northeastern frontier. The Nigerian attitude was probably also influenced by other West African states who saw themselves threatened by Libya and who looked to Nigeria to provide leadership in a period when France was hesitant to act. In early 1981 the Nigerian government expelled Libyan diplomats from Lagos, although it did not officially break diplomatic relations. Both unilaterally and in an OAU-sponsored resolution, Nigeria called upon Qadhaafi to withdraw his force from Chad. The government sent troops into Borno State on the Chadian border and took steps to increase the defense budget, but as of mid-1981 further Nigerian military moves against Libya did not appear to be technically or politically feasible. Libyan troops were firmly entrenched in Chad, and Libyan oil money was able to finance Chadian government operations. Moreover the Shagari government found itself in a position where, by strongly condemning Libyan intervention-which did seem to have ended the civil war-it would be seen by some politically relevant sections of Nigerian opinion to be supporting French "imperialism" in Africa. Although it seemed unlikely that Nigeria would be willing to risk military confrontation with the Libyans in Chad, Qadhaafi's operation defined his regime as a danger to Nigeria in the eyes of the Shagari government. The Armed Forces The Nigerian military establishment in 1981 was making an apparently smooth adjustment to civilian rule after more than thirteen years of governing the country. Although a phased demobilization had brought the military's total personnel strength to about 146,000 from 230,000 in 1976, Nigeria maintained the second largest regular military force in sub-Saharan Africa after Ethiopia. Included in the total was an army of 130,000, an air force of 8,000, and a navy of 8,000. Precise numbers had not been disclosed, and it was unlikely that even the Nigerian high command knew the exact personnel strengths because wages were reportedly being drawn in the name of soldiers who had died or otherwise left the service. Thus it was likely in 1981 that a further "paper reduction" of as many as 10,000 troops would take place when the military's bookkeeping reflected reality. A modernization program designed to increase mobility and striking power in the three services continued into the 1980s. General Development Trends The development of organized military units employing Nigerians began in the second half of the nineteenth century with the formation of several constabularies to extend and consolidate British political and commercial holdings in the area. The first of these constabularies, "Glover's Hausas," was established in 1863 and was composed of former slaves who had sought British protection in Lagos. When the British government assumed direct control over its interest in Nigeria in 1900, the constabularies were reorganized as strictly military units, British trained and led. In 1914, at the time of the amalgamation of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, the separate units were united to form the Nigerian Regiment of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF-see Colonial Nigeria, ch. 1). Before World War I Nigerians fought abroad only once when a force was sent to the Gold Coast (later Ghana) to participate in the British campaign against the Ashanti in 1900. During World War I the regiment took part in the conquest of German-colonized Kamerun (later Cameroon) and later was sent to fight in German East Africa (present-day Tanzania). The performance of Nigerian soldiers in World War I operations earned the praise of their British officers, who were impressed with their determination, discipline, and devotion. During World War II the RWAFF expanded from four to twenty-eight battalions and to a total troop strength of 121,650. Approximately 30,000 Nigerians served abroad during the war. They participated in the campaign against the Italians in the Horn of Africa that restored Emperor Haile Selassie to his Ethiopian throne in 1941. Nigerian troops also saw combat with the 81st and 82nd (West Africa) Divisions in Burma and served with other British units in Egypt, Palestine, Libya, Morocco, and Sicily. Nigerian troops and units were generally praised for their conduct by Allied commanders. Throughout the colonial era the British concentrated recruiting efforts among what they considered the "fighting tribes" of the north, particularly among the Hausa. Colonial enlistment patterns indicate that in all three administrative regions-Northern, Western, and Eastern-the overwhelming number of recruits came from the most remote, poverty stricken areas and included many from minority ethnic groups: the Tiv, the Idoma, and other Middle Belt (see Glossary) peoples. This pattern continued until independence when educated southerners, especially the Ibo, joined the military in greater numbers. In 1958, during the preparation for independence, the RWAFF was transferred from the authority of the War Office in London to the control of the government in Lagos. As a result the Nigerian taxpayer had to take full responsibility for paying the 3-4 million pounds sterling annual cost of the army, but British financial grants eased the transition. "Nigerianization" of the officer corps began in 1949 and continued after independence. The last British battalion commander was replaced in mid-1963, and all staff positions within the army headquarters were Nigerianized in 1964. In 1965, after a delay due to ethnically motivated political controversy, Major General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Ibo, was named commander of the army, completing the transfer of power. After independence the armed forces became a symbol of national pride, and demands for military expansion were made frequently in the press and the legislature. Military spending increased over 70 percent between FY 1962-63 and FY 1965-66. In the early 1960s Nigeria expanded its small naval unit and formed an air force. The navy was originally authorized by the Nigerian Naval Forces Ordinance of 1956 and replaced the Nigerian Marine (coast guard), which had performed antisubmarine and minesweeping services during both world wars. Led at first by British officers who were gradually replaced by Nigerians, the navy developed its capabilities in two planned phases. In the first phase, completed in 1966-67, the navy assumed responsibilities formerly undertaken by the Nigerian Ports Authority: maintenance of the Eastern Protective Sea Patrol, enforcement of customs laws, hydrographic surveying outside the port limits, and operation of a training school for its personnel and those of the merchant marine. These peacetime tasks were performed with a small fleet of coastal patrol boats. During the second phase the navy developed a wartime capability of performing mining, minesweeping, and antisubmarine operations. In addition it protected the fishing industry, carried out rescue services, and assisted the police in maintaining port security. During the period 1961-66 the navy had expanded from a personnel strength of 500 to eighty officers and 820 ratings. The air force, newest of the three services, was formed shortly after independence as a training squadron. Its organization was supervised initially by a mission of the Indian Air Force, which was replaced in 1963 by a training team from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The first Nigerian cadets undertook pilot training in Canada, West Germany, and Ethiopia. The West Germans soon established a primary flight school at Kaduna, and a German also commanded the Federal Nigerian Air Force until 1966. The initial goal of the program was to train 100 Nigerian pilots, fifty ground specialists, and ten aircraft technicians. Equipment consisted of Italian trainers and West German liaison aircraft provided by the Bonn government at regular commercial rates. In 1964 Nigeria allocated 443,000 Nigerian pounds (for value of the Nigerian pound-NP-see Glossary) to expand its air force to 1,000 men, and additional transport aircraft arrived from West Germany. But mounting tensions in the Northern Region caused foreign advisers to be withdrawn, and the program slowed. Reflecting domestic political concerns, efforts were made by the Nigerian government to achieve an ethnically balanced military. After 1958 and before mobilization for the civil war in 1967, enlisted personnel were recruited on a system of regional quotas: 50 percent from the Northern Region (including those from the Middle Belt), 25 percent from the Western Region, and 25 percent from the Eastern Region. In practice northerners exceeded the 50 percent level and westerners were underrepresented. In 1966 the Yoruba, the most numerous group in the Western Region, numbered only 700 men in an army of 10,500. Recruitment in the Northern Region was based on lower educational standards, and northern soldiers generally served in the infantry while those from the Eastern and Western regions were more frequently assigned to technical and clerical positions. In 1961 a quota system was also adopted by the federal government for the officer corps, which was dominated by the Ibo. In 1960 only 14 percent of Nigerian officers were from the north, mainly from the Middle Belt, whereas 65 percent came from the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region. After the introduction in 1961 of a quota system paralleling that for enlisted ranks, northern representation among cadets and junior officers increased and was more closely aligned with the general population. In the rank of major and above, however, other groups continued to outnumber northerners by a ratio of seven to one as late as January 1966. For a time after independence the army maintained an apolitical attitude, partly because of its British heritage and partly because of its preoccupation with strictly military matters. For a period of four years beginning in 1960, two infantry battalions served with distinction supporting United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts in Congo (Leopoldville/Kinshasa, later Zaire), and in 1964 Nigerian units were flown to Tanganyika (later Tanzania) to help maintain order after a coup attempt there. But in Nigeria the acute ethnic and regional rivalries that characterized civilian political groupings soon penetrated the army and destroyed is apolitical ethos. In January 1966 a coup d'etat led by mid-level officers brought to Nigeria a fourteen-year period of military rule marked by further coups and civil war (see Independent Nigeria, ch. 1).